Re: [Mailman-Users] Mailman security question
On Tue, 2013-05-07 at 10:40 +0900, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote: > Lindsay Haisley writes: > > > Is there any support in any version of Mailman for total end to end > > message security? > > Not in a distributed version, although as mentioned in another post > there's a patch. There's a GSoC proposal to implement some such thing > for Mailman 3, with a reasonable UI for handling user pubkey and such, > but I can't say at this point whether that project will be approved > (Google rules). > > Also, "total end to end security" is a fantasy. The attack surface in > the mail system is huge, even if the messages are encrypted in > transport. Without specifying what the "ends" are (workstations? > MTAs? users?) and whether traffic analysis or a court-authorized > "wiretap" at the Mailman site is considered a threat, I can't help you > on whether any given system might be considered "secure" or not. My thought is that "total security" would be MUA to MUA, with the assumption that most MUAs can handle encryption using GnuPGP, Enigmail, or some such. Of course these days nothing is totally secure, since in a pinch, and given a little time, a supercomputer can break even a 4096 bit, or larger key. This is, at this point, curiosity on my part rather than a need for this capability. > > It would also, in the current political climate, doubtless be deemed to > > be something close to a national security threat, > > AFAIK PGP-style encryption is no longer considered munitions. As long > as the crypto stuff is done by third-party modules, Mailman has no > problem, I think. (We can distribute a ROT13 implementation without > bothering even a member of the Bush family, let alone sophisticated > Dems like Al Gore, The Father of the Internet as We Know It :-) I suppose ROT13 would fall under just about everyone's radar ;) I mean, who would suspect -- Lindsay Haisley | "The difference between a duck is because FMP Computer Services |one leg is both the same" 512-259-1190 | - Anonymous http://www.fmp.com| -- Mailman-Users mailing list Mailman-Users@python.org http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/mailman-users Mailman FAQ: http://wiki.list.org/x/AgA3 Security Policy: http://wiki.list.org/x/QIA9 Searchable Archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/mailman-users%40python.org/ Unsubscribe: http://mail.python.org/mailman/options/mailman-users/archive%40jab.org
[Mailman-Users] Mailman security question
Lindsay Haisley writes: > Is there any support in any version of Mailman for total end to end > message security? Not in a distributed version, although as mentioned in another post there's a patch. There's a GSoC proposal to implement some such thing for Mailman 3, with a reasonable UI for handling user pubkey and such, but I can't say at this point whether that project will be approved (Google rules). Also, "total end to end security" is a fantasy. The attack surface in the mail system is huge, even if the messages are encrypted in transport. Without specifying what the "ends" are (workstations? MTAs? users?) and whether traffic analysis or a court-authorized "wiretap" at the Mailman site is considered a threat, I can't help you on whether any given system might be considered "secure" or not. > It would also, in the current political climate, doubtless be deemed to > be something close to a national security threat, AFAIK PGP-style encryption is no longer considered munitions. As long as the crypto stuff is done by third-party modules, Mailman has no problem, I think. (We can distribute a ROT13 implementation without bothering even a member of the Bush family, let alone sophisticated Dems like Al Gore, The Father of the Internet as We Know It :-) Steve -- Mailman-Users mailing list Mailman-Users@python.org http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/mailman-users Mailman FAQ: http://wiki.list.org/x/AgA3 Security Policy: http://wiki.list.org/x/QIA9 Searchable Archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/mailman-users%40python.org/ Unsubscribe: http://mail.python.org/mailman/options/mailman-users/archive%40jab.org
Re: [Mailman-Users] Mailman security question
On 5/6/2013 4:54 PM, Lindsay Haisley wrote: > Is there any support in any version of Mailman for total end to end > message security? This would involve being able to send, say, a GPG (or > PGP) encrypted post to a list, using the list's public key, having the > list decrypt it, and then repost it to all subscribers, encrypted for > each using their respective public keys. > > Granted that such a facility would be a system resources suck of an > order of magnitude greater than a simple, unencrypted list, however I > can see that it might well be useful in some cases. > > It would also, in the current political climate, doubtless be deemed to > be something close to a national security threat, and even discussing > the idea might attract DHS attention. I do recall that some years ago > that Phil Zimmerman, who invented PGP, was the subject of a criminal > investigation since the PGP algorithm was deemed by the US government to > be "weapon" subject to export controls. > There is a patch that is supposed to do that. I have not tried it. https://bugs.launchpad.net/mailman/+bug/558189 signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature -- Mailman-Users mailing list Mailman-Users@python.org http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/mailman-users Mailman FAQ: http://wiki.list.org/x/AgA3 Security Policy: http://wiki.list.org/x/QIA9 Searchable Archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/mailman-users%40python.org/ Unsubscribe: http://mail.python.org/mailman/options/mailman-users/archive%40jab.org
[Mailman-Users] Mailman security question
Is there any support in any version of Mailman for total end to end message security? This would involve being able to send, say, a GPG (or PGP) encrypted post to a list, using the list's public key, having the list decrypt it, and then repost it to all subscribers, encrypted for each using their respective public keys. Granted that such a facility would be a system resources suck of an order of magnitude greater than a simple, unencrypted list, however I can see that it might well be useful in some cases. It would also, in the current political climate, doubtless be deemed to be something close to a national security threat, and even discussing the idea might attract DHS attention. I do recall that some years ago that Phil Zimmerman, who invented PGP, was the subject of a criminal investigation since the PGP algorithm was deemed by the US government to be "weapon" subject to export controls. -- Lindsay Haisley | "Behold! Our way lies through a FMP Computer Services |dark wood whence in which 512-259-1190 | weirdness may wallow!” http://www.fmp.com| --Beauregard -- Mailman-Users mailing list Mailman-Users@python.org http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/mailman-users Mailman FAQ: http://wiki.list.org/x/AgA3 Security Policy: http://wiki.list.org/x/QIA9 Searchable Archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/mailman-users%40python.org/ Unsubscribe: http://mail.python.org/mailman/options/mailman-users/archive%40jab.org
