spam analysis

2003-07-11 Thread Tomas Daniska

hi there,


although i don't have a spare time for this, maybe there is anyone of
the spam fighters willing to perform an analysis of what amount of spam
is [probably] sent to addressess digested from various lists like nanog
or cisco-nsp? from my own experience, the number of spams i receive
daily increased about tenfold since i have subscribed.

maybe some of the students participating in nanog could make a nice
project with this


list members could forward them all of their spams for a while, and
let's see



--
 
Tomas Daniska
systems engineer
Tronet Computer Networks
Plynarenska 5, 829 75 Bratislava, Slovakia
tel: +421 2 58224111, fax: +421 2 58224199
 
A transistor protected by a fast-acting fuse will protect the fuse by
blowing first.



From Kelly Cooper: goodbye good luck (fwd)

2003-07-11 Thread Sean Donelan

Kelly Cooper asked me to forward this to NANOG.

-- Forwarded message --
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 23:05:38 + (GMT)
From: Kelly J. Cooper [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: goodbye  good luck


My last day with BBN/BBN Planet/GTE Internetworking/Genuity/Level3 is
tomorrow, 11 July 2003.  After a little more than 8.5 years, I think the
time is right to go and I'm looking forward to the change.

I will be taking some time off, to write and regroup and organize my life
a bit.  Along those lines I'll also be unsubscribing from NANOG.

Why should you care?  Because this is more or less the official death of
my effort to create an ISP Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISP-ISAC).  If you are rooting around in your pockets looking for loose
change and find a whole mess of disposable capital or a financing angel,
do feel free to contact me or Ira Richer (who's still contracting with
CNRI).  Ira can be found thru RICHER at cnri dot reston dot va dot us.

You can find me thru KJC at acmehacking dot com.

Regards,
Kelly J. Cooper








Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy

2003-07-11 Thread Rubens Kuhl Jr.


Managing security perception can sometimes reduce security risks or the
security TCO, by reducing the number of low-risk attackers. Die-hards will
only stop for real security controls, but you may find easier to impose such
controls without a lot of noise from your security alarms.

The real issue is when you start believing that you are as safe as the sheep
think you are.


Rubens


- Original Message - 
From: Peter Galbavy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: E.B. Dreger [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:16 PM
Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy


|
| E.B. Dreger wrote:
|  Perhaps some security measures have a different purpose -- as
|  you say, LOOKS great (emphasis added).
|
| Just like 99% of all recent airport security measures... reassure the
sheep,
| then they might stop bleating and march to order instead. Baauy
| McDonalds, Bauy Gas, Bauy SUV.
|
| This is OT. Obviously.
|
| Peter
|
|



Re: it's 1918 in bologna

2003-07-11 Thread Daniel Karrenberg

On 10.07 19:56, Randy Bush wrote:
  note the 37. address.  cute, eh?  and i thought omphaloskepsis
  was greek!
  Someone is going to have fun when tat part of 37/8 gets assigned and used.
 
 as the us military is blocking overseas access to more and more address
 space, i guess non-american isps can use that space with impunity.
  ^
  
Do they publish a list? ;-)


The Cidr Report

2003-07-11 Thread cidr-report

This report has been generated at Fri Jul 11 21:46:47 2003 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.

Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.

Recent Table History
Date  PrefixesCIDR Agg
04-07-03123419   87837
05-07-03123316   87710
06-07-03123271   87836
07-07-03123341   87535
08-07-03122905   87866
09-07-03123510   87930
10-07-03123628   87966
11-07-03123604   88038


AS Summary
 15433  Number of ASes in routing system
  6101  Number of ASes announcing only one prefix
  1498  Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS
AS701  : ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc.
  73215488  Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s)
AS568  : SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA


Aggregation Summary
The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only
when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as 
to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also
proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes').

 --- 11Jul03 ---
ASnumNetsNow NetsAggr  NetGain   % Gain   Description

Table 123549880183553128.8%   All ASes

AS7132   838  231  60772.4%   SBIS-AS SBC Internet Services
   - Southwest
AS701   1498 1055  44329.6%   ALTERNET-AS UUNET
   Technologies, Inc.
AS4323   606  177  42970.8%   TW-COMM Time Warner
   Communications, Inc.
AS11305  549  137  41275.0%   INTERLAND-NET1 Interland
   Incorporated
AS7018  1339  929  41030.6%   ATT-INTERNET4 ATT WorldNet
   Services
AS702   1016  618  39839.2%   ALTERNET-AS UUNET
   Technologies, Inc.
AS3908   885  517  36841.6%   SUPERNETASBLK SuperNet, Inc.
AS7843   591  238  35359.7%   ADELPHIA-AS Adelphia Corp.
AS1221  1053  745  30829.2%   ASN-TELSTRA Telstra Pty Ltd
AS6197   527  234  29355.6%   BATI-ATL BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS1239   961  673  28830.0%   SPRINTLINK Sprint
AS4355   400  112  28872.0%   ERMS-EARTHLNK EARTHLINK, INC
AS6198   477  192  28559.7%   BATI-MIA BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS6347   363   94  26974.1%   DIAMOND SAVVIS Communications
   Corporation
AS25844  2579  24896.5%   SKADDEN1 Skadden, Arps, Slate,
   Meagher  Flom LLP
AS17676  250   24  22690.4%   GIGAINFRA Softbank BB Corp.
AS27364  305   84  22172.5%   ACS-INTERNET Armstrong Cable
   Services
AS22773  2259  21696.0%   CCINET-2 Cox Communications
   Inc. Atlanta
AS209514  305  20940.7%   ASN-QWEST Qwest
AS2386   407  225  18244.7%   INS-AS ATT Data
   Communications Services
AS705488  309  17936.7%   ALTERNET-AS UUNET
   Technologies, Inc.
AS17557  349  170  17951.3%   PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan
   Telecom
AS6327   197   24  17387.8%   SHAWFIBER Shaw Fiberlink
   Limited
AS2048   258   88  17065.9%   LANET-1 State of Louisiana
AS690448  294  15434.4%   MERIT-AS-27 Merit Network Inc.
AS20115  460  309  15132.8%   CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC Charter
   Communications
AS3602   228   79  14965.4%   SPRINT-CA-AS Sprint Canada
   Inc.
AS14654  1496  14396.0%   WAYPORT Wayport
AS6140   298  157  14147.3%   IMPSAT-USA ImpSat
AS7303   236   98  13858.5%   AR-TAST-LACNIC Telecom
   Argentina Stet-France Telecom
   S.A.

Total  16172 8142 803049.7%   Top 30 total


Possible Bogus Routes

24.119.0.0/16AS11492 CABLEONE CABLE ONE
61.12.32.0/24AS7545  TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Internet Pty Ltd
61.12.34.0/24AS7545