[openssl.org #2732] Bug: verification fails if muliple certification path (EV/Verisign)

2012-03-06 Thread Dan Lukes via RT

Same problem apply for cross-certificates which create multiple paths also.

Imagine the expiring CA (expiring within year or two, not expired 
already). The organization will create the new one, but want to maintain 
transition period for the users. So create two cross certificates - the 
public of oldCA will sign by new CA and vice versa. So resulting 
structure is:


a) public key of newCA is selfsigned, creating root certificate of new  tree
b) same public key is signed by oldCA with CA:TRUE attribute, creating 
certificate of intermediate CA authority within old tree

End servers with certificate issued by (newCA|intermediate CA) should 
send following chain:

  
s: /CN=EndCertificate
i: /CN=newCA

s: /CN=newCA # This is intermediate CA certificate
i: /CN=oldCA
  

Scenario 1:
User is not aware of existence newCA yet (but oldCA is still not expired 
and trusted by user). Verification:

EndCertificate issued by (newCA|intermediate CA) issued by oldCA

Conclusion: certificate considered trusted

  

Scenario 2:
User trusting newCA. Verification:

EndCertificate issued by (newCA|intermediate CA) which is considered 
trusted by user, no further steps required

Conclusion: certificate considered trusted

  

Unfortunately, scenario 2 doesn't work with OpenSSL.
End-of-chain certificates are verified against trusted store only.

So painless transition from one CA to other CA is not possible

Dan


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[openssl.org #1588] Already resolved in other ticket, please close

2012-03-06 Thread Dan Lukes via RT

Same issue has been reported and resolved in #1624.

This report can be closed.

Dan


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[openssl.org #2754] Ugly interaction of (openssl x509)'s option -x509toreq with -outform/-text/-noout

2012-03-05 Thread Dan Lukes via RT
About year ago, the apps/x509.c has been patched not to ignore -keyform 
during -x509toreq operation.

IMHO it's proper time to patch not to ignore other options as well.

All following text is related to "openssl req -x509toreq" call.

Current behavior:

1. -outform is ignored, PEM format used all the times
2. output contain text representation of created request all the time, 
despite of '-text' option is used or not
3a. -text -x509toreq sequence results to following output sequence:
 [text representation of source x509 certificate]
 [text representation of resulting request]
 [resulting request in PEM format]
3b. -x509toreq -text sequence results to following output sequence:
 [text representation of resulting request]
 [resulting request in PEM format]
 [text representation of source x509 certificate]
3c. -x509toreq -text or -text -x509toreq sequences combined with -noout 
in any position results to following output sequence:
 [text representation of source x509 certificate]

  ---

Proposed behavior:

1. honor the -outform
2,3. print text representation of resulting request when -text requested 
only, then print resulting request in DER or PEM format unless -noout 
specified, don't print text representation of source x509 certificate in 
-x509toreq mode at all. It results to following output sequence:
 IF -textTHEN [text representation of resulting request]
 IF ! -noout THEN [resulting request in $( outform) format]


I wish [1] need no more explanation.

According to 2&3 - I assume the current behavior is not intentional. I 
wish the proposed behavior is more consistent with x509 app behavior in 
non x509toreq mode as well as behavior of other apps.

Patch is attached.

Best regards

Dan Lukes



patch-DAN-apps::x509.c
Description: application/unregisterd-mime-type-to-avoid-ie-mime-sniffing


[openssl.org #1588] Bug report with PATCH

2007-10-15 Thread Dan Lukes via RT
 >Synopsis:  /dev/crypto broken on FreeBSD

 >Class: sw-bug

 >OS Release:   FreeBSD 6.2-RELEASE-p8 i386
 >OpenSSL Release:  All OpenSSL releases based on 
crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c v.1.5 and newer (tested on 0.9.8e)

 >Description:
The problem check-in #11541
http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=11541
commited to crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c 1.4 -> 1.5
broke the /dev/crypto support on FreeBSD

The current code contain:
  --
...
if (defined(__unix__) || defined(unix)) && !defined(USG) && \
   (defined(OpenBSD) || defined(__FreeBSD_version))
#include 
...
  --

Unfortunately, the __FreeBSD_version variable is defined within 
sys/param.h

As the #if check the presence of such variable before the sys/param 
inclusion, it fail everytime so /dev/crypto support is not compiled in.

 >How-To-Repeat:
 Run the 'openssl speed' on FreeBSD with and without a 
/dev/crypto supported hardware accelerator, compare the results

 >Fix:

We can check the existence of variables, but after the sys/param.h 
inclusion only.

See the attached patch.


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[openssl.org #912] Re: [PATCH] Back-translation of CA.pl into CA.sh

2004-07-04 Thread Dan Lukes via RT

Stephen Henson via RT wrote:

>>I back-translated the current version of CA.pl back into CA.sh. 
...
 >> there are no reason for using as strong tool as perl for this simple 
task

> There is at least one reason for the perl translation. Some of the many
> platforms OpenSSL compiles on have will have perl installed (well by
> virtue of the fact that this is mandatory) but no bourne shell, Windows
> is one such case.

BTW, the CA.sh use no extensions of Bourne shell (which is, by default, 
present on Linux only, AFAIK). It should be interpretable by original 
Korn shell (old good "sh"), e.g. on almost every UNIX-like OSs.

Of course, the Windows remain an example of OS without Korn-shell 
compatible command interpretter ...

Thank you for your comment.

Dan

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