[PATCH] crypto: Move RSA+MPI constructs into an #include file

[Gary R Hook]

Move RSA support of general use into internal/rsa.h.
This allows reuse of, e.g. RSA MPI keys and support
functions.

Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook 
---
 crypto/rsa.c  |   16 
 include/crypto/internal/rsa.h |   17 +
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rsa.c b/crypto/rsa.c
index 4c280b6..15e9220 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa.c
@@ -16,12 +16,6 @@
 #include 
 #include 
 
-struct rsa_mpi_key {
-   MPI n;
-   MPI e;
-   MPI d;
-};
-
 /*
  * RSAEP function [RFC3447 sec 5.1.1]
  * c = m^e mod n;
@@ -240,16 +234,6 @@ err_free_m:
return ret;
 }
 
-static void rsa_free_mpi_key(struct rsa_mpi_key *key)
-{
-   mpi_free(key->d);
-   mpi_free(key->e);
-   mpi_free(key->n);
-   key->d = NULL;
-   key->e = NULL;
-   key->n = NULL;
-}
-
 static int rsa_check_key_length(unsigned int len)
 {
switch (len) {
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
index 9e8f159..253b275 100644
--- a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #ifndef _RSA_HELPER_
 #define _RSA_HELPER_
 #include 
+#include 
 
 /**
  * rsa_key - RSA key structure
@@ -52,6 +53,22 @@ struct rsa_key {
size_t qinv_sz;
 };
 
+struct rsa_mpi_key {
+   MPI n;
+   MPI e;
+   MPI d;
+};
+
+static inline void rsa_free_mpi_key(struct rsa_mpi_key *key)
+{
+   mpi_free(key->d);
+   mpi_free(key->e);
+   mpi_free(key->n);
+   key->d = NULL;
+   key->e = NULL;
+   key->n = NULL;
+}
+
 int rsa_parse_pub_key(struct rsa_key *rsa_key, const void *key,
  unsigned int key_len);
 

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Re: [PATCH 6/6] Add support for AEAD algos.

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Donnerstag, 13. Oktober 2016, 16:39:39 CEST schrieb Harsh Jain:

Hi Harsh,

> Add support for following AEAD algos.
>  GCM,CCM,RFC4106,RFC4309,authenc(hmac(shaXXX),cbc(aes)).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain 
> ---
>  drivers/crypto/chelsio/Kconfig   |1 +
>  drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c   | 1466
> +- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.h   |  
> 16 +-
>  drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_core.c   |8 +-
>  drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_core.h   |2 -
>  drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_crypto.h |   90 ++-
>  6 files changed, 1541 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/Kconfig
> index 4ce67fb..3e104f5 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/Kconfig
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_CHELSIO
>   select CRYPTO_SHA1
>   select CRYPTO_SHA256
>   select CRYPTO_SHA512
> + select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
>   ---help---
> The Chelsio Crypto Co-processor driver for T6 adapters.
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c
> b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c index 18385d6..cffc38f 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,12 @@
>  #include 
>  #include 
>  #include 
> +#include 
> +#include 
> +#include 
> +#include 
> +#include 
> +#include 
>  #include 
> 
>  #include "t4fw_api.h"
> @@ -62,6 +68,11 @@
>  #include "chcr_algo.h"
>  #include "chcr_crypto.h"
> 
> +static inline  struct chcr_aead_ctx *AEAD_CTX(struct chcr_context *ctx)
> +{
> + return ctx->crypto_ctx->aeadctx;
> +}
> +
>  static inline struct ablk_ctx *ABLK_CTX(struct chcr_context *ctx)
>  {
>   return ctx->crypto_ctx->ablkctx;
> @@ -72,6 +83,16 @@ static inline struct hmac_ctx *HMAC_CTX(struct
> chcr_context *ctx) return ctx->crypto_ctx->hmacctx;
>  }
> 
> +static inline struct chcr_gcm_ctx *GCM_CTX(struct chcr_aead_ctx *gctx)
> +{
> + return gctx->ctx->gcm;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct chcr_authenc_ctx *AUTHENC_CTX(struct chcr_aead_ctx
> *gctx) +{
> + return gctx->ctx->authenc;
> +}
> +
>  static inline struct uld_ctx *ULD_CTX(struct chcr_context *ctx)
>  {
>   return ctx->dev->u_ctx;
> @@ -94,12 +115,37 @@ static inline unsigned int sgl_len(unsigned int n)
>   return (3 * n) / 2 + (n & 1) + 2;
>  }
> 
> +static void chcr_verify_tag(struct aead_request *req, u8 *input, int *err)
> +{
> + u8 temp[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> + int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
> + struct cpl_fw6_pld *fw6_pld;
> + int cmp = 0;
> +
> + fw6_pld = (struct cpl_fw6_pld *)input;
> + if ((get_aead_subtype(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_SUB_TYPE_AEAD_RFC4106) ||
> + (get_aead_subtype(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_SUB_TYPE_AEAD_GCM)) {
> + cmp = memcmp(_pld->data[2], (fw6_pld + 1), authsize);
> + } else {
> +
> + sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, sg_nents(req->src), temp,
> + authsize, req->assoclen +
> + req->cryptlen - authsize);

I am wondering whether the math is correct here in any case. It is permissible 
that we have an AAD size of 0 and even a zero-sized ciphertext. How is such 
scenario covered here?

> + cmp = memcmp(temp, (fw6_pld + 1), authsize);

I would guess in both cases memcmp should be replaced with crypto_memneq

> + }
> + if (cmp)
> + *err = -EBADMSG;
> + else
> + *err = 0;

What do you think about memzero_explicit(tmp)?

> +}
> +
>  /*
>   *   chcr_handle_resp - Unmap the DMA buffers associated with the request
>   *   @req: crypto request
>   */
>  int chcr_handle_resp(struct crypto_async_request *req, unsigned char
> *input, -  int error_status)
> +  int err)
>  {
>   struct crypto_tfm *tfm = req->tfm;
>   struct chcr_context *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> @@ -109,11 +155,27 @@ int chcr_handle_resp(struct crypto_async_request *req,
> unsigned char *input, unsigned int digestsize, updated_digestsize;
> 
>   switch (tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) {
> + case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
> + ctx_req.req.aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
> + ctx_req.ctx.reqctx = aead_request_ctx(ctx_req.req.aead_req);
> + dma_unmap_sg(_ctx->lldi.pdev->dev, ctx_req.req.aead_req->dst,
> +  ctx_req.ctx.reqctx->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> + if (ctx_req.ctx.reqctx->skb) {
> + kfree_skb(ctx_req.ctx.reqctx->skb);
> + ctx_req.ctx.reqctx->skb = NULL;
> + }
> + if (ctx_req.ctx.reqctx->verify == VERIFY_SW) {
> + chcr_verify_tag(ctx_req.req.aead_req, input,
> + );
> + ctx_req.ctx.reqctx->verify = VERIFY_HW;
> + }
> +