Re: Blackhole Routes

2004-09-30 Thread Mark Kasten
Richard A Steenbergen wrote:

That said, it is still absolutely silly that we can't standardize on a 
globally accepted blackhole community. A provider with many transit 
upstreams who wishes to pass on blackhole routes for their customers could 
quickly find themselves with some very messy configs and announcements 
trying to get everyones' specific blackhole community in place. I know 
we've all been tossing this idea around for a number of years, but if it 
hasn't been done already will someone please get this put into a draft 
already.

The problem with this is authentication.  I can authenticate prefixes my 
customers advertise me (as much as currently possible anyway).  I can't 
authenticate a prefix coming in from a peer that is not filtered.  If an 
ISP were to accept any prefix with 65535:666 as a triggered blackhole, 
how do you trust that?  As much as I agree that a global blackhole 
community would be nice, that's a big gotcha with potential liability 
attached.



Re: Phishing (Was Re: WashingtonPost computer security stories)

2004-08-16 Thread Mark Kasten
Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
On Mon, 16 Aug 2004, Niels Bakker wrote:

It's disheartening to see that this website is still online after
several days (I received the scam mail received Friday morning).

out of curiosity, you did send in a complaint to CitiBank's proper alias
for spoofing/phishing/blah, and a followup to Savvis who is providing
transit as you see from your perspective? and a sprint+sbc as it's their
customer 'hosting' the original page?
If no complaint is lodged citibank/sbc/sprint/savvis are non-the-wiser to
the problem, eh?

> /dev/null
passing to abuse, sorry for missing missing the original comments neils.
mark


Re: C&W Support Number

2004-08-16 Thread Mark Kasten
Brent,
	You should be able to reach support at 888-638-6771.  Also, 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] and/or [EMAIL PROTECTED] will work.  Though I believe 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] is being deprecated with [EMAIL PROTECTED] remaining.

Regards,
Mark Kasten
Savvis

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
All,
What is the new # for the Cable and Wireless support center  for 
Internet Circuits.  (800) 663-9932 is just ringing busy.  

Thanks,
Brent


Re: yo, savvis, cox, comcast, and armstrong! (Re: The Cidr Report)

2004-06-04 Thread Mark Kasten
yeah, we(being savvis) are aware.  this will all disappear when AS6347 
is integrated to AS3561.  AS3561 is, for the most part clean, and it 
will stay that way.  AS6347 will drop off the map in the coming months. 
 have patience.  ;-)

thx,
mark

Paul Vixie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

This report has been generated at Fri Jun  4 21:43:44 2004 AEST.
...
Recent Table History
   Date  PrefixesCIDR Agg
...
   03-06-04137774   96139
   04-06-04137884   95196

ok, so in one day we saw the addition of 110 prefixes, but they were aligned
such that the size of a properly cidr-aggregated table dropped by 943.  this
is quite a trick.  what does it all mean?

...
Aggregation Summary
The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only
when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as 
to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also
proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes').

and who's doing it?

ASnumNetsNow NetsAggr  NetGain   % Gain   Description
Table 136767951724159530.4%   All ASes
AS6347   940  160  78083.0%   SAVV SAVVIS Communications
  Corporation

yo, savvis!  you're putting 940 routes into the global routing table, and
when somebody did "sort -u" on the as-paths, they found that with no change
to your transit policies, you could be sending just 160 instead.  "help?"

AS22909  390   33  35791.5%   CMCS Comcast Cable
  Communications, Inc.

yo, comcast!

AS22773  378   58  32084.7%   CXAB Cox Communications Inc.
  Atlanta
AS27364  360   44  31687.8%   ARMC Armstrong Cable Services

yo, cox and armstrong!

AS11172  351   56  29584.0%   Servicios Alestra S.A de C.V
AS17676  339   50  28985.3%   JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan
  Network Information Center
AS9929   316   33  28389.6%   CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp.
AS6478   305   48  25784.3%   ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services
AS25844  243   16  22793.4%   SASMFL-2 Skadden, Arps, Slate,
  Meagher & Flom LLP
AS14654  2305  22597.8%   WAYPOR-3 Wayport
AS6327   208   28  18086.5%   SHAWC-2 Shaw Communications
  Inc.

yo!  yo!  yo!  (i've only listed those who could reduce their impact on the
global routing table by 80% or more... as you all saw, the list *was* longer.)
there are any number of unemployed bgp experts haunting this mailing list
looking for post-dotbomb work.  many of them would accept work as short term
consultants to help you folks get down under the 80% level.  just ask!


Re: BellNexxia to C&W problems in NY ? (AS577 - AS3561)

2004-03-09 Thread Mark Kasten
Mike,
   It does appear that this interconnect is running a bit hot.  If 
there is anyone from Bell Nexxia/AS577 listening, feel free to ping me 
offline and I'll see what I can do to help out.  But, to be honest, this 
is an issue that could/should be handled your upstream and [EMAIL PROTECTED]  
I don't see any emails from you sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED] 

Regards,
   Mark Kasten


Mike Tancsa wrote:



I have a few users exchanging data with sites inside Bell Canada call 
in to complain today with various symptoms (eg. VPNs timing out, 
transfers taking a long time).  After a bit of narrowing down, it 
would seem that when the traffic comes at me via C&W from Bell (2 of 
my 3 transit providers 852 and 6539 talk to parts of Bell this way) 
the problems are acute.

Looking at traceroutes between C&W and Bell IP space, there does 
indeed seem to be some issue between their exchange point in NY

The 2 snippets being
From bell to cw
  6 bx2-newyork83-pos3-0.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.103.194) 20 msec 
20 msec 16 msec
  7 iar4-so-2-3-0.NewYork.cw.net (208.173.135.185) [AS 3561] 172 msec 
176 msec 176 msec
From cw to bell
  6 iar4-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.39) 68 msec 68 msec 72 msec
  7 teleglobe.NewYork.cw.net (208.173.135.186) 208 msec 208 msec 208 msec

At one point in the day, it was adding about 400 to 500ms of latency

Type escape sequence to abort.
Tracing the route to route-server.cw.net (209.1.220.234)
  1 dis40-toronto63-fe5-0-0.in.bellnexxia.net (205.207.238.210) 32 
msec 0 msec 232 msec
  2 core2-toronto63-pos11-5.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.98.141) 0 msec 
0 msec 0 msec
  3 core3-toronto63-pos6-0.in.bellnexxia.net (64.230.242.101) 0 msec 0 
msec 0 msec
  4 core4-montreal02-pos13-1.in.bellnexxia.net (64.230.243.237) 28 
msec 204 msec 208 msec
  5 core1-newyork83-pos0-0.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.99.190) 20 msec 
20 msec 16 msec
  6 bx2-newyork83-pos3-0.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.103.194) 20 msec 
20 msec 16 msec
  7 iar4-so-2-3-0.NewYork.cw.net (208.173.135.185) [AS 3561] 172 msec 
176 msec 176 msec
  8 agr2-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.102) [AS 3561] 184 msec 
176 msec 180 msec
  9 dcr1-so-6-1-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.53) [AS 3561] 184 msec 
180 msec 184 msec
 10 dcr2-loopback.SantaClara.cw.net (208.172.146.100) [AS 3561] 248 
msec 248 msec 248 msec
 11 bhr1-pos-0-0.SantaClarasc8.cw.net (208.172.156.198) [AS 3561] 256 
msec 244 msec 244 msec
 12 bhr2-ge-2-0.SantaClarasc8.cw.net (208.172.147.54) [AS 3561] 252 
msec 248 msec 248 msec
 13 209.1.169.177 [AS 3561] 172 msec 184 msec *



route-server.cw.net>traceroute looking-glass.in.bellnexxia.net
Translating "looking-glass.in.bellnexxia.net"...domain server 
(64.41.189.214) [OK]

Type escape sequence to abort.
Tracing the route to looking-glass.in.bellnexxia.net (205.207.237.50)
  1 209.1.169.178 0 msec 0 msec 0 msec
  2 bhr1-ge-2-0.SantaClarasc8.cw.net (208.172.147.53) 0 msec 0 msec 0 
msec
  3 dcr2-so-3-0-0.SantaClara.cw.net (208.172.156.197) 0 msec 4 msec 0 
msec
  4 dcr1-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.99) 76 msec
dcr2-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.100) 72 msec
dcr1-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.99) 68 msec
  5 agr1-so-0-0-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.50) 68 msec 72 msec 68 msec
  6 iar4-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.39) 68 msec 68 msec 72 msec
  7 teleglobe.NewYork.cw.net (208.173.135.186) 208 msec 208 msec 208 msec
  8 core1-newyork83-pos1-1.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.103.193) 260 
msec 332 msec 216 msec
  9 core4-montreal02-pos6-3.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.99.189) 196 
msec 204 msec 200 msec
 10 64.230.243.238 208 msec 296 msec 460 msec
 11 core2-torontodc-pos3-1.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.104.2) [AS 577] 
432 msec 404 msec 404 msec
 12 dis4-torontodc-Vlan82.in.bellnexxia.net (206.108.104.30) [AS 577] 
400 msec 240 msec 440 msec
 13 looking-glass.in.bellnexxia.net (205.207.237.50) [AS 577] 452 msec 
236 msec 244 msec
route-server.cw.net>

Anyone know whats up ?

---Mike

Mike Tancsa,tel +1 519 651 3400
Sentex Communications,   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Providing Internet since 1994www.sentex.net
Cambridge, Ontario Canada  www.sentex.net/mike



Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS

2004-03-03 Thread Mark Kasten




We actually accept up to the customers aggregate.  So if they have a
/16, they can tag the whole /16.  And we do not tag no-export.  I saw
some time ago on a list, and I think Bill Manning suggested it, that if
you are getting bits for unused address space, to announce that address
space (up to host specific) with the DDoS community string.  That keeps
the packets off of your link and thus you don't get charged for them. 
The same can be done in reverse.  We have a customer that is
advertising their larger block with the DDoS community string, and then
advertising the addresses they are actually using more specifically, so
we blackhole everything less specific.  These are a couple of
applications that can be utilized if you don't tag no-export and accept
more than just /32's within their address space.  FWIW.


Also, we are utilizing Juniper's DCU for tracebacks, which makes life
MUCH easier when tracing an attack.  :-)  SNMP polling the DCU counters
every few minutes is relatively fast and painless, and provides quick
results.


Mark


Lumenello, Jason wrote:

  Oh, and I strip their communities, and apply no-export, on the first
term of my route map so the /32 does not get out. Of course my peer
facing policy requires specific communities to get out as well (belt and
suspenders).

This method works very well, and you do not have to give up length
restrictions or maintain two sets of customer prefix/access lists.

Jason

  
  
-Original Message-
From: Lumenello, Jason
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 4:52 PM
To: 'Stephen J. Wilcox'; james
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS

I struggled with this, and came up with the following.

We basically use a standard route-map for all customers where the

  
  first
  
  
term looks for the community. The customer also has a prefix-list on

  
  their
  
  
neighbor statement allowing their blocks le /32. The following terms

  
  (term
  
  
2 and above) in the route-map which do NOT look for the customer

  
  discard
  
  
community, have a different standard/generic prefix-list evaluation

  
  which
  
  
blocks cruft and permits 0.0.0.0/0 ge 8 le 24.

By doing this, I only accept a customer /32 from his dedicated

  
  prefix-list
  
  
when it has the DOS discard community, otherwise I catch them with the

  
  ge
  
  
8 le 24 in the following terms.

Jason Lumenello
IP Engineering
XO Communications



  -Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf
  

  
  Of
  
  

  Stephen J. Wilcox
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 3:48 PM
To: james
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS



I'm puzzled by one aspect on the implementation.. how to build your
customer
prefix filters.. that is, we have prefix-lists for prefix and
  

  
  length.
  
  

  Therefore
at present we can only accept a tagged route for a whole block.. not
  

good


  if the
announcement is a /16 etc !

Now, I could do as per the website at secsup.org which means we have
  

  
  a
  
  

  route-map
entry to match the community before the filtering .. but that would
  

allow


  the
customer to null route any ip.

What we need is one to allow them to announce any route including
  

  
  more
  
  

  specifics of the prefix list - how are folks doing this?

Steve

On Wed, 3 Mar 2004, james wrote:

  
  
Global Crossing has this, already in production.
I was on the phone with Qwest yesterday & this was one
of this things I asked about. Qwest indicated they are
going to deploy this shortly. (i.e., send routes tagged with
a community which they will set to null)


James Edwards
Routing and Security
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
At the Santa Fe Office: Internet at Cyber Mesa
Store hours: 9-6 Monday through Friday
505-988-9200 SIP:1(747)669-1965



  

  
  
  





Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS

2004-03-03 Thread Mark Kasten
We still implement exact match prefix filtering, but also generate a 
second "aggregated" prefix-list for customers to match more specifics.  
If a prefix matches 3561:666 _and_ falls within the DDoS/aggregated 
prefix-list, we accept it and blackhole it.  If a customer announces the 
more specific without the community, we won't accept it.  (No flame wars 
about exact match filtering please).  Yes, that means we maintain two 
prefix-lists for each customer. 

uRPF is another matter.  We use policies for prefix-lists on Junipers 
and prefix-lists on Cisco's, which means that if we want to do strict 
uRPF for customers we have to generate a third prefix-list/acl?  

Regards,
   Mark Kasten
   C&W^H^H^H^Savvis
.

Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:

I'm puzzled by one aspect on the implementation.. how to build your customer 
prefix filters.. that is, we have prefix-lists for prefix and length. Therefore 
at present we can only accept a tagged route for a whole block.. not good if the 
announcement is a /16 etc !

Now, I could do as per the website at secsup.org which means we have a route-map 
entry to match the community before the filtering .. but that would allow the 
customer to null route any ip. 

What we need is one to allow them to announce any route including more 
specifics of the prefix list - how are folks doing this?

Steve

On Wed, 3 Mar 2004, james wrote:

 

Global Crossing has this, already in production. 
I was on the phone with Qwest yesterday & this was one
of this things I asked about. Qwest indicated they are
going to deploy this shortly. (i.e., send routes tagged with
a community which they will set to null)

James Edwards
Routing and Security
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
At the Santa Fe Office: Internet at Cyber Mesa
Store hours: 9-6 Monday through Friday
505-988-9200 SIP:1(747)669-1965
   

 




Re: Cable & Wireless, Verio and/or Level 3 port blocking?

2003-09-08 Thread Mark Kasten
Cable & Wireless is not doing any port filtering, with the possible 
exception of specific customer requests.

Regards,
   Mark


William Devine, II wrote:

Can anyone from these three carriers tell me if you're doing port blocking
on the Windows file/print ports (135-139, 445 & 593) ?
A client of ours (in the US), against our recommendation, still wants to
connect to their Exchange server in the UK without a VPN.  We're not
blocking their IP#'s from anything but somewhere in between it's getting
blocked.  We use C&W directly and Verio/Level3 through a peer.
Thanks!
william
 




Re: cw to att? issue?

2003-03-12 Thread Mark Kasten
No issues to report, probably a return path issue.  It'd be easier to 
confirm that with a traceroute showing the latency.  And you will get a 
timely response from [EMAIL PROTECTED], which is where this email belongs.

Regards,
  Mark Kasten
  Cable & Wireless
Scott Granados wrote:

Anyone else seeing an issue between cw and att somewhere near sf it looks
like.
I go from 4 ms, at the point tagged as the peer between cw and att and
1400 ms once I land on att.
THanks



 




RE: XO problems?

2002-04-17 Thread Mark Kasten


Before there is wild speculation since cw.net shows up in the path  We
are not experiencing any issues in DC or NY that would cause the problem
below.  I have dropped in traceroutes from the ingress to our network from
XO to Cisco.com, and back to the first hop in the traceroute in Joe's
traceroute to demonstrate that CW is forwarding packets as we are supposed
to do.  :-)

If there are questions regarding routing issues within AS3561, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
would be happy to investigate and respond.

Regards,
    Mark Kasten
Cable & Wireless


[EMAIL PROTECTED]> traceroute www.cisco.com
traceroute to www.cisco.com (198.133.219.25), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets
 1  agr2-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.102)  1.131 ms
agr1-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.101)  1.077 ms  1.001 ms
 2  dcr2-so-7-1-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.197)  0.789 ms  0.650 ms
dcr2-so-6-0-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.177)  0.610 ms
 3  agr4-so-4-0-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.78)  0.758 ms
agr3-so-2-0-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.186)  0.671 ms  0.704 ms
 4  acr1-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.61)  1.026 ms  1.039 ms  0.912
ms
 5  206.24.195.202 (206.24.195.202)  0.843 ms  0.799 ms  0.814 ms
 6  gbr2-p70.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.123.1.134)  1.037 ms  0.863 ms  0.852 ms
 7  tbr1-p013301.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.122.11.5)  1.261 ms  3.661 ms  1.650
ms
 8  tbr1-cl1.cgcil.ip.att.net (12.122.10.5)  68.805 ms  68.180 ms  68.625 ms
 9  tbr1-p013302.sffca.ip.att.net (12.122.11.217)  68.233 ms  68.018 ms
67.755 ms
10  gbr5-p100.sffca.ip.att.net (12.122.11.74)  66.266 ms  66.326 ms  66.368
ms
11  gar1-p360.sj2ca.ip.att.net (12.122.2.253)  67.636 ms  67.600 ms  67.711
ms
12  12.127.200.82 (12.127.200.82)  67.434 ms  67.357 ms  67.478 ms
13  sjck-dirty-gw1.cisco.com (128.107.239.9)  66.229 ms  66.220 ms  66.134
ms
14  sjck-sdf-ciod-gw1.cisco.com (128.107.239.106)  67.582 ms  67.750 ms
67.504 ms
^C
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ping www.cisco.com
PING www.cisco.com (198.133.219.25): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 198.133.219.25: icmp_seq=0 ttl=244 time=66.618 ms
64 bytes from 198.133.219.25: icmp_seq=1 ttl=244 time=66.287 ms


[EMAIL PROTECTED]> traceroute 132.237.9.3
traceroute to 132.237.9.3 (132.237.9.3), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets
 1  agr1-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.101)  1.152 ms
agr2-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.102)  1.081 ms  0.823 ms
 2  dcr2-so-6-0-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.177)  9.728 ms
dcr1-so-7-0-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.65)  0.797 ms
dcr2-so-7-1-0.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.207.197)  0.803 ms
 3  dcr1-loopback.Washington.cw.net (206.24.226.99)  4.954 ms
dcr2-loopback.Washington.cw.net (206.24.226.100)  5.144 ms
dcr1-loopback.Washington.cw.net (206.24.226.99)  4.943 ms
 4  agr2-so-0-0-0.Washington.cw.net (206.24.238.54)  4.851 ms
agr2-so-2-0-0.Washington.cw.net (206.24.238.182)  4.770 ms  4.692 ms
 5  iar2-loopback.Washington.cw.net (206.24.226.13)  5.180 ms  5.167 ms
5.065 ms
 6  xo-communication-telc-audit.Washington.cw.net (208.173.10.70)  5.402 ms
4.883 ms  5.632 ms
 7  ge5-3-1.RAR1.Washington-DC.us.xo.net (64.220.0.222)  6.359 ms  6.010 ms
6.067 ms
 8  p1-0-0.RAR1.SanJose-CA.us.xo.net (65.106.0.38)  78.736 ms  78.773 ms
79.209 ms
 9  p4-0-0.MAR1.Fremont-CA.us.xo.net (65.106.5.142)  78.519 ms  78.741 ms
78.407 ms
10  p0-0.CHR1.Fremont-CA.us.xo.net (207.88.80.10)  79.890 ms  79.791 ms
80.193 ms
11  67.104.110.114 (67.104.110.114)  81.329 ms  82.717 ms  81.717 ms
12  * * *
13  * * *
14  * * *



-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Joe
Blanchard
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2002 4:03 PM
To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
Subject: XO problems?




Anyone seeing issues with XO routing?
/root# traceroute www.cisco.com
traceroute to www.cisco.com (198.133.219.25), 30 hops max, 38 byte packets
 1  132.237.9.3 (132.237.9.3)  3.510 ms  0.448 ms  0.443 ms
 2  132.237.245.1 (132.237.245.1)  0.739 ms  0.791 ms  0.790 ms
 3  67.104.110.113 (67.104.110.113)  1.826 ms  2.091 ms  1.860 ms
 4  p4-3-0.MAR1.Fremont-CA.us.xo.net (207.88.80.9)  2.044 ms  2.088 ms
2.112 ms
 5  p5-1-0-0.RAR1.SanJose-CA.us.xo.net (65.106.5.141)  2.438 ms  2.371 ms
2.368
 ms
 6  p1-0-0.RAR1.Washington-DC.us.xo.net (65.106.0.37)  82.448 ms  87.242 ms
82.
110 ms
 7  p6-0-0.RAR2.NYC-NY.us.xo.net (65.106.0.1)  86.110 ms  86.055 ms  86.090
ms
 8  ge5-0.dist1.hud-ny.us.xo.net (64.220.3.65)  86.688 ms  86.560 ms  86.586
ms
 9  ge6-0.edge1.hud-ny.us.xo.net (64.220.3.83)  86.734 ms  86.715 ms  86.835
ms
10  * * *
11  * * agr1-loopback.NewYork.cw.net (206.24.194.101)  3100.552 ms
12  * * *