Please find below a copy of a formal complaint I have made to ICANN today
regarding Verisign's wildcard change of yesterday, which may be of
interest to members of this list.
The text is also available at:-
http://www.itconsult.co.uk/misc/icann17sep2003.htm
Best wishes,
Matthew
From: Matthew Richardson
To: Tina Dam
Subject: {18876} Formal Complaint - .com & .net wildcards cause Internet
destabilisation
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 20:46:54 +0100
Organization: I. T. Consultancy Limited, Jersey
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
{ref: 18876}
To: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
For the attention of: Tina Dam
I refer to our telephone conversation of yesterday morning relating
to the very recent addition of "wildcard" records to the .com & .net
GTLDs by Verisign. My purpose in writing, as we discussed, is to
make a formal complaint to ICANN regarding Verisign's actions, and
furthermore to formally request ICANN to instruct Verisign to remove
these wildcard records with immediate effect, subject only to their
possible reinstatement following an appropriate period of
consultation.
This complaint is being made in the public interest. Specifically it
is that the CHANGE in behaviour within two of the largest Internet
TLDs is likely to cause serious difficulties in a number of areas.
The inevitable consequence of these CHANGES is that many businesses
and users involved with .com & .net domains (quite a sizeable
proportion of the Internet) will be involved in varying degrees of
unforeseen inconvenience, failure and expenditure. Such unexpected
disruption and expense seems, at the very least, somewhat inequitable
to those on the receiving end, all the more so in the absence of any
notice from Verisign.
This is clearly a destabilising effect on a very significant portion
of the Internet as a whole, which seems to be at some variance with
ICANN's ongoing responsibilities as described in your announcement of
today http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-17sep03.htm,
which states "The MoU highlights ICANN's responsibility to ensure the
stability of the Internet".
There may be many additional (and perhaps compelling) reasons why
others might suggest that change is not good, predominantly from a
privacy and data protection perspective. However this complaint
deals solely with the issues of the failures caused by the unexpected
change and the cost of correcting them.
The change appears to have been announced by Verisign yesterday and I
have seen references by them in public to the documents:-
http://www.verisign.com/resources/gd/sitefinder/implementation.pdf
http://www.verisign.com/resources/gd/sitefinder/bestpractices.pdf
The former, dated 27 August 2003, describes their wildcard
implementation, citing its conformance with their latter document,
which is dated 09 September 2003. Whilst the lay reader might assume
that this latter document represents some form of approved Internet
standard, nothing could be further from the truth.
The following are merely a few very examples of the sorts of issues
which will cause failures and which will cost money to fix:-
(a) Unsolicited commercial email (colloquially known as "spam"), is a
serious (and increasingly serious) problem. Many email servers
incorporate anti-spam protections. One commonly used method is to
perform a DNS check on the sender domain prior to continuing to
accept the message. If it does not exist, the email is not accepted
being either delayed or permanently rejected. At a low level, this
is done by issuing a DNS query for the sender domain and checking for
the presence of MX or A records. Verisign's changes will cause this
mechanism to fail for all non-existent .com or .net domains.
(b) Verisign have installed software which answers on SMTP port 25 on
the IP address returned as the A record. This software, which
purports to be an email server, is not even remotely compliant with
rfc2821, the current standard for SMTP email. It is clearly designed
to receive email connections and reject the messages, although it
remains unclear what difficulties its gross non-compliance will
cause. As an aside, its ability to capture sender addresses (and
should it wish in the future whole email messages) which is most
likely to cause significant concern to those of a privacy protection
persuasion.
(c) There are likely to be many applications and services around the
Internet, which utilise the results of DNS lookups to test the
existence of domains under .com & .net, a method which has worked
correctly since the creation of these TLDs long long ago. Many of
these applications will belong to those involved in the domain
registration business. The addition of wildcard records will cause
all such applications to fail. This appears to be understood by
clea
