Re: FW: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-17 Thread Igor Gashinsky

:: >So, if you, or the original poster, is going to move
:: ${important_resource}
:: >around ip-wise keep in mind that your ${important_thing} may have to
:: >answer to more than 1 ip address for a period much longer than your
:: tuned
:: >TTL :(
:: 
:: Thanks all for the responses. I do understand we may need to support the
:: old IP addresses for sometime. I was hoping someone had performed a
:: study out there to determine what a ratio maybe for us supporting an old
:: IP address (I know our traffic profile will be unique for us thus it
:: would only give us a general idea). 
:: 
:: For example if we change ip addresses will we need to plan on 20%
:: traffic at old site on day1, 10% day2, 5%, day3, and so on...? There are
:: also issues related to proxy servers and browser caching that are
:: independent of DNS we will need to quantify to understand full risk. The
:: more data we have will drive some of our decisions.

In my not-so-scientific "studies" with changind IPs for a fairly large 
volume site, I found that 90% of the people will use the new ip within an 
hour of TTL expiration, 99.999% of the people within 3 days, and that 
remaining .001% may take years

As someone said earlier, some parts of the 'net are just broken beyond 
your control...

-igor


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-16 Thread Simon Waters

On Thursday 16 Mar 2006 04:23, you wrote:
> 
> You might consider the following paper from IMC 2003: "On the
> Responsiveness of DNS-based Network Control" by Jeffrey Pang, Aditya
> Akella, Anees Shaikh, Balachander Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan Seshan,
> http://www.imconf.net/imc-2004/papers/p21-pang.pdf

The results are greatly at odds with my experience.

As they imply the problem may be specifically misconfigured ISPs DNS server, 
which might explain why we see less violations, if our sites aren't popular 
with those ISPs users.

However I wouldn't trust any report where the control of the authoritative DNS 
itself wasn't explicitly monitored and reported. They may think they have 
updated the authoritative answers (and TTL), but in my experience when you 
find violators you often find that the authoritative DNS servers didn't all 
update as, or when, expected, or that earlier records were returned with a 
longer TTL from those servers.

Certainly that was the experience of moving many sites last week. Where you 
can in real time check the logs and find which domains we messed up on by the 
traffic still arriving.

Looking at the 4 long term violators for one site

  Hits  Source IP
  8 198.78.130.68 <--- ??
  1 212.95.252.16 <--- lager.netcraft.com
 15 66.147.154.3  <--- IBM Almaden Research Center
  5 70.42.51.10 <--- Fast Search & Transfer

During this period (starting 3 days after moving a 10 minute TTL) we saw 27234 
hits (okay not exactly a busy site) for that site on the correct server. So 
roughly 1 in a 1000 hits during days 3 to 6 went to the old web server, and 
this domain had the most lost hits, most of the moved domains don't show in 
the old server's log at all.

Given I think we can exclude at least 21 out of 29 safely as being 
"non-human" (sorry IBM Research if you were deeply interested in proof 
reading), and I'm guessing have made a deliberate effort to cache stale data 
for their own reasons.

So I can put an upper estimate on our sites of 1 in 1000 hits of interest 
going to the wrong site during days 3 to 6.

The most popular site moved, had only two DNS violators days 3 to 6, the most 
notable being the same "Fast Search & Transfer" IP above.
 
It may be that popular sites have a far worse problem by dint of exercising 
more caching code, but this site is far from being our most popular. And 
these sites were moved by reducing the TTL to a low value (10 minutes) and 
keeping it there for a long period of time, before we actually performed the 
move.


RE: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Sharad Agarwal

(re-sending because I wasn't on nanog-post)


> For example if we change ip addresses will we need to plan on 
> 20% traffic at old site on day1, 10% day2, 5%, day3, and so 
> on...? There are also issues related to proxy servers and 
> browser caching that are independent of DNS we will need to 
> quantify to understand full risk. The more data we have will 
> drive some of our decisions.


You might consider the following paper from IMC 2003: "On the
Responsiveness of DNS-based Network Control" by Jeffrey Pang, Aditya
Akella, Anees Shaikh, Balachander Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan Seshan,
http://www.imconf.net/imc-2004/papers/p21-pang.pdf

It sheds some light on how widely DNS TTLs are adhered to. The CDF
graphs on the 4th page suggest that you should be fairly safe after a
day, though I don't see if the paper specifically states what the
largest recorded violation was.

Sharad.


FW: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Thurman, Steven

On Wed, 15 Mar 2006, Simon Waters wrote:
>
> > This behavior is unfortunately not unique.
>
> Alas what others peoples servers do, shouldn't be an issue for you.
Your
> problem is they can be coerced into a DoS attack, not that the data is
stale.

>actually, dos-attack-aside, the interesting thing is that lots of
people
>(original poster perhaps included) believe that TTL's are adhered to
>except in some marginal cases. I think Rodney's point is that they are
not
>adhered to anywhere near as much as we would all like to believe :(

>So, if you, or the original poster, is going to move
${important_resource}
>around ip-wise keep in mind that your ${important_thing} may have to
>answer to more than 1 ip address for a period much longer than your
tuned
>TTL :(

Thanks all for the responses. I do understand we may need to support the
old IP addresses for sometime. I was hoping someone had performed a
study out there to determine what a ratio maybe for us supporting an old
IP address (I know our traffic profile will be unique for us thus it
would only give us a general idea). 

For example if we change ip addresses will we need to plan on 20%
traffic at old site on day1, 10% day2, 5%, day3, and so on...? There are
also issues related to proxy servers and browser caching that are
independent of DNS we will need to quantify to understand full risk. The
more data we have will drive some of our decisions.

Thanks again,

Steve 


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Christopher L. Morrow



On Wed, 15 Mar 2006, Simon Waters wrote:
>
> > This behavior is unfortunately not unique.
>
> Alas what others peoples servers do, shouldn't be an issue for you. Your
> problem is they can be coerced into a DoS attack, not that the data is stale.

actually, dos-attack-aside, the interesting thing is that lots of people
(original poster perhaps included) believe that TTL's are adhered to
except in some marginal cases. I think Rodney's point is that they are not
adhered to anywhere near as much as we would all like to believe :(

So, if you, or the original poster, is going to move ${important_resource}
around ip-wise keep in mind that your ${important_thing} may have to
answer to more than 1 ip address for a period much longer than your tuned
TTL :(


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Jon Lewis


On Wed, 15 Mar 2006, Simon Waters wrote:


This behavior is unfortunately not unique.


Alas what others peoples servers do, shouldn't be an issue for you. Your
problem is they can be coerced into a DoS attack, not that the data is stale.


Tell that to a customer when you've moved some resource of theirs to a 
different IP...having been careful to decrease the TTL well in advance.


Some parts of the internet are simply broken and beyond your control.

--
 Jon Lewis   |  I route
 Senior Network Engineer |  therefore you are
 Atlantic Net|
_ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Simon Waters

On Wednesday 15 Mar 2006 14:16, you wrote:
> 
> Let me help you become aware, then...

:)

> Some people don't believe it is a bug, and therefor don't see that
> anything needs "fixing".

Oh the one shown is a bug, and needs fixing.

> Feel free to, for example, send 2 consecutive queries for a record
> that has a short (<10,000 second TTL) to 212.23.11.206. 

Safecom http response, busybox on telnet, some sort of embedded Linux device. 
Safecom sell routers... 

Of course can't tell if the broken DNS behaviour is the device, or possibly it 
is proxying upstream DNS servers.

> This behavior is unfortunately not unique.

Alas what others peoples servers do, shouldn't be an issue for you. Your 
problem is they can be coerced into a DoS attack, not that the data is stale.


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Rodney Joffe



On Mar 15, 2006, at 1:56 AM, Simon Waters wrote:


In answer to the original question, I'm not aware of any DNS  
servers that
don't expire data at the end of the TTL period correctly. Failing  
to expire
such data would be a good way of breaking things, and people would  
just not

use such broken software.


Let me help you become aware, then...



I'm not sure why the OP thinks someone would research such a bug in  
detail, my

experience is they would just fix it.


Some people don't believe it is a bug, and therefor don't see that  
anything needs "fixing".


Feel free to, for example, send 2 consecutive queries for a record  
that has a short (<10,000 second TTL) to 212.23.11.206. This is one  
of the over 100,000 random open recursive servers that have been  
party to some of the recursive DNS server amplification DDoS attacks  
over the last few weeks... and this behavior exists in a number of them.


If you can't think of a record to query for that has a short enough  
TTL, I've created a wildcard entry of:


 *.example.centergate.com

so that you can test this repeatedly without having to wait for the  
overridden TTL to expire. Just use a different random wildcard record  
each time (remembering to send 2 consecutive identical queries to see  
the misbehavior).


$ dig @212.23.11.206 jhgfd.example.centergate.com a


This behavior is unfortunately not unique.

/rlj


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-15 Thread Simon Waters

On Wednesday 15 Mar 2006 02:32, Joe Maimon wrote:
>
> And the dnscache resolver cache service in win2k and up.
>
> http://support.microsoft.com/kb/318803/en-us
> http://support.microsoft.com/kb/245437/EN-US/

Both these article say the DNS TTL is honoured by the cache. Microsoft may 
have done some horrid things with DNS over the years, but returning stale 
data just breaks things.

> If you are expecting hot cutovers to anything by utilizing DNS, sure
> seems that you need to expect to support traffic to the values of the
> old records for some time.

Nope. You can bin traffic as soon as the TTL for it expires. Everything else 
is broken, and experience here is that it is either spam/zombie generated or 
googlebots .

> And if you are expecting very long TTL's to give you extra insurance for
> outages and what-nots, expect spotty effectiveness.

Agreed, there is no requirement to cache records for the whole of the 
advertised TTL (or -ve TTL).

In answer to the original question, I'm not aware of any DNS servers that 
don't expire data at the end of the TTL period correctly. Failing to expire 
such data would be a good way of breaking things, and people would just not 
use such broken software.

I'm not sure why the OP thinks someone would research such a bug in detail, my 
experience is they would just fix it.


Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-14 Thread Joe Maimon




[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Although you asked for DNS servers - it helps to remember that no matter 
what the servers and resolvers do - IE will bring that behaviour to 
naught in many cases


http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;en-us;263558


*/"Thurman, Steven" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>/* wrote:

Does anyone know if there is a research paper or statistics related
to what percentage of DNS servers do not adhere to advertised TTL
’ s? I am looking for some verifiable research on this topic if it
is available.
Thanks,

Steve




And the dnscache resolver cache service in win2k and up.


http://support.microsoft.com/kb/318803/en-us
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/245437/EN-US/

If you are expecting hot cutovers to anything by utilizing DNS, sure 
seems that you need to expect to support traffic to the values of the 
old records for some time.


And if you are expecting very long TTL's to give you extra insurance for 
outages and what-nots, expect spotty effectiveness.





Re: DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-14 Thread ennova2005-nanog
Title: DNS TTL adherence
Although you asked for DNS servers - it helps to remember that no matter what the servers and resolvers do - IE will bring that behaviour to naught in many caseshttp://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;en-us;263558"Thurman, Steven" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:  Does anyone know if there is a research paper or statistics related to what percentage of DNS servers do not adhere to advertised TTL’s? I am looking for some verifiable research on this topic if it is available.  Thanks,   Steve  

DNS TTL adherence

2006-03-14 Thread Thurman, Steven
Title: DNS TTL adherence






Does anyone know if there is a research paper or statistics related to what percentage of DNS servers do not adhere to advertised TTL’s? I am looking for some verifiable research on this topic if it is available.

Thanks,


Steve