Re: Cogent issues in SF area?

2007-09-28 Thread Jim Shankland


The archive.org/Cogent stuff was an issue specific to archive.org's
connection to Cogent.

Jim Shankland


Re: Seeking Comcast Contact: need to troubleshoot packet loss and/or asymmetric routing issue between Comcast Onvoy

2007-08-02 Thread Jim Shankland


Robert Boyle wrote:
Either your firewall/router or the customer's firewall/router is 
blocking PMTUD packets.  I suspect an overzealous firewall admin

 is blocking all icmp.

Which you can't do anything about if the overzealous firewall admin
is at the other end of the connection.  My repeated, first-hand
experience has been that several of the better-known web sites out
there will happily send out 1500-byte packets with DF set, then
ignore the DEST_UNREACH/FRAG_NEEDED icmp responses they get.  If you're
on the client end of this, you're sunk unless you initiate the
connection specifying a lower MSS.

Linux has a nifty iptables option (clamp-mss-to-pmtu) to rewrite the
MSS in TCP SYN packets when forwarding a packet onto a link with
a lower MTU than the MSS in the packet.  Works like a charm.  If every
packet forwarding device on the Internet did this, PMTUD would not be
needed.  As is, PMTUD is simply broken, due to widespread firewall
misconfiguration.  As in so many other cases of Internet misbehavior,
you can avoid being part of the problem, but you can't be the solution.

Jim Shankland



Re: Seeking Comcast Contact: need to troubleshoot packet loss and/or asymmetric routing issue between Comcast Onvoy

2007-08-02 Thread Jim Shankland


Adrian Chadd wrote:

On Thu, Aug 02, 2007, Jim Shankland wrote:


Linux has a nifty iptables option (clamp-mss-to-pmtu) to rewrite the
MSS in TCP SYN packets when forwarding a packet onto a link with
a lower MTU than the MSS in the packet.  Works like a charm.  If every
packet forwarding device on the Internet did this, PMTUD would not be
needed.  As is, PMTUD is simply broken, due to widespread firewall
misconfiguration.  As in so many other cases of Internet misbehavior,
you can avoid being part of the problem, but you can't be the solution.


.. non-TCP traffic?


Hmm; I've never actually heard of anybody doing PMTUD on non-TCP
traffic, though it's possible.  Does anybody actually do it?

Jim Shankland


Security gain from NAT (was: Re: Cool IPv6 Stuff)

2007-06-04 Thread Jim Shankland

[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 Let's not forget all the NAT boxes out there that are *perfectly*
 willing to let a system make an *outbound* connection.  So the user
 makes a first outbound connection to visit a web page, gets exploited,
 and the exploit then phones home to download more malware.
 
 Yeah, that NAT *should* be providing security, but as you point out,
 there's that big gap between should and is... :)

I will happily (well ...) further concede that NAT does not provide
*absolute* security.  Let me be the first to mention that NAT provides
precisely zero protection against:  Hey, kids, just download and
run this .EXE to see a cute cartoon of Santa dancing with a polar
bear :-).

Jim


Re: from the academic side of the house

2007-04-24 Thread Jim Shankland

[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 The next day, the team used a modified version of TCP to achieve an
 even greater record. Using the same 30,000 km path, the network was
 able to achieve a throughput of 9.08 Gbps which is equal to 272,400
 Tb-m/s for both the IPv6 multi and single stream categories. In doing
 so, the team surpassed the current IPv4 records, proving that IPv6
 networks are able to provide the same, if not better, performance as
 IPv4.

Good job.  Two questions, though:

(1) Do the throughput figures count only the data payload (i.e.,
anything above the TCP layer), or all the bits from the protocol
stack?  If the latter, it seems a little unreasonable to credit
IPv6 with its own extra overhead -- though I'll concede that with
jumbo datagrams, that's not all that much.

(2) Getting this kind of throughput seems to depend on a fast
physical layer, plus some link-layer help (jumbo packets), plus
careful TCP tuning to deal with the large bandwidth-delay product.
The IP layer sits between the second and third of those three items.
Is there something about IPv6 vs. IPv4 that specifically improves
perfomance on this kind of test?  If so, what is it?

Jim Shankland


[no subject]

2007-03-27 Thread Jim Shankland

[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Use GigE cards on the servers with a jumbo MTU and only buy IP network
 access from a service provider who supports jumbo MTUs end-to-end
 through their network.

I'm not sure that I see how jumbo frames help (very much).  The
principal issue here is the relatively large bandwidth-delay
product, right?  So you need large TCP send buffers on the sending
side, a large (scaled) receive window on the receiver side, and
turn on selective acknowledgement (so that you don't have to
resend the whole send buffer if a packet gets dropped).

At 45 Mb/s and 120 ms RTT, you need to be able to have ca. 700 KBytes
of data in flight; round up and call it a megabyte.

Having said that, I too have tried to configure Windows to use
a large send buffer, and failed.  (In my case, it was Windows
machines at a remote location sending to Linux machines.)
I'm not a Windows person; maybe I didn't try hard enough.  In
the event, I threw up my hands and installed a Linux proxy server
at the remote site, appropriately configured, and went home happy.

Jim Shankland


Re: Google wants to be your Internet

2007-01-22 Thread Jim Shankland

Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 IIRC, someone representing the electrical companies approached
 someone representing network providers, possibly the IETF, to
 ask about the feasibility of using IP to monitor the electrical
 meters throughout the US
 
 The response was yeah, well, maybe with IPv6.

Which is nonsense.  More gently, it's only true if you not only
want to use IP to monitor electrical meters, but want the use
the (global) Internet to monitor electrical meters.

I'd love to hear the business case for why my home electrical meter
needs to be directly IP-addressable from an Internet cafe in Lagos.

Jim Shankland


Re: Google wants to be your Internet

2007-01-22 Thread Jim Shankland

In response to my saying:

 I'd love to hear the business case for why my home electrical meter
 needs to be directly IP-addressable from an Internet cafe in Lagos.

Jay R. Ashworth [EMAIL PROTECTED] responds, concisely:

 It doesn't, and it shouldn't.  That does *not* mean it should not have
 a globally unique ( != globally routable) IP address.

and Jeroen Massar [EMAIL PROTECTED] presents several hypothetical
scenarios.

Note that the original goal was for electrical companies to monitor
electrical meters.  Jeroen brings up backyard mini-nuke plants, seeing
how much the power plug in the garden is being used, etc.  These may
all be desirable goals, but they represent considerable mission creep
from the originally stated goal.

None of Jeroen's applications requires end-to-end, packet-level access
to the individual devices in Jeroen's future (I assume) home.  You can
certainly argue that packet-level connectivity is better, easier to
engineer, scales better, etc., etc.; but it is not *required*.
In fact, there are sound engineering arguments against packet-level
access:  since we've dragged in the backyard nuke plant, consider what
happens when everybody has a backyard mini-nuke, with control software
written by Linksys, and it turns out that sending it a certain kind
of malformed packet can cause it to melt down 

No matter.  Reasonable people can disagree on the question of whether
every networkable device benefits from being globally, uniquely
addressable.  The burden on the proponents is higher than that:  there
are *costs* associated with such an architecture, and the proponents
of globally unique addressing need to show not only that it has benefits,
but that the benefits exceed the costs.  Coming full circle, the original
assertion was that IPv6 was required in order for electric companies
to use IP to monitor US electric meters.  That assertion is false, and
no amount of hand-waving about backyard nuke plants will make it true.

The history of IPv6 has been that it keeps receding into the future
as people's use of IPv4 adapts enough to make the current benefit of
switching to IPv6 smaller than the cost to do so.  Perhaps after a
decade or so, we're nearing the end of that road.  Or perhaps, as
F. Scott Fitzgerald once wrote about IPv6, it is:

the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before
us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter - tomorrow
we will run faster, stretch out our arms further
And one fine morning -

We'll see.

Jim Shankland


Re: TCP receive window set to 0; DoS or not?

2006-09-08 Thread Jim Shankland

Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 Advertising a window of 0 is a perfectly valid way of telling the other
 side that you are temporarily out of resoruces, and would like them to
 stop sending you data

Except that that's not what's going on here.  This message appears
when the TCP peer shrinks the window, withdrawing a previously granted
permission to send bytes -- a protocol violation.  For example, you're
free to tell me (with your window advertisement) that you're
authorizing me to send you 32K bytes, and then, after I've sent you
32K bytes, to close the window until you're ready to accept more.
You're not free to tell me it's OK to send 32K bytes, then change your
mind and advertise a window size of 0 after I've sent you only 16K
bytes.

To address the DoS question, I don't see how this protocol violation
enables a DoS attack.  More likely, it's simply somebody's buggy
TCP stack misbehaving.  That somebody is unlikely to be Windows, MacOS,
FreeBSD, or Linux.  My money is on some flavor of $50 NAT/home router
box.

Jim Shankland


Re: TCP receive window set to 0; DoS or not?

2006-09-08 Thread Jim Shankland

Travis Hassloch [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 The part where it becomes a DoS is when they tie up all the listeners
 on a socket (e.g. apache), and nothing happens for several minutes until
 their connections time out.  Whether intentional or not, it does have
 a negative effect.

Ah, that makes sense.  I was assuming a deliberate attack, which is
not actually implicit in the term DoS.  A deliberate denial of
service is not made easier by shrinking the window.  But an implementation
that advertises a 0 window in lieu of sending FIN or RST can certainly
deny service inadvertently by tying up resources that should have been
freed.

Jim Shankland


Re: The entire mechanism is Wrong!

2005-01-16 Thread Jim Shankland

 Just remember that, as an example, Melbourne IT has probably two orders
 of magnitude more clients than you. A 24x7 pager service would attract
 a /lot/ of Emergencies and as such they'd have to consider running
 at least a muppet level call service outside of hours to filter
 emergency requests away from the normal signup procedures and over
 to the People Who Really Fix Things.

Of course it's unreasonable to expect a registrar to have to
put up with such a burden during off hours:  God only knows what
kind of silly calls would come in.  Emergencies are best
handled in a batch during the regular work week.  For the
stuff that really won't wait, you just put a lawyer on retainer,
who can fax off a letter telling the complainant to sod off until
Monday morning, or until the moon is in the seventh house and Jupiter
aligns with Mars, whichever comes first. 

I mean, if we can't be on the golf course by 3:00, what are we
in this business for, anyway -- right?

Jim Shankland


Re: Cable and Wireless Security Contact?

2004-01-02 Thread Jim Shankland

 In addition, I've called Erie Forge and Steel, the rightful owners of
 this block , who've articulated they've gotten numerous complaints
 about port scanning and spam from this IP block.

And let us note in passing the irony of Erie Forge and Steel having
its address block forged and stolen.

Jim Shankland


Re: Appreciation for Bind patches

2003-09-20 Thread Jim Shankland

Andrew Fried writes:

 Simply put, I would like to publicly express my appreciation to
 Mr. Vixie for taking the time to add the root-delegation-only patch
 for Bind.

You speak for many.

 Andrew Fried, Senior Special Agent
 United States Department of the Treasury
 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
 Strategic Enforcement Division

Now go audit Verisign's tax returns for the last 3 years :-).


Re: RPC errors

2003-08-14 Thread Jim Shankland

On the bright side, when double-checking the firewall on my home cable
modem setup, it appears that Comcast here in the SF Bay Area has
started filtering out incoming port 135 SYN packets -- they get
dropped before they hit my firewall.  Thanks, Comcast!

On the not so bright side, I'm getting a steady stream of port 135
SYNs from my fellow Comcast customers (i.e., presumably on my side
of Comcast's filters), which may mean the horses have mostly already
left the barn.

Jim Shankland


Re: IPv6

2003-06-12 Thread Jim Shankland

David Barak [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 I think the place you're going to see IPv6 adoption is government
 networks - I've seen several RFPs from various government offices
 which are requiring some degree of IPv6 capability.  This is going
 to drive the various large carriers who have these governments as
 customers to implement a generically working IPv6 solution.

This is the same phenomenon that drove the explosive adoption rates
of the ISO OSI protocol stack and the Ada programming language.

Jim Shankland


Re: redundancy [was: something about arrogance]

2002-07-30 Thread Jim Shankland


Patrick Evans [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 My first project, if network availability were a key issue, within any
 organisation would be to a) obtain [an AS number] and b) make use of
 it.

Heh.  How many bits in an AS number, again?

Jim Shankland