Re: [liberationtech] Bangladesh's new ICT Act and Law

2013-08-20 Thread Md.Rahmatullah Faruque
Dear Hasib Vhai,

Thanks for sharing the new ICT Act- 2013. The new act seems to be
promulgated to strangle the right of expression of a human being. ICT is an
strong instrument to promote and protect human rights but now people will
feel unsafe to express their opinion over political augments lest they are
apprehended.As a development practitioner, I am much worried over the ICT
Act  law.

Faruque


On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Hasib Ahsan hasib.ah...@gmail.com wrote:

 Is Bangladesh going to a new era of Digital Darkness? Freedom of the net
 will not only be questioned but also be punished. According to the new act,
 law enforcement agencies can arrest any person without a warrant.
 Previously we have seen, persons were taken into custody for sharing status
 against political decisions in Social Media and blogs. Now, we might see
 some more from the new act. You can find the news below -

 http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/ominous-draft-cleared-by-govt/

 Thanks

 Hasib

 *Hasib Ahsan*
 *Senior Program and Research Manager *
 *mPower Social Enterprises Ltd.*

 *ICT Head of Operation (Project Manager), *USAID Agricultural Extension
 Support Activity Project (2012-2017)
 *Project Manager, *WaterAid mobile based Programme Management Information
 System (mPMIS)
 *Project Manager, *mLivestock intelligence for Shiree (DFID, UkAid)
 *Senior Program Manager, *iStrategy Limited (Rockefeller Foundation
 e-Health project with GoB)

 *Cell:* +8801711076753
 *Skype:* nadeem_hasib
 *Website:* www.mpower-social.com

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Re: [liberationtech] [Dewayne-Net] Are Hackers the Next Bogeyman Used to Scare Americans Into Giving Up More Rights?

2013-08-20 Thread Shelley
Julian,

If it weren't for the late, great Howard Zinn, I wouldn't have known the extent 
of the USA's egregious crimes in Laos. nbsp;They tend to teach a very 
different version of history here.

Your summation of our present situation is spot-on (if somewhat kinder than my 
own views of the majority of my fellow citizens.)

gt;gt;Up until that point, we have a hostage situation.

It truly feels that way. nbsp;The propaganda here is just awful, and the lack 
of critical thinking skills amongst the general populace makes for a credulous 
lot.

We can but hope these latest disclosures via the brave Ed Snowden will shake 
enough of them from their stupor long enough to stand and take action.

-Shelley


https://prism-break.org/

On Aug 19, 2013 8:28 PM, Julian Oliver lt;jul...@julianoliver.comgt; wrote: 




[...]

OT: Speaking of violence, greetings from Vientiane, Laos, where I'm told to

greet with I'm not an American!. Seems locals are still a bit grumpy about the

70+ civilians killed by U.S. bombs in the Vietnam War. 



There were more bombs dropped here by U.S. (260 million) than all the bombs

dropped in WWII. The U.S. wasn't at war with Laos. 80 million bombs still lie in

the fields, unexploded, and no U.S. gov since the war will help clean up. Few

Americans would know of this. Many won't even know where or what Laos is.



U.S. taxpayers bankrolled that death and suffering. I don't think the majority

of people in the U.S. would be OK with that if transparently given the choice

to do so again today. Americans - generally speaking - aren't a violent

blood-thirsty people. They are however - generally speaking - drunk on national

myths, spun-out on bad news and kept very much out of touch with what their

government (as a group of powerful people) actually does - what it is interested

in, what it wants.



This is why whistleblowing is so very important.  Only in knowledge can a

democracy ever take seed. If, after tangible knowledge of such violence wrought,

(under so and so terms, at such and such cost, with these and these goals)

citizens are /still/ to vote in favour, then sad and terrible that country is.



Up until that point, we have a hostage situation.



Cheers!



-- 

Julian Oliver

PGP B6E9FD9A

http://julianoliver.com

http://criticalengineering.org

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[liberationtech] Cryptocat: Call for Translators. Please Participate!

2013-08-20 Thread Nadim Kobeissi
Dear Libtech,

Echoing Commotion's recent call for translators on this list:

Cryptocat is adding cool new features (and modifying some existing ones) over 
the upcoming weeks, all of which necessitate the translation of various new 
words and sentences for the user interface. Currently, Cryptocat is available 
in almost 40 languages, and maintaining these translations would be impossible 
without the participation of language speakers from around the world.

You can very easily contribute to Cryptocat translations here:
https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/

Just pick a language and fill it up to 100%! If you know people who can help, I 
urge you to please forward this email to them.

The following languages are priority. Any language not on this list is 
considered not necessary to fully translate at the moment.
Catalan
Arabic
Chinese (Hong Kong)
Chinese (China)
Urdu
Tibetan
Russian
Estonian
Czech
German
Danish
Spanish
Basque
Greek
Farsi
French
Japanese
Hebrew
Bengali
Italian
Khmer
Korean
Latvian
Dutch
Norwegian
Polish
Portuguese
Bulgarian
Swedish
Turkish
Vietnamese
Uighur

Thanks very much, and please don't forget to pass this around to people who may 
know these languages and be able to translate from English.

NK
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Re: [liberationtech] Cryptocat: Call for Translators. Please Participate!

2013-08-20 Thread Amin Sabeti
I'll do the Persian language :)

A


On 20 August 2013 12:42, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote:

 Dear Libtech,

 Echoing Commotion's recent call for translators on this list:

 Cryptocat is adding cool new features (and modifying some existing ones)
 over the upcoming weeks, all of which necessitate the translation of
 various new words and sentences for the user interface. Currently,
 Cryptocat is available in almost 40 languages, and maintaining these
 translations would be impossible without the participation of language
 speakers from around the world.

 You can very easily contribute to Cryptocat translations here:
 https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/

 Just pick a language and fill it up to 100%! If you know people who can
 help, I urge you to please forward this email to them.

 The following languages are priority. Any language not on this list is
 considered not necessary to fully translate at the moment.
 Catalan
 Arabic
 Chinese (Hong Kong)
 Chinese (China)
 Urdu
 Tibetan
 Russian
 Estonian
 Czech
 German
 Danish
 Spanish
 Basque
 Greek
 Farsi
 French
 Japanese
 Hebrew
 Bengali
 Italian
 Khmer
 Korean
 Latvian
 Dutch
 Norwegian
 Polish
 Portuguese
 Bulgarian
 Swedish
 Turkish
 Vietnamese
 Uighur

 Thanks very much, and please don't forget to pass this around to people
 who may know these languages and be able to translate from English.

 NK

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Re: [liberationtech] Cryptocat: Call for Translators. Please Participate!

2013-08-20 Thread Arif YILDIRIM
I'll do the Turkish Language.

-- 
Dr.Arif YILDIRIM


On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Amin Sabeti aminsab...@gmail.com wrote:

 I'll do the Persian language :)

 A


 On 20 August 2013 12:42, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote:

 Dear Libtech,

 Echoing Commotion's recent call for translators on this list:

 Cryptocat is adding cool new features (and modifying some existing ones)
 over the upcoming weeks, all of which necessitate the translation of
 various new words and sentences for the user interface. Currently,
 Cryptocat is available in almost 40 languages, and maintaining these
 translations would be impossible without the participation of language
 speakers from around the world.

 You can very easily contribute to Cryptocat translations here:
 https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/

 Just pick a language and fill it up to 100%! If you know people who can
 help, I urge you to please forward this email to them.

 The following languages are priority. Any language not on this list is
 considered not necessary to fully translate at the moment.
 Catalan
 Arabic
 Chinese (Hong Kong)
 Chinese (China)
 Urdu
 Tibetan
 Russian
 Estonian
 Czech
 German
 Danish
 Spanish
 Basque
 Greek
 Farsi
 French
 Japanese
 Hebrew
 Bengali
 Italian
 Khmer
 Korean
 Latvian
 Dutch
 Norwegian
 Polish
 Portuguese
 Bulgarian
 Swedish
 Turkish
 Vietnamese
 Uighur

 Thanks very much, and please don't forget to pass this around to people
 who may know these languages and be able to translate from English.

 NK

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Re: [liberationtech] Seeing threats, feds target instructors of polygraph-beating methods

2013-08-20 Thread R. Jason Cronk
Speech in an of itself is generally not target-able. However, speech 
that accompanies some action can be. Someone saying I'm going to shoot 
the president might get you a visit from the Secret Service but not 
arrested. Someone saying that and buying a gun and flying to D.C. could 
actually get prosecuted, even if they posed no real threat.


Here, it isn't so much the speech that is being targeted. If he is 
teaching people how to lie to Federal prosecutors and he knows that they 
are going to lie to Federal prosecutors he is aiding in the commission 
of a crime. However, just publishing a book on techniques or even 
teaching someone without knowing that they are potentially to be 
questioned/interrogated, then no crime has been committed.


Jason Cronk



On 8/19/2013 10:42 PM, Tom Ritter wrote:

I'm trying to think of how you could prosecute free speech (in the
US).  It's not illegal to talk about how to use rusty nails to create
themite - that's been in the Anarchist Cookbook for years.  It's a
somewhat fine line between X should be killed and incitement to
murder but as all the Assange and Snowden press has shown, that's not
a great indicator.  I don't _think_ nuclear secrets is actually
protected, it's just that the individuals who know about them are
contracted/NDA-ed/under classified restrictions.

ESPECIALLY when polygraphs aren't actually accepted by the courts, as
far as I know.

/sigh

So far, authorities have targeted at least two instructors, one of
whom has pleaded guilty to federal charges, several people familiar
with the investigation told McClatchy.

Love to know the inside details of the person who pleaded guilty, and why.

-tom



*R. Jason Cronk, Esq., CIPP/US*
/Privacy Engineering Consultant/, *Enterprivacy Consulting Group* 
enterprivacy.com


 * phone: (828) 4RJCESQ
 * twitter: @privacymaverick.com
 * blog: http://blog.privacymaverick.com

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Re: [liberationtech] Fwd: Avaaz in grave danger due to GMail spam filters

2013-08-20 Thread Matt Holland
Hi everyone, this is Matt Holland, head of online stuff here at Avaaz. I
would have replied sooner, but just returned from a week away. I've been a
member of the list for a while, because I learn a ton from all of you. I
haven't had anything valuable to contribute before now, but glad to have
the opportunity to switch from lurker to poster. So, some replies:

Moritz: I'd be thrilled if everyone could use an email account from Riseup
or similar, but as others have said it's pretty hard to convince people to
change their email service, and convenience often trumps other concerns.
Our judgement is that we accomplish more overall by meeting people where
they are, even though that involves these sorts of Gmail hassles sometimes.

Tom O: It's true that some people sign a petition and then disappear, but
actually a high percentage of Avaaz members stay engaged over time. This
isn't an advertisement for Avaaz, but you might not know that the petitions
are just the tip of the iceberg -- we have scores of organizers around the
world who use that citizen pressure as a tool to lobby decisionmakers, get
stories into the media, affect administrative policy decisions, shame
corporations into changing their behavior, etc.

Rich: We actually do run our email lists in-house, sent from our own MTA's,
with appropriate SPF records, DKIM signature, list-precedence headers, etc.
etc. Our message to members was focused on getting into a particular tab
at Gmail though; I think if we were having problems with those basic
list-management issues we'd be more likely to see our messages being marked
spam or just dropped outright.

Jillian: I think Ricken's response was more about the Executive Director
engaging in a lengthy debate about that particular issue back in 2012. As
an organization we work closely with all sorts of allies all over the
world, and I have personal relationships with several people on this list.

I gain a huge amount from this community and the work many of you do
individually, and I hope I can return the favor some day.


-- 

Matt Holland
Chief Online Officer
Avaaz
www.avaaz.org
Email: m...@avaaz.org
Skype:  tm_matt

PGP 
keyhttp://keyserver1.pgp.com/vkd/DownloadKey.event?keyid=0xE2A4F7982BE302CB
 (at keyserver.pgp.com)

Fingerprint:
3150 3B69 3B8A 9786 C951 EDE0 E2A4 F798 2BE3 02CB
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Re: [liberationtech] Cryptocat: Call for Translators. Please Participate!

2013-08-20 Thread Buddhadeb Halder
I will do Bengali.

On Tuesday, August 20, 2013, Neil Blazevic neilblaze...@gmail.com wrote:
 What would be the process to add other languages? I could potentially
round up some Swahili translators one day.
 Neil

 Sent from a mobile device

 On 20 Aug 2013 14:42, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote:

 Dear Libtech,

 Echoing Commotion's recent call for translators on this list:

 Cryptocat is adding cool new features (and modifying some existing ones)
over the upcoming weeks, all of which necessitate the translation of
various new words and sentences for the user interface. Currently,
Cryptocat is available in almost 40 languages, and maintaining these
translations would be impossible without the participation of language
speakers from around the world.

 You can very easily contribute to Cryptocat translations here:
 https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/Cryptocat/resource/cryptocat/

 Just pick a language and fill it up to 100%! If you know people who can
help, I urge you to please forward this email to them.

 The following languages are priority. Any language not on this list is
considered not necessary to fully translate at the moment.
 Catalan
 Arabic
 Chinese (Hong Kong)
 Chinese (China)
 Urdu
 Tibetan
 Russian
 Estonian
 Czech
 German
 Danish
 Spanish
 Basque
 Greek
 Farsi
 French
 Japanese
 Hebrew
 Bengali
 Italian
 Khmer
 Korean
 Latvian
 Dutch
 Norwegian
 Polish
 Portuguese
 Bulgarian
 Swedish
 Turkish
 Vietnamese
 Uighur

 Thanks very much, and please don't forget to pass this around to people
who may know these languages and be able to translate from English.

 NK

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[liberationtech] South-by-Southwest Interactive Workshop on Surveillance, Technology, and Privacy

2013-08-20 Thread Yosem Companys
from: Bobby Chesney rches...@law.utexas.edu

http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/south-by-southwest-interactive-workshop-on-surveillance-technology-and-privacy/

In connection with the annual South-by-Southwest Interactive (SXSWi)
conference here in Austin, UT’s Robert S. Strauss Center for
International Security and Law has proposed a nifty event focused on
the intersection of privacy, technology, and surveillance.  The
proposal is for a 2.5 hour workshop featuring Susan Landau, Tim Edgar,
Jeff Rosen, and me. The catch is:  there are thousands of proposals
every year, and voting by the public plays an important role in the
selection process.  So, if you think you might be in Austin for SXSWi,
or in any event if you just want to lend us your support, your help
would be most welcome.  Here is the announcement and the link for
voting (and here’s avideo in which I demonstrate that it is in fact
quite difficult not to look and sound uncomfortable on camera…yeesh.).

Is privacy dead? Is Big Brother always watching? Or are enhanced
surveillance programs necessary in a world where terrorism is an
ever-present threat? The Strauss Center has proposed to host a
workshop at this year’s South by Southwest (SXSW) Interactive to get
to the heart of these issues by engaging in conversation with experts
in technology, intelligence, law, and policy and you – the audience!
But to make it all happen, the proposal needs your vote. Vote now for
the workshop “After Snowden: Privacy, Surveillance, and the
NSA.”[Note: the SXSW system asks you to register, and then lets you
pick out proposals you want to support]

Edward Snowden’s dramatic revelations of classified information this
summer set off a massive public debate concerning the intersection of
technological change, national security, and privacy. Alas, that
debate is not always sufficiently well informed when it comes to its
legal, policy, and technical aspects. This workshop is meant not to
evangelize in favor of any one particular solution, but rather to
provide attendees with a sophisticated-but-accessible foundation for
sharpening (or perhaps changing) their own views. It brings together
dynamic, nationally known experts in technology, privacy policy, civil
liberties, law, and U.S. government intelligence policy. The workshop
will delve into the technical and policy aspects of national security
surveillance, the evolution of the legal architecture governing the
NSA, and the way that things may develop in the years ahead. It will
also deploy classroom “voting” technology and other participatory
measures to directly engage attendees.

But to make this a reality, the proposal needs your vote! If you think
this conversation would be a great addition to SXSW Interactive,
please take the time to vote for the workshop on SXSW’s Panel Picker.
Voting is open from now until September 6, so get your vote in today!

The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The
University of Texas at Austin provides the imagination, leadership and
intellectual innovation required to help meet the challenges of the
21st century. It is designed to be a new kind of institution, one that
engages the best minds in academia, government and the private sector
in developing practical solutions to the pressing problems of an
increasingly globalized world. The Center seeks the widest possible
audience, enriching the public debate and giving guidance to decision
makers on how to respond to dangers and opportunities in global
affairs. For more information on the Strauss Center, visit our website
at www.strausscenter.org.
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[liberationtech] FYI: SXSW proposed panel discussion

2013-08-20 Thread Nicholas Merrill

  NSA and the future of web users and web companies

On Thursday, June 6, 2013, the PRISM story broke, shattering any trust
we had in the US government with regards to online privacy. At a
pinnacle point in technological advancement, the tech industry is now
faced with the prospect of National Security Letters, data subpoenas and
constant privacy and security concerns from customers. This panel will
be a frank discussion about the NSA, online surveillance, and the
privacy expectations from the perspective of both web users and web
companies. This will be a conversation that presents the societal
benefits of network analysis alongside the fears and concerns.


Questions Answered

 1. What to do when you receive a National Security Letter
 2. How to handle your customers' and users' questions and concerns
 3. How to protect your customers and users
 4. What you can do to protect your business
 5. What to expect from the NSA in the future


Speakers

  * Matthew Prince CloudFlare https://www.cloudflare.com/
  * Nicholas Merrill The Calyx Institute https://calyxinstitute.org/
  * Cesar Hidalgo MIT http://chidalgo.com/index.html
  * Brad Burnham Union Square Ventures http://www.usv.com/


Organizer

Kristin Tarr CloudFlare https://www.cloudflare.com/


Cast Your Vote:   http://panelpicker.sxsw.com/vote/23181



-- 
Nicholas Merrill
Executive Director
The Calyx Institute
287 Spring Street
New York, NY 10013

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Re: [liberationtech] Trsst: An Open and Secure Alternative to Twitter

2013-08-20 Thread Rianna Morgan
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 08/18/2013 01:47 AM, Edwin Chu wrote:
 I came across this project in kickstarter. Subscribers of this list
 may find it interesting. (Btw I am not associated with them)
 
 --
 
 Welcome to Trsst: An Open and Secure Alternative to Twitter
 
 Post your thoughts, share links, and follow other interesting
 people or web sites, using the web or your mobile or any software
 of your choice.
 
 All of your private posts to individuals or friends and family are
 securely encrypted so that even your hosting provider - or
 government - can't unlock them. All of your public posts are
 digitally signed so you can prove that no one - and no government -
 modified or censored your writings. You control your identity and
 your posts and can move them to another site or hosting provider at
 any time. Think of Trsst as an RSS reader (and writer) that works
 like Twitter but built for the open web.  The public stuff stays
 public and search-indexable, and the private stuff is encrypted and
 secured.  Only you will hold your keys, so your hosting provider
 can't sell you out.
 
 
 http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1904431672/trsst-a-distributed-secure-blog-platform-for-the-o/description

 
 
 


Today on Twitter I (@arRMorgan) had an extended engagement with the
Trsst (@TrsstProject) developers.  In this email, I have included my
questions and the Trsst Team's responses, as well as any follow-up
commentary I had.  Hashtags and other such characters have been
eliminated.

Overall, I was very pleased with the speed, clarity, and content of
their responses to my questions.

Cheers,
Rianna Morgan

*
Q1: Will the TrsstProject Free and Open Source? Are there plans to
open the source at any point?
https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369883363768676352

Trsst: Yes. We're starting with the critical bit - the client - out in
the open in JS w/ off-the-shelf open-source. Needs many eyes.

Trsst: The server will follow because the first cut is kind of
quick-and-dirty code to test the client, and server is dumb anyway.

RM: JavaScript? Rather concerning for me, honestly. Most
#cryptographers I've read seem to think it lends itself to insecurity.

***

Q2: With TrsstProject does all #encryption take place client side? Not
totally clear from white paper.
https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369884124128882688

Trsst: YES. Client-side crypto is what makes it work. Reference impl
is in JS, but we want to see many hardened native clients.

Trsst: We like to say: it's all https get and post, so you can write
our own client with openssl+curl+bash if you trust your binaries

RM: That is freaking awesome though! Client-side is a great way to
make dragnet #surveillance difficult. Very glad to hear that.

**

Q3: In what jurisdiction does @TrsstProject intend for its servers to
be located? https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369886356840783872

Trsst: We're in the US, but doesn't matter given that the servers
don't store anything non-public that isn't encrypted.

Trsst: If your client randomizes which trsst servers you pull from and
post to, then the connection logs won't be useful either.

**

Q4: Will TrsstProject have a function for password retrieval?
https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369892215520112640

Trsst: We never see or hear the password used to encrypt your
keystore, nor do we want to. Probably the weak link wrt consumer UX.

**

Q5: For the record, will @TrsstProject ever have access to user's
secret keys? https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369892369845329921

Trsst: No server -- not ours not anybody -- ever decrypts your
keystore. Only happens inside the client and never leaves your PC.

Trsst: For consumer UX need to figure out how to move a keystore from
one device to another (PC+mobile), but never decrypted.

**

Q6: Can end users run @TrsstProject peers?
https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369893971897495553

Trsst: YES. PLEASE DO. :) A trsst server is just an http server with
agreed upon conventions for accepting and relaying RSS snippets.

RM: That is so dang cool! Seems like y'all really get the what and why
behind a decentralised service.

**

Q7: What licence will you use for the TrsstProject's software?
https://twitter.com/arRMorgan/status/369894066340646912

Trsst: We always lean GPL but people have issues, so #Apache, #MIT,
all/none of the above? Dunno honestly.

RM: FWIW, I'm a big fan of the GPL!

**

Q8: Will 'following' 

Re: [liberationtech] Google confirms critical Android crypto flaw

2013-08-20 Thread Maxim Kammerer
On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Maxim Kammerer m...@dee.su wrote:
 On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Nathan of Guardian
 nat...@guardianproject.info wrote:
 The best description is here:
 http://armoredbarista.blogspot.ch/2013/03/randomly-failed-weaknesses-in-java.html

 Unbelievable… It seems that PRNG implementers suffer from NIH
 syndrome. If you are going to use /dev/urandom, then use it all the
 time, and rely on code that's reviewed and maintained by thousands of
 kernel people, not just your favorite buggy seeded PRNG du-jour. And
 even sans the bugs, consider something like the following in Apache
 Harmony (precursor of Dalvik's class library) [1, p. 131]:

   iv = sha1(iv,concat(state, cnt));
   cnt = cnt + 1;
   return iv;

 So they're essentially constructing a state-based bit stream that
 varies in each block, and hash it with SHA-1 — exposing each
 intermediate hash value in the middle. Who the hell told them it's
 safe from cryptanalysis POV? E.g., SP800-90A's Hash_DRBG [2, p. 40]
 resembles nothing of the sort.

 [1] http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_9
 [2] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf

I have looked at (what I believe is) the code, finally:
git clone https://android.googlesource.com/platform/libcore
git blame 
luni/src/main/java/org/apache/harmony/security/provider/crypto/SHA1PRNG_SecureRandomImpl.java

Long story short — unbelievable POS monstrosity (of course), and
Google shares the blame. The paper authors are completely right —
seed[BYTES_OFFSET] is not assigned anywhere where it matters, and the
initial seed gets continuously partly overwritten with the counter at
the same offset 0. The funny part is that even if Apache Harmony
people were to get that part right, the PRNG would still possibly have
entropy issues due to this gem (slightly simplified below):

 lastWord = seed[BYTES_OFFSET] == 0 ? 0
 : (seed[BYTES_OFFSET] + 7)  3 - 1;

They didn't notice that subtraction takes precedence over bitshift, so
this last word (8 bytes — just to confuse with 4-byte words in
SHA-1, I presume) is taken from the wrong place in the array. How did
I notice the precedence blunder? Why, there is a commit:

Author: Nick Kralevich n...@google.com
Date:   Wed Oct 20 13:53:55 2010 -0700

fix operator precedence bug when calculating bits.

-bits = seedLength  3 + 64; // transforming # of bytes
into # of bits
+bits = (seedLength  3) + 64; // transforming # of bytes
into # of bits

So this Google guy noticed a precedence bug in one place, but left the
one a few lines above it (dating to Apache Harmony) intact. Not his
problem, probably — corporate programming at its finest. Had he fixed
the bug above as well, he might have noticed (or not) that the output
stream for a given seed remained completely unchanged.

In short, don't use Google's security-related code for anything important.

-- 
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte
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