Re: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

2008-07-05 Thread Justin Shore

Phil Vandry wrote:

On Tue, Jul 01, 2008 at 11:54:46AM +0200, Jeroen Massar wrote:

The magic keyword: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA.

[snip description on how to reject during DATA phase]
Unfortunately there is also a side-effect, partially, one has to have 
all inbound servers use this trick, and it might be that they need to be 
a bit heavier to process and scan all that mail. Then again, you can 


More than that: you also need to have all users in the domain (indeed
all users who share an MX server) agree on the accept/reject policy.
If users are free to use different spam filtering techniques and tune
them to their liking (e.g. someone uses SpamAssassin with a low threshold,
someone else uses it with a high threshold, someone else uses bogofilter
instead) then what do you do with mails that are addresses to more than
one user? You can have some users reject the message during the RCPT
phase and others accept it, but if you've waited until the DATA phase,
it's too late for that.


Phil,

This is a non-problem if you use the right spam filter.  I mentioned 
CanIt earlier in the thread.  It individually applies filtering rules to 
incoming mail and can apply different rules and take actions on a 
per-user basis.  It handles messages with multiple recipients by feeding 
copies of the message into an individual user's stream where that user's 
settings dictate what actions are taken.  A user may have an aggressive 
spam score or an extremely conservative score, message rejection with 
SpamHaus and SORBS or no DNSBLs at all, tons of custom rules and lots of 
bells and whistles or spam filtering disabled completely.  They've 
already anticipated all the possible problems that have been brought up 
in this thread.  Arrange for a demo and give it a try.  I don't think 
you'd be disappointed.


http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2008-July/001884.html

Justin



RE: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

2008-07-05 Thread Skywing
I think the problem that was being raised here was that past the DATA phase, if 
one recipient is going to receive the message and another is going to reject 
it, you have lost the ability to communicate this back to the sender (at least 
without an NDR).  Thus the problem of mails disappearing into spam folder black 
holes is back in the multirecipient case when one is dealing with DATA and 
recipients have differing spam policies.

- S

-Original Message-
From: Justin Shore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2008 2:05 AM
To: Phil Vandry
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: 
Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

Phil,

This is a non-problem if you use the right spam filter.  I mentioned
CanIt earlier in the thread.  It individually applies filtering rules to
incoming mail and can apply different rules and take actions on a
per-user basis.  It handles messages with multiple recipients by feeding
copies of the message into an individual user's stream where that user's
settings dictate what actions are taken.  A user may have an aggressive
spam score or an extremely conservative score, message rejection with
SpamHaus and SORBS or no DNSBLs at all, tons of custom rules and lots of
bells and whistles or spam filtering disabled completely.  They've
already anticipated all the possible problems that have been brought up
in this thread.  Arrange for a demo and give it a try.  I don't think
you'd be disappointed.

http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2008-July/001884.html

Justin




Re: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

2008-07-05 Thread Jean-François Mezei
one note about whether to filter at receiving SMTP server or later.

The receiving SMTP server is the one that has the conversation with the
sender.

Rejecting mail from servers having an un-backtranslatable IP is best
done right away by the receiving server right after the HELO command by
issuing error message about the IP being unbacktranslatable. Reduces the
load.

later on (for instance at the client level), you need to parse the
RFC822 text header and there are some bits that are missing, notably the
RCPT TO: commands. This is especially true when the TO in the 822
header is faked.

Blocking messages as early as possible also greatly reduces the load on
your system, disk storage requirements etc.



Re: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

2008-07-05 Thread Justin Shore

Jean-François Mezei wrote:

Blocking messages as early as possible also greatly reduces the load on
your system, disk storage requirements etc.


Rejecting during the SMTP dialog but before you signal that you've 
accepted the DATA output also also pushes the responsibility for sending 
a DSN to the sending MTA.  It's is a spammer then they'll drop the DSN. 
 If it's a compromised PC running Storm Worm or the like it won't 
generate DSNs anyway.  If it's a legit but poorly-configured MTA acting 
as an open relay it will generate the DSN and eventually get itself 
blacklisted.  Sending a DSN to a spoofed envelope From is considered 
spam in and of itself and will get an MTA blacklisted.  You could always 
not send DSNs in which case the sender of a legit message that had a few 
to many !!!s in it will not get a bounce and will not know that there 
message was blocked.  It disappears into an email blackhole.  Few things 
piss off users like disappearing email.


It's best all around to force the sending MTA to send the bounce.  Your 
MTA doesn't get blacklisted, spammers' relays are forced to do a little 
extra work, and senders of legit mail that's a false-positive get a DSN 
telling them that their message didn't go through (and hopefully why). 
Everyone wins.  Block early and block often.


Justin




REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

2008-07-01 Thread Jeroen Massar

Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote


It is because, if someone reports (by telephone, IRC or IRL) that he
sent an email and I did not receive it, I regard as VERY IMPORTANT to
be able to check the spam folder (with a search tool, not by hand) and
go back to him saying No, we really did not receive it.


The magic keyword: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA.

Aka during the DATA phase of the email, also directly scan it, then 
when the spam/virus tool thinks it is spam/virus, you just reject it.


This solves a couple of things in one go:

 - You don't have to handle bounces if you would send a bounce back
   to the sender hey you had a spam/virus because you already accepted
   the mail, thus less overhead at least there

 - The sending SMTP server will send a bounce back to the sender.
   The sender thus gets a SMTP rejection mail, with the rejection
   reason and knows that you didn't accept the message and why.
   They can then opt to change the content of the mail or contact you
   differently.

 - No more 'spam' folder, as the stuff that is spam is already rejected.
   You might get a few mails through that are actually spam, but this is
   mostly marginal.

This thus solves completely that email gets lost. Also note that if a 
virus/bot or something else silly is trying to send these mails it 
either has to handle the bounces, which they generally (afaik ;) don't, 
thus the faked sender doesn't get a swamp of failed deliveries either.

This is a Win-Win situation in my ears.

Unfortunately there is also a side-effect, partially, one has to have 
all inbound servers use this trick, and it might be that they need to be 
a bit heavier to process and scan all that mail. Then again, you can 
better let sending SMTP servers queue a bit (or throttle them) then 
having to process them anyway later.


Of course not all mail platforms can be fitted in this way, but people 
who have such systems probably already have other ways to handle things.


For the excellent Spamassassin, read:
http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/IntegratedInMta

The 'milter' options (originally sendmail, but nowadays also available 
for other mailers) can do this for you. Other anti-spam tools might also 
be able to do similar things. YMMV.


Oh and of course as a access-ISP, one should also employ this trick to 
the customers, that way they know that they are sending spam ;)


Greets,
 Jeroen



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Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: REJECT-ON-SMTP-DATA (Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs)

2008-07-01 Thread Justin Shore

Chris Owen wrote:
The lack of a spam folder is one of the problems with such a solution.  
Having a middle ground quarantine is actually quite nice.


However, the biggest problem is these solutions are global in nature.  
We let individual customers considerable control over the process.  They 
can each set their own block and quarantine levels, configure their own 
white and blacklists and even turn the spam controls completely off.  
For various reasons none of that would be possible with this solution 
and all the implementations you link to all run with a single global 
configuration.


Chris,

I can think of one spam filter that does give both you and your users 
individual control over all of these settings while still rejecting mail 
during the SMTP dialog including the DATA phase:  CanIt-Pro.


http://www.roaringpenguin.com/

CanIt-Pro is a mail filter or 'milter' in Sendmail-speak.  It 
essentially connects into Sendmail from the side.  Sendmail calls on it 
during the SMTP dialog with the remote MTA, giving CanIt-Pro the 
opportunity to work its magic before the message is accepted for 
delivery which allows from rejecting mail right up until the last second 
RFC 2821 permits it.  I use CanIt-Pro for this very reason.  Each user 
can have their own individual mail stream in CanIt terminology.  Each 
user can define white/blacklists by senders, domains and hosts.  Users 
can block or permit by MIME types or perform actions based on attachment 
suffixes.  They can write their own rules with regexs against the 
headers or body as well as checking to see if a sending domain matches 
that of the relaying MTA (not always accurate but often is; ebay.com is 
a good example).  Users can enable or disable individually configured 
DNSBLs or change the score.  They can even define rules based on SPF 
values.  Each user gets their own bayesian DB as well.


You as an admin can disable any of the above features on a per-user 
basis so you can make it as simple or as complex as you want.  You can 
also pre-define streams with specific settings that users can subscribe 
to if they don't want the more fine-grained control.  I created a stream 
that only tags suspect spam.  I also created 3 streams with varying 
levels of aggressiveness.


Have you ever heard the phrase a pilot's plane?  Well I would liken 
CanIt to being the equivalent for mail admins and their spam filters.  I 
first started using the OSS predecessor to CanIt back in late 2000 or so 
called MIMEDefang.  MD is still the underpinnings of CanIt.  When you 
buy CanIt you also get the source code so you have the ability to code 
in custom things if you have the need and desire.  It's perfect for SPs.


BTW, I'm not a Roaring Penguin employee.  I'm just an impressed user of 
their products so they've earned my loyalty.


Justin



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-30 Thread 'Stephane Bortzmeyer'
On Sun, Jun 29, 2008 at 03:30:15PM -0500,
 Frank Bulk - iNAME [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 
 a message of 35 lines which said:

 Because if you do anything, even as basic as RBLs, you're not being
 consistent with your stance.

The typical use of RBLs is to reject email at the SMTP level, when it
matches an entry in the RBL. That way, the sender is warned that
something went wrong, email does not disappear silently.



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-30 Thread Roland Perry
On Sat, Jun 28, 2008 at 05:25:16PM -0500,
 Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
 a message of 53 lines which said:

It is because, if someone reports (by telephone, IRC or IRL) that he
sent an email and I did not receive it, I regard as VERY IMPORTANT to
be able to check the spam folder (with a search tool, not by hand) and
go back to him saying No, we really did not receive it.

In article
!!AAAuAKTyXRN5/+lGvU59a+P7CFMBAN6gY+ZG84BMpVQcAbDh1IQAA
[EMAIL PROTECTED], Frank Bulk -
iNAME [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes
You mean, you don't employ *any* spam mitigation techniques besides sorting?
Because if you do anything, even as basic as RBLs, you're not being
consistent with your stance.

I agree completely with Chris Owen's approach, even though I use spam
mitigation techniques.

The reason for this is because those lost emails that I very
occasionally rescue from the spam bucket are:

NOT sent by someone on an RBL

NOT sent to an unpublished and unused address
(eg [EMAIL PROTECTED])
etc.
-- 
Roland Perry



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sat, Jun 28, 2008 at 05:56:23PM -0400, Jean-Fran?ois Mezei wrote:
 The original mantra of either discarding the email during SMTP
 conversation, or sending a non delivery notification should be strictly
 adhered to. When email becomes unreliable (thanks to microsoft), people
 stop using it.

I agree with your sentiments -- that notification is essential in order
to provide a heads-up about problems (and that once problems are noticed,
cooperation is essential in order to fix them).  But mail should never
be discarded without notice, and NDN's should never be sent (MTA-to-MTA,
which is a different matter than MSA-to-MTA): it should either be accepted
(and delivered) or rejected (and not delivered).   This provides accurate
notification to the sending MTA of the disposition of the message, and it
avoids outscatter spam.  Of course, this doesn't do anything to elicit
cooperation from either side, but at least it makes problems visible
(provided nobody's MTA mangles or drops the reject notice) so that there's
a decent chance of figuring *whose* cooperation is needed.

---Rsk



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread John Peach
On Sat, 28 Jun 2008 17:25:16 -0500
Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

[snip]
 
 So should I have bounced all 4,602?  Since ninety some percent of
 them came from forged addresses that would not only be pointless but
 would be contributing to the problem (and get us into bl.spamcop.com).
 
Of course you shouldn't accept and bounce them; you should not accept
them at all. Reject them up front.

-- 
John



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Roger Marquis

Rich Kulawiec wrote:

notification is essential in order to provide a heads-up about
problems (and that once problems are noticed, cooperation is
essential in order to fix them). But mail should never be
discarded without notice


In practice we've found that (notification) is the core issue.  Reject v
discard is a non-issue by comparison.

The format of those notifications does not have to be a spam folder, as
many seem to assume.  A summary report serves the purpose far better than
tagging and delivery with far less overhead.  Quoting
http://www.postconf.com/docs/spamrep/ :

  The only reliable way to avoid false-positives is by monitoring
  the email server or gateway logs and allowing end-users to receive
  a daily report of email sent to their account that was identified
  as spam and filtered.

This is more or less identical to the issue ISP's like Comcast face when
implementing QOS or other filtering, when they fail to notify end-users.

Backscatter / NDNs are another issue.  In practice they are no longer
feasible without assurance that the sender is both valid and legitimate.
Bounces without these validations are usually spam and will get your server
blacklisted.

Roger Marquis



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sun, Jun 29, 2008 at 07:55:07AM -0700, Roger Marquis wrote:
 Quoting http://www.postconf.com/docs/spamrep/ :

   The only reliable way to avoid false-positives is by monitoring
   the email server or gateway logs and allowing end-users to receive
   a daily report of email sent to their account that was identified
   as spam and filtered.

Two comments:

First, it is impossible to avoid false positives (unless you turn all
spam filtering off) or false negatives (unless you block everything).
The discussion thus shouldn't focus on 0% FP, 0% FN, but on how to
minimize both simultaneously such that the percentages are acceptable
to the receiving organization.  (Note as well that FP and FN are always
defined on recipient side, never the sender side.)

Second, while in principle this isn't a bad approach, in reality it
tends not to work well.  It requires that users weed through the daily
reports (which they won't) and determine what's spam/not-spam (which
they'll get wrong) and it requires accepting and storing considerable
volumes of mail which are likely spam/phish/virus/etc.  It also can
make FP detection difficult, since senders do not get a reject (mail
was accepted, after all; why should they?) and thus may be unaware that
their message was dropped in a probable-spam folder.  I find it's much
better to reject outright with a very clear error message (that provides
recourse for senders who believe it to be in error) and then address the
resulting issues at the postmaster level (since in most environments
such issues are likely to effect more than one user).

---Rsk



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
[Wow, operational content!]

On Sat, Jun 28, 2008 at 05:25:16PM -0500,
 Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 
 a message of 53 lines which said:

 At some point what is the difference between putting the mail into a
 spam folder and sending them to /dev/null?

To me, there is a huge difference. I send no mail to Dave Null,
everything goes into a spam folder. Do I read it? Do I review it from
time to time? Never. It is too huge. So, what's the point besides
bringing money to hard disk manufacturers?

It is because, if someone reports (by telephone, IRC or IRL) that he
sent an email and I did not receive it, I regard as VERY IMPORTANT to
be able to check the spam folder (with a search tool, not by hand) and
go back to him saying No, we really did not receive it.

In a professional environment, I would not accept the idea of email
disappearing without being able to recover it.




RE: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Frank Bulk - iNAME
You mean, you don't employ *any* spam mitigation techniques besides sorting?
Because if you do anything, even as basic as RBLs, you're not being
consistent with your stance.

Frank

-Original Message-
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Sunday, June 29, 2008 3:08 PM
To: Chris Owen
Cc: nanog
Subject: Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

[Wow, operational content!]

On Sat, Jun 28, 2008 at 05:25:16PM -0500,
 Chris Owen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
 a message of 53 lines which said:

 At some point what is the difference between putting the mail into a
 spam folder and sending them to /dev/null?

To me, there is a huge difference. I send no mail to Dave Null,
everything goes into a spam folder. Do I read it? Do I review it from
time to time? Never. It is too huge. So, what's the point besides
bringing money to hard disk manufacturers?

It is because, if someone reports (by telephone, IRC or IRL) that he
sent an email and I did not receive it, I regard as VERY IMPORTANT to
be able to check the spam folder (with a search tool, not by hand) and
go back to him saying No, we really did not receive it.

In a professional environment, I would not accept the idea of email
disappearing without being able to recover it.






Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Laurence F. Sheldon, Jr.

Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:


It is because, if someone reports (by telephone, IRC or IRL) that he
sent an email and I did not receive it, I regard as VERY IMPORTANT to
be able to check the spam folder (with a search tool, not by hand) and
go back to him saying No, we really did not receive it.

In a professional environment, I would not accept the idea of email
disappearing without being able to recover it.


In my view of a professional environment (what ever that turns out to 
mean) a log file would enable that, without any of the problems holding 
mail text might engender.


Did you get the email from...to...?
Yes
Please tell the court what it said.

--
Requiescas in pace o email  Two identifying characteristics
 of System Administrators:
Ex turpi causa non oritur actioInfallibility, and the ability to
 learn from their mistakes.
Eppure si rinfresca

ICBM Targeting Information: http://tinyurl.com/4sqczs



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-29 Thread Roger Marquis

Rich Kulawiec wrote:

Quoting http://www.postconf.com/docs/spamrep/ :

  The only reliable way to avoid false-positives is by monitoring
  the email server or gateway logs and allowing end-users to receive
  a daily report of email sent to their account that was identified
  as spam and filtered.


First, it is impossible to avoid false positives (unless you turn all
spam filtering off) or false negatives


A bit of a Red Herring as nobody expects 100%.


Second, while in principle this isn't a bad approach, in reality it
tends not to work well.


Judging by user acceptance, over a decade's use and several thousand users,
it works better than any other method, certainly better than silently
rejecting and discarding spam on the one hand, or tagging and delivering it
on the other.

Not that any ISP delivers everything (since ~1996).  The ones that try
learn a hard lesson in DOS or they lose customers (remember netcom.com).
The issue isn't delivery, it's reporting, and only ISPs that inform users
about _every_ rejected or discarded email are capable of effectively
minimizing false positives.


It requires that users weed through the daily reports


Looks like you haven't looked at the reports.  Nothing in them is more
difficult to parse than a large spam folder.  I'm guessing you also don't
intend to imply that users look in their spam folder?


and it requires accepting and storing considerable volumes of
mail which are likely spam/phish/virus/etc.


You must be talking about some other system.  Volumes of mail stored in
spam folders are what reports _avoid_.  Simple text reports take almost no
disk and, for most users, a year's worth of searchable daily reports takes
just a few MBs.


can make FP detection difficult, since senders do not get a
reject (mail was accepted, after all; why should they?) and thus
may be unaware that their message was dropped in a probable-spam
folder.


You really should read the URL cited above, and have a look at the sample
reports.

Whether spam is rejected outright or discarded after delivery is not
relevant since good reports list both.  Users don't make a distinction
either, as long as they know what was filtered.

Whether to A) reject or B) accept and discard is also a bit of a red
herring.  Most spam will get reject by RBLs but you still _must_ run
everything else through Spamassassin and AV, and there's no way to do those
checks pre-queue without SMTP timeouts and DOS.

Roger Marquis



RE: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread michael.dillon
   Requirement ?  What requirement ?  There's no requirement for
   reverse DNS for email in any RFC.  Not that RFCs are 
 ideal references
   for mail operation in general.

You're right, documents published by an organization whose goal
is to design internetworking protocols are not the best place
to find operational advice. For that you would be better to go
to an organization like MAAWG which publishes this BCP:

http://www.maawg.org/about/MAAWG_Sender_BCP/MAAWG_Senders_BCP_Combine.pd
f

On page 5 they do recommend matching reverse DNS and in
Appendix A they go on to state that RFC 1912 states that
all hosts on the Internet should have a valid rDNS entry.
Perhaps the RFC series doesn't have as many gaps as we think.

   known-dynamic is extremely up to debate.  Frankly, 
 blacklisting
   entire /16s because individual customer PCs have been 
 hijacked is
   absurd, but I guess colateral damage is acceptable.  

If collateral damage is acceptable, then how is this
absurd? Once you accept that it is better to reject
good email than let bad email through, the game has
changed. It may end up by destroying the business usefulness
of the existing email architecture, but not without a
push from someone who has a better mousetrap.

   I'm not laying blame here, just pointing out that rejecting mail
   from IP addresses for which no PTR delegation exists is 
 unwarranted,

This is quite simply, wrong. It is warranted.

 Don't go preaching
   it as a best practice, though.

Too late, the MAAWG has already published this as a best practice
for quite some time. If you don't follow the MAAWG best practices
then you are not a serious email operator. If email is mission
critical to your business, then you really should be an MAAWG
member as well.

--Michael Dillon

P.S. I personally have nothing to do with the MAAWG although
my company is an active member.



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread Phil Regnauld
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (michael.dillon) writes:
 
 
 http://www.maawg.org/about/MAAWG_Sender_BCP/MAAWG_Senders_BCP_Combine.pdf

Thanks for the pointer.  I don't necessarily agree with all of it,
but it's definitely a good reference.

I just get irritated by actions that penalize end users who feel they
don't have other options other than just using some horrible webmail
service, because their operator/ISP is clueless.  I do make a
distinction.

 On page 5 they do recommend matching reverse DNS and in
 Appendix A they go on to state that RFC 1912 states that
 all hosts on the Internet should have a valid rDNS entry.

Indeed it does, but rejecting a mail based on a missing PTR
is still arbitrarily useless (and I'm speaking in terms of
volume of spam emanating from hosts with a missing PTR, vs
spam origination from hosts that do have a PTR).

 Perhaps the RFC series doesn't have as many gaps as we think.

For mail operations, we're half a galaxy away from be conservative
in what you send, be liberal in what you accept.

  absurd, but I guess colateral damage is acceptable.  
 
 If collateral damage is acceptable, then how is this
 absurd?

Apologies, I was being sarcastic.

 Once you accept that it is better to reject
 good email than let bad email through, the game has
 changed. It may end up by destroying the business usefulness
 of the existing email architecture, but not without a
 push from someone who has a better mousetrap.

Yep.

 This is quite simply, wrong. It is warranted.

Not agreeing :)  But fair enough, any site is allowed to operate
mail the way it wants.

  Don't go preaching
  it as a best practice, though.
 
 Too late, the MAAWG has already published this as a best practice
 for quite some time. If you don't follow the MAAWG best practices
 then you are not a serious email operator. If email is mission
 critical to your business, then you really should be an MAAWG
 member as well.

We work for several customers and operate large mail installations.
We implement quite a few requirements that are fairly strict, but
rejecting based on missing PTR is not one of them.
Neither is blacklisting entire TLDs for that matter, but I digress.
I still feel like a serious mail operator, just because I don't
conclude that I as the receiver should reject mail from a host with
a missing PTR, because the MAAWG *Senders* BCP says that hosts
should have a reverse.

Phil




RE: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread Frank Bulk - iNAME
Comments in-line.

-Original Message-
From: Phil Regnauld [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Saturday, June 28, 2008 1:02 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (michael.dillon) writes:


 http://www.maawg.org/about/MAAWG_Sender_BCP/MAAWG_Senders_BCP_Combine.pdf

Thanks for the pointer.  I don't necessarily agree with all of it,
but it's definitely a good reference.

I just get irritated by actions that penalize end users who feel
they
don't have other options other than just using some horrible webmail
service, because their operator/ISP is clueless.  I do make a
distinction.

FB You do have an option -- ask the sender to clean up their act.  Then the
operator/ISP will happily receive the sender's e-mail.  When one of our
business customers complains to us (ISP) that they can't send e-mail to an
external third-party and I find out it's due to poor configuration on their
part (almost 100% of the time -- the sole exception that I can recall is a
business customer's IP address being blocked by a GoDaddy RBL even though
another properly SWIPed customer was sending the spam.  Apparently GoDaddy's
minimum block size is /24 and they can't bother to look up the ranges), I
don't complain about the external third-party, I educate our business
customer on best practices.

 On page 5 they do recommend matching reverse DNS and in
 Appendix A they go on to state that RFC 1912 states that
 all hosts on the Internet should have a valid rDNS entry.

Indeed it does, but rejecting a mail based on a missing PTR
is still arbitrarily useless (and I'm speaking in terms of
volume of spam emanating from hosts with a missing PTR, vs
spam origination from hosts that do have a PTR).

FB The point is that those are able to create a valid rDNS entry likely
have more control of their infrastructure than those who don't.  You must
admit, if you can't get a proper rDNS entry created for your domain, what
does that say about your ability to control your infrastructure?  Of course,
the inverse it not true.

snip






Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread Jim Popovitch
On Sat, Jun 28, 2008 at 2:21 PM, Frank Bulk - iNAME [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 FB The point is that those are able to create a valid rDNS entry likely
 have more control of their infrastructure than those who don't.  You must
 admit, if you can't get a proper rDNS entry created for your domain, what
 does that say about your ability to control your infrastructure?

And to that point, a valid rDNS entry can easily be removed by the
netblock holder at smal co-lo facility.  This is an easy, although not
widely used enough, means for co-lo providers to retain control over
leased (mail) servers without worrying about the legal issues with
pre-maturely taking a customer offline.  I've never seen a posted
service delivery statement that guaranteed PTRs.  In fact, IMHO, PTRs
are a courtesy from the netblock owner, not a given.

-Jim P.



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread Jean-François Mezei
re: reverse DNS and emails.

There are well documented and fairly simple tasks to reduce spam.
requiring rdns, using rbls and blocking certain IP blocks goes a long way.

The biggest problem however are outfits like microsoft whose hotmail/msn
properties have undocumented logic which confirm reception of the
message at the SMTP/821 level but then proceed to discard the email
instead of delivering it to the person's inbox (or spam folder). Because
they are unfortunatly popular, this means that sending email to users of
those systems has become untrustable since you need to phone them to
ensure they got the email.

And it is impossible to talk to a postmaster at hotmail to know why
hotmail sometimes/often doesn't like your emails even though you abide
by standard rules. (rdns, spf etc)

Spam getrs you more than you bargained for, but you still get your
legitimate emails. But hotmail/MSN discard legitimate emails without
warning and that makes SMTP untrustable and this is a far more serious
issue.

The original mantra of either discarding the email during SMTP
conversation, or sending a non delivery notification should be strictly
adhered to. When email becomes unreliable (thanks to microsoft), people
stop using it.



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread Chris Owen

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Hash: SHA1

On Jun 28, 2008, at 4:56 PM, Jean-François Mezei wrote:

The biggest problem however are outfits like microsoft whose hotmail/ 
msn

properties have undocumented logic which confirm reception of the
message at the SMTP/821 level but then proceed to discard the email
instead of delivering it to the person's inbox (or spam folder).


At some point what is the difference between putting the mail into a  
spam folder and sending them to /dev/null?


Yesterday I received 4,932 emails.  294 of those went into my inbox.   
36 of those went info my quarantine folder.  The other 4,602 went  
straight to /dev/null (actually many of them went through various  
blacklist building scripts first).  Had I put the full 4,638 into a  
spam folder that would have been completely worthless.  It would be  
impossible for me to actually review all those emails.  Ultimately,  
there wouldn't be any difference between that and /dev/null.  The only  
difference is I would have deleted them later rather than when they  
came in.


So should I have bounced all 4,602?  Since ninety some percent of them  
came from forged addresses that would not only be pointless but would  
be contributing to the problem (and get us into bl.spamcop.com).


The size of the problem presented by spam is just enormous.  Before we  
started selective greylisting, we used to accept a million messages a  
day.  Of those we only delivered about 50,000.  And that's for a  
system only handling about 5,000 email accounts.  I can't even imagine  
having to do that on the scale hotmail is talking about.


Chris


Chris Owen ~ Garden City (620) 275-1900 ~  Lottery (noun):
President  ~ Wichita (316) 858-3000 ~A stupidity tax
Hubris Communications Inc  www.hubris.net




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Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread Randy Bush
some folk on this list are network operators.  i.e. what you do with
your personal mailbox is not highly interesting.   we have this silly
problem called paying users. the issue is what an mta operator does
for hundreds, thousands, or more of these pesky critters.

at least in my world, they seem to have significantly higher tolerance
for 100 spams than one dropped ham.  they may whine about blow-back from
a joe job, but they will go bleeping nuts if they lose one message from
a legitimate contact.  and i suspect that this aversion to beta errors
is not irrational; think postal mail.

the issue, at least to me, is keeping mail drop alpha error reasonably
low while keeping beta error as close to zero as possible.

so please excuse me if i do not take talk about blocking some form of
dns silliness, or a continent of ip addresses, or ... very seriously.

we now return you to our regular channel of telling icann what it should
do at layer fourteen, a subject on which we have deep expertise.

randy



Re: Mail Server best practices - was: Pandora's Box of new TLDs

2008-06-28 Thread John Levine
So should I have bounced all 4,602?  Since ninety some percent of them  
came from forged addresses that would not only be pointless but would  
be contributing to the problem (and get us into bl.spamcop.com).

Of course not.  You should have rejected them.

Note that rejection doesn't keep you from using them to tune your filters.
My MTA does much of its filtering at the end of data, and if it decides
the message isn't going into the nominal recipient's mailbox, it returns
a 553 status, then dumps the message into the spamtrap.

R's,
John