Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Dave Martin wrote: > Shouldn't the bootloader or firmware be doing this stuff, and if not, > why not? Firmware yes, bootloader no, or maybe. Bootloaders IMO loads in images, checksum, even public key check or whatever, then sets up the basics and boot them. Some hacks in U-Boot install PSCI handlers. It is neat, but a hack: a piece of code is compiled to a special offset and copied there by U-Boot to install the PSCI handlers. I would be fine if that software was not compiled as part of U-Boot, but another binary loaded by it. This would be another such "neat hack" also leaving a minimal monitor behind IIUC. I see the simplicity it brings to compile a load of stuff into U-Boot, but eahhh... Yours, Linus Walleij -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On 24/08/15 14:55, Christopher Covington wrote: ARM Linux appears to have never been made aware of the ARMv7 security extensions. When CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT=y, have it probe for its security state by checking whether CNTFRQ is writeable and potentially make mode changes based on the information. The most features are available from hypervisor (HYP) mode, so switch to it possible. Failing that, prefer non-secure supervisor (SVC) mode to secure supervisor mode. If there is no hypervisor mode available what benefit do we get from transitioning to non-secure mode? When running in secure mode we retain access to some potentially useful features such as having access to FIQ. Daniel. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:19:39AM -0400, Christopher Covington wrote: > Hi, > > Thank you for the feedback. > > On 08/26/2015 06:48 AM, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 11:39:42AM +0100, Dave Martin wrote: > >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 09:55:26AM -0400, Christopher Covington wrote: > >>> ARM Linux appears to have never been made aware of the ARMv7 security > >>> extensions. When CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT=y, have it probe for its security > >>> state by checking whether CNTFRQ is writeable and potentially make > >>> mode changes based on the information. The most features are available > >>> from hypervisor (HYP) mode, so switch to it possible. Failing that, > >>> prefer non-secure supervisor (SVC) mode to secure supervisor mode. > >> > >> Up to now we've steered clear of this, since it's a bit of a fig leaf > >> for broken firmware unless Linux actually has some valid use for the > >> Security Extensions itself. > >> > >> Shouldn't the bootloader or firmware be doing this stuff, and if not, > >> why not? > > In my opinion, it is sometimes useful, particularly when running on simulators > or performing bring up, to have as little dependency on firmwares and > bootloaders as possible. I want to run Linux out of reset, or get as close to Definitely :) That's exactly why the bootwrapper exists. > that as possible. I want an ease of use comparable to QEMU's Linux loader on > other simulators, like ARM's RTSM/AEM/FVPs, without various different, > fragmented model plugins or the overhead and noise of the semihosting > bootwrapper. I have attempted to craft the patches in such a way that the > enjoyment of sophisticated firmwares and bootloaders remains unhindered. > > >> Some other things that would need to be considered in any case: > >> > >> * SoC-specific setup of the Non-secure view of the system: This has > >>to happen very early, so making it DT aware is going to be hard -- > >>failing that, we are effectively risking bringing back board files. > >>The split in responsibility between firmware/bootloader and kernel > >>needs to be clearly defined and (as far as possible) platform- > >>independent, otherwise we'll have total chaos. > > My intention was to only perform architecturally defined initialization. All > implementation defined specifics would remain delegated to firmware, simulator > reset state hacks, or external debuggers, as the case may be. Note that using > this code does not preclude running firmware, just that if you want Linux to > do the exception level/mode transitions, you can omit those instructions from > firmware. I'll have to refresh my memory--it's been a while since I worked on > this, I apologize--but I think I used a modified bootwrapper to still perform > its usual GIC initialization. This is really just moving what is probably the smallest and simplest piece of the initialisation problem into the kernel. Only in trivial cases that don't involve real hardware is this going to remove the need for firmware. In the general case, the S->NS switch cannot be done without platform- specific knowledge of both the S and NS physical views of the system. But except for switching to NS, the kernel isn't going to use the knowledge about the S view. It would be interesting to see what the amended Documentation/arm/Booting would look like... My worry is that this even if this is handy for development, it will introduce a new kernel boot protocol that is impossible to standardise. Nonethess, vendors in a hurry will be tempted to use it if it's there. [...] Cheers ---Dave > > >> * Out of reset, generally the CPU state is only fully defined for the > >>highest exception level. You probably need to be doing more setup > >>than you're currently doing. > > Agreed. This is just the first step. > > >> * SMP, secondary boot and suspend/resume -- again involving board- > >>specific code. > > I've only tested single core so far, but I was thinking external debuggers and > simulators may be able to emulate PSCI in a semihosting-like manner, if > merging holding pen code is as frowned upon as I think it is (that may be an > AArch64-specific statement, but it'd probably be nice if similar facilities > were available across A32 and A64). > > >> * You need to safely "park" the Secure World before running anything > >>in Non-Secure. As a minimum, you would need to quiesce any > >>Secure interrupt sources, disable all interrupt traps to Monitor > >>mode, and make sure that the Monitor vectors point somewhere > >>real, so that executing SMC doesn't send the CPU off into the > >>long grass... > > Thanks. I'll work towards support for these aspects in the next version. > > > Another question is: has this been tested with kexec? > > I have not tested it with kexec. My testing was mostly of cold boots performed > some time back on ARM's AEM/RSTM/FVP using its configurable parameters and > some simple custom firmwar
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
Hi, Thank you for the feedback. On 08/26/2015 06:48 AM, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote: > On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 11:39:42AM +0100, Dave Martin wrote: >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 09:55:26AM -0400, Christopher Covington wrote: >>> ARM Linux appears to have never been made aware of the ARMv7 security >>> extensions. When CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT=y, have it probe for its security >>> state by checking whether CNTFRQ is writeable and potentially make >>> mode changes based on the information. The most features are available >>> from hypervisor (HYP) mode, so switch to it possible. Failing that, >>> prefer non-secure supervisor (SVC) mode to secure supervisor mode. >> >> Up to now we've steered clear of this, since it's a bit of a fig leaf >> for broken firmware unless Linux actually has some valid use for the >> Security Extensions itself. >> >> Shouldn't the bootloader or firmware be doing this stuff, and if not, >> why not? In my opinion, it is sometimes useful, particularly when running on simulators or performing bring up, to have as little dependency on firmwares and bootloaders as possible. I want to run Linux out of reset, or get as close to that as possible. I want an ease of use comparable to QEMU's Linux loader on other simulators, like ARM's RTSM/AEM/FVPs, without various different, fragmented model plugins or the overhead and noise of the semihosting bootwrapper. I have attempted to craft the patches in such a way that the enjoyment of sophisticated firmwares and bootloaders remains unhindered. >> Some other things that would need to be considered in any case: >> >> * SoC-specific setup of the Non-secure view of the system: This has >>to happen very early, so making it DT aware is going to be hard -- >>failing that, we are effectively risking bringing back board files. >>The split in responsibility between firmware/bootloader and kernel >>needs to be clearly defined and (as far as possible) platform- >>independent, otherwise we'll have total chaos. My intention was to only perform architecturally defined initialization. All implementation defined specifics would remain delegated to firmware, simulator reset state hacks, or external debuggers, as the case may be. Note that using this code does not preclude running firmware, just that if you want Linux to do the exception level/mode transitions, you can omit those instructions from firmware. I'll have to refresh my memory--it's been a while since I worked on this, I apologize--but I think I used a modified bootwrapper to still perform its usual GIC initialization. >> * Out of reset, generally the CPU state is only fully defined for the >>highest exception level. You probably need to be doing more setup >>than you're currently doing. Agreed. This is just the first step. >> * SMP, secondary boot and suspend/resume -- again involving board- >>specific code. I've only tested single core so far, but I was thinking external debuggers and simulators may be able to emulate PSCI in a semihosting-like manner, if merging holding pen code is as frowned upon as I think it is (that may be an AArch64-specific statement, but it'd probably be nice if similar facilities were available across A32 and A64). >> * You need to safely "park" the Secure World before running anything >>in Non-Secure. As a minimum, you would need to quiesce any >>Secure interrupt sources, disable all interrupt traps to Monitor >>mode, and make sure that the Monitor vectors point somewhere >>real, so that executing SMC doesn't send the CPU off into the >>long grass... Thanks. I'll work towards support for these aspects in the next version. > Another question is: has this been tested with kexec? I have not tested it with kexec. My testing was mostly of cold boots performed some time back on ARM's AEM/RSTM/FVP using its configurable parameters and some simple custom firmwares to simulate entry under all the circumstances I could think of. I grepped instruction traces to make sure the initial mode after firmware was as intended and then that AArch32 Linux switched into the intended mode. EL3: not present, AArch64, AArch32 EL2: not present, AArch64, AArch32 AArch32 Linux starts in: svc_s, svc_n, hyp_n, mon_s By my calculations, there were 36 - 17 = 19 valid combinations. Thanks, Christopher Covington -- Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum, a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 11:39:42AM +0100, Dave Martin wrote: > On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 09:55:26AM -0400, Christopher Covington wrote: > > ARM Linux appears to have never been made aware of the ARMv7 security > > extensions. When CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT=y, have it probe for its security > > state by checking whether CNTFRQ is writeable and potentially make > > mode changes based on the information. The most features are available > > from hypervisor (HYP) mode, so switch to it possible. Failing that, > > prefer non-secure supervisor (SVC) mode to secure supervisor mode. > > Up to now we've steered clear of this, since it's a bit of a fig leaf > for broken firmware unless Linux actually has some valid use for the > Security Extensions itself. > > Shouldn't the bootloader or firmware be doing this stuff, and if not, > why not? > > > Some other things that would need to be considered in any case: > > * SoC-specific setup of the Non-secure view of the system: This has >to happen very early, so making it DT aware is going to be hard -- >failing that, we are effectively risking bringing back board files. >The split in responsibility between firmware/bootloader and kernel >needs to be clearly defined and (as far as possible) platform- >independent, otherwise we'll have total chaos. > > * Out of reset, generally the CPU state is only fully defined for the >highest exception level. You probably need to be doing more setup >than you're currently doing. > > * SMP, secondary boot and suspend/resume -- again involving board- >specific code. > > * You need to safely "park" the Secure World before running anything >in Non-Secure. As a minimum, you would need to quiesce any >Secure interrupt sources, disable all interrupt traps to Monitor >mode, and make sure that the Monitor vectors point somewhere >real, so that executing SMC doesn't send the CPU off into the >long grass... Another question is: has this been tested with kexec? -- FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line: currently at 10.5Mbps down 400kbps up according to speedtest.net. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 09:55:26AM -0400, Christopher Covington wrote: > +/* > + * ARM Linux has the most features available in hypervisor mode and > + * running in non-secure mode is recommended. Thus, try to get into > + * hypervisor mode if we're not already there, or failing that, try > + * to get into non-secure supervisor mode. > + */ > +ENTRY(__mon_stub_install) > + /* > + * Store the mode field of the CPSR in r4 and return early if we're > + * already in hypervisor mode. > + */ > + mrs r4, cpsr > + and r4, r4, #MODE_MASK > + cmp r4, #HYP_MODE > + reteq lr > + > + /* > + * Save the link register in a non-banked register, r5, so that we > + * still have access to it after mode switches. > + */ > + mov r5, lr > + > + /* > + * Read ID_PFR1 and store the value in r6. This register indicates > + * the presence of the security and virtualization extensions. The > + * former is interesting because we must traverse secure monitor mode > + * to get to hypervisor mode and it allows easy manipulation of > + * exception vectors via the Vector Base Address Register (VBAR). > + * > + * ID_PFR1 also indicates whether the generic timer is present, which > + * has a handy register for our purposes, CNTFRQ. Accesses won't trap > + * even with higher exception levels in AArch64 and writes will only > + * succeed from the highest exception level on a system (the undefined > + * exception from a failed write is used as a branch). > + */ > + > + mrc p15, 0, r6, c0, c1, 1 @ ID_PFR1 As this code can be built into any kernel for a CPU containing a MMU, including all the way back to ARMv4, you had better make sure that this code will run there without causing faults. You should probably be checking the main ID register and ensuring that the CPU supports the new ID scheme before trying to read CP15 registers that may not be present in older cores. > diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig > index 7c6b976..32fa451 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig > @@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ config ARM_THUMBEE > make use of it. Say N for code that can run on CPUs without ThumbEE. > > config ARM_VIRT_EXT > - bool > + bool "Support for Virtualization Extensions" This change is not explained in the commit message. > depends on MMU > default y if CPU_V7 > help > @@ -684,9 +684,21 @@ config ARM_VIRT_EXT > Extensions to install hypervisors without run-time firmware > assistance. > > - A compliant bootloader is required in order to make maximum > - use of this feature. Refer to Documentation/arm/Booting for > - details. > + A compliant bootloader or enabling ARM_SEC_EXT is required in > + order to make maximum use of this feature. Refer to > + Documentation/arm/Booting for details. > + > +config ARM_SEC_EXT > + bool "Support for Security Extensions" > + depends on MMU > + default n Please get rid of this redundant "default n". -- FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line: currently at 10.5Mbps down 400kbps up according to speedtest.net. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 09:55:26AM -0400, Christopher Covington wrote: > ARM Linux appears to have never been made aware of the ARMv7 security > extensions. When CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT=y, have it probe for its security > state by checking whether CNTFRQ is writeable and potentially make > mode changes based on the information. The most features are available > from hypervisor (HYP) mode, so switch to it possible. Failing that, > prefer non-secure supervisor (SVC) mode to secure supervisor mode. Up to now we've steered clear of this, since it's a bit of a fig leaf for broken firmware unless Linux actually has some valid use for the Security Extensions itself. Shouldn't the bootloader or firmware be doing this stuff, and if not, why not? Some other things that would need to be considered in any case: * SoC-specific setup of the Non-secure view of the system: This has to happen very early, so making it DT aware is going to be hard -- failing that, we are effectively risking bringing back board files. The split in responsibility between firmware/bootloader and kernel needs to be clearly defined and (as far as possible) platform- independent, otherwise we'll have total chaos. * Out of reset, generally the CPU state is only fully defined for the highest exception level. You probably need to be doing more setup than you're currently doing. * SMP, secondary boot and suspend/resume -- again involving board- specific code. * You need to safely "park" the Secure World before running anything in Non-Secure. As a minimum, you would need to quiesce any Secure interrupt sources, disable all interrupt traps to Monitor mode, and make sure that the Monitor vectors point somewhere real, so that executing SMC doesn't send the CPU off into the long grass... Cheers ---Dave > > Signed-off-by: Christopher Covington > --- > arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h | 27 +++ > arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 1 + > arch/arm/kernel/Makefile | 1 + > arch/arm/kernel/head.S | 3 + > arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S | 158 > + > arch/arm/mm/Kconfig| 20 - > 6 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h > create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S > > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000..4a9a573 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h > @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ > +/* > + * Copyright (c) 2014, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and > + * only version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. > + * > + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the > + * GNU General Public License for more details. > + */ > + > +#ifndef SEC_H > +#define SEC_H > + > +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT > +extern int __boot_cpu_secure; > +#else > +#define __boot_cpu_secure 0 > +#endif > + > +#endif /* ! __ASSEMBLY__ */ > + > +#endif /* SEC_H */ > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > index 5af0ed1..70ff6bf 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > +++ b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ > #endif > #define FIQ_MODE 0x0011 > #define IRQ_MODE 0x0012 > +#define MON_MODE 0x0016 > #define ABT_MODE 0x0017 > #define HYP_MODE 0x001a > #define UND_MODE 0x001b > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile > index e69f7a1..a60a0f7 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile > @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ head-y := head$(MMUEXT).o > obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LL) += debug.o > obj-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += early_printk.o > > +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT)+= mon-stub.o > obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_VIRT_EXT) += hyp-stub.o > ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM_PSCI),y) > obj-y+= psci.o psci-call.o > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm/kernel/head.S > index 29e2991..d137ba4 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/head.S > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/head.S > @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ ENTRY(stext) > THUMB( .thumb ) @ switch to Thumb now. > THUMB(1:) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT > + bl __mon_stub_install > +#endif > #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_VIRT_EXT > bl __hyp_stub_install > #endif > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S b/arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S > new file mode 100644 > index 000..ab1a361 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S > @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ > +/* > + * Copyright (c) 2014, The L
Re: [PATCH] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode
On 24 August 2015 at 15:55, Christopher Covington wrote: > ARM Linux appears to have never been made aware of the ARMv7 security > extensions. When CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT=y, have it probe for its security > state by checking whether CNTFRQ is writeable and potentially make > mode changes based on the information. The most features are available > from hypervisor (HYP) mode, so switch to it possible. Failing that, > prefer non-secure supervisor (SVC) mode to secure supervisor mode. > > Signed-off-by: Christopher Covington Nice hack! One comment below ... > --- > arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h | 27 +++ > arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 1 + > arch/arm/kernel/Makefile | 1 + > arch/arm/kernel/head.S | 3 + > arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S | 158 > + > arch/arm/mm/Kconfig| 20 - > 6 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h > create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S > > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000..4a9a573 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/sec.h > @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ > +/* > + * Copyright (c) 2014, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and > + * only version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. > + * > + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the > + * GNU General Public License for more details. > + */ > + > +#ifndef SEC_H > +#define SEC_H > + > +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT > +extern int __boot_cpu_secure; > +#else > +#define __boot_cpu_secure 0 > +#endif > + > +#endif /* ! __ASSEMBLY__ */ > + > +#endif /* SEC_H */ > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > index 5af0ed1..70ff6bf 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > +++ b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h > @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ > #endif > #define FIQ_MODE 0x0011 > #define IRQ_MODE 0x0012 > +#define MON_MODE 0x0016 > #define ABT_MODE 0x0017 > #define HYP_MODE 0x001a > #define UND_MODE 0x001b > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile > index e69f7a1..a60a0f7 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile > @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ head-y:= head$(MMUEXT).o > obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LL) += debug.o > obj-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += early_printk.o > > +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT) += mon-stub.o > obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_VIRT_EXT) += hyp-stub.o > ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM_PSCI),y) > obj-y += psci.o psci-call.o > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm/kernel/head.S > index 29e2991..d137ba4 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/head.S > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/head.S > @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ ENTRY(stext) > THUMB(.thumb ) @ switch to Thumb now. > THUMB(1: ) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT > + bl __mon_stub_install > +#endif > #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_VIRT_EXT > bl __hyp_stub_install > #endif > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S b/arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S > new file mode 100644 > index 000..ab1a361 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/mon-stub.S > @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ > +/* > + * Copyright (c) 2014, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and > + * only version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. > + * > + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the > + * GNU General Public License for more details. > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +.data > +ENTRY(__boot_cpu_secure) > + .long 0 > +.text > + > +/* > + * ARM Linux has the most features available in hypervisor mode and > + * running in non-secure mode is recommended. Thus, try to get into > + * hypervisor mode if we're not already there, or failing that, try > + * to get into non-secure supervisor mode. > + */ > +ENTRY(__mon_stub_install) > + /* > +* Store the mode field of the CPSR in r4 and return early if we're > +* already in hypervisor mode. > +*/ > + mrs r4, cpsr > + and r4, r4, #MODE_MASK > + cmp r4, #HYP_MODE > + reteq lr > + > + /* > +* Save the link register in a non-banked register, r5, so that we >
