TRILL
Hi all! Can anybody recommend any good resources on TRILL? Particularly anything that addresses do's and don'ts or any problems and pitfalls. Also any experiences deploying and using TRILL in networks that anybody would like to share would be welcome. For clarity, this is the TRILL I'm referring to: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRILL_(computing) Jared
Re: TRILL
On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 8:46 AM, wrote: > > Hi all! > > Can anybody recommend any good resources on TRILL? Particularly anything that > addresses do's and don'ts or any problems and pitfalls. Also any experiences > deploying and using TRILL in networks that anybody would like to share would > be welcome. That might depend on your application and to some extent whose equipment you are using. You might want to contact the people at http://www.six.sk/?lang=en&page= or SANET https://www.infinera.com/how-sanet-created-a-different-kind-of-network-backbone-a-discussion-between-marian-durkovic-sanet-and-geoff-bennett-infinera/ Thanks, Donald === Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1-508-333-2270 (cell) 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA d3e...@gmail.com > For clarity, this is the TRILL I'm referring to: > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRILL_(computing) > > Jared
Re: BCP 38 coverage if top x providers ...
* Jared Mauch: >> On Nov 19, 2016, at 9:13 PM, Frank Bulk wrote: >> >> My google fu is failing me, but I believe there was a NANOG posting a year >> or two ago that mentioned that if the top x providers would >> implement BCP 38 >> then y% of the traffic (or Internet) would be de-spoofed. The point was >> that we don't even need everyone to implement BCP 38, but if the largest >> (transit?) providers did it, then UDP reflection attacks could be >> minimized. >> >> If someone can recall the key words in that posting and dig it up, that >> would be much appreciated. > A double lookup of the packet is twice as expensive and perhaps > impractical in some (or many) cases. Do you actually have to filter all packets? Or could you just sample a subset and police the offenders, on the assumption that if you don't implement an anti-spoofing policy, you end up with near-constant leakage?
Weekly Routing Table Report
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, AusNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, MENOG, SAFNOG, SdNOG, BJNOG, CaribNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-st...@lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith . Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 25 Mar, 2017 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary BGP routing table entries examined: 639326 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 249732 Deaggregation factor: 2.56 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 309219 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 56642 Prefixes per ASN: 11.29 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 49032 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 21726 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:7610 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:213 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.3 Max AS path length visible: 41 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 55644) 36 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:75 Numnber of instances of unregistered ASNs: 76 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 17833 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 13867 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 56285 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table:46 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:0 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space:412 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2839257668 Equivalent to 169 /8s, 59 /16s and 162 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 98.5 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 212171 APNIC Region Analysis Summary - Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 175163 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 50255 APNIC Deaggregation factor:3.49 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 174442 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks:72098 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:7950 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 21.94 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2232 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1126 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:4.5 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 41 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 2789 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 762323332 Equivalent to 45 /8s, 112 /16s and 33 /24s APNIC AS Blocks4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-137529 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes:195124 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation:93482 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.09 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 197529 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 90549 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:17854 ARIN Prefixes per ASN:11.06 ARIN Region o
Re: BCP 38 coverage if top x providers ...
Wouldn't you want BCP38 policies to be as close as possible to the traffic sources? Instead of creating more "fake" traffic? And at the same time, partial filtering doesn't seem as a very effective way to fight spoofed traffic on a large scale. On 03/24/2017 11:07 AM, Florian Weimer wrote: * Jared Mauch: On Nov 19, 2016, at 9:13 PM, Frank Bulk wrote: My google fu is failing me, but I believe there was a NANOG posting a year or two ago that mentioned that if the top x providers would implement BCP 38 then y% of the traffic (or Internet) would be de-spoofed. The point was that we don't even need everyone to implement BCP 38, but if the largest (transit?) providers did it, then UDP reflection attacks could be minimized. If someone can recall the key words in that posting and dig it up, that would be much appreciated. A double lookup of the packet is twice as expensive and perhaps impractical in some (or many) cases. Do you actually have to filter all packets? Or could you just sample a subset and police the offenders, on the assumption that if you don't implement an anti-spoofing policy, you end up with near-constant leakage?
Re: BCP 38 coverage if top x providers ...
* Laurent Dumont: > Wouldn't you want BCP38 policies to be as close as possible to the > traffic sources? Instead of creating more "fake" traffic? Maybe as close as possible, but still without sacrificing source network attribution is sufficient. > And at the same time, partial filtering doesn't seem as a very > effective way to fight spoofed traffic on a large scale. That depends on the problems caused by spoofed traffic. My hunch is that non-policing networks emit a constant trickle of spoofed traffic which does not cause any problems, and that traffic can be used to detect lack of policing even without actual abuse of the spoofing capability.