Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls
Okay, -15 has been published and incorporates those fixes and suggestions: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-15 On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 5:04 PM Brian Campbell wrote: > Thanks Roman, I'll work to incorporate those suggestions into the next > revision before the impending I-D submission cutoff date. > > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 2:14 PM Roman Danyliw wrote: > >> Hi Brian! >> >> >> >> My response is inline ... >> >> >> >> *From:* Brian Campbell [mailto:bcampb...@pingidentity.com] >> *Sent:* Monday, June 24, 2019 1:17 PM >> *To:* Roman Danyliw >> *Cc:* oauth >> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls >> >> >> >> Thanks for the additional review, Roman. I feel lucky, it's not often one >> gets *two* AD reviews :) Please see below for replies inline with a few >> followup questions. >> >> >> >> [Roman] *chuckle* >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 12:29 PM Roman Danyliw wrote: >> >> Hi! >> >> I conducted as second AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-mtls per the AD >> hand-off. I have the following additional feedback: >> >> ** Per ekr's earlier review at >> https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3657, paraphrasing: >> -- Section 2.1.2, How is these metadata parameters being obtained? >> >> >> >> The authorization server can obtain client metadata via the Dynamic >> Client Registration Protocol [RFC7591], which is referenced in the top of >> that section. Also the metadata defined by RFC7591, and registered >> extensions to it, implies a general data model for clients that is used by >> most authorization server implementations even when the Dynamic Client >> Registration Protocol isn't in play. Such implementations typically have >> some sort of user interface available for managing client configuration.. >> >> >> >> Dose that answer your question? Do you believe more should be said in the >> document to better explain or clarify that? >> >> >> >> [Roman] It does clear it up. Thanks. I think it’s worth a short >> statement about how the AS would get the fields. >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Section 3.2, Figure 3. In this example, what new information is the >> auth server providing to the relying party here? >> >> >> >> The new info here (and in Section 3.1 too) is the hash of the client >> certificate to which the access token is bound, which is in the "cnf" >> confirmation method at the bottom as the "x5t#S256" member. >> >> >> >> [Roman] Makes sense. To make the example clearer, I’d call out this out >> in the prose introducing the example. >> >> >> >> >> ** Section 2.0. What is the expected behavior if the presented >> certificate doesn't match expected client_id? How is this signaled? >> >> >> >> With a normal OAuth 2.0 error response using the "invalid_client" error >> code per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2 >> >> >> >> Do you think that needs to be stated more explicitly in this document? >> >> >> >> [Roman] Yes, I’d explicit state it with that citation, especially since >> Section 3 discusses of how errors are returned. >> >> >> >> >> ** Section 2.2. Per the sentence "As pre-requisite, the client registers >> its X.509 certificate ... or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates >> ... with the authorization server. >> -- Editorial: s/As pre-requisite/As a prerequisite/ >> >> >> >> done >> >> >> >> -- What's a "trusted source" in this case? Is that just a jwks_uri? If >> so, maybe s/a trusted source/a reference to a trust source/. If not, can >> you please elaborate. >> >> >> >> Yes, it's just a jwks_uri. I'll change that. >> >> >> >> >> A few editorial nits: >> ** Section 2.2.2. Typo. s/sec 4.7/Section 4.7/ >> >> >> >> fixed >> >> >> >> >> ** Section 3.1 Cite DER encoding as: >> [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: >> Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical >> Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules >> (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. >> >> >> >> will do >> >> >> >
Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls
Thanks Roman, I'll work to incorporate those suggestions into the next revision before the impending I-D submission cutoff date. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 2:14 PM Roman Danyliw wrote: > Hi Brian! > > > > My response is inline ... > > > > *From:* Brian Campbell [mailto:bcampb...@pingidentity.com] > *Sent:* Monday, June 24, 2019 1:17 PM > *To:* Roman Danyliw > *Cc:* oauth > *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls > > > > Thanks for the additional review, Roman. I feel lucky, it's not often one > gets *two* AD reviews :) Please see below for replies inline with a few > followup questions. > > > > [Roman] *chuckle* > > > > On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 12:29 PM Roman Danyliw wrote: > > Hi! > > I conducted as second AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-mtls per the AD > hand-off. I have the following additional feedback: > > ** Per ekr's earlier review at > https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3657, paraphrasing: > -- Section 2.1.2, How is these metadata parameters being obtained? > > > > The authorization server can obtain client metadata via the Dynamic Client > Registration Protocol [RFC7591], which is referenced in the top of that > section. Also the metadata defined by RFC7591, and registered extensions to > it, implies a general data model for clients that is used by most > authorization server implementations even when the Dynamic Client > Registration Protocol isn't in play. Such implementations typically have > some sort of user interface available for managing client configuration. > > > > Dose that answer your question? Do you believe more should be said in the > document to better explain or clarify that? > > > > [Roman] It does clear it up. Thanks. I think it’s worth a short > statement about how the AS would get the fields. > > > > > > -- Section 3.2, Figure 3. In this example, what new information is the > auth server providing to the relying party here? > > > > The new info here (and in Section 3.1 too) is the hash of the client > certificate to which the access token is bound, which is in the "cnf" > confirmation method at the bottom as the "x5t#S256" member. > > > > [Roman] Makes sense. To make the example clearer, I’d call out this out > in the prose introducing the example. > > > > > ** Section 2.0. What is the expected behavior if the presented > certificate doesn't match expected client_id? How is this signaled? > > > > With a normal OAuth 2.0 error response using the "invalid_client" error > code per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2 > > > > Do you think that needs to be stated more explicitly in this document? > > > > [Roman] Yes, I’d explicit state it with that citation, especially since > Section 3 discusses of how errors are returned. > > > > > ** Section 2.2. Per the sentence "As pre-requisite, the client registers > its X.509 certificate ... or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates > ... with the authorization server. > -- Editorial: s/As pre-requisite/As a prerequisite/ > > > > done > > > > -- What's a "trusted source" in this case? Is that just a jwks_uri? If > so, maybe s/a trusted source/a reference to a trust source/. If not, can > you please elaborate. > > > > Yes, it's just a jwks_uri. I'll change that. > > > > > A few editorial nits: > ** Section 2.2.2. Typo. s/sec 4.7/Section 4.7/ > > > > fixed > > > > > ** Section 3.1 Cite DER encoding as: > [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: > Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical > Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules > (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. > > > > will do > > > > ** Section 5. Typo. s/metatdata/metadata/ > > > > yup > > > > > ** Section 6. Typo. s/The the/The/ > > > > got it > > > > > ** Section 7.2. Typo. s/the the/the/ > > > > done > > > > > ** Appendix. Cite the figures numbers (#5 - 7) in the text describing the > contents of the section. > > > > will do > > > > > The shepherd write-up is in good shape. Thank you. > > Regards, > Roman > > > > [Roman] Thanks for all of the above. > > > > Roman > > > > > ___ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > *CONFIDEN
Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls
Hi Brian! My response is inline ... From: Brian Campbell [mailto:bcampb...@pingidentity.com] Sent: Monday, June 24, 2019 1:17 PM To: Roman Danyliw Cc: oauth Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls Thanks for the additional review, Roman. I feel lucky, it's not often one gets *two* AD reviews :) Please see below for replies inline with a few followup questions. [Roman] *chuckle* On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 12:29 PM Roman Danyliw mailto:r...@cert.org>> wrote: Hi! I conducted as second AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-mtls per the AD hand-off. I have the following additional feedback: ** Per ekr's earlier review at https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3657, paraphrasing: -- Section 2.1.2, How is these metadata parameters being obtained? The authorization server can obtain client metadata via the Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [RFC7591], which is referenced in the top of that section. Also the metadata defined by RFC7591, and registered extensions to it, implies a general data model for clients that is used by most authorization server implementations even when the Dynamic Client Registration Protocol isn't in play. Such implementations typically have some sort of user interface available for managing client configuration. Dose that answer your question? Do you believe more should be said in the document to better explain or clarify that? [Roman] It does clear it up. Thanks. I think it’s worth a short statement about how the AS would get the fields. -- Section 3.2, Figure 3. In this example, what new information is the auth server providing to the relying party here? The new info here (and in Section 3.1 too) is the hash of the client certificate to which the access token is bound, which is in the "cnf" confirmation method at the bottom as the "x5t#S256" member. [Roman] Makes sense. To make the example clearer, I’d call out this out in the prose introducing the example. ** Section 2.0. What is the expected behavior if the presented certificate doesn't match expected client_id? How is this signaled? With a normal OAuth 2.0 error response using the "invalid_client" error code per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2 Do you think that needs to be stated more explicitly in this document? [Roman] Yes, I’d explicit state it with that citation, especially since Section 3 discusses of how errors are returned. ** Section 2.2. Per the sentence "As pre-requisite, the client registers its X.509 certificate ... or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates ... with the authorization server. -- Editorial: s/As pre-requisite/As a prerequisite/ done -- What's a "trusted source" in this case? Is that just a jwks_uri? If so, maybe s/a trusted source/a reference to a trust source/. If not, can you please elaborate. Yes, it's just a jwks_uri. I'll change that. A few editorial nits: ** Section 2.2.2. Typo. s/sec 4.7/Section 4.7/ fixed ** Section 3.1 Cite DER encoding as: [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. will do ** Section 5. Typo. s/metatdata/metadata/ yup ** Section 6. Typo. s/The the/The/ got it ** Section 7.2. Typo. s/the the/the/ done ** Appendix. Cite the figures numbers (#5 - 7) in the text describing the contents of the section. will do The shepherd write-up is in good shape. Thank you. Regards, Roman [Roman] Thanks for all of the above. Roman ___ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. Thank you. ___ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
Re: [OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls
Thanks for the additional review, Roman. I feel lucky, it's not often one gets *two* AD reviews :) Please see below for replies inline with a few followup questions. On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 12:29 PM Roman Danyliw wrote: > Hi! > > I conducted as second AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-mtls per the AD > hand-off. I have the following additional feedback: > > ** Per ekr's earlier review at > https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3657, paraphrasing: > -- Section 2.1.2, How is these metadata parameters being obtained? > The authorization server can obtain client metadata via the Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [RFC7591], which is referenced in the top of that section. Also the metadata defined by RFC7591, and registered extensions to it, implies a general data model for clients that is used by most authorization server implementations even when the Dynamic Client Registration Protocol isn't in play. Such implementations typically have some sort of user interface available for managing client configuration. Dose that answer your question? Do you believe more should be said in the document to better explain or clarify that? -- Section 3.2, Figure 3. In this example, what new information is the > auth server providing to the relying party here? > The new info here (and in Section 3.1 too) is the hash of the client certificate to which the access token is bound, which is in the "cnf" confirmation method at the bottom as the "x5t#S256" member. > > ** Section 2.0. What is the expected behavior if the presented > certificate doesn't match expected client_id? How is this signaled? > With a normal OAuth 2.0 error response using the "invalid_client" error code per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2 Do you think that needs to be stated more explicitly in this document? > > ** Section 2.2. Per the sentence "As pre-requisite, the client registers > its X.509 certificate ... or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates > ... with the authorization server. > -- Editorial: s/As pre-requisite/As a prerequisite/ > done > -- What's a "trusted source" in this case? Is that just a jwks_uri? If > so, maybe s/a trusted source/a reference to a trust source/. If not, can > you please elaborate. > Yes, it's just a jwks_uri. I'll change that. > > A few editorial nits: > ** Section 2.2.2. Typo. s/sec 4.7/Section 4.7/ > fixed > > ** Section 3.1 Cite DER encoding as: > [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: > Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical > Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules > (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. > will do > ** Section 5. Typo. s/metatdata/metadata/ > yup > ** Section 6. Typo. s/The the/The/ > got it > > ** Section 7.2. Typo. s/the the/the/ > done > > ** Appendix. Cite the figures numbers (#5 - 7) in the text describing the > contents of the section. > will do > > The shepherd write-up is in good shape. Thank you. > > Regards, > Roman > > ___ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > -- _CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. Thank you._ ___ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
[OAUTH-WG] Second AD Review: draft-ietf-oauth-mtls
Hi! I conducted as second AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-mtls per the AD hand-off. I have the following additional feedback: ** Per ekr's earlier review at https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3657, paraphrasing: -- Section 2.1.2, How is these metadata parameters being obtained? -- Section 3.2, Figure 3. In this example, what new information is the auth server providing to the relying party here? ** Section 2.0. What is the expected behavior if the presented certificate doesn't match expected client_id? How is this signaled? ** Section 2.2. Per the sentence "As pre-requisite, the client registers its X.509 certificate ... or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates ... with the authorization server. -- Editorial: s/As pre-requisite/As a prerequisite/ -- What's a "trusted source" in this case? Is that just a jwks_uri? If so, maybe s/a trusted source/a reference to a trust source/. If not, can you please elaborate. A few editorial nits: ** Section 2.2.2. Typo. s/sec 4.7/Section 4.7/ ** Section 3.1 Cite DER encoding as: [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. ** Section 5. Typo. s/metatdata/metadata/ ** Section 6. Typo. s/The the/The/ ** Section 7.2. Typo. s/the the/the/ ** Appendix. Cite the figures numbers (#5 - 7) in the text describing the contents of the section. The shepherd write-up is in good shape. Thank you. Regards, Roman ___ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
