Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking (v2)

2007-10-26 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Thu, 2007-10-25 at 17:41 -0700, Chris Wright wrote:
 * Casey Schaufler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
  --- Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
   * Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Here is a new version of the 64-bit capability patches I was supposed
to send last week I think.

This patch could stand alone without the 64-bit caps, but should
definately not be applied anywhere until it has been better
reviewed.  It is the alternative to the patch removing the
capability type checking code.
   
   How likely is  64?
  
  If the Granularity Gremlins get loose the answer is 100%.
  DG/UX ended up with over 330.
 
 Yeah, I think a few systems ended up with  64.

I think the current Solaris and FreeBSD implementations support
extensible privilege sets, and that Solaris already has  64.

 
  Fortunately the GGs have a playpen already in SELinux.
  I suggest that the capabilities maintainer be very stingy
  and refer anyone who's need isn't pretty obvious there.
  This means that the folks who want to divide CAP_SYSADMIN
  are going to be disappointed with what they get, but some
  level of restraint is important.
 
 Sure, I guess my point is, if we open up to 64, how quickly
 will we hit 65.  Perhaps a generic bitmask is better, and then
 we need a stricter type mode anyway.
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking (v2)

2007-10-25 Thread Chris Wright
* Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
 Here is a new version of the 64-bit capability patches I was supposed
 to send last week I think.
 
 This patch could stand alone without the 64-bit caps, but should
 definately not be applied anywhere until it has been better
 reviewed.  It is the alternative to the patch removing the
 capability type checking code.

How likely is  64?
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Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking (v2)

2007-10-25 Thread Casey Schaufler

--- Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 * Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
  Here is a new version of the 64-bit capability patches I was supposed
  to send last week I think.
  
  This patch could stand alone without the 64-bit caps, but should
  definately not be applied anywhere until it has been better
  reviewed.  It is the alternative to the patch removing the
  capability type checking code.
 
 How likely is  64?

If the Granularity Gremlins get loose the answer is 100%.
DG/UX ended up with over 330.

Fortunately the GGs have a playpen already in SELinux.
I suggest that the capabilities maintainer be very stingy
and refer anyone who's need isn't pretty obvious there.
This means that the folks who want to divide CAP_SYSADMIN
are going to be disappointed with what they get, but some
level of restraint is important.



Casey Schaufler
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking (v2)

2007-10-25 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Chris Wright ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
 * Casey Schaufler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
  --- Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
   * Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Here is a new version of the 64-bit capability patches I was supposed
to send last week I think.

This patch could stand alone without the 64-bit caps, but should
definately not be applied anywhere until it has been better
reviewed.  It is the alternative to the patch removing the
capability type checking code.
   
   How likely is  64?

My instinct is to say not very, but only a fool would admit that
publicly.

  If the Granularity Gremlins get loose the answer is 100%.
  DG/UX ended up with over 330.
 
 Yeah, I think a few systems ended up with  64.
 
  Fortunately the GGs have a playpen already in SELinux.
  I suggest that the capabilities maintainer be very stingy
  and refer anyone who's need isn't pretty obvious there.
  This means that the folks who want to divide CAP_SYSADMIN
  are going to be disappointed with what they get, but some
  level of restraint is important.
 
 Sure, I guess my point is, if we open up to 64, how quickly
 will we hit 65.  Perhaps a generic bitmask is better, and then
 we need a stricter type mode anyway.

Hmm, using a generic bitmask may indeed be a good idea.

Though the main complication with 64-bit is communication with
userspace, the rest is simple.  How would we generically communicate the
generic bitmap caps to userspace?  The way xattrs are, pass in a buffer,
and a NULL buffer to query size?  Or do we still version by number of
longs in the bitmaps?

thanks,
-serge
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