Re: BGP unsupported capability code

2006-08-18 Thread Danny McPherson



On Aug 17, 2006, at 10:57 PM, Joe Maimon wrote:


If A tries to peer with B, and B sends a BGP capability 64 to A, if  
A does not support that capability what would proper and/or  
reasonable behavior for A be?


Speaker A MAY send a NOTIFICATION message with Open
Message Error/Error Subcode Unsupported Capability and
a data field listing capability 64 as the trigger for the
NOTIFICATION to speaker B (thereby terminating the session).
However, RFC 3392 does NOT require that the local BGP
speaker terminate the connection, which has particular utility
when considering the implications such a hard requirement
may otherwise impose on functions such as dynamic BGP
capabilities.


(a published source for it, if you could possibly do so.)

a) send

unsupported capability code 64 lengh 6
## 2006-08-17 19:17:05 : [bgp/stack]: send NOTIFICATION msg  
code (Open-Error)
subcode(Open Message Error: Unsupported Capability) to peer  
w9.x4.y7.z9 via socket 415


b) ignore it

c) admin defined

rfc3392.txt only appears to address the case where if A tries to  
peer with B, and B sends a BGP capability 64 to A, if A does not  
support that capability, B MAY terminate the connection with the  
above notification.


(section 3 paragraph 5)


If the peer doesn't support the capability and this is conveyed
from A to B via a NOTIFICATION message (as illustrated in the
log message above), then given the scenario you provide B
SHOULD NOT include the capability (64) in any subsequent
OPEN message sent to A when attempting to reestablish a
BGP connection -- IF B so chooses to attempt to automatically
reestablish a connection.  Note that the above says SHOULD
NOT, not MUST NOT.

I'm not quite sure what your point above is, as I think the
document sufficiently outlines the required behavior.

Although BGP is perhaps (?) still of interest to the NANOG
community, I suspect such protocol intricacies are not and
would submit that queries of nature are best directed to
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

-danny




Re: GTSM - Do you use it?

2006-08-18 Thread Peter Corlett


On 17 Aug 2006, at 21:45, Pekka Savola wrote:
[...]
Enhancement Requests haven't gotten through, but maybe gripes on  
nanog will :-(


IME, griping about something on a mailing list, while typically  
getting you an email from a techie at the company concerned  
(especially if the gripe was ferocious enough to strip paint), rarely  
actually gets the problem fixed.


It's not unreasonable, I guess. Decision makers aren't likely to be  
reading operational mailing lists with a low S/N ratio.





BGP Update Report

2006-08-18 Thread cidr-report


Copies of this report are mailed to:
  nanog@merit.edu
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


The Cidr Report

2006-08-18 Thread cidr-report

This report has been generated at Fri Aug 18 21:44:55 2006 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.

Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.

Recent Table History
Date  PrefixesCIDR Agg
11-08-06192373  125579
12-08-06192469  125391
13-08-06192248  125495
14-08-06192399  125585
15-08-06192453  125795
16-08-06192642  125743
17-08-06192848  125900
18-08-06192996  125754


AS Summary
 22814  Number of ASes in routing system
  9554  Number of ASes announcing only one prefix
  1464  Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS
AS7018 : ATT-INTERNET4 - ATT WorldNet Services
  91538944  Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s)
AS721  : DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center


Aggregation Summary
The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only
when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as 
to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also
proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes').

 --- 18Aug06 ---
ASnumNetsNow NetsAggr  NetGain   % Gain   Description

Table 192964   1258566710834.8%   All ASes

AS4134  1264  263 100179.2%   CHINANET-BACKBONE
   No.31,Jin-rong Street
AS4755   964   71  89392.6%   VSNL-AS Videsh Sanchar Nigam
   Ltd. Autonomous System
AS18566  955  145  81084.8%   COVAD - Covad Communications
   Co.
AS4323   979  282  69771.2%   TWTC - Time Warner Telecom,
   Inc.
AS721   1004  315  68968.6%   DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network
   Information Center
AS22773  688   53  63592.3%   CCINET-2 - Suddenlink
   Communications
AS9498   786  179  60777.2%   BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET
   LTD.
AS6197  1018  486  53252.3%   BATI-ATL - BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS7018  1464  951  51335.0%   ATT-INTERNET4 - ATT WorldNet
   Services
AS19262  684  185  49973.0%   VZGNI-TRANSIT - Verizon
   Internet Services Inc.
AS19916  563   65  49888.5%   ASTRUM-0001 - OLM LLC
AS17488  522   47  47591.0%   HATHWAY-NET-AP Hathway IP Over
   Cable Internet
AS855559   88  47184.3%   CANET-ASN-4 - Aliant Telecom
AS11492  725  284  44160.8%   CABLEONE - CABLE ONE
AS3602   530  106  42480.0%   AS3602-RTI - Rogers Telecom
   Inc.
AS18101  437   27  41093.8%   RIL-IDC Reliance Infocom Ltd
   Internet Data Centre,
AS17676  492   96  39680.5%   JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan
   Network Information Center
AS15270  451   57  39487.4%   AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec.net -a
   division of
   PaeTecCommunications, Inc.
AS812414   46  36888.9%   ROGERS-CABLE - Rogers Cable
   Inc.
AS4766   670  307  36354.2%   KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom
AS22047  456   94  36279.4%   VTR BANDA ANCHA S.A.
AS6198   598  243  35559.4%   BATI-MIA - BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS4812   413   59  35485.7%   CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom
   (Group)
AS6467   393   47  34688.0%   ESPIRECOMM - Xspedius
   Communications Co.
AS16852  364   53  31185.4%   FOCAL-CHICAGO - Focal Data
   Communications of Illinois
AS9583   943  639  30432.2%   SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited
AS8151   768  466  30239.3%   Uninet S.A. de C.V.
AS16814  329   46  28386.0%   NSS S.A.
AS6517   409  128  28168.7%   YIPESCOM - Yipes
   Communications, Inc.
AS19115  363   92  27174.7%   CHARTER-LEBANON - Charter
   Communications

Total

Re: BGP unsupported capability code

2006-08-18 Thread Joe Maimon




Danny McPherson wrote:




On Aug 17, 2006, at 10:57 PM, Joe Maimon wrote:



If A tries to peer with B, and B sends a BGP capability 64 to A, if  A 
does not support that capability what would proper and/or  reasonable 
behavior for A be?



Speaker A MAY send a NOTIFICATION message with Open
Message Error/Error Subcode Unsupported Capability and
a data field listing capability 64 as the trigger for the
NOTIFICATION to speaker B (thereby terminating the session).
However, RFC 3392 does NOT require that the local BGP
speaker terminate the connection, which has particular utility
when considering the implications such a hard requirement
may otherwise impose on functions such as dynamic BGP
capabilities.


Unless there is actual utility gained by B learning the hard way that A 
doesnt support this capability, rather than by not receiving the same 
capability in A's OPEN, I would not consider this behavior reasonable.


And rfc3392 specificaly says

   A BGP speaker determines the capabilities supported by its peer by
   examining the list of capabilities present in the Capabilities
   Optional Parameter carried by the OPEN message that the speaker
   receives from the peer.

Not by hit or miss with NOTIFICATION messages.

And as I read it, rfc3392 makes absolutely no mention of my case.



(section 3 paragraph 5)



If the peer doesn't support the capability and this is conveyed
from A to B via a NOTIFICATION message (as illustrated in the
log message above), then given the scenario you provide B
SHOULD NOT include the capability (64) in any subsequent
OPEN message sent to A when attempting to reestablish a
BGP connection -- IF B so chooses to attempt to automatically
reestablish a connection.  Note that the above says SHOULD
NOT, not MUST NOT.

I'm not quite sure what your point above is, as I think the
document sufficiently outlines the required behavior.


Which document is this? Are you quoting?

In any event the above is not observed behavior either, as the 500 log 
messages on the peer's (the one sending capability 64) support desk 
attest to.


Does your paragraph also suggest that B SHOULD NOT send the capability 
when A automaticaly tries to reconnect?


Should A (the peer that sent the notification upon receipt of capability 
 64) NOT try to automatically reconnect?




Although BGP is perhaps (?) still of interest to the NANOG
community, I suspect such protocol intricacies are not and
would submit that queries of nature are best directed to
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


This isnt an intellectual excercise, its something that operationaly 
affects me. Perhaps it has, is, or will affect any of the operators who 
subscribe to this list.


Since I may have to go to bat against the vendor on this one, I thought 
I would obtain some operator opinion beforehand.


I hope that satsifies the on-topic police.



-danny




Thanks for your reply.



Weekly Routing Table Report

2006-08-18 Thread Routing Analysis Role Account

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet
Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan.
Daily listings are sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

For historical data, please see http://thyme.apnic.net.

If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED].

Routing Table Report   04:00 +10GMT Sat 19 Aug, 2006

Analysis Summary


BGP routing table entries examined:  195444
Prefixes after maximum aggregation:  107128
Unique aggregates announced to Internet:  95305
Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 22909
Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:   19924
Origin ASes announcing only one prefix:9551
Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:2985
Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 70
Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table:   3.6
Max AS path length visible:  29
Max AS path prepend of ASN (36728)   27
Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:26
Unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:   5
Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:0
Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space:  9
Number of addresses announced to Internet:   1574577068
Equivalent to 93 /8s, 218 /16s and 35 /24s
Percentage of available address space announced:   42.5
Percentage of allocated address space announced:   61.5
Percentage of available address space allocated:   69.1
Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations:   97295

APNIC Region Analysis Summary
-

Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes:42778
Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   17444
Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks:   40468
Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks:18700
APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:2674
APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:757
APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:397
Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:3.5
Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 24
Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet:  260538976
Equivalent to 15 /8s, 135 /16s and 130 /24s
Percentage of available APNIC address space announced: 81.5

APNIC AS Blocks4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431
(pre-ERX allocations)  23552-24575, 37888-38911
APNIC Address Blocks   58/7, 60/7, 121/8, 122/7, 124/7, 126/8, 202/7
   210/7, 218/7, 220/7 and 222/8

ARIN Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 98830
Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation:58753
Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks:72522
Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 27331
ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:10905
ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:4114
ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:1017
Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.3
Max ARIN Region AS path length visible:  29
Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet:   295414528
Equivalent to 17 /8s, 155 /16s and 171 /24s
Percentage of available ARIN address space announced:  76.6

ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106
(pre-ERX allocations)  2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153
   3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466
   7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407
   18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591,
   26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791
   35840-36863, 39936-40959
ARIN Address Blocks24/8, 63/8, 64/5, 72/6, 76/8, 199/8, 204/6,
   208/7 and 216/8

RIPE Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 39282
Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation:26280
Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks:36240
Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 24435
RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 8387
RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:4397
RIPE Region transit ASes present in the 

Re: BGP unsupported capability code

2006-08-18 Thread Per Gregers Bilse

On Aug 18,  8:31am [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 This isnt an intellectual excercise, its something that operationaly 
 affects me. Perhaps it has, is, or will affect any of the operators who 
 subscribe to this list.
 
 Since I may have to go to bat against the vendor on this one, I thought 
 I would obtain some operator opinion beforehand.

I can't see the on-topic police having any problems with this, unless
network operations have degraded to a point marginally above machine-level
automation.  If it has, what is NANOG's purpose?

As one who has both created a BGP implementation from scratch and have
operated many, I think I can help you.

It's easy to confuse the announcement of a particular capability with
announcement of capabilities altogether.  RFC3392 is clear enough, but
doesn't underline the point, and also doesn't mention any administrative
aspects.

The idea is that if a speaker supports capabilities negotiation, it
will include a BGP optional parameter in its OPEN message, listing the
capabilities it supports [Sec 3 Para 1].  The receiving speaker may
or may not support capability negotiation; if it doesn't it has no
choice except to send an error notification with error code unsupported
optional parameter, and the originator should restart but not send any
capabilities parameter [Sec 3 Para 4].  (If that is actually acceptable
is partly an administrative issue, but implementations vary.)

Assuming both peers support capability announcements, they would each
inspect the list of capabilities supported by the other [Sec 3 Para 2],
and determine if this satisfies their needs [Sec 3 Para 3,5].  This is
a partly administrative issue, and implementations have, well, varied.
If one peer strictly requires a particular capability that the other
doesn't support, it will send an error notification, terminate the
session, and not restart [Sec 3 Para 5].  The idea here is that the
problem is beyond protocol level negotiation (ie, it isn't eg just an
optimization), and requires human intervention.

Otherwise, assuming no strictly required capabilities are missing
on either side, the session goes ahead on each side, with each peer
respecting the capabilities it understands the other peer supports.

The whole capability thing is very much an afterthought to BGP; proper
negotiation could well require several transactions, but that would
require obvious changes to the BGP protocol itself.  Consequently,
actual support and behaviour for capabilities has seen some variation
between implementations and also between different versions and releases.
Things should have been reasonably settled by now, though, so I suspect
one of your peers is running old software.

As for the capability you mention (code 64), this is Graceful Restart, see

http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes

Graceful Restart is an optimization, and nothing prevents peering
without it.  Hence, you should not see repeated terminations and restarts,
the session should simply go ahead without using Graceful Restart.

Best,

  -- Per


Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Richard A Steenbergen

So, lets kick this Friday off right... I don't suppose anybody has noticed 
that Wikipedia is being blackholed by Cogent, and that it seems to be 
intentional? :)

-- 
Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED]   http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras
GPG Key ID: 0xF8B12CBC (7535 7F59 8204 ED1F CC1C 53AF 4C41 5ECA F8B1 2CBC)


Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Jeremy Chadwick

On Fri, Aug 18, 2006 at 03:02:45PM -0400, Richard A Steenbergen wrote:
 So, lets kick this Friday off right... I don't suppose anybody has noticed 
 that Wikipedia is being blackholed by Cogent, and that it seems to be 
 intentional? :)

I'm not able to reach 207.142.136.174 (also via Cogent) either,
which is forums.miranda-im.org.

207.142.136.0/24   *[BGP/170] 01:57:05, localpref 100
  AS path: 701 174 ?

For Wikipedia:

207.142.131.0/24   *[BGP/170] 01:58:02, localpref 100
  AS path: 701 174 ?

-- 
| Jeremy Chadwick jdc at parodius.com |
| Parodius Networkinghttp://www.parodius.com/ |
| UNIX Systems Administrator   Mountain View, CA, USA |
| Making life hard for others since 1977.   PGP: 4BD6C0CB |



Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Geoffrey Pan


Supposedly Cogent is working on this - I have space on this block 
207.142.131.0/21 ( I believe is the allocation) which includes wiki, 
miranda


Can someone on Cogent please comment on this . Thank you.

Geoffrey Pan
RHCE, CISSP, CISM
gpanatcheetaweb.com

Richard A Steenbergen wrote:
So, lets kick this Friday off right... I don't suppose anybody has noticed 
that Wikipedia is being blackholed by Cogent, and that it seems to be 
intentional? :)


  





Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Jeremy Chadwick

Looks like some others may have noticed...

207.142.131.0/24   *[BGP/170] 00:26:46, localpref 100
  AS path: 701 3356 30217 I

-- 
| Jeremy Chadwick jdc at parodius.com |
| Parodius Networkinghttp://www.parodius.com/ |
| UNIX Systems Administrator   Mountain View, CA, USA |
| Making life hard for others since 1977.   PGP: 4BD6C0CB |



Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Christopher L. Morrow


On Fri, 18 Aug 2006, Jeremy Chadwick wrote:


 Looks like some others may have noticed...

 207.142.131.0/24   *[BGP/170] 00:26:46, localpref 100
   AS path: 701 3356 30217 I

so.. is the problem that wikipedia's ip address is in a block of PA space
of Cogent's and they feel it's walked away without their consent?


Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Geoffrey Pan


This space has been assigned to the same location, facility for years.

The blocks affected that I know of are..

207.142.131.0/24  - 
207.142.136.0/24  


Are all of them being reported as that now?

so.. is the problem that wikipedia's ip address is in a block of PA space
of Cogent's and they feel it's walked away without their consent?
  





Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Christopher L. Morrow


On Fri, 18 Aug 2006, Geoffrey Pan wrote:

 This space has been assigned to the same location, facility for years.


same location/facility doesn't mean that that place/people/thing still has
authority to route the PA block... Like say the decided to stop having
Cogent as a provider? or stopped payments to Cogent? or some other sort of
snafu...

 The blocks affected that I know of are..

 207.142.131.0/24  -
 207.142.136.0/24

 Are all of them being reported as that now?
  so.. is the problem that wikipedia's ip address is in a block of PA space
  of Cogent's and they feel it's walked away without their consent?
 




Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread William Allen Simpson


Christopher L. Morrow wrote:

same location/facility doesn't mean that that place/people/thing still has
authority to route the PA block... Like say the decided to stop having
Cogent as a provider? or stopped payments to Cogent? or some other sort of
snafu...


According to the lead developer, brion vibber:

PowerMedium has assigned us a new IP space which is under their control (unlike
the old IPs which were leased from Cogent under an older contract), and we will
be transitioning to them over the weekend.





Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Geoffrey Pan


Can someone from Cogent please contact me off list regarding to this 
issue. Thank you.


Geoffrey Pan
RHCE, CISSP, CISM
gpanatcheetaweb.com



Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Richard A Steenbergen

On Fri, Aug 18, 2006 at 09:09:59PM +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
 
 On Fri, 18 Aug 2006, Geoffrey Pan wrote:
 
  This space has been assigned to the same location, facility for years.
 
 
 same location/facility doesn't mean that that place/people/thing still has
 authority to route the PA block... Like say the decided to stop having
 Cogent as a provider? or stopped payments to Cogent? or some other sort of
 snafu...

Cogent seems to think that they terminated a relationship with said 
company (one of what looks like many different hostway names at any rate), 
and gave them several months to renumber out of the IP allocation.

-- 
Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED]   http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras
GPG Key ID: 0xF8B12CBC (7535 7F59 8204 ED1F CC1C 53AF 4C41 5ECA F8B1 2CBC)


Cox leaking 128.0.0.0/1

2006-08-18 Thread Richard A Steenbergen

Seeing as this has been going on for over 2h30m, no one can seem to get 
ahold of any live bodies who can fix it, and the emails about it to the 
noc contacts have gone unanswered, I'm reduced to trying the old public 
embarassment approach...

Would Cox please stop announcing 128.0.0.0/1. Thanks.

route-views.oregon-ix.netsh ip bgp 128.0.0.1
BGP routing table entry for 128.0.0.0/1, version 471808
Paths: (14 available, best #14, table Default-IP-Routing-Table)
  Not advertised to any peer
  852 22773
154.11.11.113 from 154.11.11.113 (154.11.11.113)
  Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 852:180
  852 22773
154.11.98.225 from 154.11.98.225 (154.11.98.225)
  Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 852:180
  3277 6820 3267 3343 174 174 174 22773
194.85.4.55 from 194.85.4.55 (194.85.4.55)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 3277:6820 3277:65361 3277:65364
  2493 3602 812 22773
206.186.255.223 from 206.186.255.223 (206.186.255.223)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 812:2 3602:65011 3602:65535
  7500 2516 22773
202.249.2.86 from 202.249.2.86 (203.178.133.115)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  6539 22773
216.18.63.137 from 216.18.63.137 (216.18.63.137)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  11608 3491 22773
207.246.129.13 from 207.246.129.13 (207.246.129.15)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 3491:2000 3491:2007 3491:22773 11608:1004 11608:5504 22773:130 
22773:60101 22773:64002 22773:64100 22773:64101
  7660 2516 22773
203.181.248.233 from 203.181.248.233 (203.181.248.13)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  1221 4637 22773
203.62.252.26 from 203.62.252.26 (203.62.252.26)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
   1103 1273 22773
193.0.0.56 from 193.0.0.56 (193.0.0.56)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  8001 22773
209.123.12.51 from 209.123.12.51 (209.123.12.51)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 8001:3000 8001:3023 8001:6008 22773:130 22773:60101 
22773:64002 22773:64100 22773:64101
  12956 22773
213.140.32.146 from 213.140.32.146 (213.140.32.146)
  Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
  Community: 12956:18500 12956:28200 12956:28201 22773:130 22773:60101 
22773:64002 22773:64100 22773:64101
  5650 22773
74.40.7.35 from 74.40.7.35 (207.173.112.63)
  Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external
  5650 22773
74.40.7.36 from 74.40.7.36 (74.40.0.11)
  Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external, best

Oh and if you are on this list (and therefore accepting that prefix), you 
may need better filters. :)

-- 
Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED]   http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras
GPG Key ID: 0xF8B12CBC (7535 7F59 8204 ED1F CC1C 53AF 4C41 5ECA F8B1 2CBC)


Re: Wikipedia/Cogent

2006-08-18 Thread Leo Bicknell
In a message written on Fri, Aug 18, 2006 at 03:02:45PM -0400, Richard A 
Steenbergen wrote:
 So, lets kick this Friday off right... I don't suppose anybody has noticed 
 that Wikipedia is being blackholed by Cogent, and that it seems to be 
 intentional? :)

Maybe they don't like: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogent_Communications

-- 
   Leo Bicknell - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - CCIE 3440
PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
Read TMBG List - [EMAIL PROTECTED], www.tmbg.org


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