Re: [liberationtech] Can JavaScript cryptography be trusted? (was: In defense of client-side encryption)

2013-08-15 Thread Francisco Ruiz
Hi Nadim,

I read your article for the second time. I'm totally with you. Javascript
is code, and therefore it is intrinsically neither more nor less secure
than compiled code running on the OS. Sure, one needs to trust that the
browser isn't doing funny things, but we need the same kind of trust when
we run compiled code on an OS (usually developed by people who sit in the
next cubicle from the browser people). I don't see why an OS deserves
implicit trust and a browser doesn't.

Unlike compiled code, javascript can be read by humans. Most people won't
bother, but there are a few who will, and they'll report their findings on
this mail list if they find something amiss. I'm experiencing that right
now with my own PassLok web app. If I had compiled it, people would have to
trust my commercial jabber, as they seem to do for server-side
applications, but they wouldn't really know how good the app was until
after extensive testing.

Right now I'm wrestling with the issue of code authentication. The page is
static and gets delivered by https, but what if someone manages to hack the
server? My current solution is to publish the SHA256 of the source in the
help page accompanying the code page. For added security, I post a youtube
video of yours truly reading that hash (I'm trying to get Justin Bieber to
do it for me, but no luck so far ;-).

Problems so far:
1. Most people don't know how to take the SHA256 of a page that comes to
their browser. If they succeed at viewing the source, there is a high
chance that they'll save it to file with the wrong encoding, so the hash
verification will fail.
2. Even if my face (or Justin Bieber's face) is familiar to them, they know
a video can be faked. I'm trying to make it harder by playing background
music so it's not easy to chop up the video (with sound) and rearrange it
so they hear me reading a counterfeit hash, but certainly there are experts
out there who can get around that.

Now, nobody seems to be requiring this level of assurance from compiled
code. You post a hash on your own website, and most people trust it. You
add some CA's signature, and apparently you can go to the bank with that.
Maybe I should just append to my code a comment containing someone's
signature and forget about the rest.




On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 2:09 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote:

 Quickly adding my blog post on the matter to this thread. Would love to
 hear discussion regarding it:

 http://log.nadim.cc/?p=33

 NK

 On 2013-08-13, at 1:58 AM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote:

  On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Ali-Reza Anghaie a...@packetknife.com
 wrote:
  I'm sorry but aren't we spending a lot of time conflating code
  quality, secure coding practices, software distribution, .. with
  ~JavaScript in a browser~?
 
  I think the title of the thread has a lot to do with that. Fixed! ;)
 
  --
  Tony Arcieri
  --
  Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google.
 Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated:
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-- 
Francisco Ruiz
Associate Professor
MMAE department
Illinois Institute of Technology

PL13lok=WsH3zTgZn8V3hnIqjdbfPus+5YF5n+LBRPuH9USMMp8izPv+hsLoZKv+jaCFMapJFfiA11Q9yJU1K1Wo0TbjXK/=PL13lok

get the PassLok privacy app at: http://passlok.com
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Re: [liberationtech] Can JavaScript cryptography be trusted? (was: In defense of client-side encryption)

2013-08-13 Thread Nadim Kobeissi
Quickly adding my blog post on the matter to this thread. Would love to hear 
discussion regarding it:

http://log.nadim.cc/?p=33

NK

On 2013-08-13, at 1:58 AM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Ali-Reza Anghaie a...@packetknife.com 
 wrote:
 I'm sorry but aren't we spending a lot of time conflating code
 quality, secure coding practices, software distribution, .. with
 ~JavaScript in a browser~?
 
 I think the title of the thread has a lot to do with that. Fixed! ;)
 
 -- 
 Tony Arcieri
 -- 
 Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. 
 Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: 
 https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, 
 change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at 
 compa...@stanford.edu.

-- 
Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. 
Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: 
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change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at 
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[liberationtech] Can JavaScript cryptography be trusted? (was: In defense of client-side encryption)

2013-08-12 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Ali-Reza Anghaie a...@packetknife.comwrote:

 I'm sorry but aren't we spending a lot of time conflating code
 quality, secure coding practices, software distribution, .. with
 ~JavaScript in a browser~?


I think the title of the thread has a lot to do with that. Fixed! ;)

-- 
Tony Arcieri
-- 
Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. 
Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, 
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at 
compa...@stanford.edu.