Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Sat, 14 Feb 2004 18:24:17 PST, Tim Thorpe [EMAIL PROTECTED]  said:
 
 Getting a bit long, I like it :D.
 
 What would be a netops general response to scans of this nature?

What's *your* netop's response to all the idiot-with-firewalls replies to your scan?

Then go and read http://www.viacorp.com/auditing.html, and remember that
the people mentioned in they're hre... are still out there


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Re: BGP - weight

2004-02-15 Thread Sven Huster

On Sun, Feb 15, 2004 at 04:47:30AM +, E.B. Dreger wrote:
 
 SH Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2004 18:00:51 +
 SH From: Sven Huster
 
 
 SH The thing that happend was that the core believed that the
 SH best path out is via R1, which R1 thought it was via R2. So a
 SH little loop there.
 
 So core sends to R1, which sends to R2... where does R2 send the
 packets?  Back to R1?

The core sends to R1, which believes the best path is via R2 and
sends it back to the core as that's the only way to reach R2.
Then the core again sends it to R1 and all the same again.

 
 What are you doing in your IGP?  Are you using { iBGP | OSPF |
 IS-IS | ... }?  How does R1 learn routes from Transit2?

As this is a small network internally everything is routed via
static routes.
R1 and R2 have full BGP views from the transit providers as well
as partial view from the peers. They run iBGP with R3 and the core.

 What about confederations?  Used correctly, they're helpful.
 Used incorrectly in similar scenarios, an iBGP mesh becomes a
 constantly-oscillating iBGP mess.
 
 Are you using either
 
   router bgp 
bgp bestpath compare-routerid
 
 or
 
   router bgp 
no bgp bestpath compare-routerid
 
 on all routers?  I'm wondering if R1 prefers Transit2 and R2
 prefers Transit1 due to different path selection algorithms...

All devices use the default settings in this respect.
R1-3 are Cisco routers, the core Extreme Alpine.

 
 Can you sh route or sh ip bgp for a route that loops?
 

It seems to be a temp problem, which we just figured out once
it went away based on netflow data and traffic dumps. So there
is no data available for this right now.

Sven


Re: BGP - weight

2004-02-15 Thread E.B. Dreger

SH Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2004 16:50:02 +
SH From: Sven Huster

[ editted and reformatted for clarity ]


SH The core sends to R1, which believes the best path is via R2
SH and sends it back to the core as that's the only way to reach
SH R2.  Then the core again sends it to R1 and all the same
SH again.

Yuck.


SH As this is a small network internally everything is routed
SH via static routes.

Except for the smallest of networks, I try to avoid static
routes.  It's additional work and opportunity for error.  Using
BGP + TCP MD5 auth, OSPF auth, hardcoded ARP entries, per-port
MAC address restrictions, prefix lists, route maps, etc., one can
run a dynamic network and still keep security under control.


SH R1 and R2 have full BGP views from the transit providers as
SH well as partial view from the peers.

Why not arrange the routers and switch in a single VLAN?  (Or did
I misunderstand your earlier ASCII-art diagram?)  I usually use
something like:

10.0.0.1/32  local sinkhole
10.0.0.2/28  virtual router (HSRP/VRRP; maybe XRRP now)
10.0.0.3/28  physical router #1
10.0.0.4/28  physical router #2
:   :   :   :   :   :   :
10.0.0.13/28 [routing] switch #2
10.0.0.14/28 [routing] switch #1

Let R1, R2, and R3 speak directly over ethernet without routing
through core.  If they already do, verify that you're setting
nexthop correctly.

Multihop routing sessions often can be made to work, but they're
a tricky house of cards.  Remember, classic IP routing forwards
to a { MAC addr | PVC | endpoint } based on destination IP addr.
You can't do fancy rewriting at each hop; that's part of why PBR
and label switching were invented. ;-)

Note: I am _not_ suggesting PBR for this situation.


SH They [R1 and R2] run iBGP with R3 and the core.

You have a partial mesh in which R1 and R2 do not exchange routes
with each other?


EBD router bgp 
EBD  [no] bgp bestpath compare-routerid

SH All devices use the default settings in this respect.
SH R1-3 are Cisco routers, the core Extreme Alpine.

Somewhere along the line Cisco changed the default from bgp
bestpath compare-routerid to the converse.  I forget when,
although a quick Google search leads me to believe it was around
12.0/12.0S/12.0ST.  I can't comment on Extreme.

Again, though, I'm going out on a limb with this one.  I'd bet on
static routes, topology, and [lack of] IGP before BGP path
selection algorithm.


SH It seems to be a temp problem, which we just figured out once

Odd.


SH it went away based on netflow data and traffic dumps. So there
SH is no data available for this right now.

If you catch any non-traceroute packets with expiring TTL, see if
you can grab routing info from all the boxes involved.  I'm
confused how these devices are building their RIBs...


Eddy
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power outage in LA?

2004-02-15 Thread matthew zeier


I just lost an upstream provider and they tell me there's a power outage in
LA - anyone have any info on that?

--
matthew zeier - Nothing in life is to be feared.  It is only to be
understood. - Marie Curie


Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Jon R. Kibler
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 On Sat, 14 Feb 2004, Tim Thorpe wrote:
 
  If these exist then why are we still having problems?
 
 Because the spammers are creating proxies faster than any of the anti-spam
 people can find them.  Evidence suggests, at least on the order of 10,000
 new spam proxies are created and used every day by spackers
 (spammer/hackers).
 
 The relative insecurity of windows and ignorance of the average internet
 user has created an incredibly target rich environment for the spackers.
 
  Why do we let customers who have been infected flood the networks with
  traffic as they do? Should they not also be responsible for the security
  of their computers? Do we not do enough to educate?
 
 Economics, and convenience outweighing security.  We're big, and slow to
 change.  They're small and mobile.
 

The Internet's spam load could be easily cut by 50% or more. All it would
take is the cooperation of most major ISPs and academic institutions. 

As this discussion thread has indicated, most spam originates from systems
infected with spamiruses or open proxy servers. How to shut down all such
malware? Simple: Apply egress filtering ACLs to all border routers to prohibit
outgoing port 25 connections from DHCP addresses.

We find that at least 85% of all spam originates from DHCP addresses. Thus, if
a significant number of ISPs would perform port 25 egress filtering, I believe 
that it would significantly reduce spam, and force criminal spammers to develop 
completely new spamming technologies.

If ISPs were to go further, and require their customers with static IPs to
perform port 25 egress filtering, blocking such connections from all systems
except for the customer's legitimate MTA, we could virtually eliminate spam
originating from hijacked systems.

OK, I can hear the objections now... ACLs slow down our routers and thus reduce
through-put. Well, that may be true in the purest sense of the argument, but can
you demonstrate that a few ACLs will have a SIGNIFICANT impact on through-put?
I would be willing to bet that any through-put reduction caused by ACLs, in the
long run, would be more than compensated for by the corresponding reduction in
spam traffic passing through the router. Also, if filtering was to occur at the
point closest to the source, rather than at an aggregation point, the impact of 
any ACLs would be distributed across the network in such a manner as to probably 
have no observable impact on network through-put.

(If anyone has any hard statistics on ACL impact on network through-put, I would
sure like to see those studies!)

Just my $0.02 worth...

Jon R. Kibler
Chief Technical Officer
A.S.E.T., Inc.
Charleston, SC  USA
(843) 849-8214




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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004, Jon R. Kibler wrote:
 We find that at least 85% of all spam originates from DHCP addresses. Thus, if
 a significant number of ISPs would perform port 25 egress filtering, I believe
 that it would significantly reduce spam, and force criminal spammers to develop
 completely new spamming technologies.

DialUp Lists (DUL) dns block lists permits you to ignore e-mail from
many dynamic IP addresses. You can configure your mail server to do this
today without waiting for ISPs to do anything.

Like most other simple solutions, how effective is it?



Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 16:40:40 EST, Sean Donelan said:

 DialUp Lists (DUL) dns block lists permits you to ignore e-mail from
 many dynamic IP addresses. You can configure your mail server to do this
 today without waiting for ISPs to do anything.

If we advertise the DHCP pools for AS1312 in a DUL, we solve the problem for
those sites that use the DUL we list them in.

If we block outbound port 25 SYN packets from origin addresses in the DHCP
address blocks, we solve the problem for everybody.


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Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-15 Thread Sean Donelan

On Fri, 13 Feb 2004, Rob Pickering wrote:
 --On 13 February 2004 09:27 -0500 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Y-Haw!  A return to the Old West of bangbaths and pathalias.
 
  No thanks.

 That's absolutely the issue with emerging resignation to e-mail
 peering and the like being the only solution to the spam problem.

The unfortunate fact is lots of people like to operate open, anonymous
services and then expect other people to clean up after them.

Why don't IRC operators require authentication of their users?
ISPs should block 6667

Why don't SMTP operators require authentication of their users?
ISPs should block 25

Why don't NETBIOS operators require authentication of their users?
ISPs should block 135, 137-139, 445

Why don't P2P operators require authentication of their users?
ISPs should block everything



Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread jlewis

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 If we advertise the DHCP pools for AS1312 in a DUL, we solve the problem for
 those sites that use the DUL we list them in.
 
 If we block outbound port 25 SYN packets from origin addresses in the DHCP
 address blocks, we solve the problem for everybody.

No...you just speed up the migration (which has already begun) to spam
proxies that use the local ISP's mail servers as smart hosts.  Then you
have to come up with a way to rate-limit customer outbound SMTP traffic.

BTW...who brought SARS (or more likely just flu) to nanog30?  I drove (so 
I didn't catch it on the plane) and symptoms (sore throat, congestion, 
very high fever) started thursday.  I've spent most of the weekend in bed 
waiting to die.
 
--
 Jon Lewis [EMAIL PROTECTED]|  I route
 Senior Network Engineer |  therefore you are
 Atlantic Net|  
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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  DialUp Lists (DUL) dns block lists permits you to ignore e-mail from
  many dynamic IP addresses. You can configure your mail server to do this
  today without waiting for ISPs to do anything.

 If we advertise the DHCP pools for AS1312 in a DUL, we solve the problem for
 those sites that use the DUL we list them in.

What if I told you about a method to identify the type of connection for
every IP address in our DNS?  You don't need to rely on third-party DUL
lists.

Blocking is a binary decision.  Instead if you have better information
about the connection source, you can make different decisions how to
handle the message.

 If we block outbound port 25 SYN packets from origin addresses in the DHCP
 address blocks, we solve the problem for everybody.

Including the people who don't want you to solve it for them.

People want to use outbound port 25 from dynamic address blocks.  Why
block it between people who want to use it just because some people
want to have open servers?

Block 119, you must use your ISPs NNTP server.
Block 6667, you must use your ISPs IRC server
Block 80, you must use your ISPs HTTP proxy.
Block N, you must use your ISPs whatever server.

Enterprises already do this, the equipment exists.  Why do we want ISPs
doing this?


Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 17:46:05 EST, Sean Donelan said:

 What if I told you about a method to identify the type of connection for
 every IP address in our DNS?  You don't need to rely on third-party DUL
 lists.

Hmm.. color me dubious, but keep talking.  Best bet here would probably be
some interesting abuse of PTR records?


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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Jon R. Kibler
Sean Donelan wrote:
 DialUp Lists (DUL) dns block lists permits you to ignore e-mail from
 many dynamic IP addresses. You can configure your mail server to do this
 today without waiting for ISPs to do anything.
 
 Like most other simple solutions, how effective is it?

We block known dialup netblks. Catches  5% of spam. Why? Because the real 
culprits are xDSL, CABLE and other systems with broadband connections. These 
account for about 80% of the spam attempts we observe.

The idea here is not just to prevent the receipt of spam (which is what
DNSBLs can accomplish), rather, it is to prevent the generation of spam
that is accounting for such a growing amount of everyone's network traffic.

If you block the ability of non-legitimate MTAs (such as open proxies and
spamiruses) to send spam, you reduce the network bandwidth waste that spam
is consuming. (As a side effect, you would also reduce the spread of viruses
by email.)

-- 
Jon R. Kibler
Chief Technical Officer
A.S.E.T., Inc.
Charleston, SC  USA
(843) 849-8214




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Identifying IP address types

2004-02-15 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 17:46:05 EST, Sean Donelan said:
  What if I told you about a method to identify the type of connection for
  every IP address in our DNS?  You don't need to rely on third-party DUL
  lists.

 Hmm.. color me dubious, but keep talking.  Best bet here would probably be
 some interesting abuse of PTR records?

You wouldn't be too far off.

It depends on whether you consider the ISP a cooperative partner or a
hostile participant.

Not only are 3rd party block lists often out-of-date and difficult to
update, the public has a hard time understanding the difference between
an ISP voluntarily listing their IP addresses in a DUL list and being
labelled a spam haven because their IP addresses are in a block list.

If you assume the ISP wants to help (which you also have to assume
for a port 25 blocks to work), how can an ISP provide first-party
information about the status of an IP address on demand to anyone?

My idea is to follow the RFC1101 example.

PTR records already have other uses and requirements. So I suggest using
another record type which doesn't have a current meaning in the reverse
DNS.  Instead use something like a HINFO record.

1.0.168.192.in-addr.arpain  ptr some1.example.net
in  hinfo   Dynamic Dialup
2.0.168.192.in-addr.arpain  ptr some2.example.net
in  hinfo   Static  xDSL

The ISP (or really the network administrator for the network block) is
in the best position to know how the IP addresses are managed.  The
netadmin can keep the HINFO records up to date, or correct the record if
they are incorrect.  You don't need to guess which DUL maintainer contains
records for various networks or worry about a DOS attacks on a few DNS
servers affecting mail service globally.  You always query the network
administrator's DNS servers when you receive a connection from an IP
address for information about that IP address.



Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004, Jon R. Kibler wrote:
  DialUp Lists (DUL) dns block lists permits you to ignore e-mail from
  many dynamic IP addresses. You can configure your mail server to do this
  today without waiting for ISPs to do anything.
 
  Like most other simple solutions, how effective is it?

 We block known dialup netblks. Catches  5% of spam. Why? Because the real
 culprits are xDSL, CABLE and other systems with broadband connections. These
 account for about 80% of the spam attempts we observe.

Why don't you block known dynamic netblks, including xDSL, Cable, and
other broadband connections using dynamic addresses such as WiFi in
Starbucks?  Most of the existing public DUL's include dynamic IP addresses
from all network technologies, not just dialup.


 The idea here is not just to prevent the receipt of spam (which is what
 DNSBLs can accomplish), rather, it is to prevent the generation of spam
 that is accounting for such a growing amount of everyone's network traffic.

All mail traffic (legitimate and illegitimate) is a very small percentage
of network traffic.  Besides, connections blocked at receipt use a very
small amount of bandwidth.  When the ISP blocks the traffic, you loose the
capability to make an exception when you decide.


 If you block the ability of non-legitimate MTAs (such as open proxies and
 spamiruses) to send spam, you reduce the network bandwidth waste that spam
 is consuming. (As a side effect, you would also reduce the spread of viruses
 by email.)

Blocking port 25 blocks the ability of all MTA's to send any type of mail.
Non-legitimate is a determination best made by the two parties involved
in the communication.


Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Jon R. Kibler
Sean Donelan wrote:
 
 On Sun, 15 Feb 2004, Jon R. Kibler wrote:
  We block known dialup netblks. Catches  5% of spam. Why? Because the real
  culprits are xDSL, CABLE and other systems with broadband connections. These
  account for about 80% of the spam attempts we observe.
 
 Why don't you block known dynamic netblks, including xDSL, Cable, and
 other broadband connections using dynamic addresses such as WiFi in
 Starbucks?  Most of the existing public DUL's include dynamic IP addresses
 from all network technologies, not just dialup.

OK, I was sloppy in my wording... I should have said that we block published dynamic
netblks, including dial, cable, xDSL, and wireless. That still catches something
less than 5% of spam originating from DHCP connections.

Also, most ISPs (at least that serve the SE U.S.) AUP prohibit the running of any
type of server on a DHCP connection. I know of at least one that regularly drop
service to any system found running web, mail, IRC, proxy, ftp, telnet, or any of
a dozen other different servers on any DHCP connection.

 Blocking port 25 blocks the ability of all MTA's to send any type of mail.
 Non-legitimate is a determination best made by the two parties involved
 in the communication.

Why should hundreds of thousands of MTAs each have to make the determination that
a given system wishing to make a connection is running spamware on a hacked system
when that user's ISP could simply block that user and save everyone else the grief?

To me, the approach you advocate is something like saying do away with any centralized
law enforcement, force everyone to carry guns, and if anyone suspects that someone
else is committing a crime, they are obliged to shoot them. I believe that blocking
spam at its source is far easier than blocking it at every possible destination. The
less parties involved in blocking the spam, the higher the probability that the spam
will be successfully blocked.

-- 
Jon R. Kibler
Chief Technical Officer
A.S.E.T., Inc.
Charleston, SC  USA
(843) 849-8214




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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Jon R. Kibler
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
snip!
  If we block outbound port 25 SYN packets from origin addresses in the DHCP
  address blocks, we solve the problem for everybody.

EXACTLY correct!

 
 No...you just speed up the migration (which has already begun) to spam
 proxies that use the local ISP's mail servers as smart hosts.  Then you
 have to come up with a way to rate-limit customer outbound SMTP traffic.
 

I agree that proxies that use the local ISP's mail servers as smart hosts is
a growing problem. However, it is a problem that is far more manageable than
is our current situation.

First, if spam is forced through a centralized set of outgoing servers, and
these servers do adequate logging, then a compromised system can be detected
in a matter of minutes and blocked.

Next, requiring users to use SMTP AUTH to authenticate to the mail server,
even when on the ISP's network, would throw another hurdle into the spammer's
ability to access the ISP's mail server, and thus block the ability of 
spamware to route mail in this manner.

Ultimately, if all local networks, including ISP customers, would require that
MUAs submit mail through MSAs (instead of through MTAs), and require that the 
MUAs use StartTLS to connect to the MSA, it would become very difficult for
spammers to hijack an ISP's MTA. (Yes, this means that ISPs will have to run
their own PKI, but I can easily see the day where this will be SOP.)

Bottom line... I believe that it such easier to control spammer traffic routed
through central mail servers, than it is to control spammers using thousands of
hijacked systems that have their own SMTP engines dumping mail onto the net.

-- 
Jon R. Kibler
Chief Technical Officer
A.S.E.T., Inc.
Charleston, SC  USA
(843) 849-8214




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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Christopher L. Morrow

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004, Jon R. Kibler wrote:

 To me, the approach you advocate is something like saying do away with any 
 centralized
 law enforcement, force everyone to carry guns, and if anyone suspects that someone
 else is committing a crime, they are obliged to shoot them. I believe that blocking

So, what Sean is proposing, and what you accurately describe (mostly) here
is how the Internet is intended to be run... Minus the 'and the people
running the systems should be smart or careful or considerate' of
course.

There was never any central control/enforcement for the Internet, and time
and again Governments have been shown that its next to impossible to BE
that central enforcer... With the exception, possibly, of China though one
could successfully argue that their firewall isn't working so well if
hundreds of thousands of hosts on their networks can get compromised and
flood out spoofed ip datagrams, eh?


Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004, Jon R. Kibler wrote:
 OK, I was sloppy in my wording... I should have said that we block
 published dynamic netblks, including dial, cable, xDSL, and wireless.
 That still catches something less than 5% of spam originating from DHCP
 connections.

Then it sounds like you have an incomplete list of dynamic network blocks.

Why do you think you will be any more successfull convincing more than 5%
of ISPs to block ports, when you haven't been successfull convincing them
to give you more than 5% of their dynamic address ranges?

 Also, most ISPs (at least that serve the SE U.S.) AUP prohibit the
 running of any type of server on a DHCP connection. I know of at least
 one that regularly drop service to any system found running web, mail,
 IRC, proxy, ftp, telnet, or any of a dozen other different servers on
 any DHCP connection.

Most ISPs prohibit any type of server on a DHCP connection?

Some cable providers do this due to some limitations in their network
architecture, but I would be surprised if most (i.e. more than 50%) ISPs
prohibit servers.  Why do you think DynDNS type services are so popular?
So people can run servers on DHCP addresses.  Peer-to-Peer is a very
popular server used on mostly dynamic addresses.

Do you really want a read-only Internet, where only the Fortune 1000 are
permitted to operate servers and everyone else must be a client?


  Blocking port 25 blocks the ability of all MTA's to send any type of mail.
  Non-legitimate is a determination best made by the two parties involved
  in the communication.

 Why should hundreds of thousands of MTAs each have to make the
 determination that a given system wishing to make a connection is
 running spamware on a hacked system when that user's ISP could simply
 block that user and save everyone else the grief?

How should an ISP decide whether or not it is legitimate for the user to
run an MTA? If they pay an extra $10 a month, they can legitimately run a
server? Or are you are proposing blocking all access, regardless of its
legitimacy?

The fact of the matter is system admins need to protect their own systems
because you never know if the remote system making the connection has been
hacked regardless how the IP address was assigned.  Blocking dynamic IP
addresses doesn't make you safer if you fail to protect your own
computers.


 To me, the approach you advocate is something like saying do away with
 any centralized law enforcement, force everyone to carry guns, and if
 anyone suspects that someone else is committing a crime, they are
 obliged to shoot them. I believe that blocking spam at its source is
 far easier than blocking it at every possible destination. The less
 parties involved in blocking the spam, the higher the probability that
 the spam will be successfully blocked.

In reality there are fewer destinations than sources.

Then let's centralize it completely.  The FCC will license ISPs and
set the regulations they must enforce.  Ma Bell will be reformed as the
single telecommunications provider. Everyone must use the MTA's
operated by Ma Bell.  Will that stop spam?


Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Rainer Atkins
I have a different idea about how spam could be dealt with, which I have yet 
to see proposed or discussed on Nanog.  Everything suggested is always a 
technical patch trying to deal with the fact that spammers can make a lot of 
money.  And, regardless of the patch you apply, they will find a way around 
it because the financial incentive is big enough.

It seems to me that if a spammer has a network of 10,000 trojaned broadband 
connected computers at his disposal to send spam, its not much use if no one 
wants to pay him to do this.  So, instead of focusing on the spammer focus 
on the spamme'rs customer.  Place the cost of spam mitigation on them, pass 
legislation that makes them liable if their product or service is advertised 
by spam.

This should generate some freedom of speech flames. :-)

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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Tim Wilde

On Sun, 15 Feb 2004, Sean Donelan wrote:

 Most ISPs prohibit any type of server on a DHCP connection?

 Some cable providers do this due to some limitations in their network
 architecture, but I would be surprised if most (i.e. more than 50%) ISPs
 prohibit servers.  Why do you think DynDNS type services are so popular?
 So people can run servers on DHCP addresses.  Peer-to-Peer is a very
 popular server used on mostly dynamic addresses.

Just because they're using our services doesn't mean their AUP doesn't say
they're not supposed to.  Charter and Comcast, two pretty good-sized cable
MSOs, at least up here in the northeast, both prohibit not only any type
of server, but the connection of any LAN/WAN that they don't operate.
I'm pretty sure Verizon DSL prohibits any servers, though I don't think
they explicitly ban LANs.  (I guess that means I've violated the AUP of
every provider I've used at home.  Whoops.)  Forget about servers being
prohibited, their AUPs even prohibit the use of those ever-so-popular NAT
routers Linksys, D-Link, Netgear, and friends like to spew out.  Does that
stop people from buying and using them, though?  Hell no.

I think the statement that most ISPs, oriented towards home use, anyway,
prohibit servers is accurate.  However, it isn't necessarily /relevant/,
because I don't think many of them actively enforce that policy.

Tim Wilde

-- 
Tim Wilde
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Systems Administrator
Dynamic Network Services, Inc.
http://www.dyndns.org/


Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Stephen Sprunk

This topic has been consistently ruled off-topic for NANOG by Merit's staff.
Please respect those of us who don't want to hear about spam here.

For those interested, the IRTF's ASRG is actively studying anti-spam
techniques and I'm sure they'd be interested in hearing all of your ideas
(after you verify they haven't been tried before).
http://www.irtf.org/charters/asrg.html

S

Stephen SprunkStupid people surround themselves with smart
CCIE #3723   people.  Smart people surround themselves with
K5SSS smart people who disagree with them.  --Aaron Sorkin
- Original Message - 
From: Tim Thorpe [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, 14 February, 2004 02:30
Subject: Anti-spam System Idea



 I wanted to run this past you to see what you thought of it and get some
 feedback on pro's and cons of this type of system.

  I have been thinking recently about the ever increasing amount of spam
that
 is flooding the internet, clogging mail servers, and in general pissing us
 all off.

 I think it time to do something about it. very few systems are effective
at
 blocking spam at the server level, and the ones that exist have a less
then
 stellar reputation and are not very effective on top of that.

 95% of spam comes through relays and its headers are forged tracking an
 E-mail back that you've received is becoming next to impossible, its also
 very time consuming and why waste your time on scumbags?

 my idea;
 a DC network that actively scans for active relays and tests them, it
 compiles a list on a daily basis of compromised IP addresses (or even
 addresses that are willingly allowing the relay) making this list freely
 available to ISPs via a secure and tracked site.

 to test a relay you actually have to send mail through it, I have a
solution
 for this as well, the clients are set to e-mail a certain address that
 changes daily the E-mails are signed with a crypto key to verify
 authenticity (that way spammers can't abuse the address if it doesn't have
 the key, it get canned)

 work with ISP's to correct issues on their network help completely black
 list IP's from their network that are operating as an open relay and
 redirect to a page that alerts them of the compromise and solutions to fix
 the problem. the only way people are going to become aware of security
 issues such as this is if something happens that wakes them up, if they
 can't access a % of the web it would hopefully clue them in.

 because these scans only need to take place once per IP per day and over a
 large distribution of computers performing the tests, I don't see network
 load becoming a big issue, no bigger then it currently is.

 the only way to fight spammers is to squeeze them out of hiding, and
that's
 what I hope this system would be designed to do.

 I do not have the coding knowledge to do this I will need coders, I do
have
 the PR skills to work with ISPs. I am also working with my congresswoman
to
 pave the way for legal clearance for this program.

 I would greatly appreciate your input on this and anything I may have
 overlooked. I would also like to know if this would be a DC program you
 would run.

 a lot of people argue the practical application of DC. although we know
 differently this project would show them what DC can do for them and wake
 them up to perhaps other DC projects.





Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 22:00:08 CST, Stephen Sprunk said:

 For those interested, the IRTF's ASRG is actively studying anti-spam
 techniques and I'm sure they'd be interested in hearing all of your ideas
 (after you verify they haven't been tried before).
 http://www.irtf.org/charters/asrg.html

Also read: http://www.rhyolite.com/anti-spam/you-might-be.html
It's quite vicious but true - if you have re-invented one of the schemes
mentioned in there, it probably won't be well received unless you include
with it *both* of the the following:

a) An indication that you've read and understood the literature describing why
the idea was shot down the last time it was suggested.

b) A *new* way of dealing with the issue that eliminates the difficulty.


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Re: Anti-spam System Idea

2004-02-15 Thread Etaoin Shrdlu
Tim Thorpe wrote:

Seeing as this system would directly impact network operators (the NO in
naNOg) I must disagree.
Go right ahead and disagree, however:

http://www.nanog.org/listfaq.html

If Merit's staff feels otherwise then I sincerely apologize and will of
course move the discussion, I will limit the out of context chatter to a
minimum however.
Merit's staff DOES feel otherwise; it's just been the weekend and all, 
or you'd have heard from Susan by now. Oh, and PUH-LEEZE -- trim your 
posts. I deleted a bazillion lines of unnecessary cruft from this.