Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions
On Thu, 2021-01-21 at 14:40 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2021, Maxim Levitsky wrote: > > BTW, on unrelated note, currently the smap test is broken in kvm-unit tests. > > I bisected it to commit 322cdd6405250a2a3e48db199f97a45ef519e226 > > > > It seems that the following hack (I have no idea why it works, > > since I haven't dug deep into the area 'fixes', the smap test for me) > > > > -#define USER_BASE (1 << 24) > > +#define USER_BASE (1 << 25) > > https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2021012808.619347-2-imbre...@linux.ibm.com > Thanks! Best regards, Maxim Levitsky
Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021, Maxim Levitsky wrote: > BTW, on unrelated note, currently the smap test is broken in kvm-unit tests. > I bisected it to commit 322cdd6405250a2a3e48db199f97a45ef519e226 > > It seems that the following hack (I have no idea why it works, > since I haven't dug deep into the area 'fixes', the smap test for me) > > -#define USER_BASE (1 << 24) > +#define USER_BASE (1 << 25) https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2021012808.619347-2-imbre...@linux.ibm.com
Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions
On Thu, 2021-01-21 at 10:06 -0600, Wei Huang wrote:
>
> On 1/21/21 8:07 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > On Thu, 2021-01-21 at 01:55 -0500, Wei Huang wrote:
> > > From: Bandan Das
> > >
> > > While running SVM related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD), some AMD
> > > CPUs check EAX against reserved memory regions (e.g. SMM memory on host)
> > > before checking VMCB's instruction intercept. If EAX falls into such
> > > memory areas, #GP is triggered before VMEXIT. This causes problem under
> > > nested virtualization. To solve this problem, KVM needs to trap #GP and
> > > check the instructions triggering #GP. For VM execution instructions,
> > > KVM emulates these instructions.
> > >
> > > Co-developed-by: Wei Huang
> > > Signed-off-by: Wei Huang
> > > Signed-off-by: Bandan Das
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 99 ++
> > > 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > > index 7ef171790d02..6ed523cab068 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > > @@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
> > > if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
> > > svm_leave_nested(svm);
> > > svm_set_gif(svm, true);
> > > + /* #GP intercept is still needed in vmware_backdoor */
> > > + if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
> > > + clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
> > Again I would prefer a flag for the errata workaround, but this is still
> > better.
>
> Instead of using !enable_vmware_backdoor, will the following be better?
> Or the existing form is acceptable.
>
> if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
> clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
To be honest I would prefer to have a module param named something like
'enable_svm_gp_errata_workaround' that would have 3 state value: (0,1,-1),
aka true,false,auto
0,1 - would mean force disable/enable the workaround.
-1 - auto select based on X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK.
0 could be used if for example someone is paranoid in regard to attack surface.
-#define USER_BASE (1 << 24)
+#define USER_BASE (1 << 25)
This isn't that much importaint to me though, so if you prefer you can leave it
as is
as well.
>
> > >
> > > /*
> > >* Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
> > > @@ -309,6 +312,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
> > >
> > > svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
> > > vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
> > > + /* Enable #GP interception for SVM instructions */
> > > + set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
> > > +
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > @@ -1957,24 +1963,6 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > > -{
> > > - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> > > - u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
> > > -
> > > - WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
> > > -
> > > - /*
> > > - * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles IN{S},
> > > - * OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero error code.
> > > - */
> > > - if (error_code) {
> > > - kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
> > > - return 1;
> > > - }
> > > - return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > static bool is_erratum_383(void)
> > > {
> > > int err, i;
> > > @@ -2173,6 +2161,81 @@ static int vmrun_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > > return nested_svm_vmrun(svm);
> > > }
> > >
> > > +enum {
> > > + NOT_SVM_INSTR,
> > > + SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
> > > + SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
> > > + SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +/* Return NOT_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode
> > > result */
> > > +static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > > +{
> > > + struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
> > > +
> > > + if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
> > > + return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
> > > +
> > > + switch (ctxt->modrm) {
> > > + case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
> > > + return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
> > > + case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
> > > + return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
> > > + case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
> > > + return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
> > > + default:
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
> > > +{
> > > + int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
> > > + [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
> > > + [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
> > > + [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
> > > + };
> > > + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> > > +
> > > + return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](
Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions
On 1/21/21 8:07 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-01-21 at 01:55 -0500, Wei Huang wrote:
>> From: Bandan Das
>>
>> While running SVM related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD), some AMD
>> CPUs check EAX against reserved memory regions (e.g. SMM memory on host)
>> before checking VMCB's instruction intercept. If EAX falls into such
>> memory areas, #GP is triggered before VMEXIT. This causes problem under
>> nested virtualization. To solve this problem, KVM needs to trap #GP and
>> check the instructions triggering #GP. For VM execution instructions,
>> KVM emulates these instructions.
>>
>> Co-developed-by: Wei Huang
>> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang
>> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 99 ++
>> 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> index 7ef171790d02..6ed523cab068 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> @@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
>> if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
>> svm_leave_nested(svm);
>> svm_set_gif(svm, true);
>> +/* #GP intercept is still needed in vmware_backdoor */
>> +if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
>> +clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
> Again I would prefer a flag for the errata workaround, but this is still
> better.
Instead of using !enable_vmware_backdoor, will the following be better?
Or the existing form is acceptable.
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
>
>>
>> /*
>> * Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
>> @@ -309,6 +312,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
>>
>> svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
>> vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
>> +/* Enable #GP interception for SVM instructions */
>> +set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
>> +
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -1957,24 +1963,6 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> return 1;
>> }
>>
>> -static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> -{
>> -struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>> -u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
>> -
>> -WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
>> -
>> -/*
>> - * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles IN{S},
>> - * OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero error code.
>> - */
>> -if (error_code) {
>> -kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
>> -return 1;
>> -}
>> -return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
>> -}
>> -
>> static bool is_erratum_383(void)
>> {
>> int err, i;
>> @@ -2173,6 +2161,81 @@ static int vmrun_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> return nested_svm_vmrun(svm);
>> }
>>
>> +enum {
>> +NOT_SVM_INSTR,
>> +SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
>> +SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
>> +SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* Return NOT_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
>> +static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> +struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
>> +
>> +if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
>> +return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
>> +
>> +switch (ctxt->modrm) {
>> +case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
>> +return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
>> +case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
>> +return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
>> +case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
>> +return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
>> +default:
>> +break;
>> +}
>> +
>> +return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
>> +{
>> +int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
>> +[SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
>> +[SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
>> +[SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
>> +};
>> +struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>> +
>> +return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](svm);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
>> + * cases:
>> + * 1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP
>> on
>> + * some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved
>> memory
>> + * regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
>> + * 2) VMware backdoor
>> + */
>> +static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> +{
>> +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>> +u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
>> +int opcode;
>> +
>> +/* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
>
> I would have kept the original description of possible #GP reasons
> for the VMWARE backdoor and that WARN_ON_ONCE that was removed.
>
Will do
>
>> +
Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions
On Thu, 2021-01-21 at 01:55 -0500, Wei Huang wrote:
> From: Bandan Das
>
> While running SVM related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD), some AMD
> CPUs check EAX against reserved memory regions (e.g. SMM memory on host)
> before checking VMCB's instruction intercept. If EAX falls into such
> memory areas, #GP is triggered before VMEXIT. This causes problem under
> nested virtualization. To solve this problem, KVM needs to trap #GP and
> check the instructions triggering #GP. For VM execution instructions,
> KVM emulates these instructions.
>
> Co-developed-by: Wei Huang
> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang
> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 99 ++
> 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 7ef171790d02..6ed523cab068 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
> if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
> svm_leave_nested(svm);
> svm_set_gif(svm, true);
> + /* #GP intercept is still needed in vmware_backdoor */
> + if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
> + clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
Again I would prefer a flag for the errata workaround, but this is still
better.
>
> /*
>* Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
> @@ -309,6 +312,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
>
> svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
> vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
> + /* Enable #GP interception for SVM instructions */
> + set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1957,24 +1963,6 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> return 1;
> }
>
> -static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> -{
> - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> - u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
> -
> - WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
> -
> - /*
> - * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles IN{S},
> - * OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero error code.
> - */
> - if (error_code) {
> - kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
> - return 1;
> - }
> - return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
> -}
> -
> static bool is_erratum_383(void)
> {
> int err, i;
> @@ -2173,6 +2161,81 @@ static int vmrun_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> return nested_svm_vmrun(svm);
> }
>
> +enum {
> + NOT_SVM_INSTR,
> + SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
> + SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
> + SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
> +};
> +
> +/* Return NOT_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
> +static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
> +
> + if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
> + return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
> +
> + switch (ctxt->modrm) {
> + case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
> + return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
> + case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
> + return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
> + case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
> + return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
> +}
> +
> +static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
> +{
> + int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
> + [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
> + [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
> + [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
> + };
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> + return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](svm);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
> + * cases:
> + * 1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP on
> + * some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved
> memory
> + * regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
> + * 2) VMware backdoor
> + */
> +static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> + u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
> + int opcode;
> +
> + /* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
I would have kept the original description of possible #GP reasons
for the VMWARE backdoor and that WARN_ON_ONCE that was removed.
> + if (error_code)
> + goto reinject;
> +
> + /* Decode the instruction for usage later */
> + if (x86_emulate_decoded_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK)
> + goto reinject;
> +
> + opcode = svm_instr_opcode(vcpu);
> + if (opcode)
I prefer opcode != NOT_SVM_INSTR.
> + return emulate_svm
[PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions
From: Bandan Das
While running SVM related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD), some AMD
CPUs check EAX against reserved memory regions (e.g. SMM memory on host)
before checking VMCB's instruction intercept. If EAX falls into such
memory areas, #GP is triggered before VMEXIT. This causes problem under
nested virtualization. To solve this problem, KVM needs to trap #GP and
check the instructions triggering #GP. For VM execution instructions,
KVM emulates these instructions.
Co-developed-by: Wei Huang
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 99 ++
1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7ef171790d02..6ed523cab068 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
svm_leave_nested(svm);
svm_set_gif(svm, true);
+ /* #GP intercept is still needed in vmware_backdoor */
+ if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
/*
* Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
@@ -309,6 +312,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+ /* Enable #GP interception for SVM instructions */
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1957,24 +1963,6 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return 1;
}
-static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
- u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
-
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
-
- /*
-* VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles IN{S},
-* OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero error code.
-*/
- if (error_code) {
- kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
- return 1;
- }
- return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
-}
-
static bool is_erratum_383(void)
{
int err, i;
@@ -2173,6 +2161,81 @@ static int vmrun_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return nested_svm_vmrun(svm);
}
+enum {
+ NOT_SVM_INSTR,
+ SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
+ SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
+ SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
+};
+
+/* Return NOT_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
+static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+ if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
+ return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
+
+ switch (ctxt->modrm) {
+ case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
+ return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
+ case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
+ return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
+ case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
+ return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NOT_SVM_INSTR;
+}
+
+static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
+{
+ int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
+ };
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](svm);
+}
+
+/*
+ * #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
+ * cases:
+ * 1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP on
+ * some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved memory
+ * regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
+ * 2) VMware backdoor
+ */
+static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+ u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+ int opcode;
+
+ /* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
+ if (error_code)
+ goto reinject;
+
+ /* Decode the instruction for usage later */
+ if (x86_emulate_decoded_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK)
+ goto reinject;
+
+ opcode = svm_instr_opcode(vcpu);
+ if (opcode)
+ return emulate_svm_instr(vcpu, opcode);
+ else
+ return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu,
+ EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
+
+reinject:
+ kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+ return 1;
+}
+
void svm_set_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool value)
{
if (value) {
--
2.27.0
