Re: Enforcement Provisions (was: Support for Paris draft)
On Mon, Feb 08, 1999 at 07:34:40AM -0600, John B. Reynolds wrote: > Jay Fenello wrote: > > > > How do you envision ICANN enforcing > > policies onto the registries? > > If all else fails, ICANN has the authority to remove them from its root > zone. It's admittedly the 'nuclear option', but it's there. An unpleasant prospect, to be sure. It's important to keep in mind that enforcement per se is ICANN's direct concern, not the DNSO's. It is also important to keep in mind that the registries are quite diverse, and not to fall into the trap of lumping all registries into one mold. I have been seriously guilty of this offense myself in the very recent past, and I would like to appologize for such sloppy thinking. [*] This diversity in the registries means that there won't be a single uniform enforcement policy, nor will there be a single enforcement mechanism. This is messy, but, in my opinion, completely unavoidable. In the long run the most common mechanism will be contracts of some sort or another, but there will be different contracts with different registries. And community, political and legal pressures from external sources will sometimes be the only effective enforcement mechanism. It's also important to keep in mind that time is an important factor here. ICANN's enforcement powers don't go from zero to 100% at some magic hour. They will grow slowly over an extended period of time, and will cover a broader and broader base of registries. This transition will measure in years. Looking at all the different cases of TLDs makes it quite clear, I think, that there will be no uniform enforcement mechanism for a long time: 1) .com, .net, .org: At the end of the two years NSI will enter into a contract with ICANN, mediated by the USG. Some enforcement power will come from that contract, and perhaps through indirect legal means. (Anti-trust theats from DoJ, for example). 2) .gov, .mil: special contract with the USG 3) .edu: a contract with a new registry operator for .edu 4) .int: perhaps administered through contract to the UN, or some related organization 5) .arpa: managed internally in conjunction with the PSO? There have been proposals for several other protocol-oriented TLDs in the past, as well 6) .us: contract with a registry designated by the USG 7) New gTLD registries: They won't become registries without signing a contract with ICANN. Enforcement powers over new gTLD registries will come from those contracts. 8) ccTLDs: A very complex sub-class. We can distinguish several cases - Large national tlds already well integrated with their associated sovereign -- probably they will sign a contract with ICANN because their government will support ICANN. The EU, for example, will probably support ICANN, and I expect the CENTR registries will fairly quickly reach a negotiated contract with ICANN. - at the other end, very tiny TLDs with an uncertain relationship with their associated sovereign -- these are the most vulnerable to the "nuclear option", which ICANN may exercise at any time if the sovereign makes a serious assertion of power. These TLDs may well want to sign a contract with ICANN to give themselves bargaining power with respect to their own sovereign - a whole bunch of intermediate cases: These will all need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and, while ICANN may not like it, I would not be at all surprised if there ere many different contracts. In all this it is important to remember that it is ICANN that will be negotiating these contracts, not the DNSO. [*] I have labled the Paris draft as the "registries draft", because of the "pre-review" clause that gives registries a veto over any policy that affects them. However, that "pre-review" concept came straight from Don Telage and David Johnsons DNSO comments, and those individuals were two of the 10 participants in the Paris meeting. The pre-review was not in the earlier CENTR draft, for example. -- Kent Crispin, PAB Chair "Do good, and you'll be [EMAIL PROTECTED] lonesome." -- Mark Twain
RE: Enforcement Provisions (was: Support for Paris draft)
Jay Fenello wrote: > > At 2/8/99, 08:34 AM, John B. Reynolds wrote: > > > > > >Jay Fenello wrote: > >> > >> At 2/7/99, 06:15 PM, John B. Reynolds wrote: > >> > > >> >Milton Mueller wrote: > >> >> > >> >> The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this > >> >> same criticism. > >> >> I commend them for this. > >> > > >> >On the other hand, the Paris group was completely unresponsive > >> to criticism > >> >that its veto provisions gave too much power to registries. > >> > >> > >> As an exercise in consensus building . . . > >> > >> How do you envision ICANN enforcing > >> policies onto the registries? > >> > >> Jay. > >> > > > >If all else fails, ICANN has the authority to remove them from its root > >zone. It's admittedly the 'nuclear option', but it's there. > > > Implicit in the Paris Draft is an entire system > of enforcement provisions designed to supplement > your "nuclear option" (which, btw, would harm the > innocent domain name holder's of the nuked TLD). > > This is the reason for the "Pre-review" process. > > If you don't like the provision as written, then > please suggest an alternate one that addresses > this enforcement issue. > > Jay. > I have already indicated that the replacement Section 5.9 proposed by AIP and NSI would be acceptable to me. Anything beyond that is an undue constraint upon the DNSO and ICANN on behalf of a special interest group, not an "enforcement provision". ICANN's enforcement mechanisms and the real-world constraints upon its actions both stem from its operation of the authoritative DNS root zone. So long as ICANN's conditions are reasonable, registries will comply in order to stay in the root. If ICANN were to attempt to enforce unreasonable conditions or to begin removing TLDs capriciously, it would quite soon thereafter discover that its root zone was no longer recognized as authoritative by the Internet community.
RE: Enforcement Provisions (was: Support for Paris draft)
At 2/8/99, 08:34 AM, John B. Reynolds wrote: > > >Jay Fenello wrote: >> >> At 2/7/99, 06:15 PM, John B. Reynolds wrote: >> > >> >Milton Mueller wrote: >> >> >> >> The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this >> >> same criticism. >> >> I commend them for this. >> > >> >On the other hand, the Paris group was completely unresponsive >> to criticism >> >that its veto provisions gave too much power to registries. >> >> >> As an exercise in consensus building . . . >> >> How do you envision ICANN enforcing >> policies onto the registries? >> >> Jay. >> > >If all else fails, ICANN has the authority to remove them from its root >zone. It's admittedly the 'nuclear option', but it's there. Implicit in the Paris Draft is an entire system of enforcement provisions designed to supplement your "nuclear option" (which, btw, would harm the innocent domain name holder's of the nuked TLD). This is the reason for the "Pre-review" process. If you don't like the provision as written, then please suggest an alternate one that addresses this enforcement issue. Jay.
RE: Enforcement Provisions (was: Support for Paris draft)
Jay Fenello wrote: > > At 2/7/99, 06:15 PM, John B. Reynolds wrote: > > > >Milton Mueller wrote: > >> > >> The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this > >> same criticism. > >> I commend them for this. > > > >On the other hand, the Paris group was completely unresponsive > to criticism > >that its veto provisions gave too much power to registries. > > > As an exercise in consensus building . . . > > How do you envision ICANN enforcing > policies onto the registries? > > Jay. > If all else fails, ICANN has the authority to remove them from its root zone. It's admittedly the 'nuclear option', but it's there.
Enforcement Provisions (was: Support for Paris draft)
At 2/7/99, 06:15 PM, John B. Reynolds wrote: > >Milton Mueller wrote: >> >> The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this >> same criticism. >> I commend them for this. > >On the other hand, the Paris group was completely unresponsive to criticism >that its veto provisions gave too much power to registries. As an exercise in consensus building . . . How do you envision ICANN enforcing policies onto the registries? Jay.
