Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > > set*id. > > > > Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul > has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities > patches rather than audit? Applied to git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-general -- James Morris -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
On 2017-10-20 01:29, James Morris wrote: > On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > > > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > > > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > > > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > > > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > > > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > > > set*id. > > > > > > > > Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul > > has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities > > patches rather than audit? > > Sure, I will take it. Thanks Jaume! > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > > > > > The first to eighth patches just massage the logic to make it easier to > > > understand. Some of them could be squashed together. > > > > > > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. > > > > > > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of > > > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" > > > to > > > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" > > > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think > > > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. > > > > > > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging > > > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some > > > duplication in the logic. > > > > > > Passes: (ltp 20170516) > > > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap > > > ./runltp -f securebits > > > ./runltp -f cap_bounds > > > ./runltp -f filecaps > > > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) > > > > > > Since this is mostly capabilities related rather than audit, could this go > > > through the capabilites (Serge) or security (James) trees please? Thanks! > > > > > > v5 > > > rebase on linux-security/next 4.14-rc2 > > > added comment block header to handle_privileged_root() > > > moved comment in handle_privileged_root() > > > moved root_privileged() check back into handle_privileged_root() > > > > > > v4 > > > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes > > > minor local func renames > > > > > > v3 > > > refactor into several sub-functions > > > convert most macros to inline funcs > > > > > > v2 > > > use macros to clarify intent of calculations > > > fix original logic error > > > address additional audit logging conditions > > > > > > Richard Guy Briggs (10): > > > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root > > > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status > > > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap > > > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic > > > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes > > > capabilities: move audit log decision to function > > > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic > > > capabilities: invert logic for clarity > > > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root > > > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions > > > > > > security/commoncap.c | 193 > > > ++- > > > 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > > > > > -- > > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > > > -- > > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe > > > linux-security-module" in > > > the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org > > > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > > > > - RGB > > > > -- > > Richard Guy Briggs > > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 > > > > -- > James Morris > > - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > > set*id. > > > > Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul > has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities > patches rather than audit? > Sure, I will take it. > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > > > The first to eighth patches just massage the logic to make it easier to > > understand. Some of them could be squashed together. > > > > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. > > > > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of > > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" > > to > > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" > > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think > > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. > > > > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging > > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some > > duplication in the logic. > > > > Passes: (ltp 20170516) > > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap > > ./runltp -f securebits > > ./runltp -f cap_bounds > > ./runltp -f filecaps > > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) > > > > Since this is mostly capabilities related rather than audit, could this go > > through the capabilites (Serge) or security (James) trees please? Thanks! > > > > v5 > > rebase on linux-security/next 4.14-rc2 > > added comment block header to handle_privileged_root() > > moved comment in handle_privileged_root() > > moved root_privileged() check back into handle_privileged_root() > > > > v4 > > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes > > minor local func renames > > > > v3 > > refactor into several sub-functions > > convert most macros to inline funcs > > > > v2 > > use macros to clarify intent of calculations > > fix original logic error > > address additional audit logging conditions > > > > Richard Guy Briggs (10): > > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root > > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status > > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap > > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic > > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes > > capabilities: move audit log decision to function > > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic > > capabilities: invert logic for clarity > > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root > > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions > > > > security/commoncap.c | 193 > > ++- > > 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > > > -- > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe > > linux-security-module" in > > the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org > > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 > -- James Morris -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > set*id. Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities patches rather than audit? > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > The first to eighth patches just massage the logic to make it easier to > understand. Some of them could be squashed together. > > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. > > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" > to > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. > > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some > duplication in the logic. > > Passes: (ltp 20170516) > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap > ./runltp -f securebits > ./runltp -f cap_bounds > ./runltp -f filecaps > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) > > Since this is mostly capabilities related rather than audit, could this go > through the capabilites (Serge) or security (James) trees please? Thanks! > > v5 > rebase on linux-security/next 4.14-rc2 > added comment block header to handle_privileged_root() > moved comment in handle_privileged_root() > moved root_privileged() check back into handle_privileged_root() > > v4 > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes > minor local func renames > > v3 > refactor into several sub-functions > convert most macros to inline funcs > > v2 > use macros to clarify intent of calculations > fix original logic error > address additional audit logging conditions > > Richard Guy Briggs (10): > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes > capabilities: move audit log decision to function > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic > capabilities: invert logic for clarity > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions > > security/commoncap.c | 193 > ++- > 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > -- > 1.8.3.1 > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe > linux-security-module" in > the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
[PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 The first to eighth patches just massage the logic to make it easier to understand. Some of them could be squashed together. The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" to "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some duplication in the logic. Passes: (ltp 20170516) ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap ./runltp -f securebits ./runltp -f cap_bounds ./runltp -f filecaps make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) Since this is mostly capabilities related rather than audit, could this go through the capabilites (Serge) or security (James) trees please? Thanks! v5 rebase on linux-security/next 4.14-rc2 added comment block header to handle_privileged_root() moved comment in handle_privileged_root() moved root_privileged() check back into handle_privileged_root() v4 rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes minor local func renames v3 refactor into several sub-functions convert most macros to inline funcs v2 use macros to clarify intent of calculations fix original logic error address additional audit logging conditions Richard Guy Briggs (10): capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes capabilities: move audit log decision to function capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic capabilities: invert logic for clarity capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions security/commoncap.c | 193 ++- 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) -- 1.8.3.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
