Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Sorry,
I thought that was part of my quote at first glance. Yes, if the
channels are not protected anyone can connect to any inbound channel. The
total solution is to use an exit or SSL to restrict the inbound connections to
the appropriate channel, AND the MCAUSER to enforce the ID restrictions.
Using one or the other doesn't work.
It
bears noting that the exit or SSL used must be placed on the protected
internal channels and is optional on the external facing channel if you
only have one. A common mistake is placing the exit on the
external-facing channel and leaving the internal-facing ones
unprotected.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 12:37 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Thanks T.Rob.
What
about the channel question I had below. Am I missing something
there?
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October
15, 2003 12:23 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
No, it just means you need to specify all the parameters. If
you run a saveqmgr it prints out runmqsc commands suitable for use on a QMgr
with no SYSTEM.DEF* objects. Use these as templates for your queue
definitions if you need to add or change anything. Make sure you run
saveqmgr on the same server or at least one with a matching version of
MQ.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC,
IT) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday,
October 15, 2003 10:08 AMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
T.Rob wrote:
"Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can
accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that
is that you cannot restrict traffic to a specific channel. For
example, if you define XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to
prevent ABC Corp from connecting to it."
If ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a MCA USer
Identifier set to 'xyz', then all the messages coming across this
channel will have xyz, even ABC's messages. How is that different
than if the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR through another listner / port? If ABC
connects XYZ.RCVR over port , where a listener is running as def,
aren't the messages still put as xyz, not def, xyz is in the
MCAUSER?
Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF* objects". I
tried deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM, and now I cant
create any queues, which I suppose is the goal. But does that meaning that
from this point forward, I can never create any more local queues on this
QM?
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September
05, 2003 4:44 PMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and
I try to nail them down as tight as possible. In my shop we
would do that last paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided
by MQIPT, our firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete
all SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing
channels to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
available). We also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
SVRCONN for external use. As a rule, the Command Server and
Trigger Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If we
do run a trigger monitor, it runs under a low-privileged ID.
All channels use MCAUSER set to a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs
under an ID other than mqm and mqm is removed from the mqm group.
UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to SET*. All of these
configurations address one or more specific vulnerabilities and when you
apply all of them in combination, it is VERY difficult to get admin
access to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and channels for
other than their intended use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound
messaging (to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are
you hosting interfaces to more than one compa
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
I like to make my own templets that incorporate any "non default" object
attributes. For instance, I have a template called TEMPLATE.XMIT.QUEUE that
is all set up to be a triggered transmit queue. When I want a transmit
queue (and all of mine are triggered) in the script I say DEFINE QLOCAL(Q
NAME) LIKE(TEMPLATE.XMIT.QUEUE) and I have a triggered transmit queue. Now
I can have the folks in ops build the definitions, and they don't have to
know anything about triggering a transmit queue.
It works well
Bill Anderson
Senior Systems Analyst
SITA Atlanta, GA
770-303-3503 (office)
404-915-3190 (cell)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.mconnect.aero/
"Potkay, Peter M
(PLC, IT)" To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]cc:
RTFORD.COM> Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Sent by: MQSeries
List
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]
AC.AT>
10/15/2003 12:37 PM
Please respond to
MQSeries List
Thanks T.Rob.
What about the channel question I had below. Am I missing something there?
-Original Message-
From: Wyatt, T. Rob [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:23 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
No, it just means you need to specify all the parameters. If you run
a saveqmgr it prints out runmqsc commands suitable for use on a QMgr
with no SYSTEM.DEF* objects. Use these as templates for your queue
definitions if you need to add or change anything. Make sure you run
saveqmgr on the same server or at least one with a matching version
of MQ.
-- T.Rob
-Original Message-
From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 10:08 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob wrote:
"Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can
accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer
to that is that you cannot restrict traffic to a specific
channel. For example, if you define XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER
('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp from connecting
to it."
If ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a MCA USer
Identifier set to 'xyz', then all the messages coming across
this channel will have xyz, even ABC's messages. How is that
different than if the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR through another
listner / port? If ABC connects XYZ.RCVR over port , where
a listener is running as def, aren't the messages still put as
xyz, not def, xyz is in the MCAUSER?
Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF* objects". I
tried deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM, and
now I cant create any queues, which I suppose is the goal. But
does that meaning that from this point forward, I can never
create any more local queues on this QM?
-Original Message-
From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 4:44 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security
concerns it addresses - or introduces. Since I work for
a bank, I always start with the assumption that my DMZ
servers are targets of attack and I try to nail them down
as tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last
paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided by
MQIPT, our firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete
all SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the
internal-facing channels to internal-facing NICs and run
security exits (or SSL where available). We also never
use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a SVRCONN for
external use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If
we do run a trigger monitor, it runs under a
low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set to a
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter has described the problem well. That said, here is my two cents
In part what we are concerned with is the difference between authorization
and authentication. Making use of the MCAUSER attribute of a channel is
important to security, but is does NOTHING to validate that the connecting
application is a trusted partner. OK, what's a boy to do? a security exit
is the only way to Authenticate a user (unless your implementing SSL I
guess). I have implemented one at our site here in Atlanta, that is quite
simple, and needs only to run on receiver side. All of the users of my
queue managers are external customers, so asking them to develop software
is turf to do. So customers who want extra security need only change
existing programs to send a user ID and password. How that data is send
depends on what language the sending program is written in. Our current
implementation is JAVA specific. Once the security exit "authenticates" the
user during the MQCONN call, it returns control back to the MCA and the
user id for that channel session is set to a value of my choice via the
MCAUSER attribute of the channel.
But all of this gets more administratively intense than some companies may
care to deal with. About half of my users are client connections. While MQ
would be quite happy to service all of them via one simple Server
Connection Channel, for security reason EVERYONE gets a dedicated SVRCONN
channel, so that each of them has a unique user id. So now the very name of
the cannel its self becomes part of your security implementation. If
somebody has ill intent, they have to access your channel to get to your
queue. If they don't know the channel name, well, they have there work cut
out for them don't they. And of course, a security exit goes a long way
here. This also adds to your system admin problems. MQ assumes each value
in the MCAUSER field is defined as a valid user at the operating system
level. If is does not exist there, your going to fall on your sword.
Making use of the MCAUSER attribute of a SVRCONN channel is about as
straight forward as life gets in IT. Making use of it on a receiver channel
is another story. One that's not told in any manual I have read. It has to
do with What authorizations you need to give to the user id in question.
For a SVRCONN channel, giving them a +connect on the queue manager and a
+put / get on the queue is suffice. On a receiver, you need to do the
following:
On the queue manager object +connect +inq +set +setall
On a local queue object +put / get (what ever) +setall
On the dead letter queue +put +setall
the dead letter thing really surprised me, but, that's the way it works!
As for deleting will known objects such as SYSTEM.DEFAULT.* to improve
security, it is unnecessary and inconvenient. The inconvenient part becomes
obvious about the first time you try to create a new object that depends on
the SYSTEM.DEFAULT* as a template. The unnecessary part is that setting the
MCAUSER attribute of the SYSTEM.DEF.RECEIVER to a value that is not defined
on the underlying OS is sufficient to stop a hack.
Ok, that was more like a nickel than two cents, but it is a subject that I
hold near and dear to my heart. Folks that claim MQ has weak security
features have not milked the cow enough!
Cheers
Bill Anderson
Senior Systems Analyst
SITA Atlanta, GA
770-303-3503 (office)
404-915-3190 (cell)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.mconnect.aero/
"Potkay, Peter M
(PLC, IT)" To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]cc:
RTFORD.COM> Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Sent by: MQSeries
List
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]
AC.AT>
10/15/2003 10:07 AM
Please respond to
MQSeries List
T.Rob wrote:
"Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can accomplish
the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that is that you
cannot restrict traffic to a specific channel. For example, if you define
XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp from
connecting to it."
If ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a MCA USer Identifier
set to 'xyz', then all the messages coming across this channel will have
xyz, even ABC's messages. How is that different than if the ABC got to
XYZ.RCVR through another listner / port? If ABC connects XYZ.RCVR over port
, where a listener is running as def, aren't the messages still put as
xyz, not def, xyz is in the MCAUSER?
Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF* objects". I tried
deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM, and now I cant create
any queues, which I suppose is the go
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
As this discussion has become a nice try to at least name all aspects of MQ security, I would like to mention another two: 1. Dead letter queue handler rules that may allow messages to go to the queue where they do not belong. 2. The problem of administering several queue managers belonging to the different organizational units who do not trust each other with all QMs running on a single big box. Just my 2 c Pavel -- This e-mail may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient (or have received this e-mail in error) please notify the sender immediately and destroy this e-mail. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this e-mail is strictly forbidden. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message
That
is what I suspected, but didn't know if I was missing
anything.
Thanks
for all your post related to security. They are helpful. I am putting together a
doc on MQ Security for our company, and your ideas are good for some of our more
vulnerable servers (DMZ ones).
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 12:47 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
Working at a bank, my answer to that is that I'm going to strip
away all non-essential parts of MQ where external connectivity is
concerned. I can, through automation, just as easily recreate
the command queue on demand as I can start the command server. It's an
extra line of code and second or so of response time. On the other hand,
I never have to explain to an auditor why the command queue was there.
If the project manager wants to keep any security-related items, (s)he needs
to spec it out and sign off on it and then any audit issues are still not my
problem. As is so often the case, project issues - even those related to
security - often turn out to be technically simple but politically
driven.
That's not to say there are no valid technical reasons for taking the
extreme approach. Every single hurdle I put up in front of an intruder
slows them down that much more but more importantly, it also increases the
fingerprints left behind. Any intruder can start the command server and
recreate the queue in under a minute but it will take much longer to erase the
evidence from the MQ logs AND the system logs since we now have both an MQ
internal command and some system-level commands. The more forensic
evidence I force the intruder to create, the harder it is to erase all of
it. I'm going to force an intruder to make as many extra keystrokes
and stay online as long as possible.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 10:39 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob,
What do you think of just stopping the command server? My
thinking is if they have access to the box to start the command server
locally, they can just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. True, it
is an extra step, but does it buy us anything really to delete the command
queue on top of stopping the command server?
As
a side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just for security. I am writing
up a doc for Security for MQ at our company, and man, this is a subject unto
itself!
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday,
September 10, 2003 8:27 AMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
You can't. Without going into too much detail, you would need
an agent that doesn't rely on the command server, a command server that
used a different queue, or you would have to define the queue and start
the command server each time. These options may seem like a
royal pain but then the whole purpose is to make it hard to administer the
QMgr by building significant hurdles for a malicious user to
overcome. With appropriate automation, none of these are
particularly burdensome for the legitimate admin team.
-- T.Rob
-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, September 09,
2003 8:47 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob,
If you delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do you send
command messages ?... sorry if this appears to be a stupid
question.
Sid
-Original Message-From: Wyatt,
T. Rob [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent:
Saturday, 6 September 2003 6:44 AMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always
start with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack
and I try to nail them down as tight as possible. In my
shop we would do that last paragraph regardless of any assumed
security provided by MQIPT, our firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete
all SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing
channels to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Luc-Michel, SSL and MCAUSER address two completely different aspects of security. Whereas SSL will authenticate the remote node, it does not prevent that node from addressing messages to the command queue or anywhere else they should not go. MCAUSER addresses this vulnerability and should be considered even where SSL is in use. In many cases, vendors and service bureaus have not upgraded to 5.3 and SSL is not an option. In the absence of SSL, channel exits address the authentication problem. Any general discussion of MQ security would need to consider playing around with MCAUSER, channel exits, firewalls, etc. -- T.Rob -Original Message- From: Luc-Michel Demey [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:17 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > T.Rob, > What do you think of just stopping the command server? My thinking > is if > they have access to the box to start the command server locally, > they can just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. True, it is > an extra step, but does it buy us anything really to delete the > command queue on top of stopping the command server? > > > > > As a side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just for security. I > am writing up a doc for Security for MQ at our company, and man, > this is a subject unto itself! > > Hi, I have done extensive testing about security, hacking and so on, on Queue Managers hosted on Windows and Unix boxes. If you want to protect your QM from external attacks, throught channels, the answer is SSL. Definitively. You can play with MCAUSER, channels exits, firewalls, but ... After applying the CSD, MQ5.3 SSL support works pretty well and is able to secure in a decent way your QM from externam attacks. If you want more (in-queue encryption), have a look at MQ Extended Security Edition 5.3, who includes Policy Director. HTH, Luc-Michel -- Luc-Michel Demey - Freelance EAI Consultant Paris / France Tel. : +33 6 08 755 655 http://consulting.demey.org/ - lmd at demey dot org Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message
Peter,
Working at a bank, my answer to that is that I'm going to strip away
all non-essential parts of MQ where external connectivity is
concerned. I can, through automation, just as easily recreate
the command queue on demand as I can start the command server. It's an
extra line of code and second or so of response time. On the other hand, I
never have to explain to an auditor why the command queue was there. If
the project manager wants to keep any security-related items, (s)he needs to
spec it out and sign off on it and then any audit issues are still not my
problem. As is so often the case, project issues - even those related to
security - often turn out to be technically simple but politically
driven.
That's
not to say there are no valid technical reasons for taking the extreme
approach. Every single hurdle I put up in front of an intruder slows them
down that much more but more importantly, it also increases the fingerprints
left behind. Any intruder can start the command server and recreate the
queue in under a minute but it will take much longer to erase the evidence from
the MQ logs AND the system logs since we now have both an MQ internal command
and some system-level commands. The more forensic evidence I force the
intruder to create, the harder it is to erase all of it. I'm going
to force an intruder to make as many extra keystrokes and stay online as
long as possible.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 10:39 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob,
What do you think of just stopping the command server? My
thinking is if they have access to the box to start the command server
locally, they can just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. True, it is
an extra step, but does it buy us anything really to delete the command queue
on top of stopping the command server?
As a
side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just for security. I am writing up
a doc for Security for MQ at our company, and man, this is a subject unto
itself!
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, September
10, 2003 8:27 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
You can't. Without going into too much detail, you would need
an agent that doesn't rely on the command server, a command server that used
a different queue, or you would have to define the queue and start
the command server each time. These options may seem like a royal
pain but then the whole purpose is to make it hard to administer the QMgr by
building significant hurdles for a malicious user to overcome. With
appropriate automation, none of these are particularly burdensome for the
legitimate admin team.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003
8:47 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob,
If you delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do you send
command messages ?... sorry if this appears to be a stupid
question.
Sid
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T.
Rob [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, 6
September 2003 6:44 AMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and
I try to nail them down as tight as possible. In my shop we
would do that last paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided
by MQIPT, our firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete
all SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing
channels to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
available). We also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
SVRCONN for external use. As a rule, the Command Server and
Trigger Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If we
do run a trigger monitor, it runs under a low-privileged ID.
All channels use MCAUSER set to a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs
under an ID other than mqm and mqm is removed from the mqm group.
UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to SET*. All of these
configurations address one or more specific vulnerabilities and when you
apply all of them in combination, it is VERY difficult to get admin
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Thanks
T.Rob.
What
about the channel question I had below. Am I missing something
there?
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 12:23 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
No,
it just means you need to specify all the parameters. If you run a
saveqmgr it prints out runmqsc commands suitable for use on a QMgr with no
SYSTEM.DEF* objects. Use these as templates for your queue definitions
if you need to add or change anything. Make sure you run saveqmgr on the
same server or at least one with a matching version of MQ.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 10:08 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob wrote:
"Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can
accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that
is that you cannot restrict traffic to a specific channel. For
example, if you define XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to
prevent ABC Corp from connecting to it."
If
ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a MCA USer Identifier set to
'xyz', then all the messages coming across this channel will have xyz,
even ABC's messages. How is that different than if the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR
through another listner / port? If ABC connects XYZ.RCVR over port
, where a listener is running as def, aren't the messages still put as
xyz, not def, xyz is in the MCAUSER?
Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF* objects". I tried
deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM, and now I cant create any
queues, which I suppose is the goal. But does that meaning that from this
point forward, I can never create any more local queues on this
QM?
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September
05, 2003 4:44 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and
I try to nail them down as tight as possible. In my shop we
would do that last paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided
by MQIPT, our firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all
SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels
to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
available). We also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
SVRCONN for external use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If we do run a
trigger monitor, it runs under a low-privileged ID. All
channels use MCAUSER set to a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under
an ID other than mqm and mqm is removed from the mqm group. UserIDs
in the DMZ are never authorized to SET*. All of these configurations
address one or more specific vulnerabilities and when you apply all of
them in combination, it is VERY difficult to get admin access to the QMgr
from outside or to hijack queues and channels for other than their
intended use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound
messaging (to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you
hosting interfaces to more than one company on the same QMgr?
In that case, I would DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a
separate ID. Can you imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ
interface to maliciously attack Company B? If your naming standards
make it easy to guess channel names and queue names based on customer name
or ID, hijacking someone else's channel or queue is not so
farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by accident when copying MQSC
scripts from one customer to another and miss the RNAME in a QREMOTE or
something. If you made this mistake with the listener running as
mqm, nothing would stop the messages from going to the wrong queue or out
to the wrong customer.
-- T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC,
IT) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday,
September 05, 2003 3:59 PMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
T.Rob, in regards to you
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
SSL will protect you from people you don't know from breaking in. You are always sure of who the other side is with SSL. I does nothing when the trusted guy on the other side decides to behave badly. That is where all the other tricks come into play. SSL in combination with all the other methods is the way to go I suppose. -Original Message- From: Luc-Michel Demey [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:17 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > T.Rob, > What do you think of just stopping the command server? My thinking > is if > they have access to the box to start the command server locally, > they can just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. True, it is > an extra step, but does it buy us anything really to delete the > command queue on top of stopping the command server? > > > > > As a side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just for security. I > am writing up a doc for Security for MQ at our company, and man, > this is a subject unto itself! > > Hi, I have done extensive testing about security, hacking and so on, on Queue Managers hosted on Windows and Unix boxes. If you want to protect your QM from external attacks, throught channels, the answer is SSL. Definitively. You can play with MCAUSER, channels exits, firewalls, but ... After applying the CSD, MQ5.3 SSL support works pretty well and is able to secure in a decent way your QM from externam attacks. If you want more (in-queue encryption), have a look at MQ Extended Security Edition 5.3, who includes Policy Director. HTH, Luc-Michel -- Luc-Michel Demey - Freelance EAI Consultant Paris / France Tel. : +33 6 08 755 655 http://consulting.demey.org/ - lmd at demey dot org Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive This communication, including attachments, is for the exclusive use of addressee and may contain proprietary, confidential or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, copying, disclosure, dissemination or distribution is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return email and delete this communication and destroy all copies. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
No, it
just means you need to specify all the parameters. If you run a saveqmgr
it prints out runmqsc commands suitable for use on a QMgr with no SYSTEM.DEF*
objects. Use these as templates for your queue definitions if you need to
add or change anything. Make sure you run saveqmgr on the same server or
at least one with a matching version of MQ.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, October 15,
2003 10:08 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob wrote:
"Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can
accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that is
that you cannot restrict traffic to a specific channel. For example, if
you define XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp
from connecting to it."
If
ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a MCA USer Identifier set to
'xyz', then all the messages coming across this channel will have xyz,
even ABC's messages. How is that different than if the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR
through another listner / port? If ABC connects XYZ.RCVR over port ,
where a listener is running as def, aren't the messages still put as xyz, not
def, xyz is in the MCAUSER?
Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF* objects". I tried
deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM, and now I cant create any
queues, which I suppose is the goal. But does that meaning that from this
point forward, I can never create any more local queues on this
QM?
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 4:44 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try
to nail them down as tight as possible. In my shop we would do that
last paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our
firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all
SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels
to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
available). We also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
SVRCONN for external use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If we do run a
trigger monitor, it runs under a low-privileged ID. All channels
use MCAUSER set to a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under an ID
other than mqm and mqm is removed from the mqm group. UserIDs in the
DMZ are never authorized to SET*. All of these configurations address
one or more specific vulnerabilities and when you apply all of them in
combination, it is VERY difficult to get admin access to the QMgr from
outside or to hijack queues and channels for other than their intended
use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound messaging
(to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you hosting
interfaces to more than one company on the same QMgr? In that
case, I would DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a separate
ID. Can you imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ interface to
maliciously attack Company B? If your naming standards make it easy to
guess channel names and queue names based on customer name or ID, hijacking
someone else's channel or queue is not so farfetched. Hell, you might
even do it by accident when copying MQSC scripts from one customer to
another and miss the RNAME in a QREMOTE or something. If you made this
mistake with the listener running as mqm, nothing would stop the messages
from going to the wrong queue or out to the wrong
customer.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC,
IT) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday,
September 05, 2003 3:59 PMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary
if
A. Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound
messaging (to other companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B. MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue
manager and the internal queue manager inside of the internal firewall
that it conne
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
> T.Rob, > What do you think of just stopping the command server? My thinking > is if > they have access to the box to start the command server locally, > they can just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. True, it is > an extra step, but does it buy us anything really to delete the > command queue on top of stopping the command server? > > > > > As a side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just for security. I > am writing up a doc for Security for MQ at our company, and man, > this is a subject unto itself! > > Hi, I have done extensive testing about security, hacking and so on, on Queue Managers hosted on Windows and Unix boxes. If you want to protect your QM from external attacks, throught channels, the answer is SSL. Definitively. You can play with MCAUSER, channels exits, firewalls, but ... After applying the CSD, MQ5.3 SSL support works pretty well and is able to secure in a decent way your QM from externam attacks. If you want more (in-queue encryption), have a look at MQ Extended Security Edition 5.3, who includes Policy Director. HTH, Luc-Michel -- Luc-Michel Demey - Freelance EAI Consultant Paris / France Tel. : +33 6 08 755 655 http://consulting.demey.org/ - lmd at demey dot org Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Thanks Sam.
That did it.
-Original Message-
From: Sam Garforth [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 11:08 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
I think you should be able to create queues using the
LIKE parameter.
Sam
--- "Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > T.Rob wrote:
> "Every time I bring this up, people always reply
> that you can accomplish the
> same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to
> that is that you cannot
> restrict traffic to a specific channel. For
> example, if you define XYZ.RCVR
> with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC
> Corp from connecting to
> it."
>
> If ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a
> MCA USer Identifier set
> to 'xyz', then all the messages coming across this
> channel will have xyz,
> even ABC's messages. How is that different than if
> the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR
> through another listner / port? If ABC connects
> XYZ.RCVR over port ,
> where a listener is running as def, aren't the
> messages still put as xyz,
> not def, xyz is in the MCAUSER?
>
>
>
>
>
> Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
> objects". I tried
> deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM,
> and now I cant create any
> queues, which I suppose is the goal. But does that
> meaning that from this
> point forward, I can never create any more local
> queues on this QM?
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Wyatt, T. Rob
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 4:44 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
>
>
> Peter,
>
> I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security
> concerns it addresses - or
> introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
> with the assumption
> that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try
> to nail them down as
> tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last
> paragraph regardless of
> any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall
> or private circuits.
>
> And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also
> delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
> objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the
> internal-facing channels to
> internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL
> where available). We
> also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
> SVRCONN for external
> use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
> Monitor are turned off
> unless specifically required. If we do run a
> trigger monitor, it runs under
> a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set
> to a low-privileged ID.
> The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is
> removed from the mqm
> group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to
> SET*. All of these
> configurations address one or more specific
> vulnerabilities and when you
> apply all of them in combination, it is VERY
> difficult to get admin access
> to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and
> channels for other than
> their intended use.
>
> Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for
> outbound messaging (to
> other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are
> you hosting interfaces to
> more than one company on the same QMgr? In that
> case, I would DEFINITELY
> want to lock down each interface under a separate
> ID. Can you imagine the
> fallout if company A used your MQ interface to
> maliciously attack Company B?
> If your naming standards make it easy to guess
> channel names and queue names
> based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone
> else's channel or queue is
> not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by
> accident when copying MQSC
> scripts from one customer to another and miss the
> RNAME in a QREMOTE or
> something. If you made this mistake with the
> listener running as mqm,
> nothing would stop the messages from going to the
> wrong queue or out to the
> wrong customer.
>
> -- T.Rob
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 3:59 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
>
>
> T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that
> still necessary if
>
> A. Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for
> outbound messaging (to
> other companies) sitting in the DMZ
>
> and
>
> B. MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any
> outside companies?
>
> (There are very specific firewall rules between the
> DMZ queue manager and
> the internal queue ma
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Thanks I have seen these very informative docs. They don't address T.Rob's suggestion of deleting the queue altogether. I am curious if it is a benificial extra step or not. -Original Message- From: Sam Garforth [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 11:48 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall Try http://www.sjg-enterpriseintegration.com/oamsecurity.asp and http://www.sjg-enterpriseintegration.com/closingmqholes.asp --- "Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > T.Rob, > What do you think of just stopping the command > server? My thinking is if > they have access to the box to start the command > server locally, they can > just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. > True, it is an extra step, > but does it buy us anything really to delete the > command queue on top of > stopping the command server? > > > > > As a side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just > for security. I am > writing up a doc for Security for MQ at our company, > and man, this is a > subject unto itself! > > > -Original Message- > From: Wyatt, T. Rob > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 8:27 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > > > You can't. Without going into too much detail, you > would need an agent that > doesn't rely on the command server, a command server > that used a different > queue, or you would have to define the queue and > start the command server > each time. These options may seem like a royal pain > but then the whole > purpose is to make it hard to administer the QMgr by > building significant > hurdles for a malicious user to overcome. With > appropriate automation, none > of these are particularly burdensome for the > legitimate admin team. > > -- T.Rob > > -----Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003 8:47 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > > > > T.Rob, > > If you delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do > you send command > messages ?... sorry if this appears to be a stupid > question. > > Sid > > -Original Message- > From: Wyatt, T. Rob > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Saturday, 6 September 2003 6:44 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > > > Peter, > > I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security > concerns it addresses - or > introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start > with the assumption > that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try > to nail them down as > tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last > paragraph regardless of > any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall > or private circuits. > > And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also > delete all SYSTEM.DEF* > objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the > internal-facing channels to > internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL > where available). We > also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a > SVRCONN for external > use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger > Monitor are turned off > unless specifically required. If we do run a > trigger monitor, it runs under > a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set > to a low-privileged ID. > The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is > removed from the mqm > group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to > SET*. All of these > configurations address one or more specific > vulnerabilities and when you > apply all of them in combination, it is VERY > difficult to get admin access > to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and > channels for other than > their intended use. > > Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for > outbound messaging (to > other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are > you hosting interfaces to > more than one company on the same QMgr? In that > case, I would DEFINITELY > want to lock down each interface under a separate > ID. Can you imagine the > fallout if company A used your MQ interface to > maliciously attack Company B? > If your naming standards make it easy to guess > channel names and queue names > based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone > else's channel or queue is > not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by > accident when copying MQSC > scripts from one customer to another and miss the > RNAME in a QREMOTE or > something. If you made this mistake with the > listen
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Try http://www.sjg-enterpriseintegration.com/oamsecurity.asp and http://www.sjg-enterpriseintegration.com/closingmqholes.asp --- "Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > T.Rob, > What do you think of just stopping the command > server? My thinking is if > they have access to the box to start the command > server locally, they can > just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. > True, it is an extra step, > but does it buy us anything really to delete the > command queue on top of > stopping the command server? > > > > > As a side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just > for security. I am > writing up a doc for Security for MQ at our company, > and man, this is a > subject unto itself! > > > -Original Message- > From: Wyatt, T. Rob > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 8:27 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > > > You can't. Without going into too much detail, you > would need an agent that > doesn't rely on the command server, a command server > that used a different > queue, or you would have to define the queue and > start the command server > each time. These options may seem like a royal pain > but then the whole > purpose is to make it hard to administer the QMgr by > building significant > hurdles for a malicious user to overcome. With > appropriate automation, none > of these are particularly burdensome for the > legitimate admin team. > > -- T.Rob > > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003 8:47 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > > > > T.Rob, > > If you delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do > you send command > messages ?... sorry if this appears to be a stupid > question. > > Sid > > -Original Message- > From: Wyatt, T. Rob > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Saturday, 6 September 2003 6:44 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall > > > Peter, > > I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security > concerns it addresses - or > introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start > with the assumption > that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try > to nail them down as > tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last > paragraph regardless of > any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall > or private circuits. > > And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also > delete all SYSTEM.DEF* > objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the > internal-facing channels to > internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL > where available). We > also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a > SVRCONN for external > use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger > Monitor are turned off > unless specifically required. If we do run a > trigger monitor, it runs under > a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set > to a low-privileged ID. > The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is > removed from the mqm > group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to > SET*. All of these > configurations address one or more specific > vulnerabilities and when you > apply all of them in combination, it is VERY > difficult to get admin access > to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and > channels for other than > their intended use. > > Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for > outbound messaging (to > other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are > you hosting interfaces to > more than one company on the same QMgr? In that > case, I would DEFINITELY > want to lock down each interface under a separate > ID. Can you imagine the > fallout if company A used your MQ interface to > maliciously attack Company B? > If your naming standards make it easy to guess > channel names and queue names > based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone > else's channel or queue is > not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by > accident when copying MQSC > scripts from one customer to another and miss the > RNAME in a QREMOTE or > something. If you made this mistake with the > listener running as mqm, > nothing would stop the messages from going to the > wrong queue or out to the > wrong customer. > > -- T.Rob > > -Original Message- > From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT) > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 3:59 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewal
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
I think you should be able to create queues using the
LIKE parameter.
Sam
--- "Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > T.Rob wrote:
> "Every time I bring this up, people always reply
> that you can accomplish the
> same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to
> that is that you cannot
> restrict traffic to a specific channel. For
> example, if you define XYZ.RCVR
> with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC
> Corp from connecting to
> it."
>
> If ABC corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a
> MCA USer Identifier set
> to 'xyz', then all the messages coming across this
> channel will have xyz,
> even ABC's messages. How is that different than if
> the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR
> through another listner / port? If ABC connects
> XYZ.RCVR over port ,
> where a listener is running as def, aren't the
> messages still put as xyz,
> not def, xyz is in the MCAUSER?
>
>
>
>
>
> Also, you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
> objects". I tried
> deleting SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM,
> and now I cant create any
> queues, which I suppose is the goal. But does that
> meaning that from this
> point forward, I can never create any more local
> queues on this QM?
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Wyatt, T. Rob
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 4:44 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
>
>
> Peter,
>
> I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security
> concerns it addresses - or
> introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
> with the assumption
> that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try
> to nail them down as
> tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last
> paragraph regardless of
> any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall
> or private circuits.
>
> And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also
> delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
> objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the
> internal-facing channels to
> internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL
> where available). We
> also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
> SVRCONN for external
> use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
> Monitor are turned off
> unless specifically required. If we do run a
> trigger monitor, it runs under
> a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set
> to a low-privileged ID.
> The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is
> removed from the mqm
> group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to
> SET*. All of these
> configurations address one or more specific
> vulnerabilities and when you
> apply all of them in combination, it is VERY
> difficult to get admin access
> to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and
> channels for other than
> their intended use.
>
> Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for
> outbound messaging (to
> other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are
> you hosting interfaces to
> more than one company on the same QMgr? In that
> case, I would DEFINITELY
> want to lock down each interface under a separate
> ID. Can you imagine the
> fallout if company A used your MQ interface to
> maliciously attack Company B?
> If your naming standards make it easy to guess
> channel names and queue names
> based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone
> else's channel or queue is
> not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by
> accident when copying MQSC
> scripts from one customer to another and miss the
> RNAME in a QREMOTE or
> something. If you made this mistake with the
> listener running as mqm,
> nothing would stop the messages from going to the
> wrong queue or out to the
> wrong customer.
>
> -- T.Rob
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 3:59 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
>
>
> T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that
> still necessary if
>
> A. Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for
> outbound messaging (to
> other companies) sitting in the DMZ
>
> and
>
> B. MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any
> outside companies?
>
> (There are very specific firewall rules between the
> DMZ queue manager and
> the internal queue manager inside of the internal
> firewall that it connects
> to.)
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Wyatt, T. Rob
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 12:19 P
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message
T.Rob,
What do you think of just stopping the command server? My thinking
is if they have access to the box to start the command server locally, they can
just as easily use runmqsc to create the queue. True, it is an extra step, but
does it buy us anything really to delete the command queue on top of stopping
the command server?
As a
side note, does anyone know of an MQ class just for security. I am writing up a
doc for Security for MQ at our company, and man, this is a subject unto
itself!
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Wednesday, September
10, 2003 8:27 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
You
can't. Without going into too much detail, you would need an agent that
doesn't rely on the command server, a command server that used a different
queue, or you would have to define the queue and start the command server
each time. These options may seem like a royal pain but then the whole
purpose is to make it hard to administer the QMgr by building significant
hurdles for a malicious user to overcome. With appropriate automation,
none of these are particularly burdensome for the legitimate admin
team.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003
8:47 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob,
If
you delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do you send command messages
?... sorry if this appears to be a stupid question.
Sid
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T.
Rob [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, 6
September 2003 6:44 AMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and
I try to nail them down as tight as possible. In my shop we
would do that last paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided
by MQIPT, our firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all
SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels
to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
available). We also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
SVRCONN for external use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If we do run a
trigger monitor, it runs under a low-privileged ID. All
channels use MCAUSER set to a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under
an ID other than mqm and mqm is removed from the mqm group. UserIDs
in the DMZ are never authorized to SET*. All of these configurations
address one or more specific vulnerabilities and when you apply all of
them in combination, it is VERY difficult to get admin access to the QMgr
from outside or to hijack queues and channels for other than their
intended use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound
messaging (to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you
hosting interfaces to more than one company on the same QMgr?
In that case, I would DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a
separate ID. Can you imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ
interface to maliciously attack Company B? If your naming standards
make it easy to guess channel names and queue names based on customer name
or ID, hijacking someone else's channel or queue is not so
farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by accident when copying MQSC
scripts from one customer to another and miss the RNAME in a QREMOTE or
something. If you made this mistake with the listener running as
mqm, nothing would stop the messages from going to the wrong queue or out
to the wrong customer.
-- T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC,
IT) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday,
September 05, 2003 3:59 PMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary
if
A. Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound
messaging (to other companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B. MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue
manager and the internal
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob
wrote:
"Every
time I bring this up, people always reply that you can accomplish the same thing
with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that is that you cannot restrict
traffic to a specific channel. For example, if you define XYZ.RCVR with
MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp from connecting to
it."
If ABC
corp connects to XYZ.RCVR, and XYZ.RCVR has a MCA USer Identifier set to 'xyz',
then all the messages coming across this channel will have xyz, even ABC's
messages. How is that different than if the ABC got to XYZ.RCVR through another
listner / port? If ABC connects XYZ.RCVR over port , where a listener
is running as def, aren't the messages still put as xyz, not def, xyz is in the
MCAUSER?
Also,
you mentioned "we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF* objects". I tried deleting
SYSTEM.DEFAULT.LOCAL.QUEUE on a dummy QM, and now I cant create any queues,
which I suppose is the goal. But does that meaning that from this point forward,
I can never create any more local queues on this QM?
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 4:44 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
I've
not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it addresses - or
introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start with the assumption
that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try to nail them down as
tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last paragraph regardless
of any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall or private
circuits.
And
that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels to
internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where available). We
also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a SVRCONN for external
use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger Monitor are turned off
unless specifically required. If we do run a trigger monitor,
it runs under a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set to
a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is
removed from the mqm group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to
SET*. All of these configurations address one or more specific
vulnerabilities and when you apply all of them in combination, it is VERY
difficult to get admin access to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and
channels for other than their intended use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound messaging
(to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you hosting
interfaces to more than one company on the same QMgr? In that case,
I would DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a separate ID.
Can you imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ interface to maliciously
attack Company B? If your naming standards make it easy to guess channel
names and queue names based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone else's
channel or queue is not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by
accident when copying MQSC scripts from one customer to another and miss the
RNAME in a QREMOTE or something. If you made this mistake with the
listener running as mqm, nothing would stop the messages from going to the
wrong queue or out to the wrong customer.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 3:59 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary if
A.
Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound messaging (to other
companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B.
MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue manager
and the internal queue manager inside of the internal firewall that it
connects to.)
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September
05, 2003 12:19 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Doug,
We are using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as specified
in MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This has been working fine for us except that servers with dual
NICs or virtual IP addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would
sometimes bind to a different address under MQ pre-5.3 and be blocked
by the firewall. Prior to 5.3 we had to set up rules for the
p
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message
You
can't. Without going into too much detail, you would need an agent that
doesn't rely on the command server, a command server that used a different
queue, or you would have to define the queue and start the command server
each time. These options may seem like a royal pain but then the whole
purpose is to make it hard to administer the QMgr by building significant
hurdles for a malicious user to overcome. With appropriate automation,
none of these are particularly burdensome for the legitimate admin
team.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003 8:47
PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an
outbound firewall
T.Rob,
If
you delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do you send command messages
?... sorry if this appears to be a stupid question.
Sid
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, 6
September 2003 6:44 AMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Peter,
I've not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it
addresses - or introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start
with the assumption that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try
to nail them down as tight as possible. In my shop we would do that
last paragraph regardless of any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our
firewall or private circuits.
And that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all
SYSTEM.DEF* objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels
to internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where
available). We also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a
SVRCONN for external use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger
Monitor are turned off unless specifically required. If we do run a
trigger monitor, it runs under a low-privileged ID. All channels
use MCAUSER set to a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under an ID
other than mqm and mqm is removed from the mqm group. UserIDs in the
DMZ are never authorized to SET*. All of these configurations address
one or more specific vulnerabilities and when you apply all of them in
combination, it is VERY difficult to get admin access to the QMgr from
outside or to hijack queues and channels for other than their intended
use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound messaging
(to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you hosting
interfaces to more than one company on the same QMgr? In that
case, I would DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a separate
ID. Can you imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ interface to
maliciously attack Company B? If your naming standards make it easy to
guess channel names and queue names based on customer name or ID, hijacking
someone else's channel or queue is not so farfetched. Hell, you might
even do it by accident when copying MQSC scripts from one customer to
another and miss the RNAME in a QREMOTE or something. If you made this
mistake with the listener running as mqm, nothing would stop the messages
from going to the wrong queue or out to the wrong
customer.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC,
IT) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday,
September 05, 2003 3:59 PMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary
if
A. Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound
messaging (to other companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B. MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue
manager and the internal queue manager inside of the internal firewall
that it connects to.)
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September
05, 2003 12:19 PMTo:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Penetrating an outbound
firewall
Doug,
We are using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as
specified in MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This has been working fine for us except that servers with dual
NICs or virtual IP addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would
sometimes bind to a different address under MQ pre-5.3 and be
blocked by the firewall. Prior to 5.3 we had to set up rules for
the physical AND virtual addresses si
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message
T.Rob,
If you
delete the SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE how do you send command messages ?...
sorry if this appears to be a stupid question.
Sid
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, 6 September
2003 6:44 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
I've
not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it addresses - or
introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start with the assumption
that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try to nail them down as
tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last paragraph regardless
of any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall or private
circuits.
And
that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels to
internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where available). We
also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a SVRCONN for external
use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger Monitor are turned off
unless specifically required. If we do run a trigger monitor,
it runs under a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set to
a low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is
removed from the mqm group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to
SET*. All of these configurations address one or more specific
vulnerabilities and when you apply all of them in combination, it is VERY
difficult to get admin access to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and
channels for other than their intended use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound messaging
(to other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you hosting
interfaces to more than one company on the same QMgr? In that case,
I would DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a separate ID.
Can you imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ interface to maliciously
attack Company B? If your naming standards make it easy to guess channel
names and queue names based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone else's
channel or queue is not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by
accident when copying MQSC scripts from one customer to another and miss the
RNAME in a QREMOTE or something. If you made this mistake with the
listener running as mqm, nothing would stop the messages from going to the
wrong queue or out to the wrong customer.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 3:59 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary if
A.
Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound messaging (to other
companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B.
MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue manager
and the internal queue manager inside of the internal firewall that it
connects to.)
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September
05, 2003 12:19 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Doug,
We are using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as specified
in MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This has been working fine for us except that servers with dual
NICs or virtual IP addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would
sometimes bind to a different address under MQ pre-5.3 and be blocked
by the firewall. Prior to 5.3 we had to set up rules for the
physical AND virtual addresses since the binding was unspecified.
The LOCALADDR field has really simplified things. We have tried
setting up rules for entire subnets but have since switched to using a set
of rules for each point-to-point connection. Although there are more
rules, there are less surprises when you change one.
Might I also suggest that you run a listener (not inetd) for
external traffic that is different from your internal traffic. This
way, you can shut down the external connection without impacting your
internal network. If you have multiple business partners connecting
to the same QMgr, run a different listener for each. Then you can
disable one without impacting the others.
If you are really security conscious, run the listeners under a
low-privileged ID. For example, if you have connections to XYZ Corp
and ABC Corp, you can crea
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message Doug, Outbound restriction is becoming a real pain in the arse for us, it seams every site we install our client software on thinks they will stop virus's if the block ALL outbound ports on a firewall! You need the network guys to open up the port and host combination so you can connect to your server, you also need to make sure it does NATing correctly and allows the host to return packets. Sid -Original Message-From: Pierson, Doug (ITD) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, 6 September 2003 12:30 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Penetrating an outbound firewall Hi MQers, Does anyone have any experience with sending MQ messages outbound through a firewall that restricts outbound traffic? The traffic needs to be delivered to numerous destination servers. Are you using MQ-IPT? If so, are you using multiple ports to define multiple routes and sending the traffic to IPT instances deployed at each of the target servers? Or, is all of your traffic sent to a single IPT instance outside of the firewall using a single route? From there, queue name resolution can be used to direct it to the true destination server with the messages in MQ protocol. The goal of the firewall administrator is to restrict us to minimal port usage. We see the restriction to a single port using IPT to be to costly in terms of performance. The traffic volume is significant. I'm also aware of MQ5.3's introduction of the LOCLADDR channel attribute to restrict outbound traffic to a single port or range of ports. Any comments or feedback would be much appreciated. Thanks, Doug Pierson
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Peter,
I've
not used MQIPT so I don't know what security concerns it addresses - or
introduces. Since I work for a bank, I always start with the assumption
that my DMZ servers are targets of attack and I try to nail them down as
tight as possible. In my shop we would do that last paragraph regardless
of any assumed security provided by MQIPT, our firewall or private
circuits.
And
that's just the beginning. In the DMZ we also delete all SYSTEM.DEF*
objects, set up LOCALADDR to bind the internal-facing channels to
internal-facing NICs and run security exits (or SSL where available). We
also never use a SVR channel in the DMZ or define a SVRCONN for external
use. As a rule, the Command Server and Trigger Monitor are turned off
unless specifically required. If we do run a trigger monitor, it runs
under a low-privileged ID. All channels use MCAUSER set to a
low-privileged ID. The QMgr runs under an ID other than mqm and mqm is
removed from the mqm group. UserIDs in the DMZ are never authorized to
SET*. All of these configurations address one or more specific
vulnerabilities and when you apply all of them in combination, it is VERY
difficult to get admin access to the QMgr from outside or to hijack queues and
channels for other than their intended use.
Incidentally, you mentioned a dedicated QMgr "for outbound messaging (to
other companies)" and I notice that's plural. Are you hosting interfaces
to more than one company on the same QMgr? In that case, I would
DEFINITELY want to lock down each interface under a separate ID. Can you
imagine the fallout if company A used your MQ interface to maliciously attack
Company B? If your naming standards make it easy to guess channel names
and queue names based on customer name or ID, hijacking someone else's channel
or queue is not so farfetched. Hell, you might even do it by accident when
copying MQSC scripts from one customer to another and miss the RNAME in a
QREMOTE or something. If you made this mistake with the listener running
as mqm, nothing would stop the messages from going to the wrong queue or out to
the wrong customer.
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Potkay, Peter M (PLC, IT)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 3:59 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob, in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary if
A.
Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound messaging (to other
companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B.
MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue manager
and the internal queue manager inside of the internal firewall that it
connects to.)
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 12:19 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Doug,
We
are using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as specified in
MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This has been working fine for us except that servers with dual NICs
or virtual IP addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would sometimes
bind to a different address under MQ pre-5.3 and be blocked by the
firewall. Prior to 5.3 we had to set up rules for the physical AND
virtual addresses since the binding was unspecified. The LOCALADDR
field has really simplified things. We have tried setting up rules for
entire subnets but have since switched to using a set of rules for each
point-to-point connection. Although there are more rules, there are
less surprises when you change one.
Might I also suggest that you run a listener (not inetd) for
external traffic that is different from your internal traffic. This
way, you can shut down the external connection without impacting your
internal network. If you have multiple business partners connecting to
the same QMgr, run a different listener for each. Then you can disable
one without impacting the others.
If
you are really security conscious, run the listeners under a low-privileged
ID. For example, if you have connections to XYZ Corp and ABC Corp, you
can create UserIDs xyz and abc and put them into groups xyz and abc,
respectively. Then start listeners under each ID. This will
allow you to set up authorizations on the queues such that traffic from ABC
and XYZ cannot end up on each other's queues or, worse yet, on your Command
Queue. Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can
accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that
is that you cannot restrict traffic to a sp
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
T.Rob,
in regards to your last paragraph, is that still necessary if
A.
Your queue manager is a dedicated one just for outbound messaging (to other companies) sitting in the DMZ
and
B.
MQIPT sits between your DMZ queue manager and any outside
companies?
(There
are very specific firewall rules between the DMZ queue manager and the internal
queue manager inside of the internal firewall that it connects
to.)
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 12:19 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Doug,
We
are using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as specified in
MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This
has been working fine for us except that servers with dual NICs or virtual IP
addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would sometimes bind to a
different address under MQ pre-5.3 and be blocked by the firewall.
Prior to 5.3 we had to set up rules for the physical AND virtual addresses
since the binding was unspecified. The LOCALADDR field has really simplified things. We have tried setting up rules for entire subnets but
have since switched to using a set of rules for each point-to-point
connection. Although there are more rules, there are less surprises when
you change one.
Might I also suggest that you run a listener (not inetd) for
external traffic that is different from your internal traffic. This way,
you can shut down the external connection without impacting your internal network. If you have multiple business partners connecting to the same
QMgr, run a different listener for each. Then you can disable one without impacting the others.
If
you are really security conscious, run the listeners under a low-privileged
ID. For example, if you have connections to XYZ Corp and ABC Corp, you
can create UserIDs xyz and abc and put them into groups xyz and abc,
respectively. Then start listeners under each ID. This will allow
you to set up authorizations on the queues such that traffic from ABC and XYZ
cannot end up on each other's queues or, worse yet, on your Command
Queue. Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that is
that you cannot restrict traffic to a specific channel. For example, if
you define XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp
from connecting to it. For that matter, there is nothing to prevent ABC
Corp from connecting to SYSTEM.DEF.SVRCONN or any other channel unless you run
exits on ALL of them or use SSL on ALL of them. Running the
listeners under low-privileged IDs allows you to lock down a specific path
from the firewall all the way down to specific queues.
Regards,
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Pierson, Doug (ITD) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003
10:30 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Hi MQers,
Does anyone have any experience with sending MQ
messages outbound through a firewall that restricts outbound traffic?
The traffic needs to be delivered to numerous destination servers. Are
you using MQ-IPT? If so, are you using multiple ports to define multiple routes and sending the traffic to IPT instances deployed at each of
the target servers? Or, is all of your traffic sent to a single IPT
instance outside of the firewall using a single route? From there,
queue name resolution can be used to direct it to the true destination server with the messages in MQ protocol.
The goal of the firewall administrator is to
restrict us to minimal port usage. We see the restriction to a single
port using IPT to be to costly in terms of performance. The traffic
volume is significant. I'm also aware of MQ5.3's introduction of the
LOCLADDR channel attribute to restrict outbound traffic to a single port or
range of ports.
Any comments or feedback would be much appreciated.
Thanks, Doug
Pierson
This communication, including attachments, is for the exclusive use of
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Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Message
T.Rob,
Excellent information, thankyou. I appreciate your taking the time
to respond!
Regards,
Doug
-Original Message-From: Wyatt, T. Rob
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, September 05,
2003 12:19 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Doug,
We
are using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as specified in
MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This
has been working fine for us except that servers with dual NICs or virtual IP
addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would sometimes bind to a
different address under MQ pre-5.3 and be blocked by the firewall.
Prior to 5.3 we had to set up rules for the physical AND virtual addresses
since the binding was unspecified. The LOCALADDR field has really
simplified things. We have tried setting up rules for entire subnets but
have since switched to using a set of rules for each point-to-point
connection. Although there are more rules, there are less surprises when
you change one.
Might I also suggest that you run a listener (not inetd) for
external traffic that is different from your internal traffic. This way,
you can shut down the external connection without impacting your internal
network. If you have multiple business partners connecting to the same
QMgr, run a different listener for each. Then you can disable one
without impacting the others.
If
you are really security conscious, run the listeners under a low-privileged
ID. For example, if you have connections to XYZ Corp and ABC Corp, you
can create UserIDs xyz and abc and put them into groups xyz and abc,
respectively. Then start listeners under each ID. This will allow
you to set up authorizations on the queues such that traffic from ABC and XYZ
cannot end up on each other's queues or, worse yet, on your Command
Queue. Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can
accomplish the same thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that is
that you cannot restrict traffic to a specific channel. For example, if
you define XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp
from connecting to it. For that matter, there is nothing to prevent ABC
Corp from connecting to SYSTEM.DEF.SVRCONN or any other channel unless you run
exits on ALL of them or use SSL on ALL of them. Running the
listeners under low-privileged IDs allows you to lock down a specific path
from the firewall all the way down to specific queues.
Regards,
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Pierson, Doug (ITD)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003
10:30 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Hi MQers,
Does anyone have any experience with sending MQ
messages outbound through a firewall that restricts outbound traffic?
The traffic needs to be delivered to numerous destination servers. Are
you using MQ-IPT? If so, are you using multiple ports to define
multiple routes and sending the traffic to IPT instances deployed at each of
the target servers? Or, is all of your traffic sent to a single IPT
instance outside of the firewall using a single route? From there,
queue name resolution can be used to direct it to the true destination
server with the messages in MQ protocol.
The goal of the firewall administrator is to
restrict us to minimal port usage. We see the restriction to a single
port using IPT to be to costly in terms of performance. The traffic
volume is significant. I'm also aware of MQ5.3's introduction of the
LOCLADDR channel attribute to restrict outbound traffic to a single port or
range of ports.
Any comments or feedback would be much
appreciated.
Thanks, Doug
Pierson
Re: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall
Doug,
We are
using direct MQ connections with firewall rules as specified in
MA86
(http://www-3.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/individual/supportpacs/ma86.pdf).
This
has been working fine for us except that servers with dual NICs or virtual IP
addresses (our Veritas clusters), the socket would sometimes bind to a different
address under MQ pre-5.3 and be blocked by the firewall. Prior to 5.3
we had to set up rules for the physical AND virtual addresses since the binding
was unspecified. The LOCALADDR field has really simplified things.
We have tried setting up rules for entire subnets but have since switched to
using a set of rules for each point-to-point connection. Although there
are more rules, there are less surprises when you change
one.
Might
I also suggest that you run a listener (not inetd) for external traffic
that is different from your internal traffic. This way, you can shut down
the external connection without impacting your internal network. If you
have multiple business partners connecting to the same QMgr, run a different
listener for each. Then you can disable one without impacting the
others.
If you
are really security conscious, run the listeners under a low-privileged
ID. For example, if you have connections to XYZ Corp and ABC Corp, you can
create UserIDs xyz and abc and put them into groups xyz and abc,
respectively. Then start listeners under each ID. This will allow
you to set up authorizations on the queues such that traffic from ABC and XYZ
cannot end up on each other's queues or, worse yet, on your Command Queue.
Every time I bring this up, people always reply that you can accomplish the same
thing with an exit or MCAUSER. My answer to that is that you cannot
restrict traffic to a specific channel. For example, if you define
XYZ.RCVR with MCAUSER('xyz'), there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp from
connecting to it. For that matter, there is nothing to prevent ABC Corp
from connecting to SYSTEM.DEF.SVRCONN or any other channel unless you run exits
on ALL of them or use SSL on ALL of them. Running the listeners
under low-privileged IDs allows you to lock down a specific path from the
firewall all the way down to specific queues.
Regards,
--
T.Rob
-Original Message-From: Pierson, Doug (ITD)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003
10:30 AMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Penetrating
an outbound firewall
Hi MQers,
Does anyone have any experience with sending MQ
messages outbound through a firewall that restricts outbound traffic?
The traffic needs to be delivered to numerous destination servers. Are
you using MQ-IPT? If so, are you using multiple ports to define multiple
routes and sending the traffic to IPT instances deployed at each of the target
servers? Or, is all of your traffic sent to a single IPT instance
outside of the firewall using a single route? From there, queue name
resolution can be used to direct it to the true destination server with the
messages in MQ protocol.
The goal of the firewall administrator is to
restrict us to minimal port usage. We see the restriction to a single
port using IPT to be to costly in terms of performance. The traffic
volume is significant. I'm also aware of MQ5.3's introduction of the
LOCLADDR channel attribute to restrict outbound traffic to a single port or
range of ports.
Any comments or feedback would be much
appreciated.
Thanks, Doug
Pierson
Penetrating an outbound firewall
Title: Penetrating an outbound firewall Hi MQers, Does anyone have any experience with sending MQ messages outbound through a firewall that restricts outbound traffic? The traffic needs to be delivered to numerous destination servers. Are you using MQ-IPT? If so, are you using multiple ports to define multiple routes and sending the traffic to IPT instances deployed at each of the target servers? Or, is all of your traffic sent to a single IPT instance outside of the firewall using a single route? From there, queue name resolution can be used to direct it to the true destination server with the messages in MQ protocol. The goal of the firewall administrator is to restrict us to minimal port usage. We see the restriction to a single port using IPT to be to costly in terms of performance. The traffic volume is significant. I'm also aware of MQ5.3's introduction of the LOCLADDR channel attribute to restrict outbound traffic to a single port or range of ports. Any comments or feedback would be much appreciated. Thanks, Doug Pierson
