[Lsr] Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-lsr-isis-area-proxy-10: (with DISCUSS)

2024-01-03 Thread Paul Wouters via Datatracker
Paul Wouters has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lsr-isis-area-proxy-10: Discuss

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--
DISCUSS:
--

I have a few minor discusses, which could be just because I'm not an ISIS
expert. Please bear with me :)

Multiple proxy system identifiers in a single area is a
misconfiguration and each unique occurrence SHOULD be logged.

This does not really answer what systems should do in this case? Use none
of them? What would the implication be? Use the one advertised by most nodes?
What would the risk be with that? The answers would be great additions to the
Security Considerations :)

The Area Leader and other candidates for Area Leader MAY withdraw
the Area Proxy System Identifier when one or more Inside Routers
are not advertising the Area Proxy Router Capability. This will
disable Area Proxy functionality.

Wouldn't this allow a malicious Inside Router to completely disable the Area
Proxy functionality? Could this be part of an attack? Can this be mitigated
somehow? Is there something to say about this for the Security Considerations?

0   1   2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Type | Length|Proxy System ID|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Proxy System Identifier continued   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

This diagram seems incorrect. It shows 4 fields instead of 3.
I suggest using:

0   1   2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Type | Length|   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Proxy System Identifier   |
   |   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





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[Lsr] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lsr-isis-area-proxy-10: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

2024-01-03 Thread Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lsr-isis-area-proxy-10: Discuss

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email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
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Please refer to 
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for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-isis-area-proxy/



--
DISCUSS:
--

** Section 4.3.  Do all the candidates need the Area Proxy System Identifier
TLVs need the same system identifier?

-- Section 4.2 says “For consistency, all Area Leader candidates SHOULD be
configured with the same Proxy System ID, Proxy Hostname, and any other
information that may be inserted into the Proxy LSP.”

-- Section 4.3.1 says: “All candidates advertising the Area Proxy System
Identifier TLV MUST be advertising the same system identifier.”

The first statement suggests that consistency might not always be required, but
the second statement is clear that it always must be the same identifier.

** Section 8.  The following statement doesn’t appear to be accurate.

8.  Security Considerations

   This document introduces no new security issues.  Security of routing
   within a domain is already addressed as part of the routing protocols
   themselves.  This document proposes no changes to those security
   architectures.

-- Aren’t a few the filtering activities described in Section 5.2
security-related?

-- What are the relevant pointers to IS-IS security considerations?


--
COMMENT:
--

Thank you to Alexey Melnikov for the SECDIR review.

** Section 4.3.1
   However, before withdrawing the Area Proxy
   System Identifier, an implementation SHOULD protect against
   unnecessary churn from transients by delaying the withdrawal.  The
   amount of delay is implementation-dependent.

Are there any guidelines on how the delay period should be computed?

** Section 4.4.4.
   An entry for a neighbor in both the IS Neighbors TLV and the Extended
   IS Neighbors would be functionally redundant, so the Area Leader
   SHOULD NOT do this.

Under what circumstances would this advice be ignored (i.e., why not a MUST)?

** Section 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 describe various behavior where fields “SHOULD” be
copied.  What governs the choice of not copying these fields?  Would operators
be impacted in troubleshooting or even operations if different implementations
applied this advice differently?  Would it be up to local configuration? Later
sections in 4.4.* also have “SHOULD” behavior as well where the reason for not
following the behavior is not clear.



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