Re: [PATCHv3 1/6] integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

2015-10-23 Thread Petko Manolov
On 15-10-22 21:49:25, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
> existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
> 
> This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().
> 
> Changes in v3:
> * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
>   keyring instead of using  __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
> * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> 
> Changes in v2:
> * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
>   CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
> * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
>   file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin 
> ---
>  security/integrity/Kconfig| 11 +++
>  security/integrity/digsig.c   | 14 --
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c |  8 +---
>  security/integrity/ima/Kconfig|  5 -
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h  | 12 
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/integrity.h|  5 ++---
>  7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
> index 73c457b..21d7568 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
> @@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> This option enables digital signature verification using
> asymmetric keys.
>  
> +config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed"
> + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> + select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
> + default y
> + help
> +This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and
> +.evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted
> +keyring.
> +
>  config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
>   bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
>   depends on AUDIT
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index 5be9ffb..8ef1511 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -24,15 +24,22 @@
>  static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
>  
>  static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
> +#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>   "_evm",
> - "_module",
> -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>   "_ima",
>  #else
> + ".evm",
>   ".ima",
>  #endif
> + "_module",
>  };
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> +static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
> +#else
> +static bool init_keyring __initdata;
> +#endif
> +
>  int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int 
> siglen,
>   const char *digest, int digestlen)
>  {
> @@ -68,6 +75,9 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
>   const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>   int err = 0;
>  
> + if (!init_keyring)
> + return 0;
> +
>   keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
>   KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
>   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 1334e02..75b7e30 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -478,15 +478,17 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
>  
>   evm_init_config();
>  
> + error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
>   error = evm_init_secfs();
>   if (error < 0) {
>   pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
> - goto err;
> + return error;
>   }
>  
>   return 0;
> -err:
> - return error;
>  }
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index df30334..a292b88 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
> If unsure, say N.
>  
>  config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> - bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
> + bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
>   depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>   depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> + select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>   default y
>   help
>  This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
>  keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
>  
> +This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> +
>  config IMA_LOAD_X509
>   bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
>   depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING


I guess we may as well remove this switch.  Otherwise somebody have to remember 
to post a patch that does so a few kernel releases after this one goes mainlin

RE: [PATCHv3 1/6] integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

2015-10-23 Thread Dmitry Kasatkin


From: Petko Manolov [pet...@mip-labs.com]
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2015 4:05 PM
To: Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com; linux-ima-de...@lists.sourceforge.net; 
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org; linux-ker...@vger.kernel.org; Dmitry 
Kasatkin
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 1/6] integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' 
keyring

On 15-10-22 21:49:25, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
> existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
>
> This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().
>
> Changes in v3:
> * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
>   keyring instead of using  __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
> * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>
> Changes in v2:
> * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
>   CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
> * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
>   file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin 
> ---
>  security/integrity/Kconfig| 11 +++
>  security/integrity/digsig.c   | 14 --
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c |  8 +---
>  security/integrity/ima/Kconfig|  5 -
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h  | 12 
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/integrity.h|  5 ++---
>  7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
> index 73c457b..21d7568 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
> @@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> This option enables digital signature verification using
> asymmetric keys.
>
> +config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed"
> + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> + select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
> + default y
> + help
> +This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and
> +.evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted
> +keyring.
> +
>  config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
>   bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
>   depends on AUDIT
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index 5be9ffb..8ef1511 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -24,15 +24,22 @@
>  static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
>
>  static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
> +#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>   "_evm",
> - "_module",
> -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>   "_ima",
>  #else
> + ".evm",
>   ".ima",
>  #endif
> + "_module",
>  };
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> +static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
> +#else
> +static bool init_keyring __initdata;
> +#endif
> +
>  int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int 
> siglen,
>   const char *digest, int digestlen)
>  {
> @@ -68,6 +75,9 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
>   const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>   int err = 0;
>
> + if (!init_keyring)
> + return 0;
> +
>   keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
>   KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
>   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 1334e02..75b7e30 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -478,15 +478,17 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
>
>   evm_init_config();
>
> + error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
>   error = evm_init_secfs();
>   if (error < 0) {
>   pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
> - goto err;
> + return error;
>   }
>
>   return 0;
> -err:
> - return error;
>  }
>
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index df30334..a292b88 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
> If 

Re: [PATCHv3 1/6] integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

2015-10-23 Thread Mimi Zohar
On Fri, 2015-10-23 at 16:05 +0300, Petko Manolov wrote:
> On 15-10-22 21:49:25, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:

> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > index df30334..a292b88 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
> >   If unsure, say N.
> >  
> >  config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > -   bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
> > +   bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
> > depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> > +   select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > default y
> > help
> >This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
> >keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
> >  
> > +  This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > +
> >  config IMA_LOAD_X509
> > bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
> > depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> 
> 
> I guess we may as well remove this switch.  Otherwise somebody have to 
> remember 
> to post a patch that does so a few kernel releases after this one goes 
> mainline.

There's no harm in leaving the "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING" Kconfig option for
a couple of releases (or perhaps until it is enabled in a long term
release), so that the INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig option is
enabled automatically.

Mimi

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Re: [PATCHv3 1/6] integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

2015-10-24 Thread Petko Manolov
On 15-10-23 14:43:53, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2015-10-23 at 16:05 +0300, Petko Manolov wrote:
> > On 15-10-22 21:49:25, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> 
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig 
> > > b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > > index df30334..a292b88 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > > @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
> > > If unsure, say N.
> > >  
> > >  config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > > - bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
> > > + bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
> > >   depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > >   depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> > > + select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > >   default y
> > >   help
> > >  This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
> > >  keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
> > >  
> > > +This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > > +
> > >  config IMA_LOAD_X509
> > >   bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
> > >   depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > 
> > 
> > I guess we may as well remove this switch.  Otherwise somebody have to 
> > remember 
> > to post a patch that does so a few kernel releases after this one goes 
> > mainline.
> 
> There's no harm in leaving the "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING" Kconfig option for a 
> couple of releases (or perhaps until it is enabled in a long term release), 
> so 
> that the INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig option is enabled automatically.

I have no strong opinion either way.  Just saying.  Let it be for the moment.


Petko
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