Re: [RFC PATCH v6] mm, pmem, xfs: Introduce MF_MEM_REMOVE for unbind
Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 11:21:44AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > ruansy.f...@fujitsu.com wrote:
> > > This patch is inspired by Dan's "mm, dax, pmem: Introduce
> > > dev_pagemap_failure()"[1]. With the help of dax_holder and
> > > ->notify_failure() mechanism, the pmem driver is able to ask filesystem
> > > (or mapped device) on it to unmap all files in use and notify processes
> > > who are using those files.
> > >
> > > Call trace:
> > > trigger unbind
> > > -> unbind_store()
> > > -> ... (skip)
> > >-> devres_release_all() # was pmem driver ->remove() in v1
> > > -> kill_dax()
> > > -> dax_holder_notify_failure(dax_dev, 0, U64_MAX, MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE)
> > > -> xfs_dax_notify_failure()
> > >
> > > Introduce MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE to let filesystem know this is a remove
> > > event. So do not shutdown filesystem directly if something not
> > > supported, or if failure range includes metadata area. Make sure all
> > > files and processes are handled correctly.
> > >
> > > ==
> > > Changes since v5:
> > > 1. Renamed MF_MEM_REMOVE to MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE
> > > 2. hold s_umount before sync_filesystem()
> > > 3. move sync_filesystem() after SB_BORN check
> > > 4. Rebased on next-20220714
> > >
> > > Changes since v4:
> > > 1. sync_filesystem() at the beginning when MF_MEM_REMOVE
> > > 2. Rebased on next-20220706
> > >
> > > [1]:
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/161604050314.1463742.14151665140035795571.st...@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com/
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
> > > ---
> > > drivers/dax/super.c | 3 ++-
> > > fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c | 15 +++
> > > include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
> > > 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/drivers/dax/super.c b/drivers/dax/super.c
> > > index 9b5e2a5eb0ae..cf9a64563fbe 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/dax/super.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/dax/super.c
> > > @@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ void kill_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
> > > return;
> > >
> > > if (dax_dev->holder_data != NULL)
> > > - dax_holder_notify_failure(dax_dev, 0, U64_MAX, 0);
> > > + dax_holder_notify_failure(dax_dev, 0, U64_MAX,
> > > + MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE);
> > >
> > > clear_bit(DAXDEV_ALIVE, &dax_dev->flags);
> > > synchronize_srcu(&dax_srcu);
> > > diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c
> > > index 69d9c83ea4b2..6da6747435eb 100644
> > > --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c
> > > +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c
> > > @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ xfs_dax_failure_fn(
> > >
> > > if (XFS_RMAP_NON_INODE_OWNER(rec->rm_owner) ||
> > > (rec->rm_flags & (XFS_RMAP_ATTR_FORK | XFS_RMAP_BMBT_BLOCK))) {
> > > + /* Do not shutdown so early when device is to be removed */
> > > + if (notify->mf_flags & MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE)
> > > + return 0;
> > > xfs_force_shutdown(mp, SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_ONDISK);
> > > return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> > > }
> > > @@ -174,12 +177,22 @@ xfs_dax_notify_failure(
> > > struct xfs_mount*mp = dax_holder(dax_dev);
> > > u64 ddev_start;
> > > u64 ddev_end;
> > > + int error;
> > >
> > > if (!(mp->m_sb.sb_flags & SB_BORN)) {
> > > xfs_warn(mp, "filesystem is not ready for notify_failure()!");
> > > return -EIO;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + if (mf_flags & MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE) {
> > > + xfs_info(mp, "device is about to be removed!");
> > > + down_write(&mp->m_super->s_umount);
> > > + error = sync_filesystem(mp->m_super);
> > > + up_write(&mp->m_super->s_umount);
> >
> > Are all mappings invalidated after this point?
>
> No; all this step does is pushes dirty filesystem [meta]data to pmem
> before we lose DAXDEV_ALIVE...
>
> > The goal of the removal notification is to invalidate all DAX mappings
> > that are no pointing to pfns that do not exist anymore, so just syncing
> > does not seem like enough, and the shutdown is skipped above. What am I
> > missing?
>
> ...however, the shutdown above only applies to filesystem metadata. In
> effect, we avoid the fs shutdown in MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE mode, which
> enables the mf_dax_kill_procs calls to proceed against mapped file data.
> I have a nagging suspicion that in non-PREREMOVE mode, we can end up
> shutting down the filesytem on an xattr block and the 'return
> -EFSCORRUPTED' actually prevents us from reaching all the remaining file
> data mappings.
>
> IOWs, I think that clause above really ought to have returned zero so
> that we keep the filesystem up while we're tearing down mappings, and
> only call xfs_force_shutdown() after we've had a chance to let
> xfs_dax_notify_ddev_failure() tear down all the mappings.
>
> I missed that subtlety in the initial ~30 rounds of review, but I figure
> at this point let's just land it in 5.20 and clean up that quirk for
Re: [RFC PATCH v6] mm, pmem, xfs: Introduce MF_MEM_REMOVE for unbind
On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 11:21:44AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> ruansy.f...@fujitsu.com wrote:
> > This patch is inspired by Dan's "mm, dax, pmem: Introduce
> > dev_pagemap_failure()"[1]. With the help of dax_holder and
> > ->notify_failure() mechanism, the pmem driver is able to ask filesystem
> > (or mapped device) on it to unmap all files in use and notify processes
> > who are using those files.
> >
> > Call trace:
> > trigger unbind
> > -> unbind_store()
> > -> ... (skip)
> >-> devres_release_all() # was pmem driver ->remove() in v1
> > -> kill_dax()
> > -> dax_holder_notify_failure(dax_dev, 0, U64_MAX, MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE)
> > -> xfs_dax_notify_failure()
> >
> > Introduce MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE to let filesystem know this is a remove
> > event. So do not shutdown filesystem directly if something not
> > supported, or if failure range includes metadata area. Make sure all
> > files and processes are handled correctly.
> >
> > ==
> > Changes since v5:
> > 1. Renamed MF_MEM_REMOVE to MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE
> > 2. hold s_umount before sync_filesystem()
> > 3. move sync_filesystem() after SB_BORN check
> > 4. Rebased on next-20220714
> >
> > Changes since v4:
> > 1. sync_filesystem() at the beginning when MF_MEM_REMOVE
> > 2. Rebased on next-20220706
> >
> > [1]:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/161604050314.1463742.14151665140035795571.st...@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan
> > ---
> > drivers/dax/super.c | 3 ++-
> > fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c | 15 +++
> > include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
> > 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/dax/super.c b/drivers/dax/super.c
> > index 9b5e2a5eb0ae..cf9a64563fbe 100644
> > --- a/drivers/dax/super.c
> > +++ b/drivers/dax/super.c
> > @@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ void kill_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
> > return;
> >
> > if (dax_dev->holder_data != NULL)
> > - dax_holder_notify_failure(dax_dev, 0, U64_MAX, 0);
> > + dax_holder_notify_failure(dax_dev, 0, U64_MAX,
> > + MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE);
> >
> > clear_bit(DAXDEV_ALIVE, &dax_dev->flags);
> > synchronize_srcu(&dax_srcu);
> > diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c
> > index 69d9c83ea4b2..6da6747435eb 100644
> > --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c
> > +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_notify_failure.c
> > @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ xfs_dax_failure_fn(
> >
> > if (XFS_RMAP_NON_INODE_OWNER(rec->rm_owner) ||
> > (rec->rm_flags & (XFS_RMAP_ATTR_FORK | XFS_RMAP_BMBT_BLOCK))) {
> > + /* Do not shutdown so early when device is to be removed */
> > + if (notify->mf_flags & MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE)
> > + return 0;
> > xfs_force_shutdown(mp, SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_ONDISK);
> > return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> > }
> > @@ -174,12 +177,22 @@ xfs_dax_notify_failure(
> > struct xfs_mount*mp = dax_holder(dax_dev);
> > u64 ddev_start;
> > u64 ddev_end;
> > + int error;
> >
> > if (!(mp->m_sb.sb_flags & SB_BORN)) {
> > xfs_warn(mp, "filesystem is not ready for notify_failure()!");
> > return -EIO;
> > }
> >
> > + if (mf_flags & MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE) {
> > + xfs_info(mp, "device is about to be removed!");
> > + down_write(&mp->m_super->s_umount);
> > + error = sync_filesystem(mp->m_super);
> > + up_write(&mp->m_super->s_umount);
>
> Are all mappings invalidated after this point?
No; all this step does is pushes dirty filesystem [meta]data to pmem
before we lose DAXDEV_ALIVE...
> The goal of the removal notification is to invalidate all DAX mappings
> that are no pointing to pfns that do not exist anymore, so just syncing
> does not seem like enough, and the shutdown is skipped above. What am I
> missing?
...however, the shutdown above only applies to filesystem metadata. In
effect, we avoid the fs shutdown in MF_MEM_PRE_REMOVE mode, which
enables the mf_dax_kill_procs calls to proceed against mapped file data.
I have a nagging suspicion that in non-PREREMOVE mode, we can end up
shutting down the filesytem on an xattr block and the 'return
-EFSCORRUPTED' actually prevents us from reaching all the remaining file
data mappings.
IOWs, I think that clause above really ought to have returned zero so
that we keep the filesystem up while we're tearing down mappings, and
only call xfs_force_shutdown() after we've had a chance to let
xfs_dax_notify_ddev_failure() tear down all the mappings.
I missed that subtlety in the initial ~30 rounds of review, but I figure
at this point let's just land it in 5.20 and clean up that quirk for
-rc1.
> Notice that kill_dev_dax() does unmap_mapping_range() after invalidating
> the dax device and that ensures that all existing mappings are gone and
> cannot be re-established. As far as
Re: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware
On Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 09:11:33PM +, Jane Chu wrote: > On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote: > >> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero > >> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a > >> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, > >> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that > >> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value. > > > > Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use > > it. > > > > Is it possible that with >if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK) > the ->physical_addr_mask is still untrustworthy? The validation_bits just show which fields the BIOS *says* it filled in. If a validation bit isn't set, then Linux should certainly ignore that field. But if it is set, then Linux needs to decide whether to use the value, or do a sanity check first. -Tony
Re: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware
On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote: >> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero >> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a >> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, >> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that >> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value. > > Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use > it. > Is it possible that with if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK) the ->physical_addr_mask is still untrustworthy? include/ras/ras_event.h has this if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK) __entry->pa_mask_lsb = (u8)__ffs64(mem->physical_addr_mask); else __entry->pa_mask_lsb = ~0; which hints otherwise. apei_mce_report_mem_error() already checks mem->validation_bits up front. thanks! -jane > -Tony
RE: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware
> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero > in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a > broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, > so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that > ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value. Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it. -Tony
RE: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware
Luck, Tony wrote: > +m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask); > > Do we want to unconditionally trust the sanity of the BIOS provided > physical_address_mask? > > There's a warning comment on the kernel __ffs64() function: > > * The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word > * is non-zero before calling this. > > Otherwise, this looks like a good idea. It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.
RE: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware
+ m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask); Do we want to unconditionally trust the sanity of the BIOS provided physical_address_mask? There's a warning comment on the kernel __ffs64() function: * The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word * is non-zero before calling this. Otherwise, this looks like a good idea. -Tony
