Re: [libvirt] Add new API for accessing remote guest text console

2010-08-20 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
On Wed, Aug 18, 2010 at 12:53:41PM +0200, Soren Hansen wrote:
 On 17-08-2010 19:02, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
  The 'virsh console' command has been an oddity that only works
  when run locally, as the same UID as the QEMU instance. This
  is because it directly opens /dev/pty/XXX. This introduces a
  formal API for accessing consoles that uses the virStreamPtr
  APIs. Now any app can open consoles anywhere it can connect
  to libvirt
 
 I don't (right now, at least) have any comments on the patches
 themselves, but I can't help but wonder what other wonderful
 improvements you've got in your pipeline. I spent at least a couple of
 hours on something like this a couple of weeks ago, but had I known that
 you were already doing it, I wouldn't have wasted my time.
 
 So, in an effort to not duplicate efforts, perhaps everyone who's
 working on something reasonably big (certainly stuff like this, but also
 smaller change sets) could put a list up somewhere for all to see?
 Perhaps such a list already exists and I just don't know about it?

I'm in the process of working through all the RFE bugs against libvirt
to put together a semi-formal 'roadmap' that we can publish. People
could then put their names against items if they intend todo them.

Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [libvirt] Add new API for accessing remote guest text console

2010-08-18 Thread Soren Hansen
On 17-08-2010 19:02, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
 The 'virsh console' command has been an oddity that only works
 when run locally, as the same UID as the QEMU instance. This
 is because it directly opens /dev/pty/XXX. This introduces a
 formal API for accessing consoles that uses the virStreamPtr
 APIs. Now any app can open consoles anywhere it can connect
 to libvirt

I don't (right now, at least) have any comments on the patches
themselves, but I can't help but wonder what other wonderful
improvements you've got in your pipeline. I spent at least a couple of
hours on something like this a couple of weeks ago, but had I known that
you were already doing it, I wouldn't have wasted my time.

So, in an effort to not duplicate efforts, perhaps everyone who's
working on something reasonably big (certainly stuff like this, but also
smaller change sets) could put a list up somewhere for all to see?
Perhaps such a list already exists and I just don't know about it?

-- 
Soren Hansen
Ubuntu Developer
http://www.ubuntu.com/

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[libvirt] Add new API for accessing remote guest text console

2010-08-17 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
The 'virsh console' command has been an oddity that only works
when run locally, as the same UID as the QEMU instance. This
is because it directly opens /dev/pty/XXX. This introduces a
formal API for accessing consoles that uses the virStreamPtr
APIs. Now any app can open consoles anywhere it can connect
to libvirt

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[libvirt] Add new API for accessing remote guest text console

2010-08-17 Thread R P Herrold

On Tue, 17 Aug 2010, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:


The 'virsh console' command has been an oddity that only works
when run locally, as the same UID as the QEMU instance. This
is because it directly opens /dev/pty/XXX. This introduces a
formal API for accessing consoles that uses the virStreamPtr
APIs. Now any app can open consoles anywhere it can connect
to libvirt


This and the patches look LOVELY --- thank you

We presently need to involve an admin level staffer to get 
onto the hosting box in question to be able to see the OOM, 
kernel, and other messages leaking out, and indeed to try to 
connect to a wedged instance.  We had it happen just last week


Getting network socket transport will solve a lot for us. 
Some authentication layer (PKI key mediated access comes to 
mind, similar to keyed SSH access), or ACL's to permit 
exposing specific consoles to specific end customers would 
close the loop


-- Russ herrold

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