Re: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-04 Thread Gregory Edigarov
On Thu, 3 Dec 2009 13:03:20 -0500
Matthew Huff mh...@ox.com wrote:

 I'm not at all concerned about door-knob twisting or network
 scanning. What concerns me is that the source addresses are spoofed
 from our address range and that our upstream providers aren't willing
 to even look at the problem. 
 
But that can be easy addressed by yourself.
just do not allow traffic originating from your range on your
external interfaces.

-- 
With best regards,
Gregory Edigarov



Re: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-04 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On Thu, Dec 3, 2009 at 10:35 PM, Matthew Huff mh...@ox.com wrote:
 We are seeing a large number of tcp connection attempts to ports known to 
 have security issues. The source addresses are spoofed from our address 
 range. They are easy to block at our border router obviously, but the number 
 and volume is a bit worrisome. Our upstream providers appear to be 
 uninterested in tracing or blocking them. Is this the new normal? One of my 
 concerns is that if others are seeing probe attempts, they will see them from 
 these addresses and of course, contact us.

 Any suggestions on what to do next? Or just ignore.

Filter it out and then ignore.   Might as well filter it out - see
http://thespamdiaries.blogspot.com/2006/02/new-host-cloaking-technique-used-by.html



port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-03 Thread Matthew Huff
We are seeing a large number of tcp connection attempts to ports known to have 
security issues. The source addresses are spoofed from our address range. They 
are easy to block at our border router obviously, but the number and volume is 
a bit worrisome. Our upstream providers appear to be uninterested in tracing or 
blocking them. Is this the new normal? One of my concerns is that if others are 
seeing probe attempts, they will see them from these addresses and of course, 
contact us.

Any suggestions on what to do next? Or just ignore.


Matthew Huff   | One Manhattanville Rd
OTA Management LLC | Purchase, NY 10577
http://www.ox.com  | Phone: 914-460-4039
aim: matthewbhuff  | Fax:   914-460-4139





Re: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-03 Thread Florian Weimer
* Matthew Huff:

 We are seeing a large number of tcp connection attempts to ports
 known to have security issues. The source addresses are spoofed from
 our address range. They are easy to block at our border router
 obviously, but the number and volume is a bit worrisome. Our
 upstream providers appear to be uninterested in tracing or blocking
 them. Is this the new normal? One of my concerns is that if others
 are seeing probe attempts, they will see them from these addresses
 and of course, contact us.

What's the distribution of the source addresses and source ports?

-- 
Florian Weimerfwei...@bfk.de
BFK edv-consulting GmbH   http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstraße 100  tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99



RE: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-03 Thread Stefan Fouant
 -Original Message-
 From: Matthew Huff [mailto:mh...@ox.com]
 Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 12:05 PM
 
 but the number and volume is a bit worrisome. Our upstream providers
 appear to be uninterested in tracing or blocking them. Is this the new
 normal?

Yes, it's the new norm... same as the old norm... I'm surprised they didn't
try to upsell you on some type of managed DDoS solution...

Stefan Fouant
www.shortestpathfirst.net
GPG Key ID: 0xB5E3803D




RE: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-03 Thread Matthew Huff
The source address appears to be fixed as well as the source port (), 
scanning different destinations and ports.


Matthew Huff   | One Manhattanville Rd
OTA Management LLC | Purchase, NY 10577
http://www.ox.com  | Phone: 914-460-4039
aim: matthewbhuff  | Fax:   914-460-4139


-Original Message-
From: Florian Weimer [mailto:fwei...@bfk.de] 
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 12:35 PM
To: Matthew Huff
Cc: (nanog@nanog.org)
Subject: Re: port scanning from spoofed addresses

* Matthew Huff:

 We are seeing a large number of tcp connection attempts to ports
 known to have security issues. The source addresses are spoofed from
 our address range. They are easy to block at our border router
 obviously, but the number and volume is a bit worrisome. Our
 upstream providers appear to be uninterested in tracing or blocking
 them. Is this the new normal? One of my concerns is that if others
 are seeing probe attempts, they will see them from these addresses
 and of course, contact us.

What's the distribution of the source addresses and source ports?

-- 
Florian Weimerfwei...@bfk.de
BFK edv-consulting GmbH   http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstraße 100  tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99



Re: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-03 Thread Charles Wyble

On Dec 3, 2009, at 9:53 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:

 The source address appears to be fixed as well as the source port (), 
 scanning different destinations and ports.
 
 


Some script kiddies found nmap and decided to target you for some reason. It 
happens. It's annoying. 


RE: port scanning from spoofed addresses

2009-12-03 Thread Matthew Huff
I'm not at all concerned about door-knob twisting or network scanning. What 
concerns me is that the source addresses are spoofed from our address range and 
that our upstream providers aren't willing to even look at the problem. 


Matthew Huff   | One Manhattanville Rd
OTA Management LLC | Purchase, NY 10577
http://www.ox.com  | Phone: 914-460-4039
aim: matthewbhuff  | Fax:   914-460-4139


-Original Message-
From: Charles Wyble [mailto:char...@thewybles.com] 
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 1:01 PM
To: Matthew Huff
Cc: Florian Weimer; (nanog@nanog.org)
Subject: Re: port scanning from spoofed addresses


On Dec 3, 2009, at 9:53 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:

 The source address appears to be fixed as well as the source port (), 
 scanning different destinations and ports.
 
 


Some script kiddies found nmap and decided to target you for some reason. It 
happens. It's annoying.