Re: [PATCH 1/2] audit: move processing of "audit" boot param to audit_init()

2018-03-02 Thread Paul Moore 
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 4:46 PM, Greg Edwards  wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 02, 2018 at 03:33:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:52 PM, Greg Edwards  wrote:
>>> So, if you want to keep the panic behavior on bad audit parameters, your
>>> delayed processing should do the trick.  If it instead, you are fine
>>> with just pr_err and leaving audit enabled for that error case, then we
>>> are almost back to my original patch, with the exceptions you previously
>>> noted:
>>>
>>>   * leave audit enabled on parsing error
>>>   * change panic on audit_set_enabled() failure to pr_err
>>>   * handle on/off as well
>>
>> If we get rid of the need to panic(), which I think we are all okay
>> with, I think we can resolve everything with something like this, yes?
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index 1a3e75d9a66c..d41d09e84163 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -1618,16 +1618,20 @@ postcore_initcall(audit_init);
>> /* Process kernel command-line parameter at boot time.  audit=0 or audit=1. 
>> */
>> static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
>> {
>> -   long val;
>> -
>> -   if (kstrtol(str, 0, ))
>> -   panic("audit: invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
>> -   audit_default = (val ? AUDIT_ON : AUDIT_OFF);
>> +   if (!strcasecmp(str, "off") || !strcmp(str, "0"))
>> +   audit_default = AUDIT_OFF;
>> +   else if (!strcasecmp(str, "on") || !strcmp(str, "1"))
>> +   audit_default = AUDIT_ON;
>> +   else {
>> +   pr_err("audit: invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
>> +   audit_default = AUDIT_ON;
>> +   }
>>
>>if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
>>audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
>>if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
>> -   panic("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", 
>> audit_default);
>> +   pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n",
>> +  audit_default);
>>
>>pr_info("%s\n", audit_default ?
>>"enabled (after initialization)" : "disabled (until reboot)");
>>
>
> Paul, yes this works great, and exactly what I was thinking.

Great, sorry it took so long to get to this point, but I'm glad we've
finally synced up.

Would you the honor, and the glory (oh the glory!) of submitting a
formal patch? ;)

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Re: [PATCH 1/2] audit: move processing of "audit" boot param to audit_init()

2018-03-02 Thread Paul Moore 
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:52 PM, Greg Edwards  wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 05:28:09PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Greg Edwards  wrote:
>>> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 07:00:51PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:

 In the process of trying to explain things a bit further (see the
 discussion thread in 0/2), I realized that some example code might
 speak better than I could.  Below is what I was thinking for a fix; I
 haven't tested it, so it may blow up badly, but hopefully it makes
 things a bit more clear.

 One thing of note, I did away with the kstrtol() altogether, when we
 are only looking for zero and one it seems easier to just compare the
 strings.

 diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
 index 1a3e75d9a66c..5dd63f60ef90 100644
 --- a/kernel/audit.c
 +++ b/kernel/audit.c
 @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include 
 #include 
 #include 
 +#include 

 #include 

 @@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ static intaudit_initialized;
 #define AUDIT_OFF  0
 #define AUDIT_ON   1
 #define AUDIT_LOCKED   2
 +#define AUDIT_ARGERR   3   /* indicate a "audit=X" syntax error at 
 boot */
 u32audit_enabled = AUDIT_OFF;
 bool   audit_ever_enabled = !!AUDIT_OFF;

 @@ -1581,6 +1583,12 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
if (audit_initialized == AUDIT_DISABLED)
return 0;

 +   /* handle any delayed error reporting from audit_enable() */
 +   if (audit_default == AUDIT_ARGERR) {
 +   pr_err("invalid 'audit' parameter value, use 0 or 1\n");
 +   audit_default = AUDIT_ON;
 +   }
 +
>>>
>>> If you are just going to pr_err() on invalid audit parameter instead of
>>> panic, you don't need AUDIT_ARGERR at all or the delayed error reporting
>>> of it here.  You can just use pr_err() in audit_enable() directly.
>>
>> I thought the issue was that we couldn't reliably write to the console
>> in audit_enable() as it required early printks to be enabled?
>
> You can't reliably panic from audit_enable() unless earlyprintk is
> enabled, since the boot stops at the panic and the regular console isn't
> initialized yet.  pr_err/printk etc work fine, as those messages just
> get queued up and output once the regular console is initialized (since
> the boot continues on).

Thanks for the more detailed explanation, I was operating under the
assumption that the printks were happening immediately and not getting
queued; my mistake.

> So, if you want to keep the panic behavior on bad audit parameters, your
> delayed processing should do the trick.  If it instead, you are fine
> with just pr_err and leaving audit enabled for that error case, then we
> are almost back to my original patch, with the exceptions you previously
> noted:
>
>   * leave audit enabled on parsing error
>   * change panic on audit_set_enabled() failure to pr_err
>   * handle on/off as well
>
> My apologies if my commit message was misleading!

No need to apologize, I was a bit confused, but I think I've got a
handle on it now.

If we get rid of the need to panic(), which I think we are all okay
with, I think we can resolve everything with something like this, yes?

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 1a3e75d9a66c..d41d09e84163 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1618,16 +1618,20 @@ postcore_initcall(audit_init);
/* Process kernel command-line parameter at boot time.  audit=0 or audit=1. */
static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
{
-   long val;
-
-   if (kstrtol(str, 0, ))
-   panic("audit: invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
-   audit_default = (val ? AUDIT_ON : AUDIT_OFF);
+   if (!strcasecmp(str, "off") || !strcmp(str, "0"))
+   audit_default = AUDIT_OFF;
+   else if (!strcasecmp(str, "on") || !strcmp(str, "1"))
+   audit_default = AUDIT_ON;
+   else {
+   pr_err("audit: invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
+   audit_default = AUDIT_ON;
+   }

   if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
   audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
   if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
-   panic("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", audit_default);
+   pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n",
+  audit_default);

   pr_info("%s\n", audit_default ?
   "enabled (after initialization)" : "disabled (until reboot)");

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Re: [RFC PATCH V1 01/12] audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Paul Moore 
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:25 PM, Paul Moore  wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 1:23 PM, Matthew Wilcox  wrote:
>> On Fri, Mar 02, 2018 at 10:48:42AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Richard Guy Briggs  wrote:
>>> > On 2018-03-01 14:41, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>>> FYI, I think you may have a problem with something in your outgoing
>>> mail path; I didn't receive the original patchset you are referencing
>>> and it doesn't appear in the mail archive either.
>>
>> I have those patches.  Which mail archive is missing them?
>
> The archive run by the linux-audit mailing list:
>
> * https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit

After having my reply get bounced from the linux-audit list I realized
that Richard had gotten a little overzealous with the number of
recipients (note to Richard, you easily could have dropped some of
those lists/people from the To/CC line).

I was able to get in and free those patches from the moderation queue,
they should be arriving on the linux-audit list shortly.

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[RFC PATCH V1 10/12] audit: add containerid support for seccomp and anom_abend records

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Add container ID information to secure computing and abnormal end
standalone records.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 10 --
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0cbd762..fcee34e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2569,6 +2569,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
@@ -2576,19 +2577,22 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
if (signr == SIGQUIT)   /* don't care for those */
return;
 
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_task(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "abend", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_task(ab);
@@ -2596,6 +2600,8 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, 
int code)
 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall,
 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "seccomp", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 11/12] debug audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Switch from the 1000 range to the 1300 range for the prototype until it
can be worked out why the former aren't showing up in the logs.
---
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 8443a8f..c392b3b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@
 #define AUDIT_TTY_SET  1017/* Set TTY auditing status */
 #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE  1018/* Turn an audit feature on or off */
 #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE  1019/* Get which features are enabled */
-#define AUDIT_CONTAINER1020/* Define the container id and 
information */
+//#define AUDIT_CONTAINER  1020/* Define the container id and 
information */
+#define AUDIT_CONTAINER1333/* Define the container id and 
information */
 
 #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG   1100/* Userspace messages mostly 
uninteresting to kernel */
 #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107/* We filter this differently */
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 12/12] debug! audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Debugging code for verbose output to aid in development.
---
 fs/proc/base.c   | 10 ++
 kernel/auditsc.c | 16 
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index f66d1e2..63d1ca4 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1309,9 +1309,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_containerid_read(struct file *file, 
char __user *buf,
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN*2];
 
if (!task)
+   {
+   pr_info("no inode owner");
return -ESRCH;
+   }
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN*2, "%llu", 
audit_get_containerid(task));
put_task_struct(task);
+   pr_info("read: pid=%d opid=%d contid=%llu", pid_nr(task_tgid(current)), 
pid_nr(task_tgid(task)), audit_get_containerid(task));
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -1324,14 +1328,19 @@ static ssize_t proc_containerid_write(struct file 
*file, const char __user *buf,
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
 
if (!task)
+   {
+   pr_info("no inode owner");
return -ESRCH;
+   }
if (*ppos != 0) {
/* No partial writes. */
put_task_struct(task);
+   pr_info("no partial writes");
return -EINVAL;
}
 
rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, );
+   pr_info("write: pid=%d rv=%d count=%ld opid=%d contid=%llu", 
task_tgid_nr(current), rv, count, task_tgid_nr(task), containerid);
if (rv < 0) {
put_task_struct(task);
return rv;
@@ -1339,6 +1348,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_containerid_write(struct file *file, 
const char __user *buf,
 
rv = audit_set_containerid(task, containerid);
put_task_struct(task);
+   //pr_info("audit_set_containerid: rv=%d", rv);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
return count;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fcee34e..39e7dc10 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2111,16 +2111,28 @@ static int audit_set_containerid_perm(struct 
task_struct *task, u64 containerid)
 
/* Don't allow to set our own containerid */
if (current == task)
+   {
+   pr_info("pid=%d can't set own containerid", task_tgid_nr(task));
return -EPERM;
+   }
/* Don't allow the containerid to be unset */
if (!cid_valid(containerid))
+   {
+   pr_info("can't unset containerid");
return -EINVAL;
+   }
/* if we don't have caps, reject */
if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+   {
+   pr_info("don't have CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL");
return -EPERM;
+   }
/* if containerid is unset, allow */
if (!audit_containerid_set(task))
+   {
+   //pr_info("unset, allow");
return 0;
+   }
/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */
ccontainerid = audit_get_containerid(task);
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2131,7 +2143,11 @@ static int audit_set_containerid_perm(struct task_struct 
*task, u64 containerid)
ppid = task_tgid_nr(parent);
task_unlock(parent);
if (ccontainerid != pcontainerid)
+   {
+   pr_info("pid=%d already has contid=%llu set, not inherited from 
ppid=%d with contid=%llu, can't set containerid %llu",
+   task_tgid_nr(task), ccontainerid, ppid, pcontainerid, 
containerid);
return -EPERM;
+   }
return 0;
 }
 
-- 
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[RFC PATCH V1 08/12] audit: add containerid support for tty_audit

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Add container ID information to tty logging rule standalone records.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 -
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
index e30aa6b..48ee4b7 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,
uid_t uid = from_kuid(_user_ns, task_uid(tsk));
uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
if (ab) {
char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
 
@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,
audit_log_n_hex(ab, data, size);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "tty", audit_get_containerid(tsk));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 05/12] audit: add containerid support for ptrace and signals

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Add container ID support to ptrace and signals.  In particular, the "op"
field provides a way to label the auxiliary record to which it is
associated.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 include/linux/audit.h | 16 +++-
 kernel/audit.c| 12 
 kernel/audit.h|  2 ++
 kernel/auditsc.c  | 19 +++
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index f10ca1b..ed16bb6 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info {
uid_t   uid;
pid_t   pid;
charctx[0];
+   u64 cid;
 };
 
 struct audit_buffer;
@@ -155,8 +156,8 @@ extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char 
*operation,
 extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
 extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct task_struct *tsk);
-extern int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
-struct audit_context *context);
+extern int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context,
+char *op, u64 containerid);
 
 extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
 
@@ -208,8 +209,8 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct 
audit_buffer *ab)
 static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
   struct task_struct *tsk)
 { }
-static inline int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
-   struct audit_context *context);
+static inline int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context,
+   char *op, u64 containerid);
 { }
 #define audit_enabled 0
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
@@ -598,9 +599,14 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct 
*tsk)
return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
 }
 
+static inline bool cid_valid(u64 containerid)
+{
+   return containerid != INVALID_CID;
+}
+
 static inline bool audit_containerid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-   return audit_get_containerid(tsk) != INVALID_CID;
+   return cid_valid(audit_get_containerid(tsk));
 }
 
 static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8dc745f..f5cd0bc 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct audit_net {
 kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
 pid_t  audit_sig_pid = -1;
 u32audit_sig_sid = 0;
+u64audit_sig_cid = INVALID_CID;
 
 /* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1394,6 +1395,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct 
nlmsghdr *nlh)
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
+   sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid;
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
kfree(sig_data);
@@ -1998,20 +2000,22 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 
 /*
  * audit_log_container_info - report container info
- * @tsk: task to be recorded
  * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: containerid string description
+ * @containerid: container ID to report
  */
-int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context 
*context)
+int audit_log_container_info(struct audit_context *context,
+ char *op, u64 containerid)
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
-   if (!audit_containerid_set(tsk))
+   if (!cid_valid(containerid))
return 0;
/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO with container ID */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO);
if (!ab)
return -ENOMEM;
-   audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", audit_get_containerid(tsk));
+   audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", op, containerid);
audit_log_end(ab);
return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 683316a..abbabba 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t  target_uid;
unsigned inttarget_sessionid;
u32 target_sid;
+   u64 target_cid;
chartarget_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -330,6 +331,7 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
 extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern u64 audit_sig_cid;
 
 extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
 
diff --git

[RFC PATCH V1 04/12] audit: read container ID of a process

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Add support for reading the container ID from the proc filesystem.

This is a read from the proc entry of the form /proc/PID/containerid
where PID is the process ID of the task whose container ID is sought.

The read expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 20 ++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 6ce4fbe..f66d1e2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1300,6 +1300,21 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, 
char __user * buf,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static ssize_t proc_containerid_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+   struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+   struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+   ssize_t length;
+   char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN*2];
+
+   if (!task)
+   return -ESRCH;
+   length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN*2, "%llu", 
audit_get_containerid(task));
+   put_task_struct(task);
+   return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
 static ssize_t proc_containerid_write(struct file *file, const char __user 
*buf,
   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -1330,6 +1345,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_containerid_write(struct file *file, 
const char __user *buf,
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations proc_containerid_operations = {
+   .read   = proc_containerid_read,
.write  = proc_containerid_write,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
@@ -2996,7 +3012,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, 
struct pid_namespace *ns,
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid",   S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
-   REG("containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
+   REG("containerid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
@@ -3391,7 +3407,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, 
int mask)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid",  S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
-   REG("containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
+   REG("containerid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 09/12] audit: add containerid support for config/feature/user records

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Add container ID information to configuration change, feature set change
and user generated standalone records.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 kernel/audit.c   | 50 --
 kernel/auditfilter.c |  5 -
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f5cd0bc..a4c0bad 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -358,8 +358,9 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 
new, u32 old,
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int rc = 0;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return rc;
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%u old=%u", function_name, new, old);
@@ -369,6 +370,8 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 
new, u32 old,
allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "config", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1016,7 +1019,8 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 
msg_type)
return err;
 }
 
-static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
+static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,
+ struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
 {
uid_t uid = from_kuid(_user_ns, current_uid());
pid_t pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
@@ -1026,7 +1030,7 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer 
**ab, u16 msg_type)
return;
}
 
-   *ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
+   *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
if (unlikely(!*ab))
return;
audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", pid, uid);
@@ -1055,16 +1059,19 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 
old_feature, u32 new_feature
 u32 old_lock, u32 new_lock, int res)
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return;
 
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE);
audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
audit_log_format(ab, " feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u 
res=%d",
 audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, 
!!new_feature,
 !!old_lock, !!new_lock, res);
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "feature", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 static int audit_set_feature(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1293,13 +1300,15 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, 
struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 
err = audit_filter(msg_type, AUDIT_FILTER_USER);
if (err == 1) { /* match or error */
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
+
err = 0;
if (msg_type == AUDIT_USER_TTY) {
err = tty_audit_push();
if (err)
break;
}
-   audit_log_common_recv_msg(, msg_type);
+   audit_log_common_recv_msg(context, , msg_type);
if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY)
audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.*s'",
 AUDIT_MESSAGE_TEXT_MAX,
@@ -1315,6 +1324,9 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct 
nlmsghdr *nlh)
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, data, size);
}
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "user",
+
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
}
break;
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
@@ -1322,9 +1334,14 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct 
nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
return -EINVAL;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) {
-   audit_log_common_recv_msg(, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
+
+   audit_log_common_recv_msg(context, , 
AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);

[RFC PATCH V1 07/12] audit: add container aux record to watch/tree/mark

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Add container ID information to mark, watch and tree rule standalone
records.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 kernel/audit_fsnotify.c |  5 -
 kernel/audit_tree.c |  5 -
 kernel/audit_watch.c| 33 +++--
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
index 52f368b..18c110d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
@@ -124,10 +124,11 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct 
audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, c
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_krule *rule = audit_mark->rule;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u op=%s",
@@ -138,6 +139,8 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct 
audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, c
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", rule->listnr);
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "config", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index fd35312..2ad85d4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -496,8 +496,9 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree 
*tree)
 static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
 {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
 
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove_rule");
@@ -506,6 +507,8 @@ static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule 
*rule)
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", rule->listnr);
audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "config", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 9eb8b35..60d75a2 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -238,20 +238,25 @@ static struct audit_watch *audit_dupe_watch(struct 
audit_watch *old)
 
 static void audit_watch_log_rule_change(struct audit_krule *r, struct 
audit_watch *w, char *op)
 {
-   if (audit_enabled) {
-   struct audit_buffer *ab;
-   ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
-   if (unlikely(!ab))
-   return;
-   audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u op=%s",
-from_kuid(_user_ns, 
audit_get_loginuid(current)),
-audit_get_sessionid(current), op);
-   audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
-   audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
-   audit_log_key(ab, r->filterkey);
-   audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
-   audit_log_end(ab);
-   }
+   struct audit_buffer *ab;
+   struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
+
+   if (!audit_enabled)
+   return;
+
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+   if (unlikely(!ab))
+   return;
+   audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u op=%s",
+from_kuid(_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+audit_get_sessionid(current), op);
+   audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
+   audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
+   audit_log_key(ab, r->filterkey);
+   audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
+   audit_log_end(ab);
+   audit_log_container_info(context, "config", 
audit_get_containerid(current));
+   audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 /* Update inode info in audit rules based on filesystem event. */
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 06/12] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Standalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated
on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone.  This is a
prototype of a method to generate a local audit context that will be
used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record.  The context
is discarded immediately after the local associated records are
produced.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 include/linux/audit.h |  8 
 kernel/auditsc.c  | 20 +++-
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index ed16bb6..c0b83cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -227,7 +227,9 @@ static inline int audit_log_container_info(struct 
audit_context *context,
 /* These are defined in auditsc.c */
/* Public API */
 extern int  audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
+extern struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void);
 extern void __audit_free(struct task_struct *task);
+extern void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context);
 extern void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long 
a1,
  unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3);
 extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
@@ -472,6 +474,12 @@ static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
 {
return 0;
 }
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void)
+{
+   return NULL;
+}
+static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+{ }
 static inline void audit_free(struct task_struct *task)
 { }
 static inline void audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0,
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0e41884..0cbd762 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -959,8 +959,26 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void)
 {
+   struct audit_context *context;
+
+   if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
+   return NULL; /* Return if not auditing. */
+
+   context = audit_alloc_context(AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
+   if (!context)
+   return NULL;
+   context->serial = audit_serial();
+   context->ctime = current_kernel_time64();
+   context->in_syscall = 1;
+   return context;
+}
+
+inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+   if (!context)
+   return;
audit_free_names(context);
unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
free_tree_refs(context);
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 02/12] audit: log container info of syscalls

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Create a new audit record AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO to document the container
ID of a process if it is present.

Called from audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.

A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c03e syscall=257 
success=yes exit=3 a0=ff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 
pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 
ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" 
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid"
type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 
dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 
nametype= PARENT cap_fp= cap_fi= cap_fe=0 
cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" 
inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp= 
cap_fi= cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): 
proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964
type=UNKNOWN[1332] msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/32
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 include/linux/audit.h  |  5 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  1 +
 kernel/audit.c | 20 
 kernel/auditsc.c   |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index fe4ba3f..3acbe9d 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char 
*operation,
 extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
 extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
+struct audit_context *context);
 
 extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
 
@@ -205,6 +207,9 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct 
audit_buffer *ab)
 static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
   struct task_struct *tsk)
 { }
+static inline int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
+   struct audit_context *context);
+{ }
 #define audit_enabled 0
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 921a71f..e83ccbd 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_REPLACE  1329/* Replace auditd if this packet 
unanswerd */
 #define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE  1330/* Kernel Module events */
 #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331/* Fanotify access decision */
+#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO   1332/* Container ID information */
 
 #define AUDIT_AVC  1400/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR  1401/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5c25449..8dc745f 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1996,6 +1996,26 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u", auid, sessionid);
 }
 
+/*
+ * audit_log_container_info - report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ */
+int audit_log_container_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context 
*context)
+{
+   struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+   if (!audit_containerid_set(tsk))
+   return 0;
+   /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO with container ID */
+   ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO);
+   if (!ab)
+   return -ENOMEM;
+   audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", audit_get_containerid(tsk));
+   audit_log_end(ab);
+   return 0;
+}
+
 void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 {
audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0ee1e59..f015c25 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1453,6 +1453,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, 
struct task_struct *ts
 
audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
 
+   audit_log_container_info(tsk, context);
+
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
if (ab)
-- 
1.8.3.1

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[RFC PATCH V1 03/12] audit: add containerid filtering

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Implement container ID filtering using the AUDIT_CONTAINERID field name
to send an 8-character string representing a u64 since the value field
is only u32.

Sending it as two u32 was considered, but gathering and comparing two
fields was more complex.

The feature indicator is AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER.

This requires support from userspace to be useful.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 include/linux/audit.h  |  1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  5 -
 kernel/audit.h |  1 +
 kernel/auditfilter.c   | 47 ++
 kernel/auditsc.c   |  3 +++
 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 3acbe9d..f10ca1b 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct audit_field {
u32 type;
union {
u32 val;
+   u64 val64;
kuid_t  uid;
kgid_t  gid;
struct {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index e83ccbd..8443a8f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24
 #define AUDIT_SESSIONID25  /* Session ID */
 #define AUDIT_FSTYPE   26  /* FileSystem Type */
+#define AUDIT_CONTAINERID  27  /* Container ID */
 
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ enum {
 #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER  0x0010
 #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET0x0020
 #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS 0x0040
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER0x0080
 
 #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \
  AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
@@ -349,7 +351,8 @@ enum {
  AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND | \
  AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER | \
  AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET | \
- AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS)
+ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS | \
+ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER)
 
 /* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */
 #define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST   AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index af5bc59..683316a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ static inline int audit_hash_ino(u32 ino)
 
 extern int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall);
 extern int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right);
+extern int audit_comparator64(const u64 left, const u32 op, const u64 right);
 extern int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right);
 extern int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right);
 extern int parent_len(const char *path);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index d7a807e..c4c8746 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, 
struct audit_field *f)
/* FALL THROUGH */
case AUDIT_ARCH:
case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
+   case AUDIT_CONTAINERID:
if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -584,6 +585,14 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct 
audit_rule_data *data,
}
entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
break;
+   case AUDIT_CONTAINERID:
+   if (f->val != sizeof(u64))
+   goto exit_free;
+   str = audit_unpack_string(, , f->val);
+   if (IS_ERR(str))
+   goto exit_free;
+   f->val64 = ((u64 *)str)[0];
+   break;
}
}
 
@@ -666,6 +675,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct 
audit_krule *krule)
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(, 
audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
break;
+   case AUDIT_CONTAINERID:
+   data->buflen += data->values[i] = sizeof(u64);
+   for (i = 0; i < sizeof(u64); i++)
+   ((char *)bufp)[i] = ((char *)>val64)[i];
+   break;
case

[RFC PATCH V1 01/12] audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.

This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
the form /proc/PID/containerid where PID is the process ID of the newly
created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an
additional task added to a container.

The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).

This will produce a record such as this:
type=UNKNOWN[1333] msg=audit(1519903238.968:261): op=set pid=596 uid=0 
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 auid=0 tty=pts0 
ses=1 opid=596 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123455 res=0

The "op" field indicates an initial set.  The "pid" to "ses" fields are
the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process
being "contained".  Old and new container ID values are given in the
"contid" fields, while res indicates its success.

It is not permitted to self-set, unset or re-set the container ID.  A
child inherits its parent's container ID, but then can be set only once
after.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/32

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 37 
 include/linux/audit.h  | 16 +
 include/linux/init_task.h  |  4 ++-
 include/linux/sched.h  |  1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  2 ++
 kernel/auditsc.c   | 86 ++
 6 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 60316b5..6ce4fbe 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1299,6 +1299,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, 
char __user * buf,
.read   = proc_sessionid_read,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
+
+static ssize_t proc_containerid_write(struct file *file, const char __user 
*buf,
+  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+   struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+   u64 containerid;
+   int rv;
+   struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+
+   if (!task)
+   return -ESRCH;
+   if (*ppos != 0) {
+   /* No partial writes. */
+   put_task_struct(task);
+   return -EINVAL;
+   }
+
+   rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, );
+   if (rv < 0) {
+   put_task_struct(task);
+   return rv;
+   }
+
+   rv = audit_set_containerid(task, containerid);
+   put_task_struct(task);
+   if (rv < 0)
+   return rv;
+   return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_containerid_operations = {
+   .write  = proc_containerid_write,
+   .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
@@ -2961,6 +2996,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, 
struct pid_namespace *ns,
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid",   S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
+   REG("containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
@@ -3355,6 +3391,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, 
int mask)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid",  S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
+   REG("containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index af410d9..fe4ba3f 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 
 #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
 #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1)
+#define INVALID_CID AUDIT_CID_UNSET
 
 struct audit_sig_info {
uid_t   uid;
@@ -321,6 +322,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
 extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
+extern int audit_set_containerid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 containerid);
 
 static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
@@ -332,6 +334,11 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct 
task_struct *tsk)
return tsk->sessionid;
 }
 
+static inline u64 audit_get_containerid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+   return tsk->containerid;
+}
+
 extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, 
umode_t mode);
 extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -517,6 +524,10 @@

Re: [RFC PATCH V1 01/12] audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Paul Moore 
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 1:23 PM, Matthew Wilcox  wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 02, 2018 at 10:48:42AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Richard Guy Briggs  wrote:
>> > On 2018-03-01 14:41, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> FYI, I think you may have a problem with something in your outgoing
>> mail path; I didn't receive the original patchset you are referencing
>> and it doesn't appear in the mail archive either.
>
> I have those patches.  Which mail archive is missing them?

The archive run by the linux-audit mailing list:

* https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit

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[RFC PATCH V1 00/12] audit: implement container id

2018-03-02 Thread Richard Guy Briggs 
Implement audit kernel container ID.

This patchset is a preliminary RFC based on the proposal document (V3)
posted:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-January/msg00014.html

The first patch implements the proc fs write to set the audit container
ID of a process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record.

The second implements an auxiliary syscall record AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO
if a container ID is present on a task.

The third adds filtering to the exit, exclude and user lists.

The 4th, implements reading the container ID from the proc filesystem
for debugging.  This isn't planned for upstream inclusion.

The 5th adds signal and ptrace support.

The 6th attempts to create a local audit context to be able to bind a
standalone record with the container ID record.

The 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th patches add container ID records to standalone
records.  Some of these may end up being syscall auxiliary records and
won't need this specific support since they'll be supported via
syscalls.

The 11th is a temporary workaround due to the AUDIT_CONTAINER records
not showing up as do AUDIT_LOGIN records.  I suspect this is due to its
range (1000 vs 1300), but the intent is to solve it.

The 12th adds debug information not intended for upstream for those
brave souls wanting to tinker with it in this early state.

Feedback please!

Here's a quick and dirty test script:
echo 123455 > /proc/$$/containerid; echo $?
sleep 4&  
child=$!; sleep 1
echo 18446744073709551615 > /proc/$child/containerid; echo $?
echo 123456 > /proc/$child/containerid; echo $?
echo 123457 > /proc/$child/containerid; echo $?
sleep 1
ausearch -ts recent |grep " contid=18446744073709551615"; echo $?
ausearch -ts recent |grep " contid=123456"; echo $?
ausearch -ts recent |grep " contid=123457"; echo $?
echo self:$$ contid:$( cat /proc/$$/containerid)
echo child:$child contid:$( cat /proc/$child/containerid)

containerid=123458
key=tmpcontainerid
auditctl -a exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F containerid=$containerid -F 
key=$key || echo failed to add containerid filter rule
bash -c "sleep 1; echo test > /tmp/$key"&
child=$!
echo $containerid > /proc/$child/containerid
sleep 2
rm -f /tmp/$key
ausearch -ts recent -k $key || echo failed to find CONTAINER_INFO record
auditctl -d exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F containerid=$containerid -F 
key=$key || echo failed to add containerid filter rule

See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/32
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64

Richard Guy Briggs (12):
  audit: add container id
  audit: log container info of syscalls
  audit: add containerid filtering
  audit: read container ID of a process
  audit: add containerid support for ptrace and signals
  audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
  audit: add container aux record to watch/tree/mark
  audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
  audit: add containerid support for config/feature/user records
  audit: add containerid support for seccomp and anom_abend records
  debug audit: add container id
  debug! audit: add container id

 drivers/tty/tty_audit.c|   5 +-
 fs/proc/base.c |  63 +++
 include/linux/audit.h  |  36 +++
 include/linux/init_task.h  |   4 +-
 include/linux/sched.h  |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h |   9 ++-
 kernel/audit.c |  74 +++---
 kernel/audit.h |   3 +
 kernel/audit_fsnotify.c|   5 +-
 kernel/audit_tree.c|   5 +-
 kernel/audit_watch.c   |  33 +-
 kernel/auditfilter.c   |  52 ++-
 kernel/auditsc.c   | 154 +++--
 13 files changed, 408 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

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Re: [RFC PATCH V1 01/12] audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Matthew Wilcox 
On Fri, Mar 02, 2018 at 10:48:42AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Richard Guy Briggs  wrote:
> > On 2018-03-01 14:41, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> FYI, I think you may have a problem with something in your outgoing
> mail path; I didn't receive the original patchset you are referencing
> and it doesn't appear in the mail archive either.

I have those patches.  Which mail archive is missing them?

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Re: [RFC PATCH V1 01/12] audit: add container id

2018-03-02 Thread Paul Moore 
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Richard Guy Briggs  wrote:
> On 2018-03-01 14:41, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
>> emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
>>
>> This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
>> the form /proc/PID/containerid where PID is the process ID of the newly
>> created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an
>> additional task added to a container.
>>
>> The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
>>
>> This will produce a record such as this:
>> type=UNKNOWN[1333] msg=audit(1519903238.968:261): op=set pid=596 uid=0 
>> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 auid=0 tty=pts0 
>> ses=1 opid=596 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123455 res=0
>>
>> The "op" field indicates an initial set.  The "pid" to "ses" fields are
>> the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process
>> being "contained".  Old and new container ID values are given in the
>> "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
>>
>> It is not permitted to self-set, unset or re-set the container ID.  A
>> child inherits its parent's container ID, but then can be set only once
>> after.
>
> There are more restrictions coming later:
> - check that the child being set has no children or threads yet, or
>   forcibly set them all to the same container ID (assuming they all pass
>   the same tests).  This will also prevent an orch from setting its
>   parent and other tit-for-tat games to circumvent the basic checks.

FYI, I think you may have a problem with something in your outgoing
mail path; I didn't receive the original patchset you are referencing
and it doesn't appear in the mail archive either.

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