Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-30 Thread Petri Helenius


Stephen Fulton wrote:



That assumes that the worm must "discover" exploitable hosts.  What if 
those hosts have already been identified through other means 
previously?A nation, terrorist or criminal with the means could 
very well compile a relatively accurate database and use such a worm 
to attack specific targets, and those attacks need not be 
destructive/disruptive.


Sure, most of the people on this list would make very smart and skilled 
criminals if they would choose to pursue that path.


Pete



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-30 Thread Christopher L. Morrow

On Fri, 29 Jul 2005, Stephen Fulton wrote:

>
> Petri Helenius wrote:
>
> > Fortunately destructive worms don't usually get too wide distribution
> > because they don't survive long.
>
> That assumes that the worm must "discover" exploitable hosts.  What if
> those hosts have already been identified through other means previously?
> A nation, terrorist or criminal with the means could very well
> compile a relatively accurate database and use such a worm to attack
> specific targets, and those attacks need not be destructive/disruptive.

and why pray-tell would they bother with any of this complex 'remote
exploit' crap when they can send a stream of 3mbps at any cisco and crunch
it?

as someone said before, the 'big deal' in the talk was: "Hey, IOS is just
like everyother OS, it has heap/stack overflows that you can smash and get
arbitrary code to run on."


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-30 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian

On 30/07/05, Janet Sullivan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 2500s, but
> 7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.
> 

That's like saying "nobody will write windows trojans to infect tiny
PCs, they'll go after big fat *nix servers with rootkits"

Something as simple as a default enable password :)  I wonder how many
routers out there have open telnet access and enable set to "cisco" or
"password123" :)

-- 
Suresh Ramasubramanian ([EMAIL PROTECTED])


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Stephen Fulton


Petri Helenius wrote:

Fortunately destructive worms don't usually get too wide distribution 
because they don't survive long.


That assumes that the worm must "discover" exploitable hosts.  What if 
those hosts have already been identified through other means previously? 
   A nation, terrorist or criminal with the means could very well 
compile a relatively accurate database and use such a worm to attack 
specific targets, and those attacks need not be destructive/disruptive.


-- Stephen.


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 29 Jul 2005 17:26:45 CDT, Chris Adams said:
> 
> Once upon a time, Janet Sullivan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> > If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 2500s, but 
> > 7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.
> 
> Right.  And if they wanted to cause chaos on computers, they'd ignore
> business desktops and home computers and target large server farms.

How many home computers did Mafiaboy DDoS?


pgp9z5eTclgLK.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Chris Adams

Once upon a time, Janet Sullivan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 2500s, but 
> 7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.

Right.  And if they wanted to cause chaos on computers, they'd ignore
business desktops and home computers and target large server farms.

-- 
Chris Adams <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Systems and Network Administrator - HiWAAY Internet Services
I don't speak for anybody but myself - that's enough trouble.


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Guru (Gurumurthy) Yeleswarapu

I just happened to see this :

Last month, a company called Internet Security Systems (ISS) issued an alert
to warn users that Cisco's VoIP offering had a security flaw that would allow
just that. According to the company, this implementation flaw in Cisco's Call
Manager, which handles call signaling and routing, could allow a buffer
overflow that would grant an intruder access to the system to listen in on
all calls routed through it.

This is one scenario described by ISS and other vendors focused on selling
technology to plug the security holes in VoIP, a method for sending voice
traffic over IP that many say was not designed with security in mind. ISS and
its competitors, which come to this new field largely from the VoIP
management and IP security markets, forecast big risks for companies that
don't take VoIP security seriously, and undoubtedly look forward to
formidable revenue streams generated by those that do.  

Guru

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Janet
Sullivan
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2005 12:44 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up


Scott Morris wrote:
> And quite honestly, we can probably be pretty safe in assuming they 
> will not be running IPv6 (current exploit) or SNMP (older exploits) or 
> BGP (other
> exploits) or SSH (even other exploits) on that box.  :)  (the 1601 or 
> the
> 2500's)

If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 2500s, but
7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.

The way I see it, all that's needed is two major exploits, one known by
Cisco, one not.

Exploit #1 will be made public.  Cisco will released fixed code.  Good
service providers will upgrade.

The upgraded code version will be the one targeted by the second, unknown,
exploit.

A two-part worm can infect Windows boxen via any common method, and then 
use them to try the exploit against routers.   A windows box can find 
routers to attack easily enough by doing traceroutes to various sites. 
Then, the windows boxen can try a limited set of exploit variants on each
router.  Not all routers will be affected, but some will.

As for what the worm could do - well, it could report home to the worm
creators that "Hey, you 0wn X number of routers", or it could do something
fun like erasing configs and locking out console ports. ;-)

Honestly, I've been expecting something like that to happen for years now.






Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Petri Helenius


Buhrmaster, Gary wrote:


The *best* exploit is the one alluded to in the presentation.
Overwrite the nvram/firmware to prevent booting (or, perhaps,
adjust the voltages to damaging levels and do a "smoke test").
If you could do it to all GSR linecards, think of the RMA
costs to Cisco (not to mention the fact that Cisco could not
possible replace all the cards in all the GSRs across the
internet in an anywhere reasonable timeframe).  *THAT* is
what I suspect worries Cisco.  But of course I am just
conjecturing...

 

One of the more effective (software) ways is to mess up the cookies on 
the cards which tell IOS what kinds of cards they are and then reload 
the box.


Fortunately destructive worms don't usually get too wide distribution 
because they don't survive long.


Pete

Gary 

 


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On 
Behalf Of Janet Sullivan

Sent: Friday, July 29, 2005 12:44 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up


Scott Morris wrote:
   

And quite honestly, we can probably be pretty safe in 
 


assuming they will not
   

be running IPv6 (current exploit) or SNMP (older exploits) 
 


or BGP (other
   

exploits) or SSH (even other exploits) on that box.  :)  
 


(the 1601 or the
   


2500's)
 

If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 
2500s, but 
7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.


The way I see it, all that's needed is two major exploits, 
one known by 
Cisco, one not.


Exploit #1 will be made public.  Cisco will released fixed 
code.  Good 
service providers will upgrade.


The upgraded code version will be the one targeted by the second, 
unknown, exploit.


A two-part worm can infect Windows boxen via any common 
method, and then 
use them to try the exploit against routers.   A windows box can find 
routers to attack easily enough by doing traceroutes to 
various sites. 
Then, the windows boxen can try a limited set of exploit variants on 
each router.  Not all routers will be affected, but some will.


As for what the worm could do - well, it could report home to 
the worm 
creators that "Hey, you 0wn X number of routers", or it could do 
something fun like erasing configs and locking out console ports. ;-)


Honestly, I've been expecting something like that to happen for years 
now. 



   



 





RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Buhrmaster, Gary

The *best* exploit is the one alluded to in the presentation.
Overwrite the nvram/firmware to prevent booting (or, perhaps,
adjust the voltages to damaging levels and do a "smoke test").
If you could do it to all GSR linecards, think of the RMA
costs to Cisco (not to mention the fact that Cisco could not
possible replace all the cards in all the GSRs across the
internet in an anywhere reasonable timeframe).  *THAT* is
what I suspect worries Cisco.  But of course I am just
conjecturing...

Gary 

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On 
> Behalf Of Janet Sullivan
> Sent: Friday, July 29, 2005 12:44 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; nanog@merit.edu
> Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up
> 
> 
> Scott Morris wrote:
> > And quite honestly, we can probably be pretty safe in 
> assuming they will not
> > be running IPv6 (current exploit) or SNMP (older exploits) 
> or BGP (other
> > exploits) or SSH (even other exploits) on that box.  :)  
> (the 1601 or the
> > 2500's)
> 
> If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 
> 2500s, but 
> 7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.
> 
> The way I see it, all that's needed is two major exploits, 
> one known by 
> Cisco, one not.
> 
> Exploit #1 will be made public.  Cisco will released fixed 
> code.  Good 
> service providers will upgrade.
> 
> The upgraded code version will be the one targeted by the second, 
> unknown, exploit.
> 
> A two-part worm can infect Windows boxen via any common 
> method, and then 
> use them to try the exploit against routers.   A windows box can find 
> routers to attack easily enough by doing traceroutes to 
> various sites. 
> Then, the windows boxen can try a limited set of exploit variants on 
> each router.  Not all routers will be affected, but some will.
> 
> As for what the worm could do - well, it could report home to 
> the worm 
> creators that "Hey, you 0wn X number of routers", or it could do 
> something fun like erasing configs and locking out console ports. ;-)
> 
> Honestly, I've been expecting something like that to happen for years 
> now. 
> 
> 


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Janet Sullivan


Scott Morris wrote:

And quite honestly, we can probably be pretty safe in assuming they will not
be running IPv6 (current exploit) or SNMP (older exploits) or BGP (other
exploits) or SSH (even other exploits) on that box.  :)  (the 1601 or the
2500's)


If a worm writer wanted to cause chaos, they wouldn't target 2500s, but 
7200s, 7600s, GSRs, etc.


The way I see it, all that's needed is two major exploits, one known by 
Cisco, one not.


Exploit #1 will be made public.  Cisco will released fixed code.  Good 
service providers will upgrade.


The upgraded code version will be the one targeted by the second, 
unknown, exploit.


A two-part worm can infect Windows boxen via any common method, and then 
use them to try the exploit against routers.   A windows box can find 
routers to attack easily enough by doing traceroutes to various sites. 
Then, the windows boxen can try a limited set of exploit variants on 
each router.  Not all routers will be affected, but some will.


As for what the worm could do - well, it could report home to the worm 
creators that "Hey, you 0wn X number of routers", or it could do 
something fun like erasing configs and locking out console ports. ;-)


Honestly, I've been expecting something like that to happen for years 
now. 




RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread David Barak



--- Scott Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> And quite honestly, we can probably be pretty safe
> in assuming they will not
> be running IPv6 (current exploit) or SNMP (older
> exploits) or BGP (other
> exploits) or SSH (even other exploits) on that box. 
> :)  (the 1601 or the
> 2500's)

Let's see - RIP, Telnet, and SNMP are the only
services listening on the box, and those are ACLed off
at the serial interface.  I'd LOVE to run SSH, but my
image is not kind, nor is the size of the flash...

> Not everyone has to worry about these things.  Place
> and time.

Agreed - I just wanted to give a concrete example of
this stuff in the wild.


David Barak
Need Geek Rock?  Try The Franchise: 
http://www.listentothefranchise.com




Start your day with Yahoo! - make it your home page 
http://www.yahoo.com/r/hs 
 


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Scott Morris

And quite honestly, we can probably be pretty safe in assuming they will not
be running IPv6 (current exploit) or SNMP (older exploits) or BGP (other
exploits) or SSH (even other exploits) on that box.  :)  (the 1601 or the
2500's)

But, in the advisory that Cisco put out, it did mention free software
upgrades were available even to non-contract customers.  They simply had to
originate from a call to TAC about it.  Doesn't seem too bad. 

Not everyone has to worry about these things.  Place and time.

Scott


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
David Barak
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2005 2:52 PM
To: nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up




--- John Forrister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Indeed - Cisco's hardware, especially the older, smaller boxes, tended 
> to be really solid once you got them running.  I was just pondering a 
> few minutes ago on how many 2500's I configured & installed in 1996 & 
> 1997 are still running today, on code that's no longer supported by 
> Cisco, and which are incapable of taking enough flash to load a newer 
> image.

As a definite example, A client of mine has a 1601 sitting on the end of a
T1 running 11.3...  They're not interested in spending any money on an
upgrade, as the box is doing exactly what they want: running RIP internally,
and taking Ethernet-in and Serial-out.

-David

 

__
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com 



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread Scott Whyte

On 7/29/05, David Barak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> --- John Forrister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Indeed - Cisco's hardware, especially the older,
> > smaller boxes, tended
> > to be really solid once you got them running.  I was
> > just pondering a
> > few minutes ago on how many 2500's I configured &
> > installed in 1996 & 1997
> > are still running today, on code that's no longer
> > supported by
> > Cisco, and which are incapable of taking enough
> > flash to load a newer image.
> 
> As a definite example, A client of mine has a 1601
> sitting on the end of a T1 running 11.3...  They're
> not interested in spending any money on an upgrade, as
> the box is doing exactly what they want: running RIP
> internally, and taking Ethernet-in and Serial-out.

As a counter-point, many thousands of routers were needlessly upgraded
because of Y2K, edge to core.  Its not about reality, its about
perception.

-Scott

> 
> -David
> 
> 
> 
> __
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
> http://mail.yahoo.com
>


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread David Barak



--- John Forrister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Indeed - Cisco's hardware, especially the older,
> smaller boxes, tended
> to be really solid once you got them running.  I was
> just pondering a 
> few minutes ago on how many 2500's I configured &
> installed in 1996 & 1997
> are still running today, on code that's no longer
> supported by
> Cisco, and which are incapable of taking enough
> flash to load a newer image.

As a definite example, A client of mine has a 1601
sitting on the end of a T1 running 11.3...  They're
not interested in spending any money on an upgrade, as
the box is doing exactly what they want: running RIP
internally, and taking Ethernet-in and Serial-out.

-David

 

__
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around 
http://mail.yahoo.com 


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-29 Thread John Forrister

On Fri, Jul 29, 2005 at 01:01:42AM +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> 
> > could they be unpatched because no one has sent out a notice saying
> > "versions before X have known vulnerabilities.  upgrade now to one
> > of the following: ...?"

> or... cause new IOS won't run on them.

Indeed - Cisco's hardware, especially the older, smaller boxes, tended
to be really solid once you got them running.  I was just pondering a 
few minutes ago on how many 2500's I configured & installed in 1996 & 1997
are still running today, on code that's no longer supported by
Cisco, and which are incapable of taking enough flash to load a newer image.

-John


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Christopher L. Morrow


On Fri, 29 Jul 2005, Randy Bush wrote:

>
> > I think there is also a LOT concern about all the unpatched routers that
> > remain unpatched simply because the admins don't feel like spending a week
> > running the cisco gauntlet to get patches when you don't have a support
> > contract with cisco. Its like cisco doesn't want you to patch or they would
> > make it easy.
>
> could they be unpatched because no one has sent out a notice saying
> "versions before X have known vulnerabilities.  upgrade now to one
> of the following: ...?"
or... cause new IOS won't run on them.


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread James Baldwin


On Jul 28, 2005, at 8:40 PM, Randy Bush wrote:


I spoke with people with Lynn in Vegas and confirmed the following,
if anyone is watching the AP wire or Forbes you'll see that Cisco, et
al. and Lynn have settled the suit.


i missed the part where we, the likely actual injured parties, learn
to what we are vulnerable and how to protect ourselves.


I would direct you to your account manager at Cisco. ;)


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Randy Bush

> I spoke with people with Lynn in Vegas and confirmed the following,  
> if anyone is watching the AP wire or Forbes you'll see that Cisco, et  
> al. and Lynn have settled the suit.

i missed the part where we, the likely actual injured parties, learn
to what we are vulnerable and how to protect ourselves.

randy



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread James Baldwin


I spoke with people with Lynn in Vegas and confirmed the following,  
if anyone is watching the AP wire or Forbes you'll see that Cisco, et  
al. and Lynn have settled the suit.


http://www.forbes.com/business/feeds/ap/2005/07/28/ap2163964.html



RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread John A. Kilpatrick

On Fri, 29 Jul 2005, Randy Bush wrote:

> could they be unpatched because no one has sent out a notice saying
> "versions before X have known vulnerabilities.  upgrade now to one
> of the following: ...?"

It's interesting...yes, I do make fun of my Windows brethren about their
security problems, but the fact is they have it pretty easy since you know
when MS security patches are coming out and you know when you'll have to
patch your servers.  But Cisco doesn't seem to make it that easy to keep a
large environment of their devices up to date.  Some better tools from
them would be good - even for those of us who do have support contracts.

-- 
   John A. Kilpatrick
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Email| http://www.hypergeek.net/
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  Text pages|  ICQ: 19147504
 remember:  no obstacles/only challenges



RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Randy Bush

> I think there is also a LOT concern about all the unpatched routers that
> remain unpatched simply because the admins don't feel like spending a week
> running the cisco gauntlet to get patches when you don't have a support
> contract with cisco. Its like cisco doesn't want you to patch or they would
> make it easy.

could they be unpatched because no one has sent out a notice saying
"versions before X have known vulnerabilities.  upgrade now to one
of the following: ...?"

randy



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Dan Hollis

On Thu, 28 Jul 2005, Jason Frisvold wrote:
> On 7/27/05, Jeff Kell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Cisco's response thus far:
> >
> > http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/security/intelligence/MySDN_CiscoIOS.html
> More fuel on the fire...  Cisco and ISS are suing Lynn now...
> http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39211011,00.htm 

Not the first time Cisco has had a highly questionable attitude toward 
security issues, even recently: http://kerneltrap.org/node/5382
(cisco, lawyers, and patents).

Is this the start of a new pattern of behavior for cisco, or just more of 
the same?

-Dan



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Stephen Sprunk


Thus spake "James Baldwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Moreover, the fix for this was already released and you have not been 
able to download a vulnerable version of the software for months  however 
there was no indication from Cisco regarding the severity of  the required 
upgrade. That is to say, they knew in April that  arbitrary code execution 
was possible on routers, they had it fixed  by May, and we're hearing 
about it now and if Cisco had its way we  might still not be hearing about 
it.


Cisco's policy, as best I can tell, is that they patch security holes 
immediately but delay notification until either (a) six months pass, or (b) 
an exploit is seen in the wild.  The former is intended to give customers 
ample time to upgrade to patched versions (often without their knowledge) 
without tipping their hand to the "bad guys".  However, a CERT advisory is 
prepared and ready for immediate distribution if the latter occurs.



How many network engineers knew there was a potential problem of
this magnitude at the beginning of May? If, knock on wood, someone
had released this code into the wild then how many networks who
have been vulnerable despite the availability of a fix?


There are network engineers that knew, but they couldn't admit it due to 
NDAs.  This is one of the benefits of buying "high touch" support 
contracts -- and Cisco is not alone in that model.


S

Stephen Sprunk  "Those people who think they know everything
CCIE #3723 are a great annoyance to those of us who do."
K5SSS --Isaac Asimov 



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Hyunseog Ryu



I'm wondering whether Cisco released security advisory for this fix or not.
According to several articles, Cisco implemented the fix around April.
But I don't recall to see any security advisory for Cisco Users to 
recommend IOS upgrade.
Between April and July, Cisco may have enough time for their account 
team to contact the customers, and do something about it except sending 
the people to tear off the conference material.
I don't know what happened between ISS, Black Hat, and Cisco, and I 
don't know how long Cisco knew about this before Black Hat conference.
But tearing off one session material from conference material is not 
common, and it already caught a lot of public attention, which may not 
be needed.


From some of articles, this guy got the clue from Chinese website, so 
it may be already known to underground community.





Buhrmaster, Gary wrote:




 


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On 
Behalf Of James Baldwin

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2005 10:36 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up



Lynn developed this information based on publicly available IOS  
images. 
   



Well, there is this long legal license "agreement" you have to
click to agree to before you download the images (and I think
it is included with the hardware you unpack too).  In there
somewhere you do agree not to reverse engineer the images
(I actually read it all once a long time ago).  As to whether
that is enforceable, that is for a court to decide.

 

There were no illegal acts committed in gaining this  
information nor was any proprietary information provided for its  
development. Reverse engineering, specifically for security testing  
has an exemption from the DMCA (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
DVD/1201.html).
   



As I understand it, it is still unsettled case law as to how that
clause should be interpreted.  It is generally considered a good
idea to avoid being the test case for such lawsuits (unless you
have deep pockets to afford the best lawyers money can buy, or
at least better than what your opposition can buy).

 

That being said, what information is he not supposed to have? 
All the  
information he had is available to anyone with a 
disassembler, an IOS  
image, and an understanding of PPC assembly.
   



Perhaps, as in at least some companies interpretations
of the DMCA, these are software equivalent of the crime of
"Possession of burglary tools"?



The US legal system is not as clean nor clear as one
might like to hope.  But the process will be followed,
and we will see what happens.  And if the result is
"bad", we can change the laws.

Gary



 






Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Jason Frisvold

On 7/28/05, Leo Bicknell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I am not a lawyer, and so under the current DMCA and other laws it
> may well be illegal to "decompile" code.

I'm sure all the script kiddies and real hackers out there will be
sure to obey the law..  This is the bit of the DMCA I have a huge
issue with..  Hackers and others engaging in illegal activities will
have no trouble breaking the law and decompiling code looking for
exploits.  But, if a researcher does it, they get slapped with a
lawsuit..  The difference being, the researcher is (usually) doing it
to help identify problems and increase security..  There should be
some safe harbor here..
 
> That said, it sounds rather like the technical equivilant to Ralph
> Nader "disassembling" the Corvair to prove the suspension design
> was flawed.  GM sure didn't like that any more than Cisco likes
> this incident.

To prove a flaw..  This is a great example.  Nader wasn't stealing
technology, nor was he interested in exploitinig the flaw..  He was
proving that it was unsafe, thus providing the vendor with vital
information on how it was flawed..  Hopefully the vendor takes that
information and fixes the flaw..

> I don't know when we decided a program should be a black box welded
> shut kept from all prying eyes, and that anyone who could run a
> decompiler was instantly a crimimal.  It probably all came about
> from the crazy decision that software should be licensed, not sold.
> We'd be in a world of hurt if anyone who figured out how to put a
> lift kit on his pickup was sued by ford for "disassembling" the
> truck and figuring out their "propretary internal designs".  Why
> is software special?

Good point..  :)  What about my house?  Can I no longer modify my
kitchen at the whim of my wife because I didn't build the house,
someone else did?  I purchased the home, although it's still
mortgaged...  So that's even worse..  I don't even really own it..  :)
 Crap..  anyone know a good lawyer?  :)

> --
>Leo Bicknell - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - CCIE 3440
> PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
> Read TMBG List - [EMAIL PROTECTED], www.tmbg.org

-- 
Jason 'XenoPhage' Frisvold
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Buhrmaster, Gary

 

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On 
> Behalf Of James Baldwin
> Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2005 10:36 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: nanog@merit.edu
> Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up
> 
>
> 
> Lynn developed this information based on publicly available IOS  
> images. 

Well, there is this long legal license "agreement" you have to
click to agree to before you download the images (and I think
it is included with the hardware you unpack too).  In there
somewhere you do agree not to reverse engineer the images
(I actually read it all once a long time ago).  As to whether
that is enforceable, that is for a court to decide.

> There were no illegal acts committed in gaining this  
> information nor was any proprietary information provided for its  
> development. Reverse engineering, specifically for security testing  
> has an exemption from the DMCA (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
> DVD/1201.html).

As I understand it, it is still unsettled case law as to how that
clause should be interpreted.  It is generally considered a good
idea to avoid being the test case for such lawsuits (unless you
have deep pockets to afford the best lawyers money can buy, or
at least better than what your opposition can buy).
 
> That being said, what information is he not supposed to have? 
> All the  
> information he had is available to anyone with a 
> disassembler, an IOS  
> image, and an understanding of PPC assembly.

Perhaps, as in at least some companies interpretations
of the DMCA, these are software equivalent of the crime of
"Possession of burglary tools"?



The US legal system is not as clean nor clear as one
might like to hope.  But the process will be followed,
and we will see what happens.  And if the result is
"bad", we can change the laws.

Gary


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Geo.

>>I think he's just pointing out that the risk assessments of many
network operators are way off.<<

I think there is also a LOT concern about all the unpatched routers that
remain unpatched simply because the admins don't feel like spending a week
running the cisco gauntlet to get patches when you don't have a support
contract with cisco. Its like cisco doesn't want you to patch or they would
make it easy.

Geo.



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Jared Mauch

On Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 01:36:01PM -0400, James Baldwin wrote:
> On Jul 28, 2005, at 10:14 AM, Scott Morris wrote:
> >While I do think it's obnoxious to try to
> >censor someone, on the other hand if they have proprietary internal
> >information somehow that they aren't supposed to have to begin  
> >with, I don't
> >think it is in security's best interested to commit a crime in  
> >order to get
> >tighter security.
> >
> 
> Lynn developed this information based on publicly available IOS  
> images. There were no illegal acts committed in gaining this  
> information nor was any proprietary information provided for its  
> development. Reverse engineering, specifically for security testing  
> has an exemption from the DMCA (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
> DVD/1201.html).
> 
> That being said, what information is he not supposed to have? All the  
> information he had is available to anyone with a disassembler, an IOS  
> image, and an understanding of PPC assembly.
> 
> If anything, the only "crime" he may or may not have committed is  
> violation of an NDA with ISS, which should a contractual, civil issue  
> not a criminal one.

I think that's why it was a restraining order and not
damanges in the amounts of billions, but IANAL.

Same way people were asked to not disclose who the half-blooded
prince was.  I'm not saying it's right, but that's up for the
judge(s) involved to decide.

As far as Cisco goes, I know it takes them some time to fix
bugs, but generally speaking they need to "fix them faster".  But this
can be said for most vendors.

- jared

-- 
Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from [EMAIL PROTECTED]
clue++;  | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only mine.


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread James Baldwin


On Jul 28, 2005, at 10:14 AM, Scott Morris wrote:



While I do think it's obnoxious to try to
censor someone, on the other hand if they have proprietary internal
information somehow that they aren't supposed to have to begin  
with, I don't
think it is in security's best interested to commit a crime in  
order to get

tighter security.



Lynn developed this information based on publicly available IOS  
images. There were no illegal acts committed in gaining this  
information nor was any proprietary information provided for its  
development. Reverse engineering, specifically for security testing  
has an exemption from the DMCA (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
DVD/1201.html).


That being said, what information is he not supposed to have? All the  
information he had is available to anyone with a disassembler, an IOS  
image, and an understanding of PPC assembly.


If anything, the only "crime" he may or may not have committed is  
violation of an NDA with ISS, which should a contractual, civil issue  
not a criminal one.




Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Christopher L. Morrow

On Thu, 28 Jul 2005, Leo Bicknell wrote:

> In a message written on Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 08:29:22AM +0100, Neil J. McRae 
> wrote:
> > I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the
> > situation as best they can so that they can deploy the needed
> > fixes before the $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its
> > no different to how any other vendor handles a exploit and
> > I'm surprised to see network operators having such an attitude.
>
> This is not a Cisco specific comment, but it is a network operator
> comment.
>  --snip---
> but to make that kind of show in public?  What is the motovation?
> If this bug is, as Cisco puts it, "not serious" then they just spent
> a lot of money on people to go do all of that for nothing.  Doesn't
> seem likely.  So what everyone's spidy sense is now telling them
> is Cisco wouldn't spend thousands of dollars on legal injunctions
> and armys of razor blade toters for nothing, so there must be
> something to this paper.  Which makes their denial all the more
> hollow.
>

There is the possiblity that cisco, in this case, knows that they have a
significant base of folks that 'never upgrade' devices. I know of several
thousand 2500's with 11.x code on them, which will NEVER be upgraded...
So, the potential for Neil's network or Leo's or Martin's to be vulnerable
to something patched in 12.0.x.y.z code train 9 months ago isn't there.
That's a good thing for them, it doesn't address the thousands, or
hundreds of thousands of devices which never get upgraded and still
connect to Neil/Martin/Leo's networks as CPE or cpe to cpe... These
devices could still cause some pain to the networks in question.

(all this without seeing the talk of course... perhaps he said: push
button yellow and router go boom. I don't know.)


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Buhrmaster, Gary

The video *might* be available on the Washington Post later today.

>From http://netsec.blogspot.com/

  "Michael Lynn's "The Holy Grail: Cisco Shellcode and Remote Execution" 
  presentation blew the doors off of Caesar's Palace Today with a full 
  shell code exec capabilities for nearly ANY Cisco vulnerability. If 
  your organization hasn't updated any Cisco IOS-based devices lately, 
  the devices may be under someone else's control.

  The story from Michael Lynn proceed like this: He discovered clues 
  that there was an issue being exploited when reading translated 
  Chinese hacker sites that alluded to the issue. It was likely 
  discovered after the theft of the Cisco Source code in May 2004 
  which was itself part of a larger series of intrusions. Upon further 
  research leading to the development of working proo-of-concept code, 
  he and his former employer ISS notified Cisco. Cisco patched the 
  issue silently in April but never issued an advisory as to the 
  seriousness of the issue. Cisco has since pulled all older, vulnerable 
  versions of IOS from it's web site. After discovering that ISS was 
  allow Lynn to present on the issue, Cisco CEO John Chambers attempted 
  to censor the issue. When ISS stood it's ground, John Chambers 
  requested that the US Government intervene as a matter of national 
  security to no apparent avail.

  The popular press is starting to pick up on the issue now and I hear 
  rumour that Michael's presentation MIGHT be made available in video 
  via the Washington Post web site tomorrow."




> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On 
> Behalf Of Network Fortius
> Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 6:39 PM
> To: nanog@merit.edu
> Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up
> 
> 
> I have been searching the net since this morning, for "The Holy  
> Grail: Cisco IOS Shellcode Remote Execution", or variations of such.  
> This seems to be - at the moment - the most thought after torrent ...
> 
> Stef
> Network Fortius, LLC
> 
> On Jul 27, 2005, at 8:13 PM, Daniel Golding wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> > Since the talk was actually delivered - does anyone have a  
> > transcript or a
> > torrent for audio/video?
> >
> > - Dan
> >
> > On 7/27/05 8:10 PM, "Jeff Kell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Cisco's response thus far:
> >>
> >>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/security/intelligence/ 
> >> MySDN_CiscoIOS.html
> >>
> >> Jeff
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> 
> 


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Florian Weimer

> Lynn's statement would tend to make one believe that this is
> yet another example of a vulnerability that is awaiting an
> exploit, not one that has yet to be discovered -- a sort of
> Sword of Damocles, if you  will...

I think he's just pointing out that the risk assessments of many
network operators are way off.  Some postings to this list certainly
suggest that.  Too many people seem to have forgotten the work done by
Phenoelit.  Maybe their exploits leave something to be desired, but,
as the saying goes, attacks only get better.

In other words, it's not about a single vulnerability.  It's about a
widespread belief in the invincibility of IOS.  And, to be honest, I'm
scared how many people subscribe to that religion.  Such irrationality
puts networks at risk, far more than any single vulnerability could.


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)

One thing that bugs me, though, is the quote that is
credited to Lynn:

[snip]

"I feel I had to do what's right for the country and the national 
infrastructure," he said. "It has been confirmed that bad people are working on 
this (compromising IOS). The right thing to do here is to make sure that 
everyone knows that it's vulnerable."

[snip]

http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11259

Lynn's statement would tend to make one believe that this is
yet another example of a vulnerability that is awaiting an
exploit, not one that has yet to be discovered -- a sort of
Sword of Damocles, if you  will...

- ferg


-- Brett Frankenberger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

On Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 07:03:31AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:

As nearly as I can tell from reports (I wasn't there), he (1) talked
about a general way to exploit a buffer overflow to cause arbitrary
code execution (this would apply to buffer overflows generally, but
would be completely useless if you didn't know of a buffer overflow to
exploit), and (2) demonstrated his technique using a previosuly known
buffer overflow vulnerability which Cisco has already patched.

So Cisco is correct in saying that he didn't identifiy any new
vulnerabilities, and Cisco is also correct in saying that the
vulnerability he used in his presentation to demonstrate his technique
has been patched.  However, the same technique will be useful on the
next buffer overflow vulnerability to be discovered.

 -- Brett




Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)

If I were to venture a guess (and it would be just
that, a guess), I'd say that you're probably spot on.

I wonder who's having more fun this week? The folks
at Black Hat, or the folks in The Netherlands at the
"Politics of Psychedelic Research" or perhaps the
"Fun and Mayhem with RFID" sessions at "What the Hack"?

 ;-)

 http://www.whatthehack.org/

- ferg

-- Brett Frankenberger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

On Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 07:03:31AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> Can you or someone else who was there or has some details describe
> what the actual result is and what the fix was? Based on what I've
> been reading, it sounds like Lynn's result was a method for exploiting
> arbitrary new vulnerabilities. Are you saying that this method can't
> be used in future IOS revs? 

As nearly as I can tell from reports (I wasn't there), he (1) talked
about a general way to exploit a buffer overflow to cause arbitrary
code execution (this would apply to buffer overflows generally, but
would be completely useless if you didn't know of a buffer overflow to
exploit), and (2) demonstrated his technique using a previosuly known
buffer overflow vulnerability which Cisco has already patched.

So Cisco is correct in saying that he didn't identifiy any new
vulnerabilities, and Cisco is also correct in saying that the
vulnerability he used in his presentation to demonstrate his technique
has been patched.  However, the same technique will be useful on the
next buffer overflow vulnerability to be discovered.

 -- Brett

--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Leo Bicknell
In a message written on Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 10:14:42AM -0400, Scott Morris 
wrote:
> And yet, look how much havoc was created there.  It's always the "potential"
> stuff that scares people more.  While I do think it's obnoxious to try to
> censor someone, on the other hand if they have proprietary internal
> information somehow that they aren't supposed to have to begin with, I don't
> think it is in security's best interested to commit a crime in order to get
> tighter security.

We don't have all the details, so I don't know what he's accused
of doing which is illegal, however, from
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39211011,00.htm I
quote:

] The filing in US District Court for the Northern District of California
] asks the court to prevent Lynn and Black Hat from "further disclosing
] proprietary information belonging to Cisco and ISS," said John Noh, a
] Cisco spokesman.
] 
] "It is our belief that the information that Lynn presented at Black Hat
] this morning is information that was illegally obtained and violated our
] intellectual-property rights," Noh added.
] 
] Lynn decompiled Cisco's software for his research and by doing so
] violated the company's rights, Noh said.

I am not a lawyer, and so under the current DMCA and other laws it
may well be illegal to "decompile" code.

That said, it sounds rather like the technical equivilant to Ralph
Nader "disassembling" the Corvair to prove the suspension design
was flawed.  GM sure didn't like that any more than Cisco likes
this incident.

I don't know when we decided a program should be a black box welded
shut kept from all prying eyes, and that anyone who could run a
decompiler was instantly a crimimal.  It probably all came about
from the crazy decision that software should be licensed, not sold.
We'd be in a world of hurt if anyone who figured out how to put a
lift kit on his pickup was sued by ford for "disassembling" the
truck and figuring out their "propretary internal designs".  Why
is software special?

-- 
   Leo Bicknell - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - CCIE 3440
PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
Read TMBG List - [EMAIL PROTECTED], www.tmbg.org


pgppARrugzTIA.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Brett Frankenberger

On Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 07:03:31AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> Can you or someone else who was there or has some details describe
> what the actual result is and what the fix was? Based on what I've
> been reading, it sounds like Lynn's result was a method for exploiting
> arbitrary new vulnerabilities. Are you saying that this method can't
> be used in future IOS revs? 

As nearly as I can tell from reports (I wasn't there), he (1) talked
about a general way to exploit a buffer overflow to cause arbitrary
code execution (this would apply to buffer overflows generally, but
would be completely useless if you didn't know of a buffer overflow to
exploit), and (2) demonstrated his technique using a previosuly known
buffer overflow vulnerability which Cisco has already patched.

So Cisco is correct in saying that he didn't identifiy any new
vulnerabilities, and Cisco is also correct in saying that the
vulnerability he used in his presentation to demonstrate his technique
has been patched.  However, the same technique will be useful on the
next buffer overflow vulnerability to be discovered.

 -- Brett


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Scott Morris

Bear in mind though that when the M$ SQL Slammer worm hit everyone, the same
attitude existed.   The patch had been available for months.  People knew
about the vulnerability and it wasn't anything "new".

And yet, look how much havoc was created there.  It's always the "potential"
stuff that scares people more.  While I do think it's obnoxious to try to
censor someone, on the other hand if they have proprietary internal
information somehow that they aren't supposed to have to begin with, I don't
think it is in security's best interested to commit a crime in order to get
tighter security.

Is this the technical version of civil disobedience?

Scott 

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
James Baldwin
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2005 9:24 AM
To: Neil J.McRae
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up


On Jul 28, 2005, at 3:29 AM, Neil J. McRae wrote:


> I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the situation as 
> best they can so that they can deploy the needed fixes before the 
> $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its no different to how any 
> other vendor handles a exploit and I'm surprised to see network 
> operators having such an attitude.
>

That's part of the issue: this wasn't an exploit in the sense of something a
$scriptkiddie could exploit. The sheer technical requirements of the exploit
itself ensure that it will only be reproduced by a small number of people
across the globe. There was no source or proof of concept code released and
duplicating the information would only provide you a method to increase the
severity of other potential exploits. It does not create any new exploits.  
Moreover, the fix for this was already released and you have not been able
to download a vulnerable version of the software for months however there
was no indication from Cisco regarding the severity of the required upgrade.
That is to say, they knew in April that arbitrary code execution was
possible on routers, they had it fixed by May, and we're hearing about it
now and if Cisco had its way we might still not be hearing about it.

How many network engineers knew there was a potential problem of this
magnitude at the beginning of May? If, knock on wood, someone had released
this code into the wild then how many networks who have been vulnerable
despite the availability of a fix?

Considering that Mr. Lynn's presentation was flawless, it is interesting to
note that Cisco and ISS considered the information to be "not quite
complete." This is especially interesting since the research was done weeks
ago according the researcher. Its surprising that such a decision as to the
incompleteness of the presentation and the retraction of Cisco's support for
the presentation were withdrawn only several days before the talk. It would
lead me to believe that both companies had less interest in a "process of
disclosure and communication" and more with burying this information for a
year or more.

I agree with everyone that making attack tools and exploit information
available to the public prior to a fix being generated with the vendor is a
poor method of encouraging good security, however that is far from the case
in this matter. A fix had been generated with the vendor and it was time
that the information to become public so network operators understood that
the remote execution empty world we had lived in until now was over.

More links:
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68328,00.html? 
tw=wn_story_page_prev2
http://securityfocus.com/news/11259






Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Florian Weimer

* James Baldwin:

> A fix had been generated with the vendor and it was time that the
> information to become public so network operators understood that
> the remote execution empty world we had lived in until now was over.

Huh?  Remote code injection exploits on Cisco routers have been
demonstrated before, haven't they?  Previous ones were rather fragile,
and the amount of knowledge and experimentation needed was rather
high.  Actually, this is the type of exploit I would expect to be
unavailable to the general public (read: network operators) for a
long, long time.

If there was a perception in the community that remote code injection
exploits were a non-issue on routers, then this incident was long
overdue, and Cisco should be thankful because their customers can
assess risks in a more realistic way.  ISS is probably the real loser
here because these days, their business is based to a large extent on
selling access to relevant strategic information, and dissemination of
any background information reduces the value of their service (or the
exclusiveness of the offerrings, at the least).


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Eric Rescorla

James Baldwin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

> On Jul 28, 2005, at 3:29 AM, Neil J. McRae wrote:
>
>
>> I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the
>> situation as best they can so that they can deploy the needed
>> fixes before the $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its
>> no different to how any other vendor handles a exploit and
>> I'm surprised to see network operators having such an attitude.
>>
>
> That's part of the issue: this wasn't an exploit in the sense of
> something a $scriptkiddie could exploit. The sheer technical
> requirements of the exploit itself ensure that it will only be
> reproduced by a small number of people across the globe. There was no
> source or proof of concept code released and duplicating the
> information would only provide you a method to increase the severity
> of other potential exploits. It does not create any new exploits.
> Moreover, the fix for this was already released and you have not been
> able to download a vulnerable version of the software for months
> however there was no indication from Cisco regarding the severity of
> the required upgrade. That is to say, they knew in April that
> arbitrary code execution was possible on routers, they had it fixed
> by May, and we're hearing about it now and if Cisco had its way we
> might still not be hearing about it.

Can you or someone else who was there or has some details describe
what the actual result is and what the fix was? Based on what I've
been reading, it sounds like Lynn's result was a method for exploiting
arbitrary new vulnerabilities. Are you saying that this method can't
be used in future IOS revs? 

Thanks,
-Ekr

[Eric Rescorla  RTFM, Inc.]


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Jason Frisvold

On 7/27/05, Jeff Kell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> Cisco's response thus far:
> 
>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/security/intelligence/MySDN_CiscoIOS.html
> 
> Jeff

More fuel on the fire...  Cisco and ISS are suing Lynn now...

http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39211011,00.htm 


-- 
Jason 'XenoPhage' Frisvold
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread James Baldwin


On Jul 28, 2005, at 3:29 AM, Neil J. McRae wrote:



I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the
situation as best they can so that they can deploy the needed
fixes before the $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its
no different to how any other vendor handles a exploit and
I'm surprised to see network operators having such an attitude.



That's part of the issue: this wasn't an exploit in the sense of  
something a $scriptkiddie could exploit. The sheer technical  
requirements of the exploit itself ensure that it will only be  
reproduced by a small number of people across the globe. There was no  
source or proof of concept code released and duplicating the  
information would only provide you a method to increase the severity  
of other potential exploits. It does not create any new exploits.  
Moreover, the fix for this was already released and you have not been  
able to download a vulnerable version of the software for months  
however there was no indication from Cisco regarding the severity of  
the required upgrade. That is to say, they knew in April that  
arbitrary code execution was possible on routers, they had it fixed  
by May, and we're hearing about it now and if Cisco had its way we  
might still not be hearing about it.


How many network engineers knew there was a potential problem of this  
magnitude at the beginning of May? If, knock on wood, someone had  
released this code into the wild then how many networks who have been  
vulnerable despite the availability of a fix?


Considering that Mr. Lynn's presentation was flawless, it is  
interesting to note that Cisco and ISS considered the information to  
be "not quite complete." This is especially interesting since the  
research was done weeks ago according the researcher. Its surprising  
that such a decision as to the incompleteness of the presentation and  
the retraction of Cisco's support for the presentation were withdrawn  
only several days before the talk. It would lead me to believe that  
both companies had less interest in a "process of disclosure and  
communication" and more with burying this information for a year or  
more.


I agree with everyone that making attack tools and exploit  
information available to the public prior to a fix being generated  
with the vendor is a poor method of encouraging good security,  
however that is far from the case in this matter. A fix had been  
generated with the vendor and it was time that the information to  
become public so network operators understood that the remote  
execution empty world we had lived in until now was over.


More links:
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68328,00.html? 
tw=wn_story_page_prev2

http://securityfocus.com/news/11259






Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Leo Bicknell
In a message written on Thu, Jul 28, 2005 at 08:29:22AM +0100, Neil J. McRae 
wrote:
> I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the
> situation as best they can so that they can deploy the needed
> fixes before the $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its
> no different to how any other vendor handles a exploit and
> I'm surprised to see network operators having such an attitude.

This is not a Cisco specific comment, but it is a network operator
comment.

You change your mind when you get hit by a network wide bug taking
out all your customers, and then spend six months beating up the
gear in your own lab to reproduce the problem, and when you do the
vendor finally admits "well, we've known about the bug for 4 years,
but we were pretty sure it couldn't happen in your network so we
didn't tell you."

I'm sure the vendors find bugs, quietly fix them, the code is
naturally upgraded and nothing ever happens.  Which is a good thing.
The problem is, most of the major operators have been hit by a bug
where the vendor knew, did nothing, or at least not enough, the
operator was hit and then the vendor continued to not want to admit
the problem because of course now they look even worse for sitting
on it.

For better or for worse, right now the only check and balance to
the vendors is conferences like the Black Hat forum.  For Cisco to
send an army of razor blade toting employees to such a conference
is chilling.  I can see them working with the parties before hand,
but to make that kind of show in public?  What is the motovation?
If this bug is, as Cisco puts it, "not serious" then they just spent
a lot of money on people to go do all of that for nothing.  Doesn't
seem likely.  So what everyone's spidy sense is now telling them
is Cisco wouldn't spend thousands of dollars on legal injunctions
and armys of razor blade toters for nothing, so there must be
something to this paper.  Which makes their denial all the more
hollow.

This isn't an endorsement of the pro-disclosure crowd.  Telling
these things to the world at large in a forum like this gives the
script kiddies a leg up, as they are almost always faster than the
vendors.  These things should happen at a more measured pace, inside
normal support channels.  That said, no one likes a coverup.  Once
it's public in any form, don't try to sweep it under the rug. Doesn't
work in politics, doesn't work for vendors.  Sometimes you can get
away with it once or twice, but in the end it costs credibility,
which is something that is extremely hard and costly to earn back.

If Cisco wanted to make me feel better right now they could contact
my company via normal support channels and have a frank and open
discussion about what this paper/presentation means, and what action
if any they are taking as a result.  Somehow for what the boxes and
support costs that doesn't seem like too much to ask.  The presentation
is out there, we will get it and read it, don't pretend like we
won't.

-- 
   Leo Bicknell - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - CCIE 3440
PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
Read TMBG List - [EMAIL PROTECTED], www.tmbg.org


pgpAjo1MvyWoE.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Florian Weimer

* Neil J. McRae:

> I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the
> situation as best they can so that they can deploy the needed
> fixes before the $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its
> no different to how any other vendor handles a exploit and
> I'm surprised to see network operators having such an attitude.

Cisco is different in at least one regard: they only list confirmed
impact, not potential impact.  Thus many bugs get labeled as DoS
issues, which other vendors would have described as a vulnerability
which potentially enables remote code injection exploits.


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-28 Thread Neil J. McRae


> This is looking like a complete PR disaster for cisco. They 
> would have been better off allowing the talk to take place, 
> and actually fixing the holes rather than wasting money on a 
> small army of razorblade-equipped censors.

I couldn't disagree more. Cisco are trying to control the
situation as best they can so that they can deploy the needed
fixes before the $scriptkiddies start having their fun. Its
no different to how any other vendor handles a exploit and
I'm surprised to see network operators having such an attitude.

Regards.
Neil.



RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Hank Nussbacher


At 12:22 AM 28-07-05 -0400, Hannigan, Martin wrote:



> ..and of course:
>
> "Cisco Denies Router Vulnerability Claims"
>
> [snip]


Of course. That's how a broken vuln system works. :-)

The major flaw is that the vendor decides who gets to know
about a vulnerability.


Or 3com:
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072505-3com.html

-Hank




RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Hannigan, Martin


> ..and of course:
> 
> "Cisco Denies Router Vulnerability Claims"
> 
> [snip]


Of course. That's how a broken vuln system works. :-)

The major flaw is that the vendor decides who gets to know
about a vulnerability. This causes an insecurity in "the system"
because $vendor is dealing with people usually more qualified than
themselves to make a decision on who needs to know and make one
independant of revenue<-- .

$vendor is probably not the best person to decide who
gets on the secret-15 lists et. al.

-M<



 


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Network Fortius


I have been searching the net since this morning, for “The Holy  
Grail: Cisco IOS Shellcode Remote Execution”, or variations of such.  
This seems to be - at the moment - the most thought after torrent ...


Stef
Network Fortius, LLC

On Jul 27, 2005, at 8:13 PM, Daniel Golding wrote:




Since the talk was actually delivered - does anyone have a  
transcript or a

torrent for audio/video?

- Dan

On 7/27/05 8:10 PM, "Jeff Kell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:




Cisco's response thus far:

   http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/security/intelligence/ 
MySDN_CiscoIOS.html


Jeff










Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Daniel Golding


Since the talk was actually delivered - does anyone have a transcript or a
torrent for audio/video?

- Dan

On 7/27/05 8:10 PM, "Jeff Kell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> Cisco's response thus far:
> 
>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/security/intelligence/MySDN_CiscoIOS.html
> 
> Jeff





Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Jeff Kell


Cisco's response thus far:

  http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/security/intelligence/MySDN_CiscoIOS.html

Jeff


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Gordon Cook


and talk about closing the barn door after the horse has escaped!??
Haven't they just turned those 15 pages scanned as a pdf and  
distributed over a p2p file sharing system like bit torrent into  
likely one of the the most sought after  documents on the planet?


How long before they show up there?  If they aren't there already.
=
The COOK Report on Internet Protocol, 431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ  
08618 USA
609 882-2572 (PSTN) 415 651-4147 (Lingo) [EMAIL PROTECTED]  
Subscription
info: http://cookreport.com/subscriptions.shtml New report:  The Only  
Sustainable Edge

vs The Oligopoly  at: http://cookreport.com/14.06.shtml
=



On Jul 27, 2005, at 11:50 PM, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote:




...and Wired News is running this story:

"Cisco Security Hole a Whopper"

Excerpt:

[snip]

A bug discovered in an operating system that runs the majority of  
the world's computer networks would, if exploited, allow an  
attacker to bring down the nation's critical infrastructure, a  
computer security researcher said Wednesday against threat of a  
lawsuit.


Michael Lynn, a former research analyst with Internet Security  
Solutions, quit his job at ISS Tuesday morning before disclosing  
the flaw at Black Hat Briefings, a conference for computer security  
professionals held annually here.


[snip]

http://www.wired.com//privacy/0,1848,68328,00.html

- ferg

-- "Fergie (Paul Ferguson)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


For what ot's worth, this story is running in the
popular trade press:

"Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code"
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072705-cisco-ios.html

- ferg


-- "Hannigan, Martin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:




For those who like to keep abreast of security issues, there are
interesting developments happening at BlackHat with regards to Cisco
IOS and its vulnerability to arbitrary code executions.

I apologize for the article itself being brief and lean on technical
details, but allow me to say that it does represent a real problem
(as in practical and confirmed):

http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/mending_a_
hole_.html





Yes, practical _and_ confirmed, but you'll never get $vendor to
admit it, which is the problem to begin with.


-M<

--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/







RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)


..and of course:

"Cisco Denies Router Vulnerability Claims"

[snip]

Cisco Systems is downplaying a news story that suggests new security flaws may 
have been discovered in some of its routers.

[snip]

http://www.varbusiness.com/components/weblogs/article.jhtml?articleId=166403151

So, until the _facts_ come out, this appears to be spin vs. spin
(a play on spy v. spy, for all you Alfred E. Newman fans)...

- ferg

-- "Fergie (Paul Ferguson)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


...and Wired News is running this story:

"Cisco Security Hole a Whopper"

Excerpt:

[snip]

A bug discovered in an operating system that runs the majority of the world's 
computer networks would, if exploited, allow an attacker to bring down the 
nation's critical infrastructure, a computer security researcher said Wednesday 
against threat of a lawsuit. 

Michael Lynn, a former research analyst with Internet Security Solutions, quit 
his job at ISS Tuesday morning before disclosing the flaw at Black Hat 
Briefings, a conference for computer security professionals held annually here. 

[snip]

http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68328,00.html

- ferg

-- "Fergie (Paul Ferguson)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


For what ot's worth, this story is running in the
popular trade press:

"Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code"
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072705-cisco-ios.html

- ferg


-- "Hannigan, Martin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> For those who like to keep abreast of security issues, there are  
> interesting developments happening at BlackHat with regards to Cisco  
> IOS and its vulnerability to arbitrary code executions.
> 
> I apologize for the article itself being brief and lean on technical  
> details, but allow me to say that it does represent a real problem  
> (as in practical and confirmed):
> 
> http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/mending_a_
> hole_.html
> 


Yes, practical _and_ confirmed, but you'll never get $vendor to 
admit it, which is the problem to begin with. 
  

-M<

--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/



RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)


...and Wired News is running this story:

"Cisco Security Hole a Whopper"

Excerpt:

[snip]

A bug discovered in an operating system that runs the majority of the world's 
computer networks would, if exploited, allow an attacker to bring down the 
nation's critical infrastructure, a computer security researcher said Wednesday 
against threat of a lawsuit. 

Michael Lynn, a former research analyst with Internet Security Solutions, quit 
his job at ISS Tuesday morning before disclosing the flaw at Black Hat 
Briefings, a conference for computer security professionals held annually here. 

[snip]

http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68328,00.html

- ferg

-- "Fergie (Paul Ferguson)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


For what ot's worth, this story is running in the
popular trade press:

"Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code"
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072705-cisco-ios.html

- ferg


-- "Hannigan, Martin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> For those who like to keep abreast of security issues, there are  
> interesting developments happening at BlackHat with regards to Cisco  
> IOS and its vulnerability to arbitrary code executions.
> 
> I apologize for the article itself being brief and lean on technical  
> details, but allow me to say that it does represent a real problem  
> (as in practical and confirmed):
> 
> http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/mending_a_
> hole_.html
> 


Yes, practical _and_ confirmed, but you'll never get $vendor to 
admit it, which is the problem to begin with. 
  

-M<

--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Dan Hollis

On Wed, 27 Jul 2005, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote:
> For what ot's worth, this story is running in the
> popular trade press:
> 
> "Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code"
> http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072705-cisco-ios.html

This is looking like a complete PR disaster for cisco. They would have 
been better off allowing the talk to take place, and actually fixing the 
holes rather than wasting money on a small army of razorblade-equipped 
censors.

-Dan



Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Andre Ludwig

Damn he sure did cause a shit storm AGAIN..

from the crn article it looks like they might have him pinned on an
NDA violation.. (taking a shot in the dark)

quote below.

"Cisco respects and encourages the work of independent research
scientists; however, we follow an industry established disclosure
process for communicating to our customers and partners," the company
said in a statement released Wednesday. "It is especially regretful,
and indefensible, that the Black Hat Conference organizers have given
Mr. Lynn a platform to publicly disseminate the information he
illegally obtained."


Which i find is funny because i know that for years people have been
beating up on him for more info into the cisco wireless cards that he
had access to under NDA.  He never once budged from what i know of and
heard.

Damn guess we will have to wait and see what happens, to bad i missed the talk. 



On 7/27/05, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> 
> For what ot's worth, this story is running in the
> popular trade press:
> 
> "Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code"
> http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072705-cisco-ios.html
> 
> - ferg
> 
> 
> -- "Hannigan, Martin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> >
> > For those who like to keep abreast of security issues, there are
> > interesting developments happening at BlackHat with regards to Cisco
> > IOS and its vulnerability to arbitrary code executions.
> >
> > I apologize for the article itself being brief and lean on technical
> > details, but allow me to say that it does represent a real problem
> > (as in practical and confirmed):
> >
> > http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/mending_a_
> > hole_.html
> >
> 
> 
> Yes, practical _and_ confirmed, but you'll never get $vendor to
> admit it, which is the problem to begin with.
> 
> 
> -M<
> 
> --
> "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
>  Engineering Architecture for the Internet
>  [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/
>


RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Fergie (Paul Ferguson)


For what ot's worth, this story is running in the
popular trade press:

"Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code"
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/072705-cisco-ios.html

- ferg


-- "Hannigan, Martin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> For those who like to keep abreast of security issues, there are  
> interesting developments happening at BlackHat with regards to Cisco  
> IOS and its vulnerability to arbitrary code executions.
> 
> I apologize for the article itself being brief and lean on technical  
> details, but allow me to say that it does represent a real problem  
> (as in practical and confirmed):
> 
> http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/mending_a_
> hole_.html
> 


Yes, practical _and_ confirmed, but you'll never get $vendor to 
admit it, which is the problem to begin with. 
  

-M<

--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/


Re: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread James Baldwin


On Jul 27, 2005, at 1:26 PM, James Baldwin wrote:


http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/ 
mending_a_hole_.html




Further information:
http://www.crn.com/sections/breakingnews/breakingnews.jhtml? 
articleId=166403096




RE: Cisco IOS Exploit Cover Up

2005-07-27 Thread Hannigan, Martin


> 
> 
> For those who like to keep abreast of security issues, there are  
> interesting developments happening at BlackHat with regards to Cisco  
> IOS and its vulnerability to arbitrary code executions.
> 
> I apologize for the article itself being brief and lean on technical  
> details, but allow me to say that it does represent a real problem  
> (as in practical and confirmed):
> 
> http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/mending_a_
> hole_.html
> 


Yes, practical _and_ confirmed, but you'll never get $vendor to 
admit it, which is the problem to begin with. 
  

-M<