Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-05-01 Thread Kees Cook
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 09:53:28AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
> 
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
> 
> [   38.579769] 
> =
> [   38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: GB): Freepointer 
> corrupt
> [   38.581948] 
> -
> 
> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
> function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
> get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
> if not overlapping with object).
> 
> Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 

Thanks! Nice catch. :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 

-Kees

> ---
>  mm/slub.c | 45 ++---
>  1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 
>  [v3: Change function name to freeptr_outside_object(), update check & add 
> comment]
> 
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 9bf44955c4f1..b762450fc9f0 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 
> *addr,
>   metadata_access_disable();
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * See comment in calculate_sizes().
> + */
> +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + return s->offset >= s->inuse;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
> + * not overlapping with object.
> + */
> +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> + else
> + return s->inuse;
> +}
> +
>  static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
>   enum track_item alloc)
>  {
>   struct track *p;
>  
> - if (s->offset)
> - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - p = object + s->inuse;
> + p = object + get_info_end(s);
>  
>   return p + alloc;
>  }
> @@ -686,10 +703,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct 
> page *page, u8 *p)
>   print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
>   s->inuse - s->object_size);
>  
> - if (s->offset)
> - off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - off = s->inuse;
> + off = get_info_end(s);
>  
>   if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
>   off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
> @@ -782,7 +796,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, 
> struct page *page,
>   * object address
>   *   Bytes of the object to be managed.
>   *   If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
> - *   pointer is the first word of the object.
> + *   pointer is at the middle of the object.
>   *
>   *   Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
>   *   0xa5 (POISON_END)
> @@ -816,11 +830,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, 
> struct page *page,
>  
>  static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
>  {
> - unsigned long off = s->inuse;   /* The end of info */
> -
> - if (s->offset)
> - /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
> - off += sizeof(void *);
> + unsigned long off = get_info_end(s);/* The end of info */
>  
>   if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
>   /* We also have user information there */
> @@ -907,7 +917,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page 
> *page,
>   check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
>   }
>  
> - if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
> + if (!freeptr_outside_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
>   /*
>* Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
>* freepointer while object is allocated.
> @@ -3587,6 +3597,11 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int 
> forced_order)
>*
>* This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
>* destructor or are poisoning the objects.
> +  *
> +  * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
> +  * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
> +  * freeptr_outside_object() function. If that is no
> +  * longer true, the function needs to be modified.
>*/
>   s->offset = size;
> 

Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-05-01 Thread Rafael Aquini
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 09:53:28AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
> 
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
> 
> [   38.579769] 
> =
> [   38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: GB): Freepointer 
> corrupt
> [   38.581948] 
> -
> 
> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
> function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
> get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
> if not overlapping with object).
> 
> Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 
> ---
>  mm/slub.c | 45 ++---
>  1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 
>  [v3: Change function name to freeptr_outside_object(), update check & add 
> comment]
> 
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 9bf44955c4f1..b762450fc9f0 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 
> *addr,
>   metadata_access_disable();
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * See comment in calculate_sizes().
> + */
> +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + return s->offset >= s->inuse;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
> + * not overlapping with object.
> + */
> +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> + else
> + return s->inuse;
> +}
> +
>  static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
>   enum track_item alloc)
>  {
>   struct track *p;
>  
> - if (s->offset)
> - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - p = object + s->inuse;
> + p = object + get_info_end(s);
>  
>   return p + alloc;
>  }
> @@ -686,10 +703,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct 
> page *page, u8 *p)
>   print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
>   s->inuse - s->object_size);
>  
> - if (s->offset)
> - off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - off = s->inuse;
> + off = get_info_end(s);
>  
>   if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
>   off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
> @@ -782,7 +796,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, 
> struct page *page,
>   * object address
>   *   Bytes of the object to be managed.
>   *   If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
> - *   pointer is the first word of the object.
> + *   pointer is at the middle of the object.
>   *
>   *   Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
>   *   0xa5 (POISON_END)
> @@ -816,11 +830,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, 
> struct page *page,
>  
>  static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
>  {
> - unsigned long off = s->inuse;   /* The end of info */
> -
> - if (s->offset)
> - /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
> - off += sizeof(void *);
> + unsigned long off = get_info_end(s);/* The end of info */
>  
>   if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
>   /* We also have user information there */
> @@ -907,7 +917,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page 
> *page,
>   check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
>   }
>  
> - if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
> + if (!freeptr_outside_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
>   /*
>* Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
>* freepointer while object is allocated.
> @@ -3587,6 +3597,11 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int 
> forced_order)
>*
>* This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
>* destructor or are poisoning the objects.
> +  *
> +  * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
> +  * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
> +  * freeptr_outside_object() function. If that is no
> +  * longer true, the function needs to be modified.
>*/
>   s->offset = size;
>   size += sizeof(void *);
> -- 
> 2.18.1
> 

Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-04-29 Thread Matthew Wilcox
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 06:42:55PM +0200, Markus Elfring wrote:
> > In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> > "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> > object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> > relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
> 
> Will any further collateral evolution become interesting?

What do you mean by this question?

> > +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> > +{
> > +   if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> > +   return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> > +   else
> > +   return s->inuse;
> > +}
> 
> How do you think about the following source code variants?
> 
> + return freeptr_outside_object(s)
> +? s->inuse + sizeof(void *)
> +: s->inuse;

That is less clear than the version Wayman posted.

> >  static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> > enum track_item alloc)
> >  {
> > struct track *p;
> >
> > -   if (s->offset)
> > -   p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> > -   else
> > -   p = object + s->inuse;
> > +   p = object + get_info_end(s);
> >
> > return p + alloc;
> >  }
> 
> + struct track *p = object + get_info_end(s);
> 
>   return p + alloc;

Yes, I think that's an improvement.


Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-04-29 Thread Markus Elfring
> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").

Will any further collateral evolution become interesting?


…
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 
> *addr,
…
> +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> + else
> + return s->inuse;
> +}

How do you think about the following source code variants?

+   return freeptr_outside_object(s)
+  ? s->inuse + sizeof(void *)
+  : s->inuse;


>  static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
>   enum track_item alloc)
>  {
>   struct track *p;
>
> - if (s->offset)
> - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - p = object + s->inuse;
> + p = object + get_info_end(s);
>
>   return p + alloc;
>  }

+   struct track *p = object + get_info_end(s);

return p + alloc;


Regards,
Markus


Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-04-29 Thread Matthew Wilcox
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 09:53:28AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
> 
> [   38.579769] 
> =
> [   38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: GB): Freepointer 
> corrupt
> [   38.581948] 
> -

I might trim the timestamp and the === and --- from the commit message ...

> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
> function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
> get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
> if not overlapping with object).
> 
> Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 

But the patch looks great.

Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 


Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-04-29 Thread Waiman Long

On 4/29/20 9:53 AM, Waiman Long wrote:

In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
"s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").

As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.

[   38.579769] 
=
[   38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: GB): Freepointer 
corrupt
[   38.581948] 
-

To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper


Sorry, forgot to change the commit log to ">=". Anyway, this is a 
serious bug that needs to be fixed before v5.7 is released.


Cheers,
Longman



[PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

2020-04-29 Thread Waiman Long
In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
"s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").

As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.

[   38.579769] 
=
[   38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: GB): Freepointer 
corrupt
[   38.581948] 
-

To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
if not overlapping with object).

Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 
---
 mm/slub.c | 45 ++---
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

 [v3: Change function name to freeptr_outside_object(), update check & add 
comment]

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 9bf44955c4f1..b762450fc9f0 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 
*addr,
metadata_access_disable();
 }
 
+/*
+ * See comment in calculate_sizes().
+ */
+static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+   return s->offset >= s->inuse;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
+ * not overlapping with object.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+   if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
+   return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
+   else
+   return s->inuse;
+}
+
 static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
enum track_item alloc)
 {
struct track *p;
 
-   if (s->offset)
-   p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
-   else
-   p = object + s->inuse;
+   p = object + get_info_end(s);
 
return p + alloc;
 }
@@ -686,10 +703,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct 
page *page, u8 *p)
print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
s->inuse - s->object_size);
 
-   if (s->offset)
-   off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
-   else
-   off = s->inuse;
+   off = get_info_end(s);
 
if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
@@ -782,7 +796,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, 
struct page *page,
  * object address
  * Bytes of the object to be managed.
  * If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
- * pointer is the first word of the object.
+ * pointer is at the middle of the object.
  *
  * Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
  * 0xa5 (POISON_END)
@@ -816,11 +830,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, 
struct page *page,
 
 static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 {
-   unsigned long off = s->inuse;   /* The end of info */
-
-   if (s->offset)
-   /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
-   off += sizeof(void *);
+   unsigned long off = get_info_end(s);/* The end of info */
 
if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/* We also have user information there */
@@ -907,7 +917,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page 
*page,
check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
}
 
-   if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
+   if (!freeptr_outside_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
/*
 * Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
 * freepointer while object is allocated.
@@ -3587,6 +3597,11 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int 
forced_order)
 *
 * This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
 * destructor or are poisoning the objects.
+*
+* The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
+* pointer is outside of the object is used in the
+* freeptr_outside_object() function. If that is no
+* longer true, the function needs to be modified.
 */
s->offset = size;
size += sizeof(void *);
-- 
2.18.1