Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-04 Thread Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

On 8/4/20 8:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are 
better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.


kvmalloc() can be used to select whichever one is most appropriate.


Other option would be for ima to compute and save the hash(es) of the 
payload and not the payload itself for later use.  I guess you won't 
know at that point which hash algorithm is desired?




I think IMA hash algorithm would be known at that point, but IMA policy 
is not loaded yet (which is why I need to queue up the buffer and 
process when policy is loaded).


I tried vmalloc and tested it with upto 16MB buffer (just made up a 
SELinux policy buffer of size 16MB) - that works fine.


I will try kvmalloc().

Also, I fixed the issue with LSM data not measured when using the IMA 
policy you had. Good catch.


Will post the updated patches today.

thanks,
 -lakshmi


Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-04 Thread Stephen Smalley

On 8/4/20 11:20 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


On 8/3/20 6:08 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:


On 8/3/20 2:07 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


[   68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[   68.870715] hardirqs last  enabled at (23486085):
[] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60
[   68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90
[   68.870715] softirqs last  enabled at (23486074):
[] __do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[   68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[   68.870715] ---[ end trace fb02740ff6f4d0cd ]---


I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, 
then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure 
SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the 
policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way 
(or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).




The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to 
measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not 
allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - 
thanks for catching it.


I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the 
above issue on my machine.


The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above 
the max order supported for kmalloc.  I think the problem is that 
ima_alloc_data_entry() is using kmemdup() to duplicate a payload of 
arbitrary size.  Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you 
can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.




Thanks for clarifying. Yes ima_alloc_entry() does use kmemdup to save 
the given buffer (to be measured) until IMA loads custom policy.


On my machine the SELinux policy size is about 2MB.

Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are 
better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.


kvmalloc() can be used to select whichever one is most appropriate.


Other option would be for ima to compute and save the hash(es) of the 
payload and not the payload itself for later use.  I guess you won't 
know at that point which hash algorithm is desired?





Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-04 Thread Stephen Smalley

On 8/3/20 6:08 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:


On 8/3/20 2:07 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


[   68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[   68.870715] hardirqs last  enabled at (23486085):
[] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60
[   68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90
[   68.870715] softirqs last  enabled at (23486074):
[] __do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[   68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[   68.870715] ---[ end trace fb02740ff6f4d0cd ]---


I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, 
then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure 
SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the 
policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way 
(or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).




The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to 
measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not 
allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - 
thanks for catching it.


I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the 
above issue on my machine.


The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above 
the max order supported for kmalloc.  I think the problem is that 
ima_alloc_data_entry() is using kmemdup() to duplicate a payload of 
arbitrary size.  Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you 
can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.




Thanks for clarifying. Yes ima_alloc_entry() does use kmemdup to save 
the given buffer (to be measured) until IMA loads custom policy.


On my machine the SELinux policy size is about 2MB.

Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are 
better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.


kvmalloc() can be used to select whichever one is most appropriate.




Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

On 8/3/20 2:07 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


[   68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[   68.870715] hardirqs last  enabled at (23486085):
[] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60
[   68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90
[   68.870715] softirqs last  enabled at (23486074):
[] __do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[   68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[   68.870715] ---[ end trace fb02740ff6f4d0cd ]---


I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, 
then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure 
SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the 
policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or 
you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).




The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to 
measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not allowed, 
but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - thanks for 
catching it.


I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the above 
issue on my machine.


The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above the 
max order supported for kmalloc.  I think the problem is that 
ima_alloc_data_entry() is using kmemdup() to duplicate a payload of 
arbitrary size.  Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you 
can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.




Thanks for clarifying. Yes ima_alloc_entry() does use kmemdup to save 
the given buffer (to be measured) until IMA loads custom policy.


On my machine the SELinux policy size is about 2MB.

Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are better 
options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.


 -lakshmi


Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Stephen Smalley

On 8/3/20 4:37 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:


On 8/3/20 1:29 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

On 8/3/20 4:00 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 12:14 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
 wrote:

On 8/3/20 8:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on 
top of

next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:

measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in
the ascii_runtime_measurements file.  No errors during loading of the
ima policy as far as I can see.


Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y

Yes, I have that set.


Try changing /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot and check
ascii_runtime_measurements file again?

No change.  Likewise for changing enforce or running load_policy again.


Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy contains LSM_STATE and
LSM_POLICY entries?

Yes, it does.  However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only
contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get
measurements.  Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the
one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994
dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

Also, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[   68.870715] [ cut here ]
[   68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4826
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139too crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel qxl serio_raw
drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper virtio_console cec drm 8139cp
ata_generic mii pata_acpi floppy qemu_fw_cfg fuse
[   68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44
[   68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89
e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d
fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff
ff e8
[   68.870715] RSP: :8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   68.870715] RAX: ed103d054f48 RBX: 11103d054f48 RCX: 

[   68.870715] RDX:  RSI: 000b RDI: 

[   68.870715] RBP: 8881e82a7ae8 R08: aa3fe2d5 R09: 
0001
[   68.870715] R10: fbfff5a88f0f R11: 0001 R12: 
007eef6a
[   68.870715] R13: 00040cc0 R14: 000b R15: 
adde766b

[   68.870715] FS:  7fdeb168c600() GS:8881e980()
knlGS:
[   68.870715] CS:  0010 DS:  ES:  CR0: 80050033
[   68.870715] CR2: 7fdeb17dd1d6 CR3: 0001cc2d2002 CR4: 
003606e0
[   68.870715] DR0:  DR1:  DR2: 

[   68.870715] DR3:  DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 
0400

[   68.870715] Call Trace:
[   68.870715]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110
[   68.870715]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0
[   68.870715]  ? match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240
[   68.870715]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x60
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[   68.870715]  kmemdup+0x1a/0x40
[   68.870715]  ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370
[   68.870715]  ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60
[   68.870715]  selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd
[   68.870715]  ? selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0
[   68.870715]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50
[   68.870715]  security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0
[   68.870715]  ? mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0
[   68.870715]  ? security_change_sid+0x90/0x90
[   68.870715]  ? mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30
[   68.870715]  sel_write_load+0x157/0x260
[   68.870715]  vfs_write+0x135/0x290
[   68.870715]  ksys_write+0xb1/0x140
[   68.870715]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0
[   68.870715]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
[   68.870715]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   68.870715] RSP: 002b:7fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 0246 ORIG_RAX:
0001
[   68.870715] RAX: ffda RBX: 0020 RCX: 
7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] RDX: 007eef6a RSI: 7fdeb0de1000 RDI: 
0

Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

On 8/3/20 1:29 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

On 8/3/20 4:00 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 12:14 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
 wrote:

On 8/3/20 8:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of
next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:

measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in
the ascii_runtime_measurements file.  No errors during loading of the
ima policy as far as I can see.


Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y

Yes, I have that set.


Try changing /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot and check
ascii_runtime_measurements file again?

No change.  Likewise for changing enforce or running load_policy again.


Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy contains LSM_STATE and
LSM_POLICY entries?

Yes, it does.  However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only
contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get
measurements.  Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the
one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994
dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

Also, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[   68.870715] [ cut here ]
[   68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4826
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139too crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel qxl serio_raw
drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper virtio_console cec drm 8139cp
ata_generic mii pata_acpi floppy qemu_fw_cfg fuse
[   68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44
[   68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89
e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d
fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff
ff e8
[   68.870715] RSP: :8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   68.870715] RAX: ed103d054f48 RBX: 11103d054f48 RCX: 

[   68.870715] RDX:  RSI: 000b RDI: 

[   68.870715] RBP: 8881e82a7ae8 R08: aa3fe2d5 R09: 
0001
[   68.870715] R10: fbfff5a88f0f R11: 0001 R12: 
007eef6a
[   68.870715] R13: 00040cc0 R14: 000b R15: 
adde766b

[   68.870715] FS:  7fdeb168c600() GS:8881e980()
knlGS:
[   68.870715] CS:  0010 DS:  ES:  CR0: 80050033
[   68.870715] CR2: 7fdeb17dd1d6 CR3: 0001cc2d2002 CR4: 
003606e0
[   68.870715] DR0:  DR1:  DR2: 

[   68.870715] DR3:  DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 
0400

[   68.870715] Call Trace:
[   68.870715]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110
[   68.870715]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0
[   68.870715]  ? match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240
[   68.870715]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x60
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[   68.870715]  kmemdup+0x1a/0x40
[   68.870715]  ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370
[   68.870715]  ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60
[   68.870715]  selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd
[   68.870715]  ? selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0
[   68.870715]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50
[   68.870715]  security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0
[   68.870715]  ? mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0
[   68.870715]  ? security_change_sid+0x90/0x90
[   68.870715]  ? mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30
[   68.870715]  sel_write_load+0x157/0x260
[   68.870715]  vfs_write+0x135/0x290
[   68.870715]  ksys_write+0xb1/0x140
[   68.870715]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0
[   68.870715]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
[   68.870715]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   68.870715] RSP: 002b:7fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 0246 ORIG_RAX:
0001
[   68.870715] RAX: ffda RBX: 0020 RCX: 
7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] RDX: 007eef6a RSI: 7fdeb0de1000 RDI: 
0004
[   68.870715] RBP: 0004 R08: 000

Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Stephen Smalley

On 8/3/20 4:00 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 12:14 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
 wrote:

On 8/3/20 8:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of
next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:

measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in
the ascii_runtime_measurements file.  No errors during loading of the
ima policy as far as I can see.


Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y

Yes, I have that set.


Try changing /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot and check
ascii_runtime_measurements file again?

No change.  Likewise for changing enforce or running load_policy again.


Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy contains LSM_STATE and
LSM_POLICY entries?

Yes, it does.  However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only
contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get
measurements.  Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the
one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994
dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

Also, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[   68.870715] [ cut here ]
[   68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4826
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139too crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel qxl serio_raw
drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper virtio_console cec drm 8139cp
ata_generic mii pata_acpi floppy qemu_fw_cfg fuse
[   68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44
[   68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89
e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d
fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff
ff e8
[   68.870715] RSP: :8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   68.870715] RAX: ed103d054f48 RBX: 11103d054f48 RCX: 
[   68.870715] RDX:  RSI: 000b RDI: 
[   68.870715] RBP: 8881e82a7ae8 R08: aa3fe2d5 R09: 0001
[   68.870715] R10: fbfff5a88f0f R11: 0001 R12: 007eef6a
[   68.870715] R13: 00040cc0 R14: 000b R15: adde766b
[   68.870715] FS:  7fdeb168c600() GS:8881e980()
knlGS:
[   68.870715] CS:  0010 DS:  ES:  CR0: 80050033
[   68.870715] CR2: 7fdeb17dd1d6 CR3: 0001cc2d2002 CR4: 003606e0
[   68.870715] DR0:  DR1:  DR2: 
[   68.870715] DR3:  DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 0400
[   68.870715] Call Trace:
[   68.870715]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110
[   68.870715]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0
[   68.870715]  ? match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240
[   68.870715]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x60
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[   68.870715]  kmemdup+0x1a/0x40
[   68.870715]  ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370
[   68.870715]  ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60
[   68.870715]  selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd
[   68.870715]  ? selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0
[   68.870715]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50
[   68.870715]  security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0
[   68.870715]  ? mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0
[   68.870715]  ? security_change_sid+0x90/0x90
[   68.870715]  ? mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30
[   68.870715]  sel_write_load+0x157/0x260
[   68.870715]  vfs_write+0x135/0x290
[   68.870715]  ksys_write+0xb1/0x140
[   68.870715]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0
[   68.870715]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
[   68.870715]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   68.870715] RSP: 002b:7fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 0246 ORIG_RAX:
0001
[   68.870715] RAX: ffda RBX: 0020 RCX: 7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] RDX: 007eef6a RSI: 7fdeb0de1000 RDI: 0004
[   68.870715] RBP: 0004 R08: 7fdeb25d0040 R09: 7fff6352b1a0
[   68.870715] R10:

Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 12:14 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
 wrote:
>
> On 8/3/20 8:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >
> > Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of
> > next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
> >
> > measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
> > measure func=LSM_POLICY
> >
> > I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in
> > the ascii_runtime_measurements file.  No errors during loading of the
> > ima policy as far as I can see.
> >
>
> Could you please check if the following config is set?
> CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y

Yes, I have that set.

> Try changing /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot and check
> ascii_runtime_measurements file again?

No change.  Likewise for changing enforce or running load_policy again.

> Also, could you please check if
> /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy contains LSM_STATE and
> LSM_POLICY entries?

Yes, it does.  However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only
contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get
measurements.  Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the
one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994
dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

Also, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[   68.870715] [ cut here ]
[   68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4826
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139too crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel qxl serio_raw
drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper virtio_console cec drm 8139cp
ata_generic mii pata_acpi floppy qemu_fw_cfg fuse
[   68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44
[   68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[   68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89
e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d
fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff
ff e8
[   68.870715] RSP: :8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   68.870715] RAX: ed103d054f48 RBX: 11103d054f48 RCX: 
[   68.870715] RDX:  RSI: 000b RDI: 
[   68.870715] RBP: 8881e82a7ae8 R08: aa3fe2d5 R09: 0001
[   68.870715] R10: fbfff5a88f0f R11: 0001 R12: 007eef6a
[   68.870715] R13: 00040cc0 R14: 000b R15: adde766b
[   68.870715] FS:  7fdeb168c600() GS:8881e980()
knlGS:
[   68.870715] CS:  0010 DS:  ES:  CR0: 80050033
[   68.870715] CR2: 7fdeb17dd1d6 CR3: 0001cc2d2002 CR4: 003606e0
[   68.870715] DR0:  DR1:  DR2: 
[   68.870715] DR3:  DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 0400
[   68.870715] Call Trace:
[   68.870715]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110
[   68.870715]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0
[   68.870715]  ? match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240
[   68.870715]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x60
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0
[   68.870715]  kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[   68.870715]  kmemdup+0x1a/0x40
[   68.870715]  ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370
[   68.870715]  ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60
[   68.870715]  selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd
[   68.870715]  ? selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0
[   68.870715]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50
[   68.870715]  security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0
[   68.870715]  ? mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0
[   68.870715]  ? security_change_sid+0x90/0x90
[   68.870715]  ? mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0
[   68.870715]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   68.870715]  ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30
[   68.870715]  sel_write_load+0x157/0x260
[   68.870715]  vfs_write+0x135/0x290
[   68.870715]  ksys_write+0xb1/0x140
[   68.870715]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[   68.870715]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[   68.870715]  ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0
[   68.870715]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
[   68.870715]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   68.870715] RSP: 002b:7fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 0246 ORIG_RAX:
0001
[   68.870715] RAX: ffda RBX: 0020 RCX: 7fdeb2539497
[   68.870715] RDX: 007eef6a RSI: 7fdeb0de1000 RDI: 0004
[   68.870715] RBP: 0004 R08: 7fdeb25d0040 R09: 7fff6352b1a0
[   68.8

Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

On 8/3/20 8:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:


Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of 
next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:


measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in 
the ascii_runtime_measurements file.  No errors during loading of the 
ima policy as far as I can see.




Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y

Try changing /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot and check 
ascii_runtime_measurements file again?


Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy contains LSM_STATE and 
LSM_POLICY entries?


 -lakshmi




Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-08-03 Thread Stephen Smalley

On 7/29/20 11:47 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:


SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this
security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used
by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration
and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered
with at runtime.

Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the
loaded policy by calling the IMA hooks ima_measure_lsm_state() and
ima_measure_lsm_policy() respectively.

Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:

10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 
696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 
selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271

To verify the measurement check the following:

Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).

   grep -m 1 "selinux-state" 
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p

The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
  
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;

To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:

  => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists,
 0 otherwise

For other entries, compare the integer value in the files
  => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
  => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
  => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities

For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included
in the IMA log entry.

To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
the following commands and verify the output hash values match.

   sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1

   grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" 
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 4

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley 
Reported-by: kernel test robot  # error: implicit declaration 
of function 'vfree'
Reported-by: kernel test robot  # error: implicit declaration 
of function 'crypto_alloc_shash'
Reported-by: kernel test robot  # sparse: symbol 
'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static?


Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of 
next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:


measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY

I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in 
the ascii_runtime_measurements file.  No errors during loading of the 
ima policy as far as I can see.





[PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy

2020-07-29 Thread Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this
security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used
by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration
and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered
with at runtime.

Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the
loaded policy by calling the IMA hooks ima_measure_lsm_state() and
ima_measure_lsm_policy() respectively.

Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:

10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 
696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 
selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271

To verify the measurement check the following:

Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).

  grep -m 1 "selinux-state" 
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 
| xxd -r -p

The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
 
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;

To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:

 => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists,
0 otherwise

For other entries, compare the integer value in the files
 => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
 => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
 => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities

For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included
in the IMA log entry.

To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
the following commands and verify the output hash values match.

  sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1

  grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" 
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 4

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley 
Reported-by: kernel test robot  # error: implicit declaration 
of function 'vfree'
Reported-by: kernel test robot  # error: implicit declaration 
of function 'crypto_alloc_shash'
Reported-by: kernel test robot  # sparse: symbol 
'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static?
---
 security/selinux/Makefile   |   2 +
 security/selinux/hooks.c|   1 +
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  15 +++
 security/selinux/measure.c  | 150 
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c|   3 +
 security/selinux/ss/services.c  |  71 +++--
 6 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c

diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
 
+selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o
+
 ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux 
-I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
 
 $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index efa6108b1ce9..5521dfc1900b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7394,6 +7394,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
}
 
selinux_mark_disabled(state);
+   selinux_measure_state(state);
 
pr_info("SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h 
b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b0e02cfe3ce1..77f42d9b544b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -222,16 +222,31 @@ static inline bool 
selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS];
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot(const struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+   return READ_ONCE(state->checkreqprot);
+}
+
 int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
 int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
 void *data, size_t len);
 int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
 void **data, size_t *len);
+int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
+   void **data, size_t *len);
 size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state