Re: [Fwd: zone transfers, a spammer's dream?]

2004-12-09 Thread Kandra Nygårds
Alex Bligh wrote:
The irony of all this is that spammers already have all this information
-- yet registrars have gone out of their way to make it as difficult as
possible for everyone else to get it (rate-limiting queries and so on).
They clearly don't already have this information, or they wouldn't
be
a) offering to pay people for it
b) continue to be trying to obtain it by data mining.
There are lots of small-time spammers. Rest assured that the big fish 
already have access to most major zonefiles.


Your argument is roughly equivalent to The irony of this is that drug
dealers already have drugs -- yet governments have gone out of their
way to make it as difficult as possible for everyone else to get them.
Or Credit card fraudsters already have credit card numbers - yet
credit card companies have gone out of their way to make it is
difficult as possible for everyone else to get them.
Drugs are bad. Domains aren't. For a certain value of aren't.
Credit card numbers are all you need to commit fraud. Domains aren't. 
For a certain value of aren't.


IE sure, there's a lot of leaked information out there (often including
personal data), that doesn't mean responsible registries should add
to it.
Such as... selling access to the data to anyone who pays? No, 
responsible registries should of course not do this.

- Kandra


Re: Change to .com/.net behavior

2003-09-17 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: David Schwartz [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 Returning NXDOMAIN when a domain does not exist is a basic requirement.
 Failure to do so creates security problems. It is reasonable to require
your
 customers to fix known breakage that creates security problems.

I agree completely. However, this is a policy breakage, not a technial one.
Strictly speaking, the com and net zones are perfectly valid, as far as DNS
is concerned.

While I too am outraged by the actions of Verisign, I've decided to NOT
modify my servers in any way.
I might decide to block the sitefinder IP, but I will not change my
nameservers into modifying DNS responses. Doing so would be to break things,
and that is not an acceptable fix even if the other thing is in itself
broken. Of course, YMMV.


- Kandra








Re: Change to .com/.net behavior

2003-09-17 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

  While I too am outraged by the actions of Verisign, I've decided to NOT
  modify my servers in any way.
  I might decide to block the sitefinder IP, but I will not change my
  nameservers into modifying DNS responses. Doing so would be to break
things,

 *You* cannot modify DNS responses, but it's okay for Verisign to do so?

No. However they are NOT modifying DNS responses. The responses are
perfectly valid results of having a wildcard in the zone.

The thing is, they have decided to make ALL second level domains in the com
and net zones exist, regardless of wether they are registred or not. This is
a policy breakage that I'm not pleased with at all.

It is, however, very important to realise the difference between breaking
policy and breaking technology.


- Kandra





Re: Verisign HOWTO

2003-09-16 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: Chris Roberts [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 I've been asked to forward this here on behalf of Martin A Brooks
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
 http://www.hinterlands.org/ver/txt
 
 It's a 'How to get your IP block removed from the list that Verisign will
 reply with SiteFinder for'.

AKA, click here to unsubscribe?


- Kandra





Re: User negligence?

2003-07-27 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: Sean Donelan [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 Unfortunately there are a lot, and growing number, of self-infected PCs
 on the net.  As the banks point out, this is not a breach of the bank's
 security. Nor is it a breach of the ISP's security.  The user infects
 his PC with a trojan and then the criminal uses the PC to transfer money
 from the user's account, with the user's own password.

Banks use passwords for authentication? That's what scares me.

Personally, I find it terrifying that banks allow such weak authentication
as a password for financial transactions. To the best of my knowledge, all
banks around here use a smartcard based system. It might be a bit more
inconvenient, but the added security makes it well worth it, in my opinion.

It may not be a breach of the bank's security as such, but the measures they
take in order to protect their customers' money is in my opinion so low
that, IMHO, they are the ones guilty of negligence.



-Kandra





Re: User negligence?

2003-07-27 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: Sean Donelan [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Smartcard has become a marketing buzzword, and its difficult to figure out
what people are actually refering too.

Sorry, wrong word. I was actually refering to SafeWord/SecureID/ActivCard
type solutions, not ATM cards with a chip. Sorry for the confusion.


-Kandra





Re: companies like microsoft and telia...

2003-06-26 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: Paul Vixie [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 route:217.208.0.0/13
 descr:TELIANET-BLK
 remarks:  Abuse issues should be reported at
 remarks:  http://www.telia.com/security/
 remarks:  Mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] will be auto-replied
 remarks:  and referred to the URL above.
 origin:   AS3301
 mnt-by:   TELIANET-RR
 changed:  [EMAIL PROTECTED] 20010508
 source:   RIPE

[...]

One would think they'd learn, after AOL blocked them.


- Kandra





Re: Less than 2% of computer attacks on military are successful

2003-01-17 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: jnull [EMAIL PROTECTED]

  But the article also says less than 2% of the attacks resulted
  in a successful intrusion.

 2% would be an embarrassingly large success rate for intrusion on a
 secured military network.

Not to mention the definition of attack the article seems to use. After
all, a DoS or a probe doesn't actually result in an intrusion, even when
they're successful.


- Kandra






Re: COM/NET informational message

2003-01-03 Thread Kandra Nygårds

From: E.B. Dreger [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 BV Before IDNA, some application developers had developed
 BV proprietary mechanisms designed to support IDNs. The Internet

 UTF-8 is a standard.  MS products have used two-octet chars to
 support Unicode for a long time.  Any reason to add yet another
 encoding?

UTF-8 is a character encoding standard, not a DNS-standard. DNS is not, and
has not ever been 8-bit clean, despite the fact that many, if not most,
implementations will survive UTF-8 labels.

IDN(A) is an effort to encode unicode into 7-bit DNS-labels, without
breaking backward compatibility (too hard). While there originally were a
few voices arguing for UTF-8 over the wire, they were few and the consensus
today is that IDN(A) is a Good Way to Go(tm).


 How about encouraging widespread adoption of EXISTING standards
 instead of adding more cruft?  UTF-8 is standard.  Proper DNS
 implementations are eight-bit safe.  People upgraded browsers
 due to SSL, Year 2000, Javascript...

Or, how about encouringing widespread adoption of upcoming standards, such
as IDN?

http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/idn-charter.html


Remember, DNS implementations may be 8-bit safe, but that doesn't prevent
anything else from not being so. Domains are used in so much more than DNS,
you know. =)


Best regards,
Kandra Nygards