RE: Resilience: faults, causes, statistics, open issues

2005-01-28 Thread András Császár (IJ/ETH)

Hi David, this is going to be very useful, I really appretiate it, thank you 
very much.

Just some comments about the root causes of BGP related problems, maybe you 
find something useful from the research perspective, although probably this is 
not going to be new for you.

I found a few author groups with very related and useful papers:

- Tim Griffin and co.
- Nick Feamster and co.
- Jennifer Rexford and co.
- Lixin Gao and co.

These people often have joint publications but sometimes separate as well. 
Also, Craig Labovitz and co have some very useful papers in the area of routing 
convergence time.

The IRTF also has some interesting, futuristic and somewhat visionary drafts 
about Future Domain Routing.

As I see things now, in case of BGP, routing divergence, configuration and 
policies have a very strong correlation.

A high level conclusion (what you probably can expect from half year paper- and 
presentation-reading research) is that the first root cause of BGP problems is 
the absence of a widely deployed and practical formal language for 
policies. Since there is no formal language, there is no compiler, and so you 
have unwanted anomalies resulting from your config.

My conclusion was that BGP has an analogy to software development:

SW: Specification=High-level formal language (e.g. C++)=Low-level formal 
language (assembly, binary, etc.)

Both steps can be called implementation or compiliation. The good thing here is 
that you have automated compilers for the second step, which is harder.

BGP: Business relation=Policies=Router configuration

First you implement your business relations, when you think out policies, but 
in the end you will have to implement/compile your policies as router 
configuration. The problem is, there is no automated compiler for the second 
step, since there is no formal policy language, and so verifcation is also very 
hard.

As a result you may have configuration bugs or your config is not doing what 
you originally wanted to do, or you have inconsistency among your routers, etc.

Of course, it is clear why such a formal language and compiler is not used in 
practice (different router vendors, different features, different capabilities, 
no standard interface, etc.), although there is, e.g., RPSL and the tools built 
upon RPSL. Lately, Griffin and co have begun thinking about a completely new 
policy language.


The second root cause that I think can be somewhat separated is that there is 
no practically used central database about policies. You do not necessary know 
what your neighbour operators are doing (their configs and policies). As a 
result you may have external inconsistency (that may lead to divergence, 
wedgies, etc.).

Of course, here it is also clear why, e.g., IRRs are not used or not updated 
frequently (information hiding principle , which is actually the basis of the 
hierarchical domain structure of the internet).


So, in the end, although we can possibly identify the root causes behind BGP 
problems, I'm not sure they can ever be fully ceased. OK, I can imagine a 
formal language and config compiler, and one can find verification tools as 
well, but I can hardly imagine e.g. the sharing of policies (although some 
papers write about methods how to infer the necessary knowledge from 
measurements).

Thanks again for you help,
András

p.s. Sorry for the long mail :) :)


Original Message
From: David Andersen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 2005. január 27. 17:38
To: András Császár (IJ/ETH)
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Resilience: faults, causes, statistics, open issues

 On Jan 27, 2005, at 6:39 AM, András Császár (IJ/ETH) wrote:
 
 
 Hi people!
 
 I've begun research on (carrier-grade, aka telecom-grade) resiliency
 in IP transport networks. The first step would be to collect possible
 failure events, their causes and consequences, statistics about
 downtimes (mean time to repair) and mean times between failures, and
 I would like to identify which of the problems are most typical (HW
 bug, SW bug, cable cut through, plugged out (link going down),
 severe misconfiguration). 
 
 I think this is the perfect forum to get some feedback from real
 network-operational experience.
 
 Is anyone out there who has some statistics/documents that would help
 me in any way?
 
 This is self-serving, but see the intro and related work sections of
 my thesis (we'll have a conference paper version of it done soon for
 NSDI, but we're still revising it.  Apologies for not having a shorter
 reference to give you):
 
http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/papers/index.php?detail=113
 
 It doesn't focus specifically on carrier failures, but it has a batch
 of references that might get you started on what the academic side
 knows.  I've also got some refs in there to some of the earlier teleco
 studies, which I recommend taking a peek at.  Again, relation to year
 2005 ISP failures isn't totally clear, but it's a starting point.
 
 Unfortunately, the reality is 

The Cidr Report

2005-01-28 Thread cidr-report

This report has been generated at Fri Jan 28 21:49:25 2005 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.

Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.

Recent Table History
Date  PrefixesCIDR Agg
21-01-05150315  103500
22-01-05151119  103502
23-01-05150437  103475
24-01-05150434  103516
25-01-05150622  103724
26-01-05150792  103854
27-01-05150792  103116
28-01-05150969  103172


AS Summary
 18774  Number of ASes in routing system
  7698  Number of ASes announcing only one prefix
  1435  Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS
AS7018 : ATTW ATT WorldNet Services
  90486528  Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s)
AS721  : DNIC DoD Network Information Center


Aggregation Summary
The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only
when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as 
to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also
proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes').

 --- 28Jan05 ---
ASnumNetsNow NetsAggr  NetGain   % Gain   Description

Table 151027   1032154781231.7%   All ASes

AS18566  7667  75999.1%   CVAD Covad Communications
AS4134   839  206  63375.4%   CHINANET-BACKBONE
   No.31,Jin-rong Street
AS4323   833  224  60973.1%   TWTC Time Warner Telecom
AS721   1118  573  54548.7%   DNIC DoD Network Information
   Center
AS7015   596   77  51987.1%   CCCH-3 Comcast Cable
   Communications Holdings, Inc
AS7018  1435  973  46232.2%   ATTW ATT WorldNet Services
AS22773  436   19  41795.6%   CXA Cox Communications Inc.
AS27364  460   46  41490.0%   ARMC Armstrong Cable Services
AS6197   834  448  38646.3%   BNS-14 BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS6478   501  118  38376.4%   ATTW ATT WorldNet Services
AS3602   513  148  36571.2%   SPCA Sprint Canada Inc.
AS22909  423   74  34982.5%   CMCS Comcast Cable
   Communications, Inc.
AS1239   923  615  30833.4%   SPRN Sprint
AS9929   340   35  30589.7%   CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp.
AS4766   568  279  28950.9%   KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom
AS17676  391  103  28873.7%   JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan
   Network Information Center
AS14654  2637  25697.3%   WAYPOR-3 Wayport
AS9443   366  121  24566.9%   INTERNETPRIMUS-AS-AP Primus
   Telecommunications
AS6140   378  141  23762.7%   IMPSA ImpSat
AS4355   300   64  23678.7%   ERSD EARTHLINK, INC
AS9583   576  343  23340.5%   SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited
AS25844  244   16  22893.4%   SASMFL-2 Skadden, Arps, Slate,
   Meagher  Flom LLP
AS6198   447  225  22249.7%   BNS-14 BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS15270  245   32  21386.9%   PDP-14 PaeTec.net -a division
   of PaeTecCommunications, Inc.
AS2386   812  609  20325.0%   ADCS-1 ATT Data
   Communications Services
AS23126  210   18  19291.4%   KTEL KMC Telecom, Inc.
AS5668   426  241  18543.4%   CIH-12 CenturyTel Internet
   Holdings, Inc.
AS19632  1918  18395.8%   Metropolis Intercom
AS6517   301  119  18260.5%   YIPS Yipes Communications,
   Inc.
AS9498   235   54  18177.0%   BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET
   LTD.

Total  15970 59431002762.8%   Top 30 total


Possible Bogus Routes

24.138.80.0/20   AS11260 AHSICHCL Andara High Speed Internet c/o 
Halifax Cable Ltd.
24.246.0.0/17AS7018  ATTW ATT WorldNet Services
24.246.38.0/24   AS25994 NPGCAB NPG Cable, INC
24.246.128.0/18  AS7018  ATTW ATT WorldNet Services
64.17.32.0/24AS5024  BRIDGE-75 BridgeNet, LC
64.17.33.0/24AS5024  BRIDGE-75 BridgeNet, LC
64.17.37.0/24AS5024  BRIDGE-75 BridgeNet, LC
64.46.27.0/24AS8674  

Re: beware of the unknown packets

2005-01-28 Thread Sabri Berisha

On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 11:12:19PM +0200, Petri Helenius wrote:

Hi,

 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/409555

Did anyone here of any exploits being in the wild? 

-- 
Sabri Berisha, SAB666-RIPE  - I route, therefore you are
http://www.cluecentral.net  - http://www.virt-ix.net


Re: beware of the unknown packets

2005-01-28 Thread Petri Helenius
Sabri Berisha wrote:
On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 11:12:19PM +0200, Petri Helenius wrote:
Hi,
 

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/409555
   

Did anyone here of any exploits being in the wild? 

 

How would one tell if the actual issue is not published? (without 
violating possible NDA's)

Pete


Announce: BGP::Inspect

2005-01-28 Thread Manish Karir


All,

Merit Network and the University of Maryland would like to announce the
beta release of a BGP update messages research tool that might be of use
to the NANOG community.  The tool is called BGP::Inspect.  The goal is to
make the vast quantities of Routeviews data easily accesible to the
network operator and research community.  This involves not just allowing
people to query and obtain the update messages, but also providing some
simple analysis and statistics on the data which can help in locating
anomalies and problems.

At this point we feel that we could really benefit from some feedback from
the community.  A beta release of our prototype is available at:
http://weasel.merit.edu:9191/
This version has been initialized with a limited amount of data.  It
currently provides information regarding 5 of the 40 routeview peers, and
only contains data for the time period from Dec 20 - Jan 6.

The basic interface has been kept simple.  There are 2 types of queries
that can be run Summary Queries and Raw Data Analysis.  The summary
queries allow users to quickly focus on potential trouble spots(as
observed at the routeview peers).  Basic queries include things like most
active ASes, most active prefixes, as well as prefixes that exhibited the
most number of changes in their OriginAS.

The second type of queries, Raw Data Analysis can be used to obtain
information regarding specific ASes or prefixes for a given time range.
A query for a specific AS will return not only the various prefixes
announced by that AS, the times, paths, and communities, but also summary
stats including total number of announcements in that time period and the
number of unique prefixes announced in that time period.  A 7 day summary
graph is also returned which summarized the most recent activity as seen
originating from that AS.
A similar query for a specific prefix will return times,
types(announce/withdraw), aspaths and communities from update messages
as well as summary statistics that indicate the min/max/avg AS path length
as seen over the query time interval, the number of originAS changes as
well as the number of unique ASes that announced that prefix.  A summary
graph indicating the activity of that prefix over the last 7 days is also
displayed.

In a lot of ways this tool complements the Search by AS/Prefix tools from
RIPE, BGP Monitor from MIT, and LinkRank from UCLA.  The more views from
different vantage points the better.  In addition there is a real effort
with BGP::Inspect to provide not simply access to the raw data, but some
simple analysis and summary statistics as well.  The hope is that people
no longer need to write custom parsers to be able to extract the
information they need.

We would appreciate any and all feedback from the NANOG community.  In
particular, it would be instructive to us to learn what are some other
typical queries that we could add, in addition to the the Top 20 most
active ASes/Prefixes and Top 20 prefixes which have most number of
origin AS changes.   What are some other basic questions that researchers
and network operators ask when attempting to analyze problems.

Please send feedback offlist to: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

thanks
manish karir





Weekly Routing Table Report

2005-01-28 Thread Routing Table Analysis

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet
Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan.
Daily listings are sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED].

Routing Table Report   04:00 +10GMT Sat 29 Jan, 2005

Analysis Summary


BGP routing table entries examined:  154984
Prefixes after maximum aggregation:   90381
Unique aggregates announced to Internet:  74096
Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 18880
Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:   16393
Origin ASes announcing only one prefix:7690
Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:2487
Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 80
Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table:   4.5
Max AS path length visible:  22
Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 6
Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:0
Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 19
Number of addresses announced to Internet:   1370739756
Equivalent to 81 /8s, 179 /16s and 212 /24s
Percentage of available address space announced:   37.0
Percentage of allocated address space announced:   58.5
Percentage of available address space allocated:   63.2
Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations:   72278

APNIC Region Analysis Summary
-

Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes:30715
Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   14875
Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks:   28751
Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks:14553
APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:2194
APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:649
APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:326
Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:4.4
Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 15
Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet:  172218240
Equivalent to 10 /8s, 67 /16s and 215 /24s
Percentage of available APNIC address space announced: 63.9

APNIC AS Blocks4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431
   23552-24575
APNIC Address Blocks   58/7, 60/7, 124/7, 126/8, 202/7, 210/7, 218/7,
   220/7 and 222/8

ARIN Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 86924
Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation:52224
Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks:66269
Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 23997
ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 9828
ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:3564
ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 964
Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 4.3
Max ARIN Region AS path length visible:  16
Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet:   240024576
Equivalent to 14 /8s, 78 /16s and 124 /24s
Percentage of available ARIN address space announced:  71.5

ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106
   2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153
   3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466
   7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407
   18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591,
   26624-27647,29695-30719, 31744-33791
ARIN Address Blocks24/8, 63/8, 64/6, 68/7, 70/7, 72/8, 198/7, 204/6,
   208/7 and 216/8

RIPE Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 29197
Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation:20200
Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks:26172
Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 17218
RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 6269
RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:3332
RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:1067
Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 5.1
Max RIPE Region AS path length visible:  22
Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet:   187084864
Equivalent to 11 

Re: Resilience: faults, causes, statistics, open issues

2005-01-28 Thread David Andersen

On Jan 28, 2005, at 5:30 AM, András Császár (IJ/ETH) wrote:
Just some comments about the root causes of BGP related problems, 
maybe you find something useful from the research perspective, 
although probably this is not going to be new for you.

I found a few author groups with very related and useful papers:
- Tim Griffin and co.
- Nick Feamster and co.
- Jennifer Rexford and co.
- Lixin Gao and co.
  Yup.  That particular group you mentioned has a lot of interplay.
These people often have joint publications but sometimes separate as 
well. Also, Craig Labovitz and co have some very useful papers in the 
area of routing convergence time.
Yes.  There's also Morley Mao's convergence work.

As I see things now, in case of BGP, routing divergence, configuration 
and policies have a very strong correlation.

A high level conclusion (what you probably can expect from half year 
paper- and presentation-reading research) is that the first root cause 
of BGP problems is the absence of a widely deployed and practical 
formal language for policies. Since there is no formal language, there 
is
 no compiler, and so you have unwanted anomalies resulting from your 
config.
  In a sense.  I think that this is one of the root causes, but it's 
perhaps not the only one.  I think we can group it into two areas:

  a)  Fundamental BGP problems
(e.g., the convergence/flap damping issues, etc.).   By 
fundamental I don't mean uncorrectable - I simply mean that they're 
features of the protocol as it exists today.  Some may be fundamental 
trade-offs in global routing;  I don't know.

  b)  The abovementioned policy issue
Some of the issues in (a) can be corrected through (b) - for example, 
the Gao/Rexford examination of what policies can be permitted if you 
want to ensure stable routing.  Given that BGP is a strongly 
policy-driven beast, many, many of its problems do arise from this.

So, in the end, although we can possibly identify the root causes 
behind BGP problems, I'm not sure they can ever be fully ceased. OK, I 
can imagine a formal language and config compiler, and one can find 
verification tools as well, but I can hardly imagine e.g. the sharing 
of policies (although some papers write about methods how to infer the 
necessary knowledge from measurements).
Agreed.  I think we'll make steps, though, and I think that groups of 
collaborating providers can probably implement some of the solutions 
between themselves in ways that make sense.

p.s. Sorry for the long mail :) :)
No worries - quite interesting.  (to me, at least!)
  -Dave


Multicast and unicast delivery at NANOG 33

2005-01-28 Thread Joel Jaeggli
Just an update.
Coverage is planned for Sunday Jan 30 19:30 - 21:30 (PST) Coordinating 
NANOG: Input From the Community.

Merit will provide Real Netoworks streaming media for the NANOG meeting 
proper, see:

http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0501/network.html#real
From the UO, NANOG will be multicast live using an ISMA MPEG-4 standard 
multicast stream using the mp3 audio codec at 250Kb/s. The stream should 
be of similar visual quality to the 1Mb/s MPEG-1 stream! Recommended free 
clients are Quicktime for Windows or Macintosh and MPlayer on Linux or 
*BSD. The VideoLAN client is able to play back the video and audio on all 
platforms.

We will also be providing a unicast http based mp3 audio stream, playable 
in itunes and any http/icecast/shoutcast capable client.

The multicast sources are:
MPEG-4 (ISMA MPEG-4 250kb/s) (SDP FILE) 
http://videolab.uoregon.edu/events/nanog/nanog33-mpg4.sdp
* Video IP Address: 224.2.174.81
* Video UDP Port: 51314
* Audio IP Address: 224.2.174.82
* Audio UDP Port: 28256
The unicast mp3 audio source is:
http://tinder.uoregon.edu:8000/nanog33.mp3
for updated information see:
http://videolab.uoregon.edu/events/nanog/nanog_33.html
--
-- 
Joel Jaeggli  	   Unix Consulting 	   [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
GPG Key Fingerprint: 5C6E 0104 BAF0 40B0 5BD3 C38B F000 35AB B67F 56B2