testmgr: async hashes : _update and _final tests
Hi, This is regarding the following patch: http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg04527.html I am using 2.6.39.4. 1 question: Q1. [SHA1]When I try to run sha1 tests on a hardware, I see that the tests are running from sha1_tv_template[]. [A] 3 tests are supposed to be run using crypto_ahash_digest() for lengths 3 bytes, 56 bytes and 163 bytes. + [B] 3 more tests (3, 56, 163 bytes again) are supposed to be run using crypto_ahash_init/_update and _final(). What I am observing is that in the [B] set of tests, the first test (length 3 bytes) runs with _init/_update/_final but the reamining two tests (of length 56 and 163 bytes) run with crypto_ahash_digest() instead of _init/_update/_final(). I could not figure out why this is happening? ~Jitendra-- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-crypto in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Re: [RFC V4 PATCH 00/15] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
On Sunday, September 15, 2013 08:56:46 AM Lee, Chun-Yi wrote: Hi experts, This patchset is the implementation for signature verification of hibernate snapshot image. The origin idea is from Jiri Kosina: Let EFI bootloader generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, then pass it to kernel for sign/verify S4 image. Due to there have potential threat from the S4 image hacked, it may causes kernel lost the trust in UEFI secure boot. Hacker attack the S4 snapshot image in swap partition through whatever exploit from another trusted OS, and the exploit may don't need physical access machine. So, this patchset give the ability to kernel for parsing RSA private key from EFI bootloader, then using the private key to generate the signature of S4 snapshot image. Kernel put the signature to snapshot header, and verify the signature when kernel try to recover snapshot image to memory. I wonder what the status of this work is? Is it considered ready for inclusion or are you still going to work on it and resubmit? Rafael -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-crypto in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Re: [PATCH] [CRYPTO] kconfig: Corrected a typo
On Thu, 17 Oct 2013, Siddharth Goel wrote: Corrected a typo in option description in Kconfig Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60848 Signed-off-by: Siddharth Goel siddharth98...@gmail.com --- crypto/Kconfig |2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index 69ce573..84698cf 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SERPENT Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps of 8 bits. Also includes the 'Tnepres' algorithm, a reversed - variant of Serpent for compatibility with old kerneli.org code. + variant of Serpent for compatibility with old kernel.org code. Automatic conversion of kerneli - kernel is not correct, it's not a typo. Please google for kerneli in LKML archives. -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-crypto in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html