Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2013.01.23 01.09, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: OpenITP will sign. Put me down individually, too. E. - -- Ideas are my favorite toys. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iF4EAREIAAYFAlD/4JgACgkQQwkE2RkM0wpMtAD+N/z+ydCj3RMJmJEVE0r4Zxwg cZ53YZc4Btn8GcaQJ70A/0zSDkNSvvxV+e1GNIMbutYTYuT5h/MJGqChLMpvCIYs =/3RJ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
On Wed, Jan 23, 2013 at 4:01 PM, Jochai Ben-Avie joc...@accessnow.orgwrote: and the basis for rejecting those requests it does not comply with. Jochai, Thanks for your helpful additions! NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Hello Nadim, Can you add me as an individual, please. Thanks for the great work. Ophelia Noor On 21 January 2013 22:31, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Everyone has been added, thank you! NK On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 1:16 PM, Fran Parker lilba...@gmail.com wrote: Can you add Fran Parker as an individual please. Thanks. Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Added. Thank you! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 10:18 PM, Martin Johnsongreatfire@greatfire.** org greatf...@greatfire.orgwrote: GreatFire.org would like to sign. Thanks very much for doing this. Martin Johnson Founder https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China. https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search. https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China. On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Nadim Kobeissina...@nadim.cc wrote: Amazing :) Thanks for your support, everyone! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericsonpett...@acc.umu.se** wrote: Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.**com/draft/http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pougetgrego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Bordershttp://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/**clapper/http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/ ) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
I would also be pleased to sign as an individual. Chip Pitts From: liberationtech-boun...@lists.stanford.edu [mailto:liberationtech-boun...@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Ophelia Noor Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2013 6:34 AM To: liberationtech Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES Hello Nadim, Can you add me as an individual, please. Thanks for the great work. Ophelia Noor On 21 January 2013 22:31, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Everyone has been added, thank you! NK On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 1:16 PM, Fran Parker lilba...@gmail.com wrote: Can you add Fran Parker as an individual please. Thanks. Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Added. Thank you! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 10:18 PM, Martin Johnsongreatf...@greatfire.orgwrote: GreatFire.org would like to sign. Thanks very much for doing this. Martin Johnson Founder https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China. https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search. https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China. On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Nadim Kobeissina...@nadim.cc wrote: Amazing :) Thanks for your support, everyone! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericsonpett...@acc.umu.sewrote: Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pougetgrego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Bordershttp://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Nadim, Valuable and much appreciated work. Please add my name as an individual signatory. --Keith Hazelton On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 10:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- ___ Keith Hazelton (khazel...@gmail.com) UW-Madison; Internet2 MACE -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Hi Nadim, Could you please add TagMeNot project TagMeNot.info to the organizations list. Best regards, Alberto Cammozzo -- Alberto Cammozzo founder, TagMeNot.info On 01/16/2013 05:58 PM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Reporters Without Borders will stay signed on. Good work ! Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk | Bureau Nouveaux Médias GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE Tel : +33 1 44 83 84 71 Reporters Without Borders http://en.rsf.org | Reporters sans frontièreshttp://fr.rsf.org Twitter (en) https://twitter.com/fightcensors_en | Twitter (fr)https://twitter.com/fightcensors_fr| Facebook https://www.facebook.com/WeFightCensorship 2013/1/18 Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.net wrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccwrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE -- Unsubscribe, change to
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Alright everyone, the list has again been updated for today. Keep in mind that I am updating the list once every 24 hours. Deadline is Thursday! NK On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 8:53 AM, A.Cammozzo a.cammo...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nadim, Could you please add TagMeNot project TagMeNot.info to the organizations list. Best regards, Alberto Cammozzo -- Alberto Cammozzo founder, TagMeNot.info On 01/16/2013 05:58 PM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.**com/draft/http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
You can add my name. Greg Norcie - PhD Student, Privacy Researcher -- Greg Norcie (g...@norcie.com) GPG key: 0x1B873635 On 1/16/13 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Can you add Fran Parker as an individual please. Thanks. Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Added. Thank you! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 10:18 PM, Martin Johnsongreatf...@greatfire.orgwrote: GreatFire.org would like to sign. Thanks very much for doing this. Martin Johnson Founder https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China. https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search. https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China. On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Nadim Kobeissina...@nadim.cc wrote: Amazing :) Thanks for your support, everyone! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericsonpett...@acc.umu.sewrote: Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pougetgrego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Bordershttp://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissina...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Looks good, Nadim. Abine will stay signed on (it's just Abine, not Abine Software, though). And I'd like to sign as an individual (Sarah A. Downey, Esq.). Thanks! -Sarah On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.net wrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccwrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Sarah A. Downey sa...@getabine.comwrote: (Sarah A. Downey, Esq. Done! NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Good idea. I've added Bates's name as a recipient. NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:51 AM, Ryan Gallagher r...@rjgallagher.co.ukwrote: Good work, more concise than the previous version and something about the general tone of the thing has been improved. Might it be worth also publicly CCing Tony Bates on the letter (he's pres of the Skype division at Microsoft)? On 18 January 2013 16:26, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.orgwrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.net wrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccwrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE -- Unsubscribe, change to
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
I like it - keep me on the letter. Many thanks for all your work. Paul Dr Paul Bernal Lecturer UEA Law School University of East Anglia Norwich Research Park Norwich NR4 7TJ email: paul.ber...@uea.ac.ukmailto:paul.ber...@uea.ac.uk Web: http://www.paulbernal.co.uk/ Blog: http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/ Twitter: @paulbernalUK On 18 Jan 2013, at 16:26, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccmailto:na...@nadim.cc wrote: Okay everyone, the final draft has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.orgmailto:grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Bordershttp://rsf.org/ would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netmailto:ch...@soghoian.net wrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccmailto:na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
I speak with people regularly at Microsoft, including their CPO. It is my understanding that Microsoft's chief privacy officer doesn't have the power to do what you ask for. Scott Charney, the VP of Trustworthy Computing, will be much more central to any internal debates over this issue than Brendon Lynch. Ultimately though, I think you probably want to address this to Brad Smith, Microsoft's General Counsel. On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.net wrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccwrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
I think your section on law enforcement stuff could still use some work. I really think you should get rid of some of the text in the references. Specifically, delete this text: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters.[3] IMHO, it isn't the HQ in Redmond that raises CALEA questions, but rather, the interconnection to the US telecommunications network. If Skype has to be CALEA complaint, those requirements kicked in long before Microsoft owned them, Thus, Instead of: Skype’s current interpretation of the applicability of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), National Security Letters (NSLs), and other lawful intercept policies to its users’ communications in the countries in which Skype is used. What about instead: Skype's interpretation of its responsibilities under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) [1], its policies related to the disclosure of call metadata in response to subpoenas and National Security Letters (NSLs) [FN2], and more generally, the policies followed when Skype receives and responds to requests for user data from law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the United States and elsewhere. [FN1] In May 2006, the FCC issued a Second Report and Order that required facilities-based broadband Internet access providers and providers of interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service to come into compliance with CALEA obligations no later than May 14, 2007. See: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-56A1.pdf [FN2] Existing US law surveillance law is unclear regarding the specific form of legal process required for law enforcement agencies to compel the production of metadata associated with Internet based text messaging services. See http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/us-surveillance-law-may-poorly-protect-new-text . On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Chris, Your suggestions and references have been implemented. Thank you! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 1:57 PM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: I think your section on law enforcement stuff could still use some work. I really think you should get rid of some of the text in the references. Specifically, delete this text: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters.[3] IMHO, it isn't the HQ in Redmond that raises CALEA questions, but rather, the interconnection to the US telecommunications network. If Skype has to be CALEA complaint, those requirements kicked in long before Microsoft owned them, Thus, Instead of: Skype’s current interpretation of the applicability of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), National Security Letters (NSLs), and other lawful intercept policies to its users’ communications in the countries in which Skype is used. What about instead: Skype's interpretation of its responsibilities under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) [1], its policies related to the disclosure of call metadata in response to subpoenas and National Security Letters (NSLs) [FN2], and more generally, the policies followed when Skype receives and responds to requests for user data from law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the United States and elsewhere. [FN1] In May 2006, the FCC issued a Second Report and Order that required facilities-based broadband Internet access providers and providers of interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service to come into compliance with CALEA obligations no later than May 14, 2007. See: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-56A1.pdf [FN2] Existing US law surveillance law is unclear regarding the specific form of legal process required for law enforcement agencies to compel the production of metadata associated with Internet based text messaging services. See http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/us-surveillance-law-may-poorly-protect-new-text . On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire Pouget, New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Amazing :) Thanks for your support, everyone! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericson pett...@acc.umu.se wrote: Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Grégoire
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
GreatFire.org would like to sign. Thanks very much for doing this. Martin Johnson Founder https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China. https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search. https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China. On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Amazing :) Thanks for your support, everyone! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericson pett...@acc.umu.sewrote: Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Added. Thank you! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 10:18 PM, Martin Johnson greatf...@greatfire.orgwrote: GreatFire.org would like to sign. Thanks very much for doing this. Martin Johnson Founder https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China. https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search. https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China. On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Amazing :) Thanks for your support, everyone! NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericson pett...@acc.umu.sewrote: Hi! Good work :) First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Okay everyone, the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your signature there (or add it!) http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ We'll be publishing next week. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget grego...@rsf.org wrote: We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters Without Borders http://rsf.org would be happy to sign it. Best, Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon.
[liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
This is very well written!! One comment - given that the Tom-Skype operations mainly affect just Chinese users, I feel it makes sense to call out China explicitly in that sentence. Best, 2013/1/16 Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Hey Nadim, The letter looks great. Thanks for driving this. Please add Aspiration (www.aspirationtech.org) to the signatories peace, gunner On 01/16/2013 08:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Allen Gunn Executive Director, Aspiration +1.415.216.7252 www.aspirationtech.org Aspiration: Better Tools for a Better World Read our Manifesto: http://aspirationtech.org/publications/manifesto Follow us: Facebook: www.facebook.com/aspirationtech Twitter: www.twitter.com/aspirationtech -- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
The Free Network Foundation will sign. As far a copy edits: voice communications software, Skype continues to be the first choice for many whose lives depend on strong communications privacy. Regretfully, Skype continues to ignore repeated, reasonable requests to clarify the basic principles of its privacy policies.[6] http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/#references The first clause (voice communications software) should either be taken out, or capitalized and the trailing comma removed. Well said, Nadim. imw On 01/16/2013 11:10 AM, x z wrote: This is very well written!! One comment - given that the Tom-Skype operations mainly affect just Chinese users, I feel it makes sense to call out China explicitly in that sentence. Best, 2013/1/16 Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc mailto:na...@nadim.cc Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Do all signatories need to be affiliated/part of an organisation? On 16 Jan 2013, at 16:58, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech - -- Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQ9uHXAAoJENsz1IO7MIrrbKEIAMYUBZsvcdaGihSRAxI30tPn CYKEv9O7FQxo1zSSfjbqi16nJ6ZCdt8R4meELwTmk0KnGIJyd+zPOWqd6fb4GhoH uw/csLwT1kaPc0WI3/44e13TW/HdjfsmjRnzHF73GJltr7WEtFlhNluDCWxqcTjY sGBX8x6wgPTbBwqr8KaOUbL53m5cf0EC7syZ4lil73aadLgIDbePZgD78s3uyjaY iij7hhezV/vb5U4nAEpPl5Djs3uoAbycIYZifZmFEqA6E73heZ28j4qzhZmYrVHR Doi9h3EUCWkVg9FzUxF8h2T8ad79PoxnQAjTwNXJJGregng5i+Ku74itlhr9M1Q= =4FPl -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Nice job. I'll sign as an individual and on behalf of Abinehttps://www.abine.com(we're an online privacy startup). -Sarah On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- *Sarah A. Downey* Privacy Analyst | Attorney Abine http://goog_822727389, Inc https://www.abine.com: Online privacy starts here. t: @SarahADowney https://twitter.com/#/SarahADowney | p: 800.928.1987 Blogging on privacy at Abine.com/Blog Like us? Spread the word! http://abine.com/likeus.php -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
On 16 January 2013 17:31, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: It's already open for individuals. Excellent, thanks Nadim. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
I'd like to sign too, if you'd like it! Paul Dr Paul Bernal Lecturer UEA Law School University of East Anglia Norwich Research Park Norwich NR4 7TJ email: paul.ber...@uea.ac.ukmailto:paul.ber...@uea.ac.uk Web: http://www.paulbernal.co.uk/ Blog: http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/ Twitter: @paulbernalUK On 16 Jan 2013, at 16:58, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccmailto:na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
I'd like to sign it as well, if I am eligible :) Amin On 16 January 2013 17:58, Paul Bernal (LAW) paul.ber...@uea.ac.uk wrote: I'd like to sign too, if you'd like it! -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Digital Rights Foundation, Pakistan would like to sign the letter too. www.digitalrightsfoundation.pk Best, Nighat Dad On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:06 PM, Amin Sabeti aminsab...@gmail.com wrote: I'd like to sign it as well, if I am eligible :) Amin On 16 January 2013 17:58, Paul Bernal (LAW) paul.ber...@uea.ac.uk wrote: I'd like to sign too, if you'd like it! -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
(first post!) While CDT can't sign[1], I wanted to ask a question. (Since we can't sign on, I don't want you to feel like you have to answer!) I was wondering: why the focus on Skype and MSFT? If I were to answer my own question, I'd probably say the focus is simply due to the wide usage base of Skype, its' relative usability and the fact that it was at one time considered very e2e-secure. However, I wonder if this isn't more powerful as a more general open letter that talks about the principles you note and what kinds of measures (propreitary?) e2e communication technologies can take, using Skype as an example. Maybe another good answer is a letter has to have an audience and making it more general might make it more of a less-powerful statement than a directed letter with asks at the end. best, Joe [1] CDT rarely signs on to things. On 1/16/13 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Senior Staff Technologist Center for Democracy Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 j...@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 3:05 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote: (first post!) While CDT can't sign[1], I wanted to ask a question. (Since we can't sign on, I don't want you to feel like you have to answer!) I was wondering: why the focus on Skype and MSFT? I must admit that your asking this question as a CDT staffer is suspect; isn't CDT funded by Microsoft? If I were to answer my own question, I'd probably say the focus is simply due to the wide usage base of Skype, its' relative usability and the fact that it was at one time considered very e2e-secure. However, I wonder if this isn't more powerful as a more general open letter that talks about the principles you note and what kinds of measures (propreitary?) e2e communication technologies can take, using Skype as an example. Maybe another good answer is a letter has to have an audience and making it more general might make it more of a less-powerful statement than a directed letter with asks at the end. best, Joe [1] CDT rarely signs on to things. On 1/16/13 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Senior Staff Technologist Center for Democracy Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 j...@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Joe, My experience has been that when a general letter is written with no particular recipient, it ends up being received and acted on by *no one*. Skype represents such a significant portion of the concern, even measured based on traffic to this list, that it warrants direct questions and focused efforts by civil society. I would add in that Skype's failures have not only been ambiguity regarding transport security, but this last particularly dark year in terms of infrastructure and client security. The acquisition of the company by MSFT, who has strong commitments to GNI and others, represents an unexplored opportunity to take up outstanding concerns, and poke at this TOM issue. However, I respect and share your broader concerns as equally legitimate, and assure you that efforts won't be spared elsewhere. Here I think CDT might make for a great bridge, even if it cannot participate at this moment. Cordially, Collin (Signed, jealous Nadim did this before me.) On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote: (first post!) While CDT can't sign[1], I wanted to ask a question. (Since we can't sign on, I don't want you to feel like you have to answer!) I was wondering: why the focus on Skype and MSFT? If I were to answer my own question, I'd probably say the focus is simply due to the wide usage base of Skype, its' relative usability and the fact that it was at one time considered very e2e-secure. However, I wonder if this isn't more powerful as a more general open letter that talks about the principles you note and what kinds of measures (propreitary?) e2e communication technologies can take, using Skype as an example. Maybe another good answer is a letter has to have an audience and making it more general might make it more of a less-powerful statement than a directed letter with asks at the end. best, Joe [1] CDT rarely signs on to things. On 1/16/13 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Senior Staff Technologist Center for Democracy Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 j...@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Suggested changes (all near the beginning): Is: Many of these users rely on secure communications - whether they are activists operating under authoritarian governments or journalists dealing with sensitive sources. Suggest: Many of these users rely on secure communications - whether they are activists, journalists, doctors, lawyers, counselors -- or anyone. Is: Many trust Skype to be secure by default and others don't have access to security advice. Suggest: Nearly all trust Skype to be secure by default; almost none have access to security advice. Is: Due to Skype's lack of transparency and repeated policy violations, these activists and journalists may be putting themselves in jeopardy. Suggest: Due to Skype's lack of transparency and repeated policy violations, these people may be putting themselves, the people with whom they interact, and the information they exchange in jeopardy. Comment: I wanted to broaden the scope beyond activists and journalists, in order to show that this affects a far larger number of people -- e.g., doctors discussing a case with colleagues via Skype *may* be violating HIPAA as well as their own professional code of ethics as well as state laws/regulations as well as their own institution's policies if that conversation isn't known-confidential. (I am not an attorney, this is not legal advice, contents may settle during shipping.) I also wanted to emphasize that hardly anyone has the ability to discern for themselves whether the software/service is actually secure and to what degree. They are simply shifting the expectations that they have for things called phones from land lines to cell phones to VOIP, and in nearly all cases, they are doing so uncritically. I'm not sure whether I'll sign this yet or not. I support the idea of transparency, don't get me wrong. But I see no reason at all to believe anything in any answer that comes back. And if I ask myself one of my favorite questions (What would Machiavelli do?) (That's a book, by the way, recommended reading) then in Skype/Microsoft's place I would use my excellent staff of attorneys and PR people to craft a beautiful but useless response, full of sound and fury -- signifying...nothing. ---rsk -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Hi NK and all, I'd like to make a suggestion about the letter itself, specifically the 'From' bit: From Concerned Privacy Advocates, Internet Activists and Journalists I'd suggest you go broader and make it from civil society organisations, Internet Activists and Journalists ... If the letter is seen to come from a specific type of advocate it'll be ignored. It'd actually make it come from 'citizens' broadly. Great initial step. Best, Sam. On 17/01/2013, at 7:44 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: I've just spoken with Eva from EFF and it seems the letter might be undergoing some significant rewrites before being published next week. Will keep you all updated. NK On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote: That makes a lot of sense. best, Joe On 1/16/13 3:25 PM, Collin Anderson wrote: Joe, My experience has been that when a general letter is written with no particular recipient, it ends up being received and acted on by /no one/. Skype represents such a significant portion of the concern, even measured based on traffic to this list, that it warrants direct questions and focused efforts by civil society. I would add in that Skype's failures have not only been ambiguity regarding transport security, but this last particularly dark year in terms of infrastructure and client security. The acquisition of the company by MSFT, who has strong commitments to GNI and others, represents an unexplored opportunity to take up outstanding concerns, and poke at this TOM issue. However, I respect and share your broader concerns as equally legitimate, and assure you that efforts won't be spared elsewhere. Here I think CDT might make for a great bridge, even if it cannot participate at this moment. Cordially, Collin (Signed, jealous Nadim did this before me.) On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org mailto:j...@cdt.org wrote: (first post!) While CDT can't sign[1], I wanted to ask a question. (Since we can't sign on, I don't want you to feel like you have to answer!) I was wondering: why the focus on Skype and MSFT? If I were to answer my own question, I'd probably say the focus is simply due to the wide usage base of Skype, its' relative usability and the fact that it was at one time considered very e2e-secure. However, I wonder if this isn't more powerful as a more general open letter that talks about the principles you note and what kinds of measures (propreitary?) e2e communication technologies can take, using Skype as an example. Maybe another good answer is a letter has to have an audience and making it more general might make it more of a less-powerful statement than a directed letter with asks at the end. best, Joe [1] CDT rarely signs on to things. On 1/16/13 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Senior Staff Technologist Center for Democracy Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 j...@cdt.org mailto:j...@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com http://averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Senior Staff Technologist Center for Democracy Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 j...@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Sam de Silva skype: samonthenet s...@media.com.au +61 412 238 041 -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Well that is a job welldone Libtech amiga-os! Keep up the great work I look forward to seeing final. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 10:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- -- Lisa M. Brownlee, Esq. Mexico Skype: lisa.m.brownlee lmbscholar...@gmail.com lmbconta...@yahoo.com Author's website at West Thomson Reutershttp://west.thomson.com/store/authorbio2.aspx?r=4889product_id=15033039aurec=217572Auth About my Law Journal Press treatisehttp://www.lawcatalog.com/product_detail.cfm?productID=15196setlist=0return=search_resultsCFID=20088542CFTOKEN=b6ddabf982b888e4-2F42CE2A-B3D2-E07B-503BCB3A910E5EEC Facebook: Lisa M Brownleehttp://www.facebook.com/#%21/profile.php?id=1691642784sk=info Author of: Intellectual Property Due Diligence in Corporate Transactions: Investment, Risk Assessment and Management (West Thomson Reuters) Assets Finance: Audits and Valuation of Intellectual Property (West Thomson Reuters) Federal Acquisition Regulations: Intellectual Property and Related Rights (Law Journal Press) -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
This is an excellent effort, but I would explain all acronyms within the body of the letter, as it is intended as an open letter on behalf of all Skype users, many of whom will be unable to grasp its import as is. Best, Michael Sent from my iPhone On Jan 16, 2013, at 11:01 PM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you said into consideration. NK On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.net wrote: You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government surveillance section: As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of National Security Letters. You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize jointly the targeting of non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order (mass acquisition order) for the surveillance either before their joint authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized probable cause determinations or supervise the program. (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories: http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. Thank you, NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech