Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
On Dec 2, 2012, at 2:00 AM, KheOps wrote: Hey, I'm thinking something that could be a total nonsense, but just in case I would like to share my thougths. Le 01/12/2012 19:39, Rafal Rohozinski a écrit : This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 By the way: notice the cable - it's super easy to trip over that one :) Maybe that's what happened? The Blue-coats didn't work anymore and it took them 2 days to figure out what happened? LOL This picture just popped up on Twitter. A long time ago there was a picture taken from the official Tarassul Facebook pages that obviously show the same devices in the same office - https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/bluecoat-Syria/tarassul-datacenter.jpg What if that second picture - the one that popped up today - had been taken just recently by some opponent to the regime who managed to gain access to the Tarassul technical office; that intrusion could have lead the regime to do a kind of massive shutdown? As I said, this might make no sense at all. But in a way, such a total disruption, including the governmental/stock exchange/whatever websites could be something the regime itself did not really want. On a more serious note: I had the exact same thought. Updated my blog post about this subject just now: http://www.cert.at/services/blog/20121129184048-616.html Does anyone have any info on the paths that the fiber cables are taking from Tartus till Damascus? If they are not to cross the border and go to Lebanon, then they must pass by Homs. Usually fiber lines are next to train tracks or highways. Also the pictures from Tarassul which you reference above are to my knowledge in Alleppo. Can anyone here say for sure that rebels could easily enter that building since it is in their controlled territory? But let's analyze this: what happens when some rebels enter the building where the blue-coats are ? What would they gain from cutting off the connections? Aaron. --- // CERT Austria // L. Aaron Kaplan kap...@cert.at // T: +43 1 505 64 16 78 // http://www.cert.at // Eine Initiative der NIC.at GmbH // http://www.nic.at/ - Firmenbuchnummer 172568b, LG Salzburg -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] updated analysis #SyriaBlackout
Folks, Here is an updated analysis from my side: http://www.cert.at/services/blog/20121129184048-616.html This includes a traceroute from within Syria. More comments welcome. a. --- // CERT Austria // L. Aaron Kaplan kap...@cert.at // T: +43 1 505 64 16 78 // http://www.cert.at // Eine Initiative der NIC.at GmbH // http://www.nic.at/ - Firmenbuchnummer 172568b, LG Salzburg -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Silent Circle? Re: AES-encyrpted telephony in Iran?
On Jun 16, 2012, at 3:51 PM, Frank Corrigan wrote: This seems relevant, building on Phil Zimmerman's Zfone/ZRTP PGP. Some time ago I rand into Jitsi.org - it is an interesting start but I had some issues with stability. Aaron. signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] A Kind Request.....
On Jun 2, 2012, at 9:23 PM, Robert Mathews (OSIA) wrote: Hello Fabio, is Wired part of the media hype? http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/flame/ They also compare it with Stuxnet. All bullocks? Yes, a bit. To quote another security researcher: I don't know if Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. But they appear to have mastered the 24 hours news cycle. (I can dig out the proper credits if needed) A true targeted attack is much more stealthy. Flame seems to be bloatware. There is however an interesting twist to the story: there is a removal tool by the ir. CERT. It will actually copy over all kinds of things and send it over encrypted . Don't know what to think of that... http://www.cert.at/services/blog/20120531174118-234.html (sorry, german. Use google translate) a. ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
