BGP related question
My apology if I am asking for a repeat question on the list. On 7/29/13 I read an incident about accidental BGP broadcast see article here https://isc.sans.edu/diary/BGP+multiple+banking+addresses+hijacked/16249 or older 2008 incident http://www.renesys.com/2008/02/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1/ My questions: 1) I would like to understand how can we detect and potentially prevent activities like this? I understand native BGP was not design to authenticate IP owners to the BGP broadcaster. Therefore, issues like this due to a human error would happen. How can activities like this be detected as this is clearly a threat if someone decides to broadcast IP networks of an organization and knock the real org. off the Net. 2) In reference to prevention, I recall there were discussions about secure BGP (S-BGP), Pretty Good BGP, or Secure Original BGP but I don't remember if any one of them was finalized (from practicality viewpoint) and if any one of them is implementable/enforceable by ISPs (do anyone have any insight)? 3) If I was to ask for an opinion, from your viewpoint which one is better and why and which one is not doable and why not? Thank you in advance, Parthiv This e-mail may contain information that is privileged or confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately.
RE: BGP related question
-Original Message- From: Shah, Parthiv [mailto:parthiv.s...@theclearinghouse.org] Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2013 9:00 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: BGP related question 1) I would like to understand how can we detect and potentially prevent activities like this? I understand native BGP was not design to authenticate IP owners to the BGP broadcaster. Therefore, issues like this due to a human error would happen. How can activities like this be detected as this is clearly a threat if someone decides to broadcast IP networks of an organization and knock the real org. off the Net. The most basic short answer would be use of proper filtering and LOAs. Transit providers should be checking whether or not customers have permission to act as a transit provider for prefixes or originate the prefixes not registered to them by the RIRs. If every operator would have controls in place to ensure folks are originating the routes they are supposed to then you wouldn't have a problem. However, it seems the best course of action is to implement checks and balances internally to each organization which usually prevents all together or mitigate things as much as possible. Human error is inevitable. We have outside monitoring (bgpmon) for our prefixes. 2) In reference to prevention, I recall there were discussions about secure BGP (S-BGP), Pretty Good BGP, or Secure Original BGP but I don't remember if any one of them was finalized (from practicality viewpoint) and if any one of them is implementable/enforceable by ISPs (do anyone have any insight)? If I had to pick one based on practicality it would be secure original BGP. You can create a fairly secure BGP session by using multiple mechanisms (prefix lists/filters/routemaps, password, iACL, TTL-security, AS limits etc.) However, there are caveats to anything.
Re: BGP related question
Hi Parthiv, .-- My secret spy satellite informs me that at 2013-08-01 7:00 AM Shah, Parthiv wrote: My apology if I am asking for a repeat question on the list. On 7/29/13 I read an incident about accidental BGP broadcast see article here https://isc.sans.edu/diary/BGP+multiple+banking+addresses+hijacked/16249 or older 2008 incident http://www.renesys.com/2008/02/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1/ This was the same issue as was discussed last week on Nanog: http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2013-July/059992.html In summary there were 72 prefixes hijacked, they also leaked a few hundred more specifics of their own prefixes. You can examples of similar events here: http://www.bgpmon.net/blog/ 1) I would like to understand how can we detect and potentially prevent activities like this? I understand native BGP was not design to authenticate IP owners to the BGP broadcaster. Therefore, issues like this due to a human error would happen. How can activities like this be detected as this is clearly a threat if someone decides to broadcast IP networks of an organization and knock the real org. off the Net. There are a few BGP monitoring tools available, BGPMon.net is one such service. 2) In reference to prevention, I recall there were discussions about secure BGP (S-BGP), Pretty Good BGP, or Secure Original BGP but I don't remember if any one of them was finalized (from practicality viewpoint) and if any one of them is implementable/enforceable by ISPs (do anyone have any insight)? The thing we can improve today is providers doing a better job of filtering. But that's still not full proof. Since many folks use max-prefix filters only on for example Internet Exchange points, it's easy to pick up a hijacked route from peers. In the long term RPKI should solve this, but that's not full proof either. The next step is full path validation, that's going to take a while. For more info see for example: http://www.bgpmon.net/securing-bgp-routing-with-rpki-and-roas/ or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource_Public_Key_Infrastructure Cheers, Andree
