worm information

2004-04-10 Thread Christopher J. Wolff

Hello,

Over the last few days I've seen a number of hosts attempt to initiate TCP
connections to the following ports in sequence.

80
139
445
6129
3127
1025
135
2745
...repeat.

At this moment I haven't seen a correlation between this activity and the
port exploitation list on CERT.  Any insight would be appreciated, thank
you.

Regards,
Christopher J. Wolff, VP CIO
Broadband Laboratories, Inc.
http://www.bblabs.com




Re: worm information

2004-04-10 Thread Jeff Workman
--On Saturday, April 10, 2004 8:35 AM -0700 Christopher J. Wolff 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Hello,

Over the last few days I've seen a number of hosts attempt to initiate TCP
connections to the following ports in sequence.
80
139
445
6129
3127
1025
135
2745
...repeat.
There's a number of viruses/worms in the wild that are programmed to 
exploit various M$ vulnerabilities:

80  - IIS WebDAV (MS03-007)and any number of other IIS vulnerabilities
135 - DCOM RPC (MS03-026)
445 - RPC locator (MS03-001) and Workstation service (MS03-049)
139 - Unpassworded NetBIOS shares
I'm not sure about the other ports, I *think* 1025 has something to do with 
MS RPC as well, but don't quote me on that.

What you are probably seeing, at least in the cases involving the ports I 
listed above, is one of the many W32.Gaobot (Symantec)[1] variants.

-J

[1] 
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.htm
--
Jeff Workman | [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://www.pimpworks.org


Re: worm information

2004-04-10 Thread Darrell Greenwood

On 04/4/10 at 1:53 PM -0400, Jeff Workman wrote the following : 

http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.htm

File Not Found... 'l' missing from end of 'htm'.

http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.html


Re: Anti-Spam Router -- opinions?

2004-04-10 Thread Hank Nussbacher


Has anyone had any experience with this device? Turntide.com. Looks like a
traffic-shaping device designed specifically for cutting down spammers
throughput to your inbound SMTP servers. My main concern is, how does it
make the distinction between legitimate mass-mailings (e.g.: mailing lists
such as this one), and spam? Interesting approach to killing spam though I
must say.
SMTP is only about 40% of the spam these days.  The rest is via HTTP and 
DAV (I have seen an upsurge of Hotmail DAV spam since March 18) as per 
http://www.unicom.com/chrome/a/000267.html) so you would need a solution 
that handles all formats.

I would like to draw your attention to a company called Pineapp 
(www.pineapp.com) that has a product called Antiflood.  It handles SMTP and 
HTTP.  For HTTP it analyzes the headers and doesn't allow more than n 
number of recepients.  It allows the admin to set the maximum posts per 
time frame, has URL blocking time, maximum outgoing recipients, safe URLs 
not to be time-blocked, etc.  It is not really a router but rather an 
inline transparent proxy box.  It is geared for Cybercafes where much spam 
still originates.

-Hank
Note: I do not work for Pineapp.



Re: worm information

2004-04-10 Thread ravi pina

On Sat, Apr 10, 2004 at 11:19:19AM -0700, Darrell Greenwood said at one point in time:
 
 On 04/4/10 at 1:53 PM -0400, Jeff Workman wrote the following : 
 
 http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.htm
 
 File Not Found... 'l' missing from end of 'htm'.
 
 http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.html

this is correct.  my organization has been infected with this
and it is a particular nasty little bugger.  we may have been
'patient 0' in terms of sending copies of the virus to symantec
so they could write signatures for it.  infected hosts flood
the network with a tremendous amount of data and port opening.

i at least manged to quarantine off all my vpn devices which
seemed to be the entry point.

-r





RE: worm information

2004-04-10 Thread Christopher J. Wolff

Thank you for the input.  The 'unique' feature of this infestation is that
affected hosts don't transmit a lot of data...however they do open up
thousands of flows in a very short time.  Perhaps that's not unique but it
certainly is annoying.

Regards,
Christopher J. Wolff, VP CIO
Broadband Laboratories, Inc.
http://www.bblabs.com

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
 ravi pina
 Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2004 11:30 AM
 To: Darrell Greenwood
 Cc: 'nanog list'
 Subject: Re: worm information
 
 
 On Sat, Apr 10, 2004 at 11:19:19AM -0700, Darrell Greenwood said at one
 point in time:
 
  On 04/4/10 at 1:53 PM -0400, Jeff Workman wrote the following :
 
 
 http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.htm
 
  File Not Found... 'l' missing from end of 'htm'.
 
 
 http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.html
 
 this is correct.  my organization has been infected with this
 and it is a particular nasty little bugger.  we may have been
 'patient 0' in terms of sending copies of the virus to symantec
 so they could write signatures for it.  infected hosts flood
 the network with a tremendous amount of data and port opening.
 
 i at least manged to quarantine off all my vpn devices which
 seemed to be the entry point.
 
 -r
 




Re: worm information

2004-04-10 Thread ravi pina

hmm, honestly i can't vouch for the data rate personally.
a co-worker said the counters on the VPN connections were
grossly disproportionate for a short time sample.

bottom line, it is indeed annoying.  i know my server
and desktop groups have been having a hell of a time
disinfecting hosts.  i know part of this was that
symantec, at the time, said it may be a polymorphic
strain.

-r


On Sat, Apr 10, 2004 at 11:37:15AM -0700, Christopher J. Wolff said at one point in 
time:
 Thank you for the input.  The 'unique' feature of this infestation is that
 affected hosts don't transmit a lot of data...however they do open up
 thousands of flows in a very short time.  Perhaps that's not unique but it
 certainly is annoying.
 
 Regards,
 Christopher J. Wolff, VP CIO
 Broadband Laboratories, Inc.
 http://www.bblabs.com
 
  -Original Message-
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
  ravi pina
  Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2004 11:30 AM
  To: Darrell Greenwood
  Cc: 'nanog list'
  Subject: Re: worm information
  
  
  On Sat, Apr 10, 2004 at 11:19:19AM -0700, Darrell Greenwood said at one
  point in time:
  
   On 04/4/10 at 1:53 PM -0400, Jeff Workman wrote the following :
  
  
  http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.htm
  
   File Not Found... 'l' missing from end of 'htm'.
  
  
  http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.um.html
  
  this is correct.  my organization has been infected with this
  and it is a particular nasty little bugger.  we may have been
  'patient 0' in terms of sending copies of the virus to symantec
  so they could write signatures for it.  infected hosts flood
  the network with a tremendous amount of data and port opening.
  
  i at least manged to quarantine off all my vpn devices which
  seemed to be the entry point.
  
  -r
  
 

-- 


RE: worm information

2004-04-10 Thread Christopher J. Wolff

Ravi,

One of the responses to this thread mentioned a 3COM switch.  One of the
infected sites has a 3COM superstack 1100.  I'm not a 3COM fan but these
switches have been up for years, literally.  All it takes to make this
switch reboot is a flow from one infected host.  I'm going to try to move
the web interface port away from 80.  Thank you.

Regards,
Christopher J. Wolff, VP CIO
Broadband Laboratories, Inc.
http://www.bblabs.com

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
 ravi pina
 Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2004 11:44 AM
 To: Christopher J. Wolff
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 'Darrell Greenwood'; 'nanog list'
 Subject: Re: worm information
 
 
 hmm, honestly i can't vouch for the data rate personally.
 a co-worker said the counters on the VPN connections were
 grossly disproportionate for a short time sample.
 
 bottom line, it is indeed annoying.  i know my server
 and desktop groups have been having a hell of a time
 disinfecting hosts.  i know part of this was that
 symantec, at the time, said it may be a polymorphic
 strain.
 
 -r




Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Richard Cox

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004 14:26:46 -0500
Chris Boyd [EMAIL PROTECTED] quoted:

 Any reports sent to this email address will not be read and will
 be automatically deleted.

Based on experience, it is arguable that not so very much has changed.

-- 
Richard Cox



Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Eric A. Hall


On 4/10/2004 2:26 PM, Chris Boyd wrote:

 NTL World no longer accepts abuse@ email. You have to go to a web form
 that requires javascript be enabled and enter all of the information 
 for them.

option [1] do their job for them so they can run a cheaper net, versus
option [2] blacklist so that we both run cheaper nets


-- 
Eric A. Hallhttp://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols  http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread jlewis

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Chris Boyd wrote:

 Please note that we no longer accept any network abuse reports at this
 address. Any reports must be submitted by using the following web form:
 http://www.ntlworld.com/netreport

 Any reports sent to this email address will not be read and will be
 automatically deleted.

I can guess their reasoning for this is they're tired of bogus complaints
(from address on spam/virus was forged to look like it came from them) or
complaints lacking the necessary detail to take any action...but the way
they've implemented their forms is not going to win them any fans.

You have to click through multiple layers of forms before you can actually
put in any details.  None of the reason options are SPAM.  And on my first
try, their site caused Mozilla to crash.

Also, I doubt this was a decision made by the network operators, but
rather by the abuse department or more likely, whoever oversees it,
perhaps figuring that by having the web form CGI neatly categorize all
complaints, they can get by with less staff (or clue) handling abuse.

--
 Jon Lewis [EMAIL PROTECTED]|  I route
 Senior Network Engineer |  therefore you are
 Atlantic Net|
_ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_


Worm Triggers Attacks on File-Trading Services

2004-04-10 Thread Sean Donelan


Why do people have the irresitable urge to click on things?

Click here to find out:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A349-2004Apr9.html

   The experts advised people not to click on strange attachments in
   e-mail, which can activate the worm, and to update their antivirus
   software frequently to ward off new threats.


Re: Worm Triggers Attacks on File-Trading Services

2004-04-10 Thread Laurence F. Sheldon, Jr.
Sean Donelan wrote:

Why do people have the irresitable urge to click on things?
Then he wrote:

Click here to find out:
What is wrong with this picture?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A349-2004Apr9.html

   The experts advised people not to click on strange attachments in
   e-mail, which can activate the worm, and to update their antivirus
   software frequently to ward off new threats.
--
Requiescas in pace o email



Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian

Chris Boyd [10/04/04 14:26 -0500]:
 
 NTL World no longer accepts abuse@ email.  You have to go to a web form 
 that requires javascript be enabled and enter all of the information 
 for them.  I guess that they got tired of processing the the abuse@ 
 mail load and just bit bucketed it.
 

NTL peers at Linx, right?  I'm sure somebody's mentioned
http://www.linx.net/noncore/bcp/ube-bcp.html to them?

srs


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread George William Herbert


Suresh writes:
Chris Boyd writes:
 NTL World no longer accepts abuse@ email.  You have to go to a web form 
 that requires javascript be enabled and enter all of the information 
 for them.  I guess that they got tired of processing the the abuse@ 
 mail load and just bit bucketed it.

NTL peers at Linx, right?  I'm sure somebody's mentioned
http://www.linx.net/noncore/bcp/ube-bcp.html to them?

None of the surrounding docs or linx membership agreement
make compliance with linx BCPs mandatory.

However, it is socially odorous at least.
They're not the first ISP to do that, 
and won't be the last, but I don't do business
with (and often, blackhole) those that do.


-george william herbert
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Packet anonymity is the problem?

2004-04-10 Thread Sean Donelan


If you connect a dialup modem to the public switched telephone network, do
you rely on Caller ID for security?  Or do you configure passwords on the
systems to prevent wardialers with blocked CLIDs from accessing your
system?  Have a generation of firewalls and security practices distracted
us from the fundamental problem, insecure systems.


http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/security/33344.html
  Gartner  research vice president Richard Stiennon confirmed that packet
  anonymity is a serious issue for Internet security.
[...]
  Because of the way TCP/IP works, it's an open network, Keromytis
  said. Other network technologies don't have that problem. They have
  other issues, but only IP is subject to this difficulty with abuse.

[...]
  Bellovin compared the situation to bank robberies. [S]treets, highways
  and getaway cars don't cause bank robberies, nor will redesigning them
  solve the problem. The flaws are in the banks, he said. Similarly, most
  security problems are due to buggy code, and changing the network will
  not affect that.


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sun, 11 Apr 2004, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
 NTL peers at Linx, right?  I'm sure somebody's mentioned
 http://www.linx.net/noncore/bcp/ube-bcp.html to them?

Should anonymous use of the Internet be eliminated so all forms
of abuse can be tracked and dealt with?


  Exception
  An exception to sections (2) and (3) arises in the case of a system run
  to deliberately hide the source of email - often called an anon
  server. Anon servers are used to preserve anonymity where, for
  example, someone seeks help from a group supporting victims of abuse or
  wishes to express political views in a country that may punish dissent.

  ISPs or their customers MAY run anon servers where this is explicitly
  intended to be the function of the service being provided. They MUST NOT
  allow their standard service to provide anonymity by failing to comply
  with this BCP.

  However an anon server SHOULD NOT be capable of 'amplification' of email
  by expanding address lists and SHOULD have limiting mechanisms to
  ensure that the volume of email passing through the server cannot be
  unusually high without explicit system owner knowledge.



Re: Packet anonymity is the problem?

2004-04-10 Thread Todd Vierling

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Sean Donelan wrote:

:   Because of the way TCP/IP works, it's an open network, Keromytis
:   said. Other network technologies don't have that problem. They have
:   other issues, but only IP is subject to this difficulty with abuse.

If networks properly filtered the source IP's of packets exiting or entering
their networks to only the valid delegations for that network, this would be
far less of a problem:  we could at least get *some* accountability going.

Of course, the still high number of bogon routes illustrate that very few
folks (if any) really care.

-- 
-- Todd Vierling [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Dan Hollis

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Sean Donelan wrote:
 Should anonymous use of the Internet be eliminated so all forms
 of abuse can be tracked and dealt with?

As long as there are tier1's who allow abuse as long as the checks dont 
bounce, this will have zero effect.

exodus for example had a hands off policy, dont do a single thing until 
law enforcement arrives with a search warrant.

looks like yahoo has adopted a similar policy.

-Dan



Re: Packet anonymity is the problem?

2004-04-10 Thread Dan Hollis

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Todd Vierling wrote:
 Of course, the still high number of bogon routes illustrate that very few
 folks (if any) really care.

Worse; the registries make it trivial to steal registrations and  
assignments, but nigh impossible to get them back to the rightful owners.

-Dan



Re: Packet anonymity is the problem?

2004-04-10 Thread Paul Vixie

 :   Because of the way TCP/IP works, it's an open network, Keromytis
 :   said. Other network technologies don't have that problem. They have
 :   other issues, but only IP is subject to this difficulty with abuse.
 
 If networks properly filtered the source IP's of packets exiting or entering
 their networks to only the valid delegations for that network, this would be
 far less of a problem:  we could at least get *some* accountability going.
 
 Of course, the still high number of bogon routes illustrate that very few
 folks (if any) really care.

in another thread tonight i see subjects like lazy network operators and at
first glance, those are the people you're describing (who don't really care.)

however, that's simple-minded.  because of the way tcp/ip works... is a very
good lead-in toward the actual cause of this apparent non-caring / laziness.

because of the way ip works, and because of the way human nature works, many
of the things that would have to be done to fix this problem have assymetric
cost/benefit.  if a network provider isn't lazy, then everyone except them
will benefit from that non-laziness.  human nature says that ain't happening.

even though i try every day, it probably is too late to redesign human nature.

the assymetric cost/benefit is an emergency property of fundamental design
principles in tcp/ip, so it's no surprise that ipv6 didn't do much about this
weakness.

attempting to symmetrize cost/benefit without design changes in either human
nature or the tcp/ip protocol suite has had mixed results.  (i.e., MAPS.)

so, the article sean quoted is all very entertaining, but says nothing new,
which is sad, because i for one would really like to hear something new.
-- 
Paul Vixie


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Paul Vixie

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sean Donelan) writes:

 Should anonymous use of the Internet be eliminated so all forms
 of abuse can be tracked and dealt with?

of course not.  however, anonymity should be brokered by trusted doubleblinds;
nonbrokered/nontrusted anonymity without recourse by recipients is right out.
-- 
Paul Vixie


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Jeff Workman


--On Saturday, April 10, 2004 8:30 PM -0700 Dan Hollis [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
wrote:

exodus for example had a hands off policy, dont do a single thing until
law enforcement arrives with a search warrant.
While this might be a PITA for everybody, I don't see why everybody wants 
to chastise NSPs for this practice, especially NSPs that are/were telcos. 
Isn't this more or less the way telcos have dealt with abuse issues for 
decades?

I used to work for a very small (~10k dialup customer) ISP, and at the time 
our abuse policy was if somebody complains, and you can find *something* 
in the logs, then lock the account.  Then I went to work for a so-called 
Tier-1 and learned in short order that this policy does not scale, 
especially when abusive customers with DS3s are waving around fully loaded 
lawyers.

-J

--
Jeff Workman | [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://www.pimpworks.org


Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Scott Call

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Jeff Workman wrote:

 --On Saturday, April 10, 2004 8:30 PM -0700 Dan Hollis [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 wrote:

  exodus for example had a hands off policy, dont do a single thing until
  law enforcement arrives with a search warrant.

 While this might be a PITA for everybody, I don't see why everybody wants
 to chastise NSPs for this practice, especially NSPs that are/were telcos.
 Isn't this more or less the way telcos have dealt with abuse issues for
 decades?

 I used to work for a very small (~10k dialup customer) ISP, and at the time
 our abuse policy was if somebody complains, and you can find *something*
 in the logs, then lock the account.  Then I went to work for a so-called
 Tier-1 and learned in short order that this policy does not scale,
 especially when abusive customers with DS3s are waving around fully loaded
 lawyers.


The problem with your argument is very much an apples and oranges
comparison.

Having spend the first five years of my network career at a ma and pa
that then got gobbled by Verio, and then the last five plus years at a
startup Telco/ISP, I can tell you, you see very different issues.

1 Telcos don't have ISP style AUPs, basically unless it's illegal, you
can do it on a phone without the carrier getting involved.
2 Telcos don't have the content variety that ISPs do.  You can't
(practically) bring down a Class 5 switch, the SS7 network, etc with the
actions of one customer.
3 A single phoneset cannot be used to contact 50 million people in a
matter of hours to sell them viagra or other stiffy pills.
4 A phoneset cannot be used to hijack or damage another phoneset on the
PSTN.  There's no such thing as a zombie telephone.  PBXs might be
hijackable, but not a home phone.
5 The other Telcos don't get pissed when you or your customers use/abuse
their resources, they send bills.

and the list goes on and one.

While both the Telco and ISP are communications services, they are
completely different beasts in the abuse department (as well as support,
provisioning, billing, etc)

If your well lawyered customers complains, wave the AUP at them, if your
AUP doesn't allow you to disconnect customers who imperil your network and
the Internet at large, rewrite it.

Remember that getting cut off by your upstream is more painful than
dealing with a PITA customer.   Remember that the Internet started out as
a community, and in our little neck of the woods (NSP network
engineering/operations) it still is, and nobody likes a (BGP) neighbor
who doesn't care about the others in his neighborhood.

As an ISP/NSP/whatever acronym they think up next, your customers are your
responsibility, and you, like a good bartender, need to be able to let
your customers know when they're a nusance.

-S

-- 
Scott Call  Router Geek, ATGi, home of $6.95 Prime Rib
I make the world a better place, I boycott Wal-Mart
VoIP incoming: +1 360-382-1814



Re: Lazy network operators

2004-04-10 Thread Avleen Vig

On Sat, Apr 10, 2004 at 11:45:20PM -0400, Jeff Workman wrote:
 I used to work for a very small (~10k dialup customer) ISP, and at the time 
 our abuse policy was if somebody complains, and you can find *something* 
 in the logs, then lock the account.  Then I went to work for a so-called 
 Tier-1 and learned in short order that this policy does not scale, 
 especially when abusive customers with DS3s are waving around fully loaded 
 lawyers.

It does not scale, if you have people reading every single mail that
comes in, with now pre-parsing, sorting, etc.
It scales up to a point when you take steps to sort what is coming in,
take active steps to block abusing leaving your network, and implement
methods to detect it on your network before people complain.

-- 
Avleen Vig
Systems Administrator
Personal: www.silverwraith.com
EFnet:irc.mindspring.com (Earthlink user access only)


TTY phone fraud and abuse

2004-04-10 Thread Sean Donelan

On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Scott Call wrote:
 While both the Telco and ISP are communications services, they are
 completely different beasts in the abuse department (as well as support,
 provisioning, billing, etc)

http://www.dailystar.com/dailystar/dailystar/17393.php
  Overseas scam artists have hijacked a telephone relay system for deaf
  people and turned phone operators in Tucson and nationwide into
  full-time facilitators of fraud.

  Operators at Tucson's Communication Service for the Deaf call center
  used to spend their shifts helping hearing- and speech-impaired
  Americans make calls. But since January their workdays are dominated by
  Internet calls from Nigeria and elsewhere.

  The callers try to use stolen credit-card numbers to make big purchases
  of merchandise from American companies. The operators often suspect
  fraud, but they can't just hang up. Federal rules require them to make
  the calls and keep the contents strictly confidential.
[...]
  Spokesmen for Sprint, ATT and Hamilton Telecommunications said the
  companies are aware of the fraudulent use of their services. But they
  said it's impossible to know what percentage of their Internet-relay
  calls are fraudulent, because the calls are confidential.

  They said they're working with the FCC to resolve the problem.

  We're watching it, we're monitoring it, but privacy is key, and no
  records are kept, said Roberto Cruz, a spokesman for ATT.