[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Dec 2017] Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737) == Severity: Moderate OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already received a fatal error. This issue does not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th November 2017 by David Benjamin (Google). The fix was proposed by David Benjamin and implemented by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738) = Severity: Low There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701. This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions like Intel Haswell (4th generation). Note: The impact from this issue is similar to CVE-2017-3736, CVE-2017-3732 and CVE-2015-3193. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing a new release of OpenSSL 1.1.0 at this time. The fix will be included in OpenSSL 1.1.0h when it becomes available. The fix is also available in commit e502cc86d in the OpenSSL git repository. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd November 2017 by David Benjamin (Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team. Note Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer receiving security updates. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20171207.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJaKUFJAAoJENnE0m0OYESRp1UH/1Z8hBb1dM82Lnn3b0pQ1LjF xBqs0cBFax6z8gelZzUI3CEJe78n3YB6jJiyCDOvrsrb9dx4kGvt97R9x9Np6glh /cL98I1mVwLdLciE1WeBPBFDijp5Bii4pz3q4StFGmh9g9cQ70onz8OO0RB9GSS5 dpbRcbOZLcyt3Lnqmnx86SLAdGgF635SO0EE10txDXjgEUK3Zo+gT+/jelwoNLXT mtYfqgXp6+Eqa08Qq3Nmrgqz4azhFLD5szixmnXQwbP+OpiT+zpNXsV5qqemWFn9 aV2qzDJJtrpObaPXSqKCBUA7C1qYmj9OmeaDUVJ29vS1mm09hs18if954ib6nbw= =MmWs -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 OpenSSL Security Advisory [02 Nov 2017] bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736) == Severity: Moderate There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2017-3732 and CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0g OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2m This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th August 2017 by the OSS-Fuzz project. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team. Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735) Severity: Low This issue was previously announced in security advisory https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170828.txt, but the fix has not previously been included in a release due to its low severity. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0g OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2m Note Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer receiving security updates. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20171102.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJZ+y3yAAoJENnE0m0OYESRWooH/2cS+HkzBCCdnJ/CWuhKomTe hshdBbYw/eYeZgrUYZX6CYosvhLX1Hkwef3vVMxHDXsnBnnZfGfwCS2EfXJ96xXK KiXVchBwlpmovrOuAvrGtPqLkiVOZZpGMfopP30WCKc6tkdqjw/NvruMbg7Iz+Sy ki5AM7Vw7kAEa18KAGjSN4jSrCHMIKkOeGkmay5hHlYLwQRQDAAo5EmWmVOJpUXF ddvQ6h+NKqlWAMF+2/U3PhUFa4V7xqlKR3GMdRawVSaoKQUsPXvRGAhLnvqfOonx y0yl7y9a7EJrcRl8HWf7qqZf0B/m3YapCHNNcBYWry+qk7LJgGjIHDF8VFkEABg= =k+bJ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 Feb 2017] Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash (CVE-2017-3733) Severity: High During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0e This issue does not affect OpenSSL version 1.0.2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 31st January 2017 by Joe Orton (Red Hat). The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. Note Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer receiving security updates. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170216.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJYpZMiAAoJENnE0m0OYESRMUgH/0UN9sxxgyDewSCMeTOYPauK cSPqyw1pndQI6Lu+d3OCdWd01rdLcm+HxlbW5FOUjGZ4G9YefE0+JcvKkIuLGIpQ 1EE0g/ZuBzWDh7/MkFWcmjHceYVXi5sKewtWcQvO9uePzlPhlSZoNIL1G66n1HAo of3ZlSL5BmibaTiz1WmpDG//0W1pgYP5OdvQ8/AVrJJf8pUnU9Oyubm1yCyK2RHi jfJWLbMx0ENgW4G1sW4s8bPaj4GwLjIrZl8ocqoyAHhghkBv/UXUhv6i62bKHmxW vfYwwiU0GlRVwPXzFKbbE3qqCRyDsq+XLAe/09NZZWA+BtscWuUhUpyEODBqzeY= =zqNG -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Jan 2017] Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731) = Severity: Moderate If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305; users should upgrade to 1.1.0d For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th November 2016 by Robert Święcki of Google. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team. Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730) === Severity: Moderate If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service attack. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d This issue does not affect OpenSSL version 1.0.2. Note that this issue was fixed prior to it being recognised as a security concern. This means the git commit with the fix does not contain the CVE identifier. The relevant fix commit can be identified by commit hash efbe126e3. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 14th January 2017 by Guido Vranken. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732) == Severity: Moderate There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2k This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 15th January 2017 by the OSS-Fuzz project. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team. Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055) === Severity: Low This issue was previously fixed in 1.1.0c and covered in security advisory https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20161110.txt OpenSSL 1.0.2k users should upgrade to 1.0.2k Note Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer receiving security updates. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170126.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJYifonAAoJENnE0m0OYESRnhYH/1ldFYDEZ894DleZfjRrZulX OQkEH7w6v+D6YFp8i2v6rJaDq8caOPEhzupQCxPcqYitBUnww9UzUvYJ77aBV0CG DQ3UvE9XeEn5D7MGAGq/ut5Z5WpvlYL7n7PaciX751vpTsWTBKfGecQ8YV0aT6y+ 7V7vHz6NVFnuTQDMUYs9C9aTsCDTNy3Bl84d7gYyoDWXUXds5k008g9LFRI4YQ8l +4z+GXRVcvAFr6fKH94Yq1RMAp6cJi0RDkyuwcGhSOUwVfSLTN8+i2v4xqzKgsx1 q2qPo3+7uederE5ZaNZScl0xAzEilotxLQyy9XSVx/DDXHz0in1500qxgxNFELU= =12E/ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 OpenSSL Security Advisory [10 Nov 2016] ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054) == Severity: High TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0c This issue does not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0 This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th September 2016 by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team), and was found using honggfuzz. The fix was developed by Richard Levitte of the OpenSSL development team. CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053) Severity: Moderate Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings. Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are affected. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0c This issue does not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0 This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 12th October 2016 by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team. Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055) === Severity: Low There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0c This issue does not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.2. Due to the low severity of this defect we are not issuing a new 1.0.2 release at this time. We recommend that 1.0.2 users wait for the next 1.0.2 release for the fix to become available. The fix is also available in the OpenSSL git repository in commit 57c4b9f6a2. This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for providing reproducible case. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team. Note As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy (https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL version 1.0.1 will cease on 31st December 2016. No security updates for that version will be provided after that date. Users of 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade. Support for versions 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer receiving security updates. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20161110.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJYJH8JAAoJENnE0m0OYESRaZwH/1S6sjqemFtHXVk77xMMbUmY kKGJoo5/7wJQWdw9LMPoxjXDyW0fWTKI+Ly2qfP8ZwVizONndN1HCDdWPSbT9EvN 1OG6gr0BQBmlcENCBrSuGwojAtQuMd47q3IAR3ZSx5yvYby4Lg9tXk1FjvnQ600O Z19r1lvc6efeO1fXPBqIUUPJ4y2XN7P1DDlE5UWxacN5Xn+a6cqrieuj0g1aoZ0h rw4fEI7o3EEufYTtodos61xLqZWq8quaMuerWEq0HfEOyMGGyDkmnQkXdU0X7o4g U17vgzM7CvN7+weBz8hVHd0RARAl21vBjYV/G1kruBxD+cYjdavzGGAf/Z1o15w= =MmoX -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
On Mon, 2016-09-26 at 10:35 +, OpenSSL wrote: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 23rd September 2016 by Robert Święcki Found by whom? Welcome to the 21st century... :) -- dwmw2 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Sep 2016] This security update addresses issues that were caused by patches included in our previous security update, released on 22nd September 2016. Given the Critical severity of one of these flaws we have chosen to release this advisory immediately to prevent upgrades to the affected version, rather than delaying in order to provide our usual public pre-notification. Fix Use After Free for large message sizes (CVE-2016-6309) == Severity: Critical This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a, released on 22nd September 2016. The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to store the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a dangling pointer to the old location is left which results in an attempt to write to the previously freed location. This is likely to result in a crash, however it could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0b This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 23rd September 2016 by Robert ÅwiÄcki (Google Security Team), and was found using honggfuzz. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. Missing CRL sanity check (CVE-2016-7052) Severity: Moderate This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.0.2i, released on 22nd September 2016. A bug fix which included a CRL sanity check was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 but was omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2i. As a result any attempt to use CRLs in OpenSSL 1.0.2i will crash with a null pointer exception. OpenSSL 1.0.2i users should upgrade to 1.0.2j The issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd September 2016 by Bruce Stephens and Thomas Jakobi. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160926.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJX6PBJAAoJENnE0m0OYESRGacIALa7/Vg0SQzqjhD/KphCdKos BjkDcEO00y3JDyYqqQxfcrM9jSwBbrNzmHdEzBcPlvvDq9qhGwsODKbGylI2St5r zVHw1qA60/+Hu9PjaGT24a8MX+fPjA4RObB/BGZ7ViucZzCxqqtJob73InKwM8+9 OyjTmrphbyFa/Hk/OUWVzjatzQjEN+a5QplRTR2Sd4fBZDWowrtOdPGmbBQfRRgm AbEO5ZPaVKBoRuMk6JsR3LFymZ2FpHjLs9HNBtSmLLdzfIXxVE+uOb9b5wdAMP/3 4cTMkhfeS3RF0GuMT3EyH/EuZS6KkjuE8y/aVTq5s3yhK3ah5kT85IO1ps0yDx0= =WJwY -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [22 Sep 2016] OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304) = Severity: High A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. Servers using OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1g are not vulnerable in a default configuration, instead only if an application explicitly enables OCSP stapling support. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0a OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 29th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. SSL_peek() hang on empty record (CVE-2016-6305) === Severity: Moderate OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer sends an empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0a This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th September 2016 by Alex Gaynor. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183) == Severity: Low SWEET32 (https://sweet32.info) is an attack on older block cipher algorithms that use a block size of 64 bits. In mitigation for the SWEET32 attack DES based ciphersuites have been moved from the HIGH cipherstring group to MEDIUM in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. OpenSSL 1.1.0 since release has had these ciphersuites disabled by default. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th August 2016 by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan Leurent (INRIA). The fix was developed by Rich Salz of the OpenSSL development team. OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303) == Severity: Low An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical on most platforms. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 11th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team. Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302) === Severity: Low If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will ultimately crash. The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 19th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team. OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182) Severity: Low The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word(). This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team. OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180) == Severity: Low The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are presented. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [3rd May 2016] Memory corruption in the ASN.1 encoder (CVE-2016-2108) == Severity: High This issue affected versions of OpenSSL prior to April 2015. The bug causing the vulnerability was fixed on April 18th 2015, and released as part of the June 11th 2015 security releases. The security impact of the bug was not known at the time. In previous versions of OpenSSL, ASN.1 encoding the value zero represented as a negative integer can cause a buffer underflow with an out-of-bounds write in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER. The ASN.1 parser does not normally create "negative zeroes" when parsing ASN.1 input, and therefore, an attacker cannot trigger this bug. However, a second, independent bug revealed that the ASN.1 parser (specifically, d2i_ASN1_TYPE) can misinterpret a large universal tag as a negative zero value. Large universal tags are not present in any common ASN.1 structures (such as X509) but are accepted as part of ANY structures. Therefore, if an application deserializes untrusted ASN.1 structures containing an ANY field, and later reserializes them, an attacker may be able to trigger an out-of-bounds write. This has been shown to cause memory corruption that is potentially exploitable with some malloc implementations. Applications that parse and re-encode X509 certificates are known to be vulnerable. Applications that verify RSA signatures on X509 certificates may also be vulnerable; however, only certificates with valid signatures trigger ASN.1 re-encoding and hence the bug. Specifically, since OpenSSL's default TLS X509 chain verification code verifies the certificate chain from root to leaf, TLS handshakes could only be targeted with valid certificates issued by trusted Certification Authorities. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2c OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1o This vulnerability is a combination of two bugs, neither of which individually has security impact. The first bug (mishandling of negative zero integers) was reported to OpenSSL by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala (Red Hat) and independently by Hanno Böck in April 2015. The second issue (mishandling of large universal tags) was found using libFuzzer, and reported on the public issue tracker on March 1st 2016. The fact that these two issues combined present a security vulnerability was reported by David Benjamin (Google) on March 31st 2016. The fixes were developed by Steve Henson of the OpenSSL development team, and David Benjamin. The OpenSSL team would also like to thank Mark Brand and Ian Beer from the Google Project Zero team for their careful analysis of the impact. The fix for the "negative zero" memory corruption bug can be identified by commits 3661bb4e7934668bd99ca777ea8b30eedfafa871 (1.0.2) and 32d3b0f52f77ce86d53f38685336668d47c5bdfe (1.0.1) Padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107) == Severity: High A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support AES-NI. This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding bytes. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2h OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1t This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th of April 2016 by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. The fix was developed by Kurt Roeckx of the OpenSSL development team. EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105) = Severity: Low An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications. These internal uses are not considered vulnerable because all calls are bounded with length checks so no overflow is possible. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may be vulnerable. (Note: Initial analysis suggested that the PEM_write_bio* were vulnerable, and this is reflected in the patch commit message. This is no longer believed to be the case). OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2h OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1t This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 3rd March 2016 by Guido Vranken. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
On Tuesday 01 March 2016 19:50:51 Nounou Dadoun wrote: > I'm interested in your tlsfuzzer tool (of which this appears to be a > part), is there a larger test suite available? Is there any > documentation out there? > Thanks again .. N No, for now there isn't one. The plan is to have a full featured "engine" for running reproducers like this one before working on writing more detailed and comprehensive test cases, and later still, automated generation of test cases (so that it really is a fuzzer for a TLS protocol). All documentation is on github, if you have questions feel free to mail me or open tickets. If you are interested in helping the project, I can for now only point you to a project that implements the crypto itself, for later use in tlsfuzzer, here: https://github.com/tomato42/tlslite-ng/issues As I'm not sure that the tlsfuzzer architecture is correct for task at hand, for now I'm not asking for help on it directly, I'd prefer not to have to throw away somebody else's months of work because the whole approach of tlsfuzzer was incorrect... That being said, I'm open for test ideas. -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
Thanks for the test tool and making it available so quickly, we were able to close our DROWN bug ticket less than an hour after opening it! I'm interested in your tlsfuzzer tool (of which this appears to be a part), is there a larger test suite available? Is there any documentation out there? Thanks again .. N Nou Dadoun Senior Firmware Developer, Security Specialist Office: 604.629.5182 ext 2632 Support: 888.281.5182 | avigilon.com Follow Twitter | Follow LinkedIn -Original Message- From: openssl-dev [mailto:openssl-dev-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Hubert Kario Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 7:22 AM To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory Scripts to verify that a server is not vulnerable to DROWN. -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
Scripts to verify that a server is not vulnerable to DROWN. Two scripts are provided to verify that SSLv2 and all of its ciphers are disabled and that export grade SSLv2 are disabled and can't be forced by client. Reproducer requires Python 2.6 or 3.2 or later, you will also need git to download the sources # Download the reproducer: git clone https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer cd tlsfuzzer git checkout ssl2 # Download the reproducer dependencies git clone https://github.com/tomato42/tlslite-ng .tlslite-ng ln -s .tlslite-ng/tlslite tlslite pushd .tlslite-ng # likely won't be necessary in near future, code will be merged soon git checkout sslv2 popd git clone https://github.com/warner/python-ecdsa .python-ecdsa ln -s .python-ecdsa/ecdsa ecdsa To verify that an https server at example.com does not support SSLv2 at all, use the following command: PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/test-sslv2-force-export-cipher.py \ -h example.com -p 443 To only verify that the server does not support export grade SSLv2 ciphers, use the following command: PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/test-sslv2-force-cipher.py -h example.com \ -p 443 (note, the first script is a superset of the second one) In both cases all the individual tests in the scripts should print "OK" status if the specific cipher is not supported and report "failed: 0" together with exit status of 0 if you want to automate it. -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [1st March 2016] = NOTE: With this update, OpenSSL is disabling the SSLv2 protocol by default, as well as removing SSLv2 EXPORT ciphers. We strongly advise against the use of SSLv2 due not only to the issues described below, but to the other known deficiencies in the protocol as described at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176 Cross-protocol attack on TLS using SSLv2 (DROWN) (CVE-2016-0800) Severity: High A cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS sessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. Note that traffic between clients and non-vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP or POP) shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability is known as DROWN (CVE-2016-0800). Recovering one session key requires the attacker to perform approximately 2^50 computation, as well as thousands of connections to the affected server. A more efficient variant of the DROWN attack exists against unpatched OpenSSL servers using versions that predate 1.0.2a, 1.0.1m, 1.0.0r and 0.9.8zf released on 19/Mar/2015 (see CVE-2016-0703 below). Users can avoid this issue by disabling the SSLv2 protocol in all their SSL/TLS servers, if they've not done so already. Disabling all SSLv2 ciphers is also sufficient, provided the patches for CVE-2015-3197 (fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1r and 1.0.2f) have been deployed. Servers that have not disabled the SSLv2 protocol, and are not patched for CVE-2015-3197 are vulnerable to DROWN even if all SSLv2 ciphers are nominally disabled, because malicious clients can force the use of SSLv2 with EXPORT ciphers. OpenSSL 1.0.2g and 1.0.1s deploy the following mitigation against DROWN: SSLv2 is now by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. In addition, weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up are now disabled in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2g OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1s This issue was reported to OpenSSL on December 29th 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. The fix was developed by Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell of OpenSSL. Double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705) === Severity: Low A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2g OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1s This issue was reported to OpenSSL on February 7th 2016 by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. The fix was developed by Dr Stephen Henson of OpenSSL. Memory leak in SRP database lookups (CVE-2016-0798) === Severity: Low The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no way of distinguishing these two cases. Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around 300 bytes per connection. Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure a seed are not vulnerable. In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed. To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed. Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However, note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular, computations are currently not carried out in constant time. This issue affects
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
Hi there, reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical inconsistency. First: OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: ... - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate and so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2. and then: It will not reuse the key for DHE ciphers suites if: - SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set ... So what's the situation if both situations apply, static DH ciphersuites are used and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set is set. Which of these is stronger? Will the key be reused? Or is that combination impossible? It doesn't seem to be clear to me from the wording in the advisory. Thanks for any clarification. Regards, Rainer ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
On Tue, Feb 02, 2016 at 10:34:32PM +0100, Rainer Jung wrote: > Hi there, > > reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical > inconsistency. > > First: > > OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: > ... > - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate and so > it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2. > > > and then: > > It will not reuse the key for DHE ciphers suites if: > - SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set > ... > > So what's the situation if both situations apply, static DH ciphersuites are > used and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set is set. Note that it says DHE ciphers, excluding the DH ciphers. Kurt ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
On 02/02/16 21:34, Rainer Jung wrote: > Hi there, > > reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical > inconsistency. > > First: > > OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: > ... > - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate > and so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2. > > > and then: > > It will not reuse the key for DHE ciphers suites if: > - SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set > ... > > So what's the situation if both situations apply, static DH ciphersuites > are used and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set is set. Which of these is > stronger? Will the key be reused? Or is that combination impossible? It > doesn't seem to be clear to me from the wording in the advisory. DH ciphersuites come in two forms: static DH and ephemeral DH (aka DHE). You can't have both at the same time. SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE does not apply to static DH ciphersuites. Matt ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
Am 03.02.2016 um 00:30 schrieb Kurt Roeckx: On Tue, Feb 02, 2016 at 10:34:32PM +0100, Rainer Jung wrote: Hi there, reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical inconsistency. First: OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: ... - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate and so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2. and then: It will not reuse the key for DHE ciphers suites if: - SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set ... So what's the situation if both situations apply, static DH ciphersuites are used and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set is set. Note that it says DHE ciphers, excluding the DH ciphers. Thanks Matt and Kurt for enlightening me. Regards, Rainer ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
+1 Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network. Original Message From: Hanno Böck Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 06:18 To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Reply To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Cc: open...@openssl.org Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory On Thu, 28 Jan 2016 15:05:47 + OpenSSL <open...@openssl.org> wrote: > Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by > default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance > impact. I think it's good that this has been changed now. I found this ephemeral key reuse always problematic. However as far as I'm aware there's still the same situation with elliptic curve diffie hellman. It reuses the ephemeral key for several connections unless one sets SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE. As with the DH one most server apps already set this. This is unrelated to the current vuln, but I find this risky. It creates an additional server secret that can leak and bugs in the elliptic curve key exchange that would be harmless without this feature could become very severe. I would therefore propose to do the same change also for ECDH and make SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE the default. -- Hanno Böck http://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: ha...@hboeck.de GPG: BBB51E42 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [28th Jan 2016] = NOTE: SUPPORT FOR VERSION 1.0.1 WILL BE ENDING ON 31ST DECEMBER 2016. NO SECURITY FIXES WILL BE PROVIDED AFTER THAT DATE. UNTIL THAT TIME SECURITY FIXES ONLY ARE BEING APPLIED. DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701) == Severity: High Historically OpenSSL usually only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: - - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh()/SSL_set_tmp_dh() is used and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set. - - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback()/SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() is used, and both the parameters and the key are set and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not used. This is an undocumted feature and parameter files don't contain the key. - - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate and so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2. It will not reuse the key for DHE ciphers suites if: - - SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set - - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback()/SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() is used and the callback does not provide the key, only the parameters. The callback is almost always used like this. Non-safe primes are generated by OpenSSL when using: - - genpkey with the dh_rfc5114 option. This will write an X9.42 style file including the prime-order subgroup size "q". This is supported since the 1.0.2 version. Older versions can't read files generated in this way. - - dhparam with the -dsaparam option. This has always been documented as requiring the single use. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f OpenSSL 1.0.1 is not affected by this CVE because it does not support X9.42 based parameters. It is possible to generate parameters using non "safe" primes, but this option has always been documented as requiring single use and is not the default or believed to be common. However, as a precaution, the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE change has also been backported to 1.0.1r. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 12 January 2016 by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team (incorporating some work originally written by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team). SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197) Severity: Low A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1r This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. The fix was developed by Nimrod Aviram with further development by Viktor Dukhovni of the OpenSSL development team. An update on DHE man-in-the-middle protection (Logjam) A previously published vulnerability in the TLS protocol allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This vulnerability is known as Logjam (CVE-2015-4000). OpenSSL added Logjam mitigation for TLS clients by rejecting handshakes with DH parameters shorter than 768 bits in releases 1.0.2b and
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015] === Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793) == Severity: High During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and issue an invalid certificate. This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication. This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o. OpenSSL 1.0.2b/1.0.2c users should upgrade to 1.0.2d OpenSSL 1.0.1n/1.0.1o users should upgrade to 1.0.1p This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 24th June 2015 by Adam Langley/David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). The fix was developed by the BoringSSL project. Note As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy (https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions 1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these releases will be provided after that date. Users of these releases are advised to upgrade. References == URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150709.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVnml8AAoJENnE0m0OYESRlcYH/iUe62/m2oZiuBHkKQvLBUbH VrLDp7xEXEg6ozByLyxughAFwY9XD2r9WkXehxw66af2pmNHphXH3Gbfpcebki0r HuZJ3CbGD/RSomWdAqkzRfV8MjNxmN4Pyi+sTsf7F+nKv80Ts51iUN1pPjkddAR8 ooKw0VMIENeMboWQ9SyQ3r7TYYywK+lXUG71Ekva9ByzABBwC/1CzZeSLJmuewnJ +9TjwQ4otH/mUJ/klvw+G2eTSn64AnA6UEFR+sBL4aNpIgdrtjonJRt2ko05Z92N HN/ibu5okd3iUbtkM0dTMGAr2NCrNYPr2dYLMPemwkAq1cRlhjGouRDDeb6TUYk= =oUAa -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o. In other words, if you are not using those specific releases -- i.e., the ones that came out less than 30 days ago -- you do not need to upgrade. ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
Huhu!! |Fixes for this issue were developed by Emilia Käsper and Kurt Roeckx I just want to mention these «UTF-8 re-encoded as UTF-8» issues, which may be acceptable for names of males, but, but *particularly* with respect to the natural beauty of the affected person… On the other hand i always knew engineers have the etiquettes of construction workers. The good news: it seems to be a long way to Boko Haram. Still. Also it is a real pity that it seems to be too hard to copy and paste the NEWS. And now it didn't even help to point one of those HTML monsters to the cesspool. Wait. I haven't said there is a coincidence. (^_^)/ --steffen ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [11 Jun 2015] === DHE man-in-the-middle protection (Logjam) A vulnerability in the TLS protocol allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This vulnerability is known as Logjam (CVE-2015-4000). OpenSSL has added protection for TLS clients by rejecting handshakes with DH parameters shorter than 768 bits. This limit will be increased to 1024 bits in a future release. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n Fixes for this issue were developed by Emilia Käsper and Kurt Roeckx of the OpenSSL development team. Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788) === Severity: Moderate When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled. This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2 and 1.0.1. Recent 1.0.0 and 0.9.8 versions are not affected. 1.0.0d and 0.9.8r and below are affected. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n OpenSSL 1.0.0d (and below) users should upgrade to 1.0.0s OpenSSL 0.9.8r (and below) users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 6th April 2015 by Joseph Birr-Pixton. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team. Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789) === Severity: Moderate X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the time string. An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification callbacks. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0s OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 8th April 2015 by Robert Swiecki (Google), and independently on 11th April 2015 by Hanno Böck. The fix was developed by Emilia Käsper of the OpenSSL development team. PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790) = Severity: Moderate The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0s OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 18th April 2015 by Michal Zalewski (Google). The fix was developed by Emilia Käsper of the OpenSSL development team. CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792) === Severity: Moderate When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using the CMS code. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0s OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 31st March 2015 by Johannes Bauer. The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team. Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791) Severity: Low If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [19 Mar 2015] === OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS (CVE-2015-0291) = Severity: High If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. This issue affects OpenSSL version: 1.0.2 OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL on 26th February 2015 by David Ramos of Stanford University. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. Reclassified: RSA silently downgrades to EXPORT_RSA [Client] (CVE-2015-0204) Severity: High This security issue was previously announced by the OpenSSL project and classified as low severity. This severity rating has now been changed to high. This was classified low because it was originally thought that server RSA export ciphersuite support was rare: a client was only vulnerable to a MITM attack against a server which supports an RSA export ciphersuite. Recent studies have shown that RSA export ciphersuites support is far more common. This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. It was previously announced in the OpenSSL security advisory on 8th January 2015. Multiblock corrupted pointer (CVE-2015-0290) Severity: Moderate OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the multiblock performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of multiblock can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. This issue affects OpenSSL version: 1.0.2 OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th February 2015 by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen (CVE-2015-0207) === Severity: Moderate The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only server. This issue affects OpenSSL version: 1.0.2 OpenSSL 1.0.2 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.2a. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 27th January 2015 by Per Allansson. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team. Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp (CVE-2015-0286) === Severity: Moderate The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1m. OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0r. OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zf. This issue was discovered and fixed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team. Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters (CVE-2015-0208) = Severity: Moderate The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
[openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 OpenSSL Security Advisory [08 Jan 2015] === DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record (CVE-2014-3571) === Severity: Moderate A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record (CVE-2015-0206) === Severity: Moderate A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1 and 1.0.0. OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 7th January 2015 by Chris Mueller who also provided an initial patch. Further analysis was performed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team, who also developed the final patch. no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL (CVE-2014-3569) = Severity: Low When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th October 2014 by Frank Schmirler. The fix was developed by Kurt Roeckx. ECDHE silently downgrades to ECDH [Client] (CVE-2014-3572) == Severity: Low An OpenSSL client will accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuite using an ECDSA certificate if the server key exchange message is omitted. This effectively removes forward secrecy from the ciphersuite. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. RSA silently downgrades to EXPORT_RSA [Client] (CVE-2015-0204) == Severity: Low An OpenSSL client will accept the use of an RSA temporary key in a non-export RSA key exchange ciphersuite. A server could present a weak temporary key and downgrade the security of the session. This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8. OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. DH client certificates accepted without verification [Server] (CVE-2015-0205) = Severity: Low An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1 and 1.0.0. OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. Certificate fingerprints can be modified (CVE-2014-8275) Severity: Low OpenSSL accepts several non-DER-variations of certificate signature algorithm and signature encodings. OpenSSL also does not enforce a match between the signature algorithm between the signed and unsigned portions of the