Re: [PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : On Tue, 27 Nov 2007 08:09:19 +0100, Eric Dumazet said: Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential exhaust. Verbiage about this point... +nr_open +--- + +Denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can +allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be +enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE +resource limit. + should probably be in here - can you add something of the form "Setting this too high can cause vmalloc failures, especially on smaller-RAM machines", and/or *say* how much RAM the default takes? Sure, it's 1M entries, but my tuning on a 2G-RAM machine will differ if these are byte-sized, or 128-byte sized - one is off in a corner, the other is 1/16th of my entire memory. vmalloc failures can already happen if you start 32 processes on i386 kernels, each of them wanting to open file handle number 600.000 (if their RLIMIT_NOFILE >= 60) fcntl(0, F_DUPFD, 60); We are not going to add warnings about vmalloc on every sysctl around there that could allow a root user to exhaust vmalloc space. This is a vmalloc issue on 32bit kernel, and quite frankly I never hit this limit. If you take a look at vmalloc() implementation, fact that it uses a 'struct vm_struct *vmlist;' to track all active zones show that vmalloc() is not used that much. Also, would it be useful to *lower* the value drastically, if you know a priori that no process should get up to 1K file handles, much less 1M? Does that buy me anything different than setting RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024? NR_OPEN is the max value that RLIMIT_NOFILE can reach, nothing more. You can set it to 256*1024*1024 or 4*1024 it wont change memory needs on your machine, unless you raise RLIMIT_NOFILE and one of your program leaks file handles, or really want to open simultaneously many of them. Most programs wont open more than 500 files, so their file table is allocated via kmalloc() - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
On Tue, 27 Nov 2007 08:09:19 +0100, Eric Dumazet said: > Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential > exhaust. Verbiage about this point... > +nr_open > +--- > + > +Denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can > +allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be > +enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE > +resource limit. > + should probably be in here - can you add something of the form "Setting this too high can cause vmalloc failures, especially on smaller-RAM machines", and/or *say* how much RAM the default takes? Sure, it's 1M entries, but my tuning on a 2G-RAM machine will differ if these are byte-sized, or 128-byte sized - one is off in a corner, the other is 1/16th of my entire memory. Also, would it be useful to *lower* the value drastically, if you know a priori that no process should get up to 1K file handles, much less 1M? Does that buy me anything different than setting RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024? pgp1uLtbj6Sc1.pgp Description: PGP signature
[PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
As changing NR_OPEN from 1024*1024 to 16*1024*1024 was considered a litle
bit dangerous, just let it default to 1024*1024 but adds a new sysctl
to let sysadmins change this value.
Thank you
[PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
NR_OPEN (historically set to 1024*1024) actually forbids processes to open
more than 1024*1024 handles.
Unfortunatly some production servers hit the not so 'ridiculously high value'
of 1024*1024 file descriptors per process.
Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential
exhaust.
This patch introduces a new sysctl (/proc/sys/fs/nr_open) wich defaults to
1024*1024, so that admins can decide to change this limit if their workload
needs it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt |8
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt| 10 ++
fs/file.c |8 +---
include/linux/fs.h |2 +-
kernel/sys.c |2 +-
kernel/sysctl.c|8
6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index dec9945..9b390d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -989,6 +989,14 @@ nr_inodes
Denotes the number of inodes the system has allocated. This number will
grow and shrink dynamically.
+nr_open
+---
+
+Denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can
+allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be
+enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE
+resource limit.
+
nr_free_inodes
--
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index aa986a3..f992543 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
- inode-max
- inode-nr
- inode-state
+- nr_open
- overflowuid
- overflowgid
- suid_dumpable
@@ -91,6 +92,15 @@ usage of file handles and you don't need to increase the
maximum.
==
+nr_open:
+
+This denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can
+allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be
+enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE
+resource limit.
+
+==
+
inode-max, inode-nr & inode-state:
As with file handles, the kernel allocates the inode structures
diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
index c5575de..5110acb 100644
--- a/fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/file.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ struct fdtable_defer {
struct fdtable *next;
};
+int sysctl_nr_open __read_mostly = 1024*1024;
+
/*
* We use this list to defer free fdtables that have vmalloced
* sets/arrays. By keeping a per-cpu list, we avoid having to embed
@@ -147,8 +149,8 @@ static struct fdtable * alloc_fdtable(unsigned int nr)
nr /= (1024 / sizeof(struct file *));
nr = roundup_pow_of_two(nr + 1);
nr *= (1024 / sizeof(struct file *));
- if (nr > NR_OPEN)
- nr = NR_OPEN;
+ if (nr > sysctl_nr_open)
+ nr = sysctl_nr_open;
fdt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct fdtable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fdt)
@@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ int expand_files(struct files_struct *files, int nr)
if (nr < fdt->max_fds)
return 0;
/* Can we expand? */
- if (nr >= NR_OPEN)
+ if (nr >= sysctl_nr_open)
return -EMFILE;
/* All good, so we try */
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index b3ec4a4..1cda287 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
/* Fixed constants first: */
#undef NR_OPEN
-#define NR_OPEN (1024*1024)/* Absolute upper limit on fd num */
+extern int sysctl_nr_open;
#define INR_OPEN 1024 /* Initial setting for nfile rlimits */
#define BLOCK_SIZE_BITS 10
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index d1fe71e..99c6ce1 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit __user *rlim)
if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
return -EPERM;
- if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN)
+ if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
return -EPERM;
retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, _rlim);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 0deed82..de22f7b 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1127,6 +1127,14 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.proc_handler = _dointvec,
},
{
+
[PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
As changing NR_OPEN from 1024*1024 to 16*1024*1024 was considered a litle
bit dangerous, just let it default to 1024*1024 but adds a new sysctl
to let sysadmins change this value.
Thank you
[PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
NR_OPEN (historically set to 1024*1024) actually forbids processes to open
more than 1024*1024 handles.
Unfortunatly some production servers hit the not so 'ridiculously high value'
of 1024*1024 file descriptors per process.
Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential
exhaust.
This patch introduces a new sysctl (/proc/sys/fs/nr_open) wich defaults to
1024*1024, so that admins can decide to change this limit if their workload
needs it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Alan Cox [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt |8
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt| 10 ++
fs/file.c |8 +---
include/linux/fs.h |2 +-
kernel/sys.c |2 +-
kernel/sysctl.c|8
6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index dec9945..9b390d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -989,6 +989,14 @@ nr_inodes
Denotes the number of inodes the system has allocated. This number will
grow and shrink dynamically.
+nr_open
+---
+
+Denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can
+allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be
+enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE
+resource limit.
+
nr_free_inodes
--
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index aa986a3..f992543 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
- inode-max
- inode-nr
- inode-state
+- nr_open
- overflowuid
- overflowgid
- suid_dumpable
@@ -91,6 +92,15 @@ usage of file handles and you don't need to increase the
maximum.
==
+nr_open:
+
+This denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can
+allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be
+enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE
+resource limit.
+
+==
+
inode-max, inode-nr inode-state:
As with file handles, the kernel allocates the inode structures
diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
index c5575de..5110acb 100644
--- a/fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/file.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ struct fdtable_defer {
struct fdtable *next;
};
+int sysctl_nr_open __read_mostly = 1024*1024;
+
/*
* We use this list to defer free fdtables that have vmalloced
* sets/arrays. By keeping a per-cpu list, we avoid having to embed
@@ -147,8 +149,8 @@ static struct fdtable * alloc_fdtable(unsigned int nr)
nr /= (1024 / sizeof(struct file *));
nr = roundup_pow_of_two(nr + 1);
nr *= (1024 / sizeof(struct file *));
- if (nr NR_OPEN)
- nr = NR_OPEN;
+ if (nr sysctl_nr_open)
+ nr = sysctl_nr_open;
fdt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct fdtable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fdt)
@@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ int expand_files(struct files_struct *files, int nr)
if (nr fdt-max_fds)
return 0;
/* Can we expand? */
- if (nr = NR_OPEN)
+ if (nr = sysctl_nr_open)
return -EMFILE;
/* All good, so we try */
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index b3ec4a4..1cda287 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
/* Fixed constants first: */
#undef NR_OPEN
-#define NR_OPEN (1024*1024)/* Absolute upper limit on fd num */
+extern int sysctl_nr_open;
#define INR_OPEN 1024 /* Initial setting for nfile rlimits */
#define BLOCK_SIZE_BITS 10
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index d1fe71e..99c6ce1 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit __user *rlim)
if ((new_rlim.rlim_max old_rlim-rlim_max)
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
return -EPERM;
- if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE new_rlim.rlim_max NR_OPEN)
+ if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE new_rlim.rlim_max sysctl_nr_open)
return -EPERM;
retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 0deed82..de22f7b 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1127,6 +1127,14 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
+ .ctl_name =
Re: [PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
On Tue, 27 Nov 2007 08:09:19 +0100, Eric Dumazet said: Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential exhaust. Verbiage about this point... +nr_open +--- + +Denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can +allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be +enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE +resource limit. + should probably be in here - can you add something of the form Setting this too high can cause vmalloc failures, especially on smaller-RAM machines, and/or *say* how much RAM the default takes? Sure, it's 1M entries, but my tuning on a 2G-RAM machine will differ if these are byte-sized, or 128-byte sized - one is off in a corner, the other is 1/16th of my entire memory. Also, would it be useful to *lower* the value drastically, if you know a priori that no process should get up to 1K file handles, much less 1M? Does that buy me anything different than setting RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024? pgp1uLtbj6Sc1.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [PATCH] get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : On Tue, 27 Nov 2007 08:09:19 +0100, Eric Dumazet said: Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential exhaust. Verbiage about this point... +nr_open +--- + +Denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can +allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be +enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE +resource limit. + should probably be in here - can you add something of the form Setting this too high can cause vmalloc failures, especially on smaller-RAM machines, and/or *say* how much RAM the default takes? Sure, it's 1M entries, but my tuning on a 2G-RAM machine will differ if these are byte-sized, or 128-byte sized - one is off in a corner, the other is 1/16th of my entire memory. vmalloc failures can already happen if you start 32 processes on i386 kernels, each of them wanting to open file handle number 600.000 (if their RLIMIT_NOFILE = 60) fcntl(0, F_DUPFD, 60); We are not going to add warnings about vmalloc on every sysctl around there that could allow a root user to exhaust vmalloc space. This is a vmalloc issue on 32bit kernel, and quite frankly I never hit this limit. If you take a look at vmalloc() implementation, fact that it uses a 'struct vm_struct *vmlist;' to track all active zones show that vmalloc() is not used that much. Also, would it be useful to *lower* the value drastically, if you know a priori that no process should get up to 1K file handles, much less 1M? Does that buy me anything different than setting RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024? NR_OPEN is the max value that RLIMIT_NOFILE can reach, nothing more. You can set it to 256*1024*1024 or 4*1024 it wont change memory needs on your machine, unless you raise RLIMIT_NOFILE and one of your program leaks file handles, or really want to open simultaneously many of them. Most programs wont open more than 500 files, so their file table is allocated via kmalloc() - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
