Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-18 Thread Michael . Dillon

Everybody thinks if its not us, we don't have problem so we dont want
to spend anything to fix it - bu its not true, you already are paying
for it due to increased cost of operation. The cost of fixing your own
network even 50% of other ISPs did it, would in the end be smaller.

The cost of building a network is a step function. 
If you didn't have to provision the capacity to handle
the traffic from spammers and DDoS attacks, then you
could delay spending these significant chunks of money.
In fact, I suspect that this was an important factor in
killing off companies during the telecom collapse. These
companies were driven to expand their networks faster
than could be justified by the paying customers because
of the large amount of traffic generated by non-paying
customers.

DDoS and spam have to be tackled in two different ways
but both of these problems will not be solved until we
address the roots of the issue and not the symptoms.
In both cases, the root of the issue is that network
operators are unable to cooperate effectively in tracking
down network abuse.

I know that a lot of people in the ISP industry have a
basically anarcho-libertarian political viewpoint and that
viewpoint has helped them make the right kind of decisions
in building most of the technical architecture of the
Internet. But this has also blinded people to the advantages
of co-operative action. There is nothing wrong with
network operators meeting together in a forum to jointly
make decisions about best practices for running the Internet's
email system or for tracking down the true sources of network
abuse. This is basically the same kind of thing that the
IETF does for network protocols and the MPLS forum and the
ATM forum, etc.

Once again, I call on the companies who participate in
the various NANOG forums to get your email engineers and
email architects and email managers all together in a
single forum to hash out the issues. We have solutions,
too many of them, but we cannot deploy these things
succesfully without broad agreement.

Remember what Tony Hain and Phil Karn have said about
end-to-end. If you get a bunch of network engineers together
and ask them to stop spam they will inevitably want to
configure their routers which leads to filtering and ACLs.
Anyone who believes that would be a mistake should be
supporting the concept of an Internet Email Operators
Forum because the people responsible for the application
will be able to find a solution at the application layer.

--Michael Dillon 





Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread Mark Turpin

On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:

 paid regularly, or their budgets are kept low, etc.  Many will have RFC 2142
 contacts, but appear to discard incoming mail. Some, such as Charter
 Communications, do not even have these mandatory addresses (mail is not
 accepted for [EMAIL PROTECTED]).

while they do not conform to the RFC, they receive accept mail at/for
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

[This would be the domain w/o outsourced MX...]

 And on the other hand, it is the CDC that would perform an outbreak
 isolation, not the restaurant staff.

You're talking about a concerted effort.  So far, I haven't seen the
levels of cooperation between providers that is required.  I'm all for
everyone holding hands and squashing out issues.  But until you get
past the isolationist mindset (you must be sick of me saying that by
now) good luck...

I think we're both in agreement that until * starts saying If I
don't stop this today, it will hurt me tomorrow, that the
cooperation required to address and stop these issues will be nil.

-mark


Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread Daniel Reed

On 2004-02-17T11:56-0600, Mark Turpin wrote:
) On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:
)  And on the other hand, it is the CDC that would perform an outbreak
)  isolation, not the restaurant staff.
) I think we're both in agreement that until * starts saying If I
) don't stop this today, it will hurt me tomorrow, that the
) cooperation required to address and stop these issues will be nil.

I am not sure it will take any major coordinated effort. For many outbreak
incidents, the CDC would respond in the U.S., other agencies would respond
elsewhere.

Coincidentally enough, CNN.com just posted an article Your PC could be a
'spam zombie' http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/02/17/spam.zombies.ap/.
The provider mentioned appears to be turning off customers [unwittingly]
involved in abuse without any major coordinated effort behind them. (And I
am sure there other examples of providers taking such action.)

-- 
Daniel Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://naim-users.org/nmlorg/   http://naim.n.ml.org/
Murphy's Law is recursive. Washing your car to make it rain doesn't
work.


RE: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread Roy


Well they accept mail at [EMAIL PROTECTED] but they certainly don't do
anything about it.  I have sent numerous complaints to that address with
absolutely nothing happening to fix the problem.  The address is a black
hole.

Roy

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of
Mark Turpin
Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 9:56 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse



On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:

 paid regularly, or their budgets are kept low, etc.  Many will have RFC
2142
 contacts, but appear to discard incoming mail. Some, such as Charter
 Communications, do not even have these mandatory addresses (mail is not
 accepted for [EMAIL PROTECTED]).

while they do not conform to the RFC, they receive accept mail at/for
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

[This would be the domain w/o outsourced MX...]

 And on the other hand, it is the CDC that would perform an outbreak
 isolation, not the restaurant staff.

You're talking about a concerted effort.  So far, I haven't seen the
levels of cooperation between providers that is required.  I'm all for
everyone holding hands and squashing out issues.  But until you get
past the isolationist mindset (you must be sick of me saying that by
now) good luck...

I think we're both in agreement that until * starts saying If I
don't stop this today, it will hurt me tomorrow, that the
cooperation required to address and stop these issues will be nil.

-mark



Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread matt

 Recently, Daniel Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 
 The *truly* unfortunate fact is lots of ISPs like to do things like throw up
 firewall rules and then expect other people to clean up after the real
 problems they are simply evading.
 
 Consider this: A pathogen is developed that kills anyone with which it comes
 in contact. People across the world are randomly exposed to the pathogen and
 begin dying en masse.
 
 Short-term public interest would seem to necessitate that hosting public
 meetings should now be discouraged, if not outright banned. In some areas,
 ordinances might be passed requiring that any human contact be made only if
 both parties know each other, and can prove they have adequate air
 filtration.
 
 This isn't the plot to next summer's killer Sci-Fi horror movie; this is
 what we are dealing with on the Internet today. In either case, the long-
 term public interest would probably be served more by funding agencies to
 track down and stop the spread of the pathogen.

The problem is, your analogy is too extreme; if people really
*were* dying, there'd be more attention paid to it.  Unfortunately,
if we look at a more real-world case, like herpes, you realize
that we don't take contagion very seriously unless people are
dying from it.  Instead, we end up with ora-gel, anbasol, and
other such fun products to take the sting away without actually
doing anything.  Likewise in the network, we have a similar
approach; when the cold sores flare up again, apply a topical
solution to take some of the sting away, and then continue
life like normal...including spreading that numb-but-still-infectious
cold sore to others.

Trojaned PCs and zombie proxies relaying spam are like cold
sores; they don't kill anyone, they just make things mildly
uncomfortable, so we numb them over, and go about our
business like normal, even if that includes allowing the
infection to spread even further.

If proxies *did* kill, then yes, we'd take them seriously;
but anything short of that, and real life tells us we won't
take them seriously enough to try to do real research into
ultimately stamping them out.

 -- 
 Daniel Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED]   http://naim-users.org/nmlorg/   
 http://naim.n.ml.org/

Matt, feeling pessimistic this morning



Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread Mark Turpin

On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:

 I am not sure it will take any major coordinated effort. For many outbreak
 incidents, the CDC would respond in the U.S., other agencies would respond
 elsewhere.

To perform a traceback in the US the CDC works with hospitals,
doctors, etc. since they have the authority to do so.  Which body has
that authority within the US (and knows how to use it).  Law
enforcement comes to mind, but that doesn't scale.

Nor is this the right place to discuss that issue ;)


 Coincidentally enough, CNN.com just posted an article Your PC could be a
 'spam zombie' http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/02/17/spam.zombies.ap/.
 The provider mentioned appears to be turning off customers [unwittingly]
 involved in abuse without any major coordinated effort behind them. (And I
 am sure there other examples of providers taking such action.)

Everyone knows about/of spam.  Does everyone know about DoS?  I'm just
throwing it out there as an example, I don't really want to get in to
who should know what, etc...  These problems [as all issues] are
a topic that only those passionate few [those typically affected by
it] truly seek resolution.  I believe it is human (or maybe just
American?) nature to not care until something affects you.

alas, i'm lacking operational content, so this is my final bit of
input on the matter.

-mark


RE: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread Nicole



 Well at least they are somewhat DNS responsible in that they seperate their
user IP space well. SO that it can be blocked. the really annoying ISPS's use
stupid things like  DSL1234.isp.com  And such. 

 Of course doing this does block those 1 in 100 people runing a server on their
DSL line and not requesting a reverse DNS change.

la.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
va.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
mn.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
ga.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
ct.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
ma.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
ca.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
wi.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
al.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
sc.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
tx.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 
nc.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL 



 Nicole




On 17-Feb-04 Unnamed Administration sources reported Roy said :
 
 
 Well they accept mail at [EMAIL PROTECTED] but they certainly don't do
 anything about it.  I have sent numerous complaints to that address with
 absolutely nothing happening to fix the problem.  The address is a black
 hole.
 
 Roy
 
 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of
 Mark Turpin
 Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 9:56 AM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse
 
 
 
 On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:
 
 paid regularly, or their budgets are kept low, etc.  Many will have RFC
 2142
 contacts, but appear to discard incoming mail. Some, such as Charter
 Communications, do not even have these mandatory addresses (mail is not
 accepted for [EMAIL PROTECTED]).
 
 while they do not conform to the RFC, they receive accept mail at/for
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 [This would be the domain w/o outsourced MX...]
 
 And on the other hand, it is the CDC that would perform an outbreak
 isolation, not the restaurant staff.
 
 You're talking about a concerted effort.  So far, I haven't seen the
 levels of cooperation between providers that is required.  I'm all for
 everyone holding hands and squashing out issues.  But until you get
 past the isolationist mindset (you must be sick of me saying that by
 now) good luck...
 
 I think we're both in agreement that until * starts saying If I
 don't stop this today, it will hurt me tomorrow, that the
 cooperation required to address and stop these issues will be nil.
 
 -mark


--
 |\ __ /|   (`\
 | o_o  |__  ) )   
//  \\ 
  -  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  -  Powered by FreeBSD  -
--
  Daemons will now be known as spiritual guides
 -Politically Correct UNIX Page

 Great places...
 http://www.nonsenseband.com -  My Band

 http://www.picturetrail.com -  Sysadmin
 
 http://www.mediatechnique.com - Sysadmin2





Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread william(at)elan.net

On Tue, 17 Feb 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Trojaned PCs and zombie proxies relaying spam are like cold
 sores; they don't kill anyone, they just make things mildly
 uncomfortable, so we numb them over, and go about our
 business like normal, even if that includes allowing the
 infection to spread even further.
 
 If proxies *did* kill, then yes, we'd take them seriously;
 but anything short of that, and real life tells us we won't
 take them seriously enough to try to do real research into
 ultimately stamping them out.

But proxies do kill - the trojaned owned PCs are and have been
for years used to create distributed DoS attacks which can easily
kill a site or even smaller network. There is enourmous potential
harm to from them and that is in addition to normal everyday less 
articulated harm because of spam and more that mail servers and other 
infrastracture is being used for it. ISPs end up paying for all this.

Everybody thinks if its not us, we don't have problem so we dont want
to spend anything to fix it - bu its not true, you already are paying
for it due to increased cost of operation. The cost of fixing your own
network even 50% of other ISPs did it, would in the end be smaller.

-- 
William Leibzon
Elan Networks
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



RE: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread Roy

1700+ attempts from one IP address to send mail today via one of my servers.

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf
Of Nicole
Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 12:25 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Mark Turpin; Roy
Subject: RE: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse




 Well at least they are somewhat DNS responsible in that they seperate their
user IP space well. SO that it can be blocked. the really annoying ISPS's
use
stupid things like  DSL1234.isp.com  And such.

 Of course doing this does block those 1 in 100 people runing a server on
their
DSL line and not requesting a reverse DNS change.

la.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
va.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
mn.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
ga.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
ct.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
ma.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
ca.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
wi.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
al.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
sc.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
tx.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL
nc.charter.com  550 NO Mail Accepted From DSL



 Nicole




On 17-Feb-04 Unnamed Administration sources reported Roy said :


 Well they accept mail at [EMAIL PROTECTED] but they certainly don't do
 anything about it.  I have sent numerous complaints to that address with
 absolutely nothing happening to fix the problem.  The address is a black
 hole.

 Roy

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of
 Mark Turpin
 Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 9:56 AM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse



 On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:

 paid regularly, or their budgets are kept low, etc.  Many will have RFC
 2142
 contacts, but appear to discard incoming mail. Some, such as Charter
 Communications, do not even have these mandatory addresses (mail is not
 accepted for [EMAIL PROTECTED]).

 while they do not conform to the RFC, they receive accept mail at/for
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 [This would be the domain w/o outsourced MX...]

 And on the other hand, it is the CDC that would perform an outbreak
 isolation, not the restaurant staff.

 You're talking about a concerted effort.  So far, I haven't seen the
 levels of cooperation between providers that is required.  I'm all for
 everyone holding hands and squashing out issues.  But until you get
 past the isolationist mindset (you must be sick of me saying that by
 now) good luck...

 I think we're both in agreement that until * starts saying If I
 don't stop this today, it will hurt me tomorrow, that the
 cooperation required to address and stop these issues will be nil.

 -mark


--
 |\ __ /|   (`\
 | o_o  |__  ) )
//  \\
  -  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  -  Powered by FreeBSD  -
--
  Daemons will now be known as spiritual guides
 -Politically Correct UNIX Page

 Great places...
 http://www.nonsenseband.com -  My Band

 http://www.picturetrail.com -  Sysadmin

 http://www.mediatechnique.com - Sysadmin2






Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread John Palmer

I hate to see government get involved in anything, but perhaps
some law holding PC owners responsible for SPAM that comes
from their unpatched machines AS LONG AS there is ample
notification to that user that their machine is compromised.

Also, ISP's should be held responsible for allowing unpatched 
machines to be connected to them and for e-mail to be propagated
from their.

Sounds like an unfunded mandate, and it probably is, but there
is the concept of attractive nusaince in the law now. 

Again, any law would need to be designed to allow for AMPLE
notification to the owner of the offending machine/ISP to allow
time for them to fix it. Only then would there be a requirement 
that their ISP disconnect them or face fines.

- Original Message - 
From: william(at)elan.net [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 15:27
Subject: Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse


 
 On Tue, 17 Feb 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Trojaned PCs and zombie proxies relaying spam are like cold
  sores; they don't kill anyone, they just make things mildly
  uncomfortable, so we numb them over, and go about our
  business like normal, even if that includes allowing the
  infection to spread even further.
  
  If proxies *did* kill, then yes, we'd take them seriously;
  but anything short of that, and real life tells us we won't
  take them seriously enough to try to do real research into
  ultimately stamping them out.
 
 But proxies do kill - the trojaned owned PCs are and have been
 for years used to create distributed DoS attacks which can easily
 kill a site or even smaller network. There is enourmous potential
 harm to from them and that is in addition to normal everyday less 
 articulated harm because of spam and more that mail servers and other 
 infrastracture is being used for it. ISPs end up paying for all this.
 
 Everybody thinks if its not us, we don't have problem so we dont want
 to spend anything to fix it - bu its not true, you already are paying
 for it due to increased cost of operation. The cost of fixing your own
 network even 50% of other ISPs did it, would in the end be smaller.
 
 -- 
 William Leibzon
 Elan Networks
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 
 


Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-17 Thread JC Dill
At 12:43 PM 2/17/2004, John Palmer wrote:

I hate to see government get involved in anything, but perhaps
some law holding PC owners responsible for SPAM that comes
from their unpatched machines AS LONG AS there is ample
notification to that user that their machine is compromised.
We don't need more new laws.  There is already a law - in most parts of the 
world you can be charged with contributory negligence for failing to 
secure an attractive nuisance and then a third party is injured or 
damaged due to your negligence.  In any part of the world that doesn't have 
such a law, a new law in another part of the world wouldn't matter anyway.

What is needed is for someone to CARE enough to bother to investigate and 
prosecute.  And yes, it's going to cost more than it's worth to 
prosecute, at least the first few times.  Someone has to decide that the 
long-term good is worth the price of being the leader in this charge.

IMHO, you should sue both the owner of the PC (for negligently failing to 
properly secure their computer, or to fix it when notified), and sue 
Microsoft (for neglegently producing and selling software that was so 
easily compromised) as they are both responsible for the hardware/software 
that was used to damage your servers/network etc.  Microsoft's EULA doesn't 
apply to you as a third party who is damaged by their faulty software.  You 
should also consider an offer to settle with the PC owner if they agree to 
jointly sue Microsoft on your behalf.  You are not held to the EULA, but 
they are, but since Microsoft's software is *negligent* it's possible that 
the EULA doesn't penetrate their inherent liability to not produce a 
product that causes harm.  (A EULA won't protect a ladder maker from 
negligently building and selling a ladder on which people get hurt when 
they use it for its intended purpose.)  But we won't know until someone 
digs down into their pockets and funds a lawsuit to try it out.

Sorry about the lack of operational content in this post, but sometimes you 
have to consider the costs and benefits of both operational solutions and 
other solutions (e.g. legal solution) in order to determine which solution 
is the best one for your network, both in the short term and in the long term.

jc



--

p.s.  Please do not cc me on replies to the list.  Please reply to the list 
only, or to me only (as you prefer) but not to both. 



Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-16 Thread Daniel Reed

On 2004-02-15T17:33-0500, Sean Donelan wrote:
) The unfortunate fact is lots of people like to operate open, anonymous
) services and then expect other people to clean up after them.
)
) Why don't IRC operators require authentication of their users?
) Why don't SMTP operators require authentication of their users?

Why don't HTTP operators require authentication of their users? If I'm
researching testicular cancer on the web, that may involve web sites, IRC
support channels, or mailing lists.

The *truly* unfortunate fact is lots of ISPs like to do things like throw up
firewall rules and then expect other people to clean up after the real
problems they are simply evading.



Consider this: A pathogen is developed that kills anyone with which it comes
in contact. People across the world are randomly exposed to the pathogen and
begin dying en masse.

Short-term public interest would seem to necessitate that hosting public
meetings should now be discouraged, if not outright banned. In some areas,
ordinances might be passed requiring that any human contact be made only if
both parties know each other, and can prove they have adequate air
filtration.


This isn't the plot to next summer's killer Sci-Fi horror movie; this is
what we are dealing with on the Internet today. In either case, the long-
term public interest would probably be served more by funding agencies to
track down and stop the spread of the pathogen.

-- 
Daniel Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://naim-users.org/nmlorg/   http://naim.n.ml.org/


Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-16 Thread Sean Donelan

On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:
 On 2004-02-15T17:33-0500, Sean Donelan wrote:
 ) The unfortunate fact is lots of people like to operate open, anonymous
 ) services and then expect other people to clean up after them.
 )
 ) Why don't IRC operators require authentication of their users?
 ) Why don't SMTP operators require authentication of their users?

 Why don't HTTP operators require authentication of their users? If I'm
 researching testicular cancer on the web, that may involve web sites, IRC
 support channels, or mailing lists.

If you have a read-write HTTP web site (i.e. send e-mail through web,
write web blogs, etc), why don't you have authentication before permiting
users to write?  This includes news web sites which let you forward
stories by entering arbitrary addresses.  mailfrom.cgi and friends is as
much of a problem.

If you want to tell everyone in the world about your new and improved
cure for testicular cancer available for the low low price of $119 by
sending continious messages on unauthenticated IRC channels, mailing
lists and web blogs why should the ISP pierce the veil of anonymitity the
IRC operator, mailing list operator, web blog operator wanted?

The operator of the anonymous service should deal with the consequences
of maintaining that anonymitity.  ISPs authenticated their users.  But
that doesn't mean it is the ISP's responsibility to track down users of
anonymous services everytime there is a problem.

 This isn't the plot to next summer's killer Sci-Fi horror movie; this is
 what we are dealing with on the Internet today. In either case, the long-
 term public interest would probably be served more by funding agencies to
 track down and stop the spread of the pathogen.

Restuarant operators are responsible for the safe preparation of the food
they serve and the cleanliness of their resturants.  It is not up to the
highway department to prevent sick people from visiting your restuarant
or to monitor the trucks transporting food on the highway.

If you want the ISP (highway department) to control it, expect them to
set up inspection points on the roads they control and disrupt all
traffic.  If you don't want ISPs doing this, don't ask them to enforce
things they shouldn't be doing.


Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-16 Thread Henry Linneweh
good while doing that add [EMAIL PROTECTED] to the list of spammers that bug 
people

-Henry
On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote: On 2004-02-15T17:33-0500, Sean Donelan wrote: ) The unfortunate fact is lots of people like to operate open, anonymous ) services and then expect other people to clean up after them. ) ) Why don't IRC operators require authentication of their users? ) Why don't SMTP operators require authentication of their users? Why don't HTTP operators require authentication of their users? If I'm researching testicular cancer on the web, that may involve web sites, IRC support channels, or mailing lists.If you have a read-write HTTP web site (i.e. send e-mail through web,write web blogs, etc), why don't you have authentication before permitingusers to write? This includes news web sites which let you "forward"stories by entering arbitrary addresses.
 mailfrom.cgi and friends is asmuch of a problem.If you want to tell everyone in the world about your new and improvedcure for testicular cancer available for the low low price of $119 bysending continious messages on unauthenticated IRC channels, mailinglists and web blogs why should the ISP pierce the veil of anonymitity theIRC operator, mailing list operator, web blog operator wanted?The operator of the anonymous service should deal with the consequencesof maintaining that anonymitity. ISPs authenticated their users. Butthat doesn't mean it is the ISP's responsibility to track down users ofanonymous services everytime there is a problem. This isn't the plot to next summer's killer Sci-Fi horror movie; this is what we are dealing with on the Internet today. In either case, the long- term public interest would probably be served more by funding agencies to track down and stop the spread of the
 pathogen.Restuarant operators are responsible for the safe preparation of the foodthey serve and the cleanliness of their resturants. It is not up to thehighway department to prevent sick people from visiting your restuarantor to monitor the trucks transporting food on the highway.If you want the ISP (highway department) to control it, expect them toset up inspection points on the roads they control and disrupt alltraffic. If you don't want ISPs doing this, don't ask them to enforcethings they shouldn't be doing.

Re: Open, anonymous services and dealing with abuse

2004-02-16 Thread Daniel Reed

On 2004-02-16T12:58-0500, Sean Donelan wrote:
) On Mon, 16 Feb 2004, Daniel Reed wrote:
)  On 2004-02-15T17:33-0500, Sean Donelan wrote:
)  ) Why don't IRC operators require authentication of their users?
)  ) Why don't SMTP operators require authentication of their users?
) The operator of the anonymous service should deal with the consequences
) of maintaining that anonymitity.  ISPs authenticated their users.  But

And in large part, we do. I am an IRC Operator on a large IRC network,
called EFnet, and I do report abuse whenever it occurs in my presence.

Unfortunately, I have never received an affirmative response from an ISP
after reporting such abuse; never received a request for additional
information; and certainly never seen the problem host cease to be a problem
after reporting.

I am perhaps one of the few operators still interested in abuse reporting;
many have simply resigned themselves to finding abusers using constantly-
evolving techniques and simply banning them from the network when they are
found. This helps us in the short term, but is only an arms race in the long
term. It is a commonly held belief that any type of subscription service
will be repeatedly evaded through technical innovation; the fix must come
from the providers.

The problem appears to be that many network operators do not think of
themselves as anything beyond commercial network providers. Many appear
loath to take any effort above and beyond ensuring their users' bills are
paid regularly, or their budgets are kept low, etc.  Many will have RFC 2142
contacts, but appear to discard incoming mail. Some, such as Charter
Communications, do not even have these mandatory addresses (mail is not
accepted for [EMAIL PROTECTED]).


) Restuarant operators are responsible for the safe preparation of the food
) they serve and the cleanliness of their resturants.  It is not up to the
) highway department to prevent sick people from visiting your restuarant
) or to monitor the trucks transporting food on the highway.

And on the other hand, it is the CDC that would perform an outbreak
isolation, not the restaurant staff.

The CDC would also trace who the infected person had contact with and take
steps to verify their health, etc.  The restaurant could not possibly hope
to have the resources or training to effectively deal with people walking in
off the street carrying a deadly pathogen, and still have enough resources
to provide a decent service.

-- 
Daniel Reed [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://naim-users.org/nmlorg/   http://naim.n.ml.org/
The pursuit of pretty formulas and neat theorems can no doubt quickly
degenerate into a silly vice, but so can the quest for austere
generalities which are so very general indeed that they are incapable
of application to any particular. -- Eric Temple Bell, Mathematician