Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Biting the bullet on issue tracking

2015-03-25 Thread JP Maxwell
Greetings everyone :)  I understand you are potentially looking for an
issue management system to adopt.  I'd like to throw it out there that you
have a look at Tipit's forked version of Chili Project (
http://www.chiliproject.org ) which itself is a fork of red mine.

Keep in mind Chili Project is no longer maintained.  In some respects I
think this is a good thing as a community, such as Open Stack, would be
prime to take it over and run with it.  We currently maintain our fork
ourselves.

We have put a fair amount of effort into improving it - especially the
e-mail integration and etherpad integration pieces.  There is certainly
more that could be done.  But under the hood we find it to be a fairly
flexible data model and pretty reasonable to work with.

I would be happy to deploy an instance on a server at Rackspace if you'd
like to login and have a look around.   Also, here are our Git Hub repos:

https://github.com/tipitnet/chiliproject

https://github.com/tipitnet/chiliproject_tipit_mailgun_handler_plugin

In summation, here are a few features it has that I believe align with what
you're looking for:

- Ability to integrate with OpenStackID

- Option for self sign up

- Multi-task features with tags and comments

- Task dashboards

- No timeout issues

- Basic Restful API

- Ability to efficiently track tasks across a large set of projects and
branches (for our horizontal teams and sanity)

- Add story ID workflow integration with Gerrit/Git

- Incoming / Outgoing e-mail support

- Ability to be puppetized/jenkenized hosted in-house at Infra

- 100% opensource


Let me know what you think :)

J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net 

Monty Taylor wrote:
> > [...]
> > We're looking at what our options are, and Thierry is examining them to
> > see how tolerable their differences would be to our community.
> >
> > I propose that we have a solid answer and migration plan to put in front
> > of people by Vancouver at the latest.
>
> StoryBoard was started initially as a proof-of-concept of what we'd
> actually love to see in the tool we use for task tracking. I was writing
> requirements documents to help the Infra team look into alternate
> solutions, and finally decided that code could be worth a thousand words.
>
> At that point, people got very excited at the idea of having a tool that
> would precisely map our workflows and processes, rather than having a
> tool you have to adapt your workflows and processes to. Let's use the
> POC today! Since that initial excitement, three things happened.
>
> (1) We realized coding the task tracking part is not really long or
> difficult. It's all the boring infrastructure that is long and painful:
> subscriptions, configurable email notifications, ACLs...
>
> (2) We did not get the surge in contributors we expected to get. The
> StoryBoard API server is built like an OpenStack API server to increase
> dev familiarity, but HP and Mirantis were the only ones to dedicate
> headcount to the effort.
>
> (3) With StoryBoard being developed not as fast as we hoped, time
> passed, some requirements changed, new teams have needs, and those are
> not necessarily easily served with a beta tool.
>
> So we are standing at the crossroads again.
>
> First, we need to determine if we are ready to accept to use a tool that
> is not tailored-fit to our workflows, in exchange for more immediate
> gratification. That is what the "Biting the bullet" from Monty is about.
> It's not an easy thing to do... after all the reason we want to move
> away from Launchpad is the pain derived from using a tool that does not
> fit our workflows and processes.
>
> Second, we need to see which solution is the closest to "being usable
> for us", and therefore should be the way forward. When you work on a
> single project team, it's easy to overlook that we have a pretty unique
> set of needs in OpenStack -- the ability to efficiently track tasks
> across a large set of projects and branches (for our horizontal teams
> sanity). Not all tools can be used like that. In fact, before we started
> StoryBoard, Launchpad was still the best tool for that.
>
> Personally I'm not totally convinced StoryBoard is out of the race. We
> may realize that the amount of custom development needed to bring
> existing solutions to a point where we can use them for task tracking in
> OpenStack is superior to the amount of development needed to bring
> StoryBoard at an acceptable usability level. But then, I don't
> personally wield any significant development headcount, so I can't make
> the choice: I can only define what "usable for OpenStack" minimally means.
>
> It's also worth noting that Launchpad is not (yet) out of the game. It
> could grow the set of features we need (ability to auth using
> OpenStackID, multi-task features with tags and comments, task
> dashboards, no more silly timeouts, comprehensive API...). Unlikely, but
> still possible :)
>
> I look forward to that discussion in Vancouver on the fu

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-11 Thread JP Maxwell
It looks like this plugin is bundled with media wiki:

https://m.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit

Which offers various different types of captcha. It also looks like you
might be using it (see:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B47GGpF8-_XHTXFfR3RIbXozSDg/view?usp=docslist_api
).

Maybe switching out the type of captcha? Google's newer reCaptcha works
pretty well (
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html ).

Though I have no idea what the secret word is in the current implementation
;)

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-12 Thread JP Maxwell
I don't think it currently used open ID as far as I can see from the login
screen.  Could be mistaken though :)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B47GGpF8-_XHb2JFeUVHTG4tTU0/view?usp=docslist_api

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 12, 2016 8:46 AM, "Doug Hellmann"  wrote:
>
> Doesn't this also mean that we have spam accounts in our OpenID
> provider?
>
> Doug
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-12 Thread JP Maxwell
Ahh - gotcha - makes sense.   Yes, it seems the mobile view wasn't modified
to use open ID sso.  Is it using an extension to accomplish this?  There
are a lot of auth extensions available (
https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Category:User_identity_extensions ).  Or was
it extended by hand?

J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Fri, Feb 12, 2016 at 11:16 AM, James E. Blair 
wrote:

> Jeremy Stanley  writes:
>
> > On 2016-02-12 09:03:16 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
> >> I don't think it currently used open ID as far as I can see from the
> login
> >> screen.  Could be mistaken though :)
> >>
> >>
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B47GGpF8-_XHb2JFeUVHTG4tTU0/view?usp=docslist_api
> >
> > Wow! That's interesting. I wonder if there's an auth hole in the
> > mobile browser support in Mediawiki? If you try to log in with a
> > normal browser it sends you to login.launchpad.net to do OpenID
> > authentication.
>
> There is a mobile/desktop toggle on the bottom of the page.  Clicking
> mobile and then clicking login takes me to:
>
>
> https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Special:UserLogin&returnto=Main+Page&returntoquery=mobileaction%3Dtoggle_view_mobile%26welcome%3Dyes
>
> -Jim
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-15 Thread JP Maxwell
Tom, yes we can probably help. Do you want to ping me off list - need to 
get

some more info about how it is setup / version controlled / deployed / etc.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]

On Mon, Feb 15, 2016 at 8:05 AM, Tom Fifield  wrote:
Is there anyone who can help with this? There's still a ton of spam
going in, and manually cleaning it is a ton of effort.

On 12/02/16 06:40, Tom Fifield wrote:
> OK, so, MediaWiki nas a nice manual on how to combat spam (
> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Combating_spam )
>
> Would it be possible to get these implemented:
>
> * update Apache web server configuration to block all spammer IPs in
> lists available from www.stopforumspam.com . Alternate, use the
> mediawiki plugin that does the same:
> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:StopForumSpam
>
> * Configre the ConfirmEdit extension to set it to display a CAPTCHA when
> creating a new page:
>
> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create'] = true;
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Tom
>
>
> On 12/02/16 11:08, Tom Fifield wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Since about 11th January, wiki.o.o has been under attack by spammers.
>>
>> They're creating new pages at a rate of more than 50 a day, with titles
>> that hint at calling certain phone numbers for various services.
>>
>> If you look at
>>
>> https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Special:NewPages
>>
>> you'll see them.
>>
>> It's across more than a dozen user accounts. I'm going to attempt some
>> cleaning, but we probably need to look for an extension to do something
>> about this pro-actively.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>>
>> Tom
>>
>>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-17 Thread JP Maxwell
Sure.. So a couple of thoughts:

1. If the attack vector involves creating a launchpad account, there's not
much we can do about that portion (account creation).   But, we could
potentially force the user to do a re-captcha when they want to edit /
insert content.   This doesn't fix the creation of fake accounts, but at
least enables a basic check of humanity before editing is allowed.

2. It was discovered that the mobile view does not invoke the SSO via
launchpad.  While it appears this is unrelated to the spam and should take
a lower priority, I would propose going ahead and fixing this for good
measure.

3. Longer term - using OpenStack ID instead of LaunchPad.  Would have to
either implement a sunset period as Martin suggested or have the user
authenticate to both SSO providers creating a relationship in the users
table of mediawiki.   The ability / complexity of such an approach would
need to be investigated.

Input is welcome.  I'll investigate whatever path people agree with and
welcome other suggestions.

J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Wed, Feb 17, 2016 at 2:21 PM, Elizabeth K. Joseph 
wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 15, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Jeremy Stanley  wrote:
> > On 2016-02-15 09:04:41 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
> >> Tom, yes we can probably help. Do you want to ping me off list -
> >> need to get some more info about how it is setup / version
> >> controlled / deployed / etc.
> >
> > Our openstack_project::wiki class[1] calls into our mediawiki Puppet
> > module[2]. Ryan Lane set up and maintained most of this for us while
> > he was at WMF, but since he's moved on to other things it's fallen
> > into some disuse so assistance is appreciated!
> >
> > [1]
> http://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/system-config/tree/modules/openstack_project/manifests/wiki.pp
> > [2] http://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki/tree/
>
> As Jeremy points out, our infrastructure is all open source so I'd
> prefer to keep this discussion here on the list so we can all pitch
> in. I don't see any active patches for this yet (please let me know if
> I've missed anything).
>
> Another data point: Canonical IS also uses Launchpad authentication,
> like we do, for edits to their Ubuntu wikis and have been hit pretty
> hard by spammers this week (initial attacks go back to December). They
> are on MoinMoin, we're on Mediawiki, so wiki-side anti-spam proposals
> will differ, but I've been keeping an eye on any solutions they may
> propose for altering how SSO is being handled for their wiki to
> perhaps shut these spammers down before they get a chance to edit.
>
> --
> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-17 Thread JP Maxwell
>
>
>
> Thanks for taking some time to look at this today! If we could find an
> open source captcha option, that may be part of the solution.
>
> Do you think you might have some time to also look at the other
> generalized Mediawiki proposals that Clint Byrum linked to earlier in
> the thread? I don't think we've really made the time to do an audit in
> this direction and starting to implement some of them may help.
>
> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Combating_spam
>
>
Yes - the first item is "Requiring log in and/or a CAPTCHA on certain
operations, such as edits, adding external links, or new user creation."

There are a number of captcha extensions:

https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit

is bundled with v1.18 and above which it looks like v.1.24 is what this
wiki is on judging by this meta tag:


So it may just be a matter of specifying what type of captcha is required
for edit operations.

I will install a local copy and have a closer look at this.  But, it seems
like a relatively easy and logical first step.  We can always ratchet
things up from there if it doesn't work.
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-22 Thread JP Maxwell
OK - so per the info here, you have to set the type of Captcha and add in
editing and create page as triggers requiring Captcha.

As an example to use QuestyCaptcha a the bottom of the LocalSettings.php
file:

https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#QuestyCaptcha

And make sure the triggers are set:

https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#Configuration

So, for example (you might want to change the questions), but the below
should at least stop the bleeding?

require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/ConfirmEdit.php";

// Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is 1.25 or newer:
//wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha' );
// Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is older than 1.25:
require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha.php";

$wgCaptchaClass = 'QuestyCaptcha';

// Add your questions in LocalSettings.php using this format
$wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "A question?", 'answer' => "An
Answer");
$wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => 'How much wood would a
woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?', 'answer' => 'as much
wood as...' );
$wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "What is this wiki's name?",
'answer' => "$wgSitename" );
// You can also provide several acceptable answers to a given question (the
answers shall be in lowercase):
$wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "2 + 2 ?", 'answer' => array(
'4', 'four' ) );

$wgCaptchaTriggers['edit']  = true;
$wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;


J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 12:55 AM, Tom Fifield  wrote:

> For wiki.o.o, I believe this is at:
>
> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Special:Version
>
> On 23/02/16 14:51, JP Maxwell wrote:
>
>> I did setup a wiki and have a look at this briefly.   Can you confirm
>> what extensions you are loading?  When you setup the wiki it generates a
>> localsettings.php file that lists the extensions:
>>
>>
>>
>> Inline image 1
>>
>> # Enabled Extensions. Most extensions are enabled by including the base
>> extension file here
>> # but check specific extension documentation for more details
>> # The following extensions were automatically enabled:
>> wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'InputBox' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'SpamBlacklist' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'TitleBlacklist' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'WikiEditor' );
>>
>> I think if you have that ConfirmEdit extension you can enable captcha
>> when creating new pages / editing existing ones.  In addition, there do
>> seem to be some spam extensions that come built in.
>>
>>
>>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-22 Thread JP Maxwell
Hah. Well, I'm not entirely sure how this is setup to manage code changes.
I looked in GitHub and just see the puppet configs.  Not sure where or how
I could push changes into LocalSettings.php, otherwise I'd be happy to do
it :D   Gotta catch a little rest now, but will check in on this in a few
hours.

J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:43 AM, Tom Fifield  wrote:

> Cheers, that's exactly what we need someone to do.
>
>
> On 23/02/16 15:34, JP Maxwell wrote:
>
>> OK - so per the info here, you have to set the type of Captcha and add
>> in editing and create page as triggers requiring Captcha.
>>
>> As an example to use QuestyCaptcha a the bottom of the LocalSettings.php
>> file:
>>
>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#QuestyCaptcha
>>
>> And make sure the triggers are set:
>>
>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#Configuration
>>
>> So, for example (you might want to change the questions), but the below
>> should at least stop the bleeding?
>>
>> require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/ConfirmEdit.php";
>>
>> // Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is 1.25 or newer:
>> //wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha' );
>> // Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is older than 1.25:
>> require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha.php";
>>
>> $wgCaptchaClass = 'QuestyCaptcha';
>>
>> // Add your questions in LocalSettings.php using this format
>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "A question?", 'answer' =>
>> "An Answer");
>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => 'How much wood would a
>> woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?', 'answer' => 'as much
>> wood as...' );
>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "What is this wiki's
>> name?", 'answer' => "$wgSitename" );
>> // You can also provide several acceptable answers to a given question
>> (the answers shall be in lowercase):
>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "2 + 2 ?", 'answer' =>
>> array( '4', 'four' ) );
>>
>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['edit']  = true;
>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;
>>
>>
>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 12:55 AM, Tom Fifield > <mailto:t...@openstack.org>> wrote:
>>
>> For wiki.o.o, I believe this is at:
>>
>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Special:Version
>>
>> On 23/02/16 14:51, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>
>> I did setup a wiki and have a look at this briefly.   Can you
>> confirm
>> what extensions you are loading?  When you setup the wiki it
>> generates a
>> localsettings.php file that lists the extensions:
>>
>>
>>
>> Inline image 1
>>
>> # Enabled Extensions. Most extensions are enabled by including
>> the base
>> extension file here
>> # but check specific extension documentation for more details
>> # The following extensions were automatically enabled:
>> wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'InputBox' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'SpamBlacklist' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'TitleBlacklist' );
>> wfLoadExtension( 'WikiEditor' );
>>
>> I think if you have that ConfirmEdit extension you can enable
>> captcha
>> when creating new pages / editing existing ones.  In addition,
>> there do
>> seem to be some spam extensions that come built in.
>>
>>
>>
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-23 Thread JP Maxwell
One final thought, I recall on the mobile view there is a secret word
request in the account creation page:

https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Special:UserLogin&type=signup&returnto=Main+Page&returntoquery=mobileaction%3Dtoggle_view_mobile%26welcome%3Dyes

So, this is probably already setup.  It's possible you only need to add the
triggers.   Though I might make the question something a human could
reasonably figure out if you want people to continue to be able to edit the
wiki in the meantime:

$wgCaptchaTriggers['edit']  = true;
$wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;

J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:48 AM, JP Maxwell  wrote:

> Hah. Well, I'm not entirely sure how this is setup to manage code
> changes.  I looked in GitHub and just see the puppet configs.  Not sure
> where or how I could push changes into LocalSettings.php, otherwise I'd be
> happy to do it :D   Gotta catch a little rest now, but will check in on
> this in a few hours.
>
> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:43 AM, Tom Fifield  wrote:
>
>> Cheers, that's exactly what we need someone to do.
>>
>>
>> On 23/02/16 15:34, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>
>>> OK - so per the info here, you have to set the type of Captcha and add
>>> in editing and create page as triggers requiring Captcha.
>>>
>>> As an example to use QuestyCaptcha a the bottom of the LocalSettings.php
>>> file:
>>>
>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#QuestyCaptcha
>>>
>>> And make sure the triggers are set:
>>>
>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#Configuration
>>>
>>> So, for example (you might want to change the questions), but the below
>>> should at least stop the bleeding?
>>>
>>> require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/ConfirmEdit.php";
>>>
>>> // Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is 1.25 or newer:
>>> //wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha' );
>>> // Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is older than 1.25:
>>> require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha.php";
>>>
>>> $wgCaptchaClass = 'QuestyCaptcha';
>>>
>>> // Add your questions in LocalSettings.php using this format
>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "A question?", 'answer' =>
>>> "An Answer");
>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => 'How much wood would a
>>> woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?', 'answer' => 'as much
>>> wood as...' );
>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "What is this wiki's
>>> name?", 'answer' => "$wgSitename" );
>>> // You can also provide several acceptable answers to a given question
>>> (the answers shall be in lowercase):
>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "2 + 2 ?", 'answer' =>
>>> array( '4', 'four' ) );
>>>
>>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['edit']  = true;
>>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;
>>>
>>>
>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 12:55 AM, Tom Fifield >> <mailto:t...@openstack.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>> For wiki.o.o, I believe this is at:
>>>
>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Special:Version
>>>
>>> On 23/02/16 14:51, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>
>>> I did setup a wiki and have a look at this briefly.   Can you
>>> confirm
>>> what extensions you are loading?  When you setup the wiki it
>>> generates a
>>> localsettings.php file that lists the extensions:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Inline image 1
>>>
>>> # Enabled Extensions. Most extensions are enabled by including
>>> the base
>>> extension file here
>>> # but check specific extension documentation for more details
>>> # The following extensions were automatically enabled:
>>> wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit' );
>>> wfLoadExtension( 'InputBox' );
>>> wfLoadExtension( 'SpamBlacklist' );
>>> wfLoadExtension( 'TitleBlacklist' );
>>> wfLoadExtension( 'WikiEditor' );
>>>
>>> I think if you have that ConfirmEdit extension you can enable
>>> captcha
>>> when creating new pages / editing existing ones.  In addition,
>>> there do
>>> seem to be some spam extensions that come built in.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-23 Thread JP Maxwell
Thanks Marton. So is there a Git repo for the code or are you just relying
on an upstream wiki media repository directly?  If so is this setting file
populated by puppet or unmanaged?

If the latter I would suggest we just ssh in and make the change to the
file as the  wiki is being effectively owned by the spammers otherwise.

Happy to do this or work with somebody on this...

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 23, 2016 3:40 AM, "Marton Kiss"  wrote:

> Tom,
>
> I can help in infra contribution if required, but don't expect a quick
> resolution, as the infra team is hell overloaded. This is the process:
> - setup the same wiki in local dev env using infra puppet to make sure we
> are not breaking anything irreversible in production
> - create the patch
> - deliver the patch to ci
> - nagging infra core reviewers (hardest part)
> - we can beg for an account to execute cleanup scripts to remove spam
> content automagically
>
> Cheers,
> Marton
> JP Maxwell  (időpont: 2016. febr. 23., K, 8:59) ezt írta:
>
>> One final thought, I recall on the mobile view there is a secret word
>> request in the account creation page:
>>
>>
>> https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Special:UserLogin&type=signup&returnto=Main+Page&returntoquery=mobileaction%3Dtoggle_view_mobile%26welcome%3Dyes
>>
>> So, this is probably already setup.  It's possible you only need to add
>> the triggers.   Though I might make the question something a human could
>> reasonably figure out if you want people to continue to be able to edit the
>> wiki in the meantime:
>>
>>
>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['edit']      = true;
>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;
>>
>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:48 AM, JP Maxwell  wrote:
>>
>>> Hah. Well, I'm not entirely sure how this is setup to manage code
>>> changes.  I looked in GitHub and just see the puppet configs.  Not sure
>>> where or how I could push changes into LocalSettings.php, otherwise I'd be
>>> happy to do it :D   Gotta catch a little rest now, but will check in on
>>> this in a few hours.
>>>
>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:43 AM, Tom Fifield  wrote:
>>>
>>>> Cheers, that's exactly what we need someone to do.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 23/02/16 15:34, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> OK - so per the info here, you have to set the type of Captcha and add
>>>>> in editing and create page as triggers requiring Captcha.
>>>>>
>>>>> As an example to use QuestyCaptcha a the bottom of the
>>>>> LocalSettings.php
>>>>> file:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#QuestyCaptcha
>>>>>
>>>>> And make sure the triggers are set:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:ConfirmEdit#Configuration
>>>>>
>>>>> So, for example (you might want to change the questions), but the below
>>>>> should at least stop the bleeding?
>>>>>
>>>>> require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/ConfirmEdit.php";
>>>>>
>>>>> // Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is 1.25 or newer:
>>>>> //wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha' );
>>>>> // Use this line ONLY if your MediaWiki version is older than 1.25:
>>>>> require_once "$IP/extensions/ConfirmEdit/QuestyCaptcha.php";
>>>>>
>>>>> $wgCaptchaClass = 'QuestyCaptcha';
>>>>>
>>>>> // Add your questions in LocalSettings.php using this format
>>>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "A question?", 'answer' =>
>>>>> "An Answer");
>>>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => 'How much wood would a
>>>>> woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?', 'answer' => 'as much
>>>>> wood as...' );
>>>>> $wgCaptchaQuestions[] = array( 'question' => "What is this wiki's
>>>>> name?", 'answer' => "$wgSitename" );
>>>>> // You can also provide several acceptable answers to a given question
>>>>> (the

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-23 Thread JP Maxwell
Thanks Marton & Paul.
Marton, however the infra community wants to handle the puppetization of the
local settings file is fine with me. It is a very typical PHP app. Whatever is
done we should have an easy path to update it.
The MediaWiki version should also be updated to the latest version at some
point.
So it seems like there are a few potential tasks around the wiki if we want to
stay on top of things. I’m happy to help drive this if it would be helpful.
Paul, thanks, let me know if I can be of any assistance.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 9:00 AM, Marton Kiss  wrote:
It is using the openstack-infra's puppet-mediawiki module, and for first sight
this setting seems to be unmanaged by puppet. I not found any related entries in
system-config's wiki.pp. Would be great to ssh in, but just an infra core have
access for this instance. Maybe we could replace rlane's account with mine, he
is not maintaining the server as I know, but infra reviewers used to refuse
those changes. As I see this LocalSettings.php was generated during the
application installation process, but it could be moved somehow to puppet
modules.
I don't have this experience with mediawiki, but I think it is a typical php
app, and if it not implements an anti-pattern, we can add the config file to
puppet. But first of all we need to retrieve the existing file from an infra
member.
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-23 Thread JP Maxwell
I did setup a wiki and have a look at this briefly.   Can you confirm what
extensions you are loading?  When you setup the wiki it generates a
localsettings.php file that lists the extensions:



[image: Inline image 1]

# Enabled Extensions. Most extensions are enabled by including the base
extension file here
# but check specific extension documentation for more details
# The following extensions were automatically enabled:
wfLoadExtension( 'ConfirmEdit' );
wfLoadExtension( 'InputBox' );
wfLoadExtension( 'SpamBlacklist' );
wfLoadExtension( 'TitleBlacklist' );
wfLoadExtension( 'WikiEditor' );

I think if you have that ConfirmEdit extension you can enable captcha when
creating new pages / editing existing ones.  In addition, there do seem to
be some spam extensions that come built in.


J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net 


On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 12:43 AM, Tom Fifield  wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> Spam pages now outnumber content pages on our wiki.
>
> I have stopped trying to keep up with deleting them, after putting in
> many, many hours.
>
>
> Is there any chance someone can make the configuration changes I posted a
> couple weeks back, as an emergency measure?
>
>
> *  update Apache web server configuration to block all spammer IPs in
> lists available from www.stopforumspam.com . Alternate, use the mediawiki
> plugin that does the same:
> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:StopForumSpam
>
> * Configre the ConfirmEdit extension to set it to display a CAPTCHA when
> creating a new page:
>
> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Tom
>
> On 15/02/16 22:05, Tom Fifield wrote:
>
>> Is there anyone who can help with this? There's still a ton of spam
>> going in, and manually cleaning it is a ton of effort.
>>
>> On 12/02/16 06:40, Tom Fifield wrote:
>>
>>> OK, so, MediaWiki nas a nice manual on how to combat spam (
>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Combating_spam )
>>>
>>> Would it be possible to get these implemented:
>>>
>>> *  update Apache web server configuration to block all spammer IPs in
>>> lists available from www.stopforumspam.com . Alternate, use the
>>> mediawiki plugin that does the same:
>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:StopForumSpam
>>>
>>> * Configre the ConfirmEdit extension to set it to display a CAPTCHA when
>>> creating a new page:
>>>
>>> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create']= true;
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>>
>>> Tom
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/02/16 11:08, Tom Fifield wrote:
>>>
 Hi,

 Since about 11th January, wiki.o.o has been under attack by spammers.

 They're creating new pages at a rate of more than 50 a day, with titles
 that hint at calling certain phone numbers for various services.

 If you look at

 https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Special:NewPages

 you'll see them.

 It's across more than a dozen user accounts. I'm going to attempt some
 cleaning, but we probably need to look for an extension to do something
 about this pro-actively.



 Regards,


 Tom


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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-23 Thread JP Maxwell
Thanks Elizabeth - good info - that document answers the questions of where the
code lives and how updates are performed. It would all require ssh access to the
server it seems, which I don’t have.
I created an ether pad here:
https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/wiki.openstack.org
[https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/wiki.openstack.org]
Though it would be great if we could use an issue tracker (I know there has been
some discussion on this in the past). We use chiliproject.org (though it is no
longer supported) - the upstream parent Redmine might be an option.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Elizabeth K. Joseph 
wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 8:53 AM, JP Maxwell  wrote:
> Thanks Marton & Paul.
>
> Marton, however the infra community wants to handle the puppetization of the
> local settings file is fine with me. It is a very typical PHP app.
> Whatever is done we should have an easy path to update it.

Agreed. And we really do want to have it fully Puppetized in public so
folks can pitch in and help us with these things. The half-Puppetized
state makes this hard, as we can see from this thread.

As for where everything lives, we do have a little documentation on
it. Where the Puppet module lives, the exact placement of the
configuration we have Puppetized and some upgrade nodes here:
http://docs.openstack.org/infra/system-config/wiki.html

I've gone ahead and sent some sanitized Settings files from production
Paul's way, so that will get us started (thanks Paul!)

> The MediaWiki version should also be updated to the latest version at some
> point.
>
> So it seems like there are a few potential tasks around the wiki if we want
> to stay on top of things. I’m happy to help drive this if it would be
> helpful.

Tracking these tasks would indeed be helpful to us, thank you for
offering. You can start putting notes in an etherpad.openstack.org
pad, or try to use Storyboard (linked from the wiki documentation page
above).

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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-23 Thread JP Maxwell
Understood on the issue tracker.

As I've said before I love the automation dream.   Let me know what we can
do in the short term and long term.

Cheers!

J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Elizabeth K. Joseph 
wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 9:33 AM, JP Maxwell  wrote:
> > Thanks Elizabeth - good info - that document answers the questions of
> where
> > the code lives and how updates are performed.  It would all require ssh
> > access to the server it seems, which I don’t have.
>
> Right, this is not the situation we want it to be. Once it's all
> Puppetized we'll be able to more easily accept contributions from
> folks who can't log in (like everything else we run).
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-24 Thread JP Maxwell
It looks like you are using it (you can see it in the mobile login view), 
but it is not being used once you are logged in:


$wgGroupPermissions['user' ]['skipcaptcha'] = true;

I think you need to remove the above line. And add in the two below:
$wgCaptchaTriggers['edit'] = true;
$wgCaptchaTriggers['create'] = true;


J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
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On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 2:23 PM, Elizabeth K. Joseph 
wrote:

> $wgCaptchaTriggers['edit'] = true;
> $wgCaptchaTriggers['create'] = true;


We're now storing our Settings.php (LocalSettings.php points at it) in
git and people can submit patches against it in the puppet-mediawiki
module:


https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki/tree/templates/Settings.php.erb

A quick glance looks like we're already loading QuestyCaptcha, but it
seems to not be enabled/used?

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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-25 Thread JP Maxwell
Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile view in
the wiki native user table. I just created an account for JpMaxMan.  Not
sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you were aware.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 24, 2016 6:16 PM, "Elizabeth K. Joseph"  wrote:

> On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 12:50 PM, Paul Belanger 
> wrote:
> > I've started updating our LocalSettings.pp based on we're talking about
> here.
> > We'll start with edit / create captcha then move to other pages if
> spaming
> > continues.
>
> We just landed a captcha change and I have tested that after I save a
> page, it then prompts for a question. on the next page before allowing
> you to fully save.
>
> The UI is not great for this, so people might miss where they are
> supposed to type in the answer to the question, but we should just
> keep an eye on this in channel as questions pop up until we make this
> better.
>
> --
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>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-25 Thread JP Maxwell
Is it an option to put the question back to an impossible answer for even a
little while? I think it would be very telling if the spam continues then
there may be an exploit possibly tied to the launchpad SSO.  It would at
least give a clue where to focus.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 25, 2016 10:10 PM, "Elizabeth K. Joseph" 
wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley  wrote:
> > On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
> >> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
> >> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
> >> JpMaxMan.  Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
> >> were aware.
> >
> > Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in fact
> > previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
> > probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
> > bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>
> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view issue.
>
> Otherwise, quick update here:
>
> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>
> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all the
> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>
> --
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>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
Marton

Make sure you are using the right upstream repository. They are in version
1.25. Check out: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Special:Version

Not that it shouldn't all be upgraded ;) be aware there seem to be config
file formatting differences in the latest version vs 1.25 as well.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 26, 2016 4:35 AM, "Marton Kiss"  wrote:

> I've deployed the mediawiki using our puppet modules to my dev machine,
> and we have more problems here:
> [image: The MediaWiki logo] MediaWiki 1.27 internal error
>
> MediaWiki 1.27 requires at least PHP version 5.5.9, you are using PHP
> 5.3.10-1ubuntu3.21.
> Supported PHP versions
>
> Please consider upgrading your copy of PHP
> <http://www.php.net/downloads.php>. PHP versions less than 5.5.0 are no
> longer supported by the PHP Group and will not receive security or bugfix
> updates.
>
> If for some reason you are unable to upgrade your PHP version, you will
> need to download <https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Download> an older
> version of MediaWiki from our website. See our compatibility page
> <https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Compatibility#PHP> for details of which
> versions are compatible with prior versions of PHP.
>
> The wiki.o.o seems to be running on precise, meanwhile the git consumed
> repo simply not supporting the PHP version provided there.
>
> M.
>
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 5:19 AM JP Maxwell  wrote:
>
>> Is it an option to put the question back to an impossible answer for even
>> a little while? I think it would be very telling if the spam continues then
>> there may be an exploit possibly tied to the launchpad SSO.  It would at
>> least give a clue where to focus.
>>
>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>> On Feb 25, 2016 10:10 PM, "Elizabeth K. Joseph" 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley 
>>> wrote:
>>> > On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
>>> >> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
>>> >> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
>>> >> JpMaxMan.  Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
>>> >> were aware.
>>> >
>>> > Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in fact
>>> > previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
>>> > probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
>>> > bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>>>
>>> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view issue.
>>>
>>> Otherwise, quick update here:
>>>
>>> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
>>> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>>>
>>> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all the
>>> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>>>
>>> --
>>> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>>>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
I really think you might consider the option that there is a vulnerability
in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will be an
ongoing wild goose chase.

I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
question impossible and see if the spam continues.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"  wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley 
> wrote:
> > > On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
> > >> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
> > >> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
> > >> JpMaxMan.  Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
> > >> were aware.
> > >
> > > Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in fact
> > > previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
> > > probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
> > > bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
> >
> > So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view issue.
> >
> > Otherwise, quick update here:
> >
> > The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
> > explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
> >
> > I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all the
> > users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
> >
> So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into this.
> We are
> using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be impossible
> for
> spammers to by pass in an automated fashion.  So, either our captcha is too
> easy, or we didn't set it up properly.  I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o so
> others
> will have to check logs.  I did test new pages and edits, and was promoted
> by
> captcha.
>
> As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2 configuration to
> blacklist IPs.  I am reading up on that now.
>
> > --
> > Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
> >
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts are
working on production because the spam either stops or not.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"  wrote:

> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
> > I really think you might consider the option that there is a
> vulnerability
> > in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will be
> an
> > ongoing wild goose chase.
> >
> > I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
> > question impossible and see if the spam continues.
> >
> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be able
> to
> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror dev
> instance for us to work on, rather then production.
>
> > J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
> > On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"  wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley 
> > > wrote:
> > > > > On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
> > > > >> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
> > > > >> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
> > > > >> JpMaxMan.  Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
> > > > >> were aware.
> > > > >
> > > > > Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in fact
> > > > > previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
> > > > > probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
> > > > > bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
> > > >
> > > > So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view
> issue.
> > > >
> > > > Otherwise, quick update here:
> > > >
> > > > The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
> > > > explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
> > > >
> > > > I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all the
> > > > users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
> > > >
> > > So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into
> this.
> > > We are
> > > using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be
> impossible
> > > for
> > > spammers to by pass in an automated fashion.  So, either our captcha
> is too
> > > easy, or we didn't set it up properly.  I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o so
> > > others
> > > will have to check logs.  I did test new pages and edits, and was
> promoted
> > > by
> > > captcha.
> > >
> > > As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2 configuration
> to
> > > blacklist IPs.  I am reading up on that now.
> > >
> > > > --
> > > > Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
> > > >
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view extension,
test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"  wrote:

> Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts are
> working on production because the spam either stops or not.
>
> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
> On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>> > I really think you might consider the option that there is a
>> vulnerability
>> > in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will be
>> an
>> > ongoing wild goose chase.
>> >
>> > I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
>> > question impossible and see if the spam continues.
>> >
>> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be
>> able to
>> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror dev
>> instance for us to work on, rather then production.
>>
>> > J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>> > On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"  wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
>> > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley 
>> > > wrote:
>> > > > > On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
>> > > > >> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
>> > > > >> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
>> > > > >> JpMaxMan.  Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
>> > > > >> were aware.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in
>> fact
>> > > > > previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
>> > > > > probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
>> > > > > bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>> > > >
>> > > > So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view
>> issue.
>> > > >
>> > > > Otherwise, quick update here:
>> > > >
>> > > > The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
>> > > > explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>> > > >
>> > > > I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all
>> the
>> > > > users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>> > > >
>> > > So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into
>> this.
>> > > We are
>> > > using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be
>> impossible
>> > > for
>> > > spammers to by pass in an automated fashion.  So, either our captcha
>> is too
>> > > easy, or we didn't set it up properly.  I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o
>> so
>> > > others
>> > > will have to check logs.  I did test new pages and edits, and was
>> promoted
>> > > by
>> > > captcha.
>> > >
>> > > As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2 configuration
>> to
>> > > blacklist IPs.  I am reading up on that now.
>> > >
>> > > > --
>> > > > Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>> > > >
>> > > > ___
>> > > > OpenStack-Infra mailing list
>> > > > OpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.org
>> > > > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>> > >
>> > > ___
>> > > OpenStack-Infra mailing list
>> > > OpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.org
>> > > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>> > >
>>
>
___
OpenStack-Infra mailing list
OpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.org
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra


Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell

I think what Jimmy is referring to is what I was suggesting by removing the
extensions / making the question impossible to answer. Basically a series 
of
rapid fire changes while tailing the logs and seeing what stops the spam. 
Once
you know what worked then you can submit as an official patch. But being 
able to
quickly try these things on a server actually under attack is the fastest 
path

toward identifying the fix.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger  
wrote:

On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest 
path
> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root 
access

> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing, 
but
> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no 
way

> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>
I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it 
shouldn't be

hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.

If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki 
manually, I
not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be 
working on

2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
changes into -infra workflow in parallel.

> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines, 
but
> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a 
place

> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set 
up

> credentials with varying levels of access.
>
As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't 
require

SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.

It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.

> Jimmy
>
> Paul Belanger wrote:
> >On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
> >>But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view 
extension,

> >>test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
> >>crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
> >>
> >Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to 
see

how
> >puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
> >
> >If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
against.
> >
> >[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
> >
> >>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
> >>On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell" wrote:
> >>
> >>>Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts 
are

> >>>working on production because the spam either stops or not.
> >>>
> >>>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
> >>>On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger" 
wrote:

> >>>
> >>>>On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
> >>>>>I really think you might consider the option that there is a
> >>>>vulnerability
> >>>>>in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs 
will be

> >>>>an
> >>>>>ongoing wild goose chase.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the 
questy

> >>>>>question impossible and see if the spam continues.
> >>>>>
> >>>>We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would 
be

> >>>>able to
> >>>>use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a 
mirror dev

> >>>>instance for us to work on, rather then production.
> >>>>
> >>>>>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
> >>>>>On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger" 
wrote:

> >>>>>
> >>>>>>On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph 
wrote:
> >>>>>>>On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy 
Stanley

> >>>>>>wrote:
> >>>>>>>&

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
Marton
Where are you seeing the logs?
Paul
The point is that to comment out a line in VI and watch the logs in another
window takes about a minute or two. To submit a patch, get approval, push, ask
someone to share the logs takes a lot longer and relies on other people.
I understand the need for openness and I appreciate the process and the
automation. I think Jimmy’s point was if we want a quick fix….

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Marton Kiss  wrote:
I see a ton of incoming post requests:
POST
/w/index.php?title=Special%3ARunJobs&tasks=jobs&maxjobs=1&sigexpiry=1456508270&signature=571cfb216f944b15d2eee1c0253d08b77003328e

M.
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:35 PM Marton Kiss < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:
Oh, I can login. So what we need?
M.
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:33 PM JP Maxwell < j...@tipit.net [j...@tipit.net] > 
wrote:
I think what Jimmy is referring to is what I was suggesting by removing the
extensions / making the question impossible to answer. Basically a series of
rapid fire changes while tailing the logs and seeing what stops the spam. Once
you know what worked then you can submit as an official patch. But being able to
quickly try these things on a server actually under attack is the fastest path
toward identifying the fix.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger < pabelan...@redhat.com 
[pabelan...@redhat.com] > wrote:
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing, but
> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no way
> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>
I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it shouldn't be
hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.

If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually, I
not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working on
2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
changes into -infra workflow in parallel.

> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines, but
> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set up
> credentials with varying levels of access.
>
As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't require
SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.

It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.

> Jimmy
>
> Paul Belanger wrote:
> >On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
> >>But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view extension,
> >>test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
> >>crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
> >>
> >Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to see
how
> >puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
> >
> >If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
against.
> >
> >[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
[https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/]
> >
> >>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
> >>[http://fibercove.com]
> >>On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"< j...@tipit.net [j...@tipit.net] > 
> >>wrote:
> >>
> >>>Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts are
> >>>working on production because the spam either stops or not.
> >>>
> >>>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
> >>>[http://fibercove.com]
> >>>On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"< pabelan...@redhat.com 
> >>>[pabelan...@redhat.com] > wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, 

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
A quick google indicates this may be an unrelated issue that should be fixed,
but I don’t *think* it is related to the spam.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Marton Kiss  wrote:
I'm going to get a dinner, but I'll be on irc after, so if I can help somehow, I
will be here. #openstack-infra mrmartin
M.
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:51 PM Paul Belanger < pbela...@redhat.com 
[pbela...@redhat.com] > wrote:
On phone but patch puppet-mediawiki and enable captcha for all pages. We only
did edit and create

On Feb 26, 2016 10:38 AM, Marton Kiss < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:

I see a ton of incoming post requests:
POST
/w/index.php?title=Special%3ARunJobs&tasks=jobs&maxjobs=1&sigexpiry=1456508270&signature=571cfb216f944b15d2eee1c0253d08b77003328e

M.
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:35 PM Marton Kiss < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:
Oh, I can login. So what we need?
M.
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:33 PM JP Maxwell < j...@tipit.net [j...@tipit.net] > 
wrote:
I think what Jimmy is referring to is what I was suggesting by removing the
extensions / making the question impossible to answer. Basically a series of
rapid fire changes while tailing the logs and seeing what stops the spam. Once
you know what worked then you can submit as an official patch. But being able to
quickly try these things on a server actually under attack is the fastest path
toward identifying the fix.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger < pabelan...@redhat.com 
[pabelan...@redhat.com] > wrote:
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing, but
> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no way
> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>
I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it shouldn't be
hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.

If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually, I
not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working on
2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
changes into -infra workflow in parallel.

> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines, but
> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set up
> credentials with varying levels of access.
>
As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't require
SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.

It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.

> Jimmy
>
> Paul Belanger wrote:
> >On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
> >>But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view extension,
> >>test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
> >>crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
> >>
> >Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to see
how
> >puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
> >
> >If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
against.
> >
> >[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
[https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/]
> >
> >>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
> >>[http://fibercove.com]
> >>On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"< j...@tipit.net [j...@tipit.net] > 
> >>wrote:
> >>
> >>>Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts are
> >>>working on production because the spam either stops or not.
> >>>
> >>>J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
> >>>[http://fibercove.com]
> >>>On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"<

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-26 Thread JP Maxwell
Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It appears the
spam continues to flow:

https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen

Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you want to
give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key attached).



ssh-rsa
B3NzaC1yc2EBIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q==
jpmax...@tipit.net




J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>


On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur 
wrote:

> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last couple
> of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like we're
> taking a very wrong approach here.
>
> Paul Belanger wrote:
>
> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach.  Based on the work we did
> yesterday, anybody can do that via our workflow. Please submit a patch to
> puppet-mediawiki[1] and ping an infra-root in #openstack-infra IRC.
>
> What I'm proposing is the workflow is really meant for software, not for
> web applications. It's tedious and time consuming when what's needed here
> is a set of tests on the server. Submitting a patch, waiting for a +1, then
> getting on IRC to find someone with access (and time) to paste the logs is
> a pretty time consuming process for what should be a series of rapid-fire
> changes/fixes on the server. Especially when we're dealign with an active
> attack.
>
>
> We can then have somebody look at the logs.  I think it is more about 
> scheduling
> the task since more infra-root as travling back from the mid-cycle last night
> and today.
>
> Right, this is my point. This has been going on for 3 weeks (or more). Tom
> Fifeldt was asking for help without response. And here we are through
> another week and no closer to stemming the flow.
>
> I'm fully aware what I'm proposing goes against what Infra and the
> OpenStack workflow is all about, but I'd ask you all to look at this from a
> web development perspective instead of a software development perspective.
>
> Jimmy
>
>
> Last email from me, just on a plane.  Will follow up when I land.
>
> [1] https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki
>
>  J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com
> [http://www.fibercove.com]
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger  
> 
> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
>
> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing,
>
> but
>
> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no
>
> way
>
> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>
>
> I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it
> shouldn't be
> hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.
>
> If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually,
> I
> not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working
> on
> 2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
> changes into -infra workflow in parallel.
>
>
> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines,
>
> but
>
> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set
>
> up
>
> credentials with varying levels of access.
>
>
> As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't
> require
> SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
> configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
> having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.
>
> It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
> really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.
>
>
> Jimmy
>
> Paul Belanger wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 1

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-27 Thread JP Maxwell
Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should we
clear out these non launchpad accounts from the DB?

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss"  wrote:

> And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch:
> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
>
> M.
>
> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss  wrote:
>
>> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are
>> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad
>> openid auth is not affected at all.
>>
>> So the spam script is creating accounts like this:
>> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G;
>> *** 1. row ***
>>  user_id: 7494
>>user_name: CedricJamieson
>>   user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson
>>user_password:
>> :pbkdf2:sha256:1:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
>> user_newpassword:
>>user_newpass_time: NULL
>>   user_email: balashkina.evdok...@mail.ru
>> user_touched: 20160227052454
>>   user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379
>> user_email_authenticated: NULL
>> user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320
>> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441
>>user_registration: 20160227052441
>>   user_editcount: 2
>>user_password_expires: NULL
>>
>> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this
>> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty.
>> We have 423 total accounts with passwords:
>> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != '';
>> +--+
>> | count(*) |
>> +--+
>> |  423 |
>> +--+
>> 1 row in set (0.00 sec)
>>
>> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary email
>> confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard user
>> login page, as described here:
>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
>>
>> And I made this patch to make it permanent:
>> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based auth
>>
>> Just for the record, the last spam user account:
>> 7536 | EarthaChester22
>>
>> Marton
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that:
>>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to
>>> wiki.o.o
>>>
>>> Marton
>>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell  wrote:
>>>
>>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It appears
>>>> the spam continues to flow:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen
>>>>
>>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you want
>>>> to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key attached).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ssh-rsa
>>>> B3NzaC1yc2EBIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q==
>>>> jpmax...@tipit.net
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last
>>>>> couple of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like
>>>>> we're taking a very wrong approach here.
>>>>>
>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach.  Based on the work 
>>>>

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-27 Thread JP Maxwell
FYI. Still seeing the mobile view...

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 27, 2016 6:53 AM, "Marton Kiss"  wrote:

> Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and check for new spam
> content / user accounts.
>
> M.
> JP Maxwell  (időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 13:50) ezt írta:
>
>> Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should
>> we clear out these non launchpad accounts from the DB?
>>
>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>> On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss"  wrote:
>>
>>> And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch:
>>> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
>>>
>>> M.
>>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are
>>>> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad
>>>> openid auth is not affected at all.
>>>>
>>>> So the spam script is creating accounts like this:
>>>> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G;
>>>> *** 1. row ***
>>>>  user_id: 7494
>>>>user_name: CedricJamieson
>>>>   user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson
>>>>user_password:
>>>> :pbkdf2:sha256:1:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
>>>> user_newpassword:
>>>>user_newpass_time: NULL
>>>>   user_email: balashkina.evdok...@mail.ru
>>>> user_touched: 20160227052454
>>>>   user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379
>>>> user_email_authenticated: NULL
>>>> user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320
>>>> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441
>>>>user_registration: 20160227052441
>>>>   user_editcount: 2
>>>>user_password_expires: NULL
>>>>
>>>> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this
>>>> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty.
>>>> We have 423 total accounts with passwords:
>>>> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != '';
>>>> +--+
>>>> | count(*) |
>>>> +--+
>>>> |  423 |
>>>> +--+
>>>> 1 row in set (0.00 sec)
>>>>
>>>> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary email
>>>> confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard user
>>>> login page, as described here:
>>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
>>>>
>>>> And I made this patch to make it permanent:
>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based
>>>> auth
>>>>
>>>> Just for the record, the last spam user account:
>>>> 7536 | EarthaChester22
>>>>
>>>> Marton
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that:
>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to
>>>>> wiki.o.o
>>>>>
>>>>> Marton
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It appears
>>>>>> the spam continues to flow:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you
>>>>>> want to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key
>>>>>> attached).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ssh-rsa
>>>>>> B3NzaC1yc2EBIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-02-27 Thread JP Maxwell
Elizabeth
I hope you feel better.
Just FYI, this is going full force in IRC right now. I’ve bowed out as the
approach I was suggesting didn’t get traction.
I proposed to manually iterate on this to confirm precisely which change solves
the spam problem. Once that has been identified we can revert and come up with a
proper patch. Right now the assumption is that disabling manual accounts will
solve the problem (and it might). As a result the team is trying to solve for
the consequences of not having manual accounts. Some bots currently use manual
accounts among other issues. If the assumption is correct, these efforts will be
worth it. However, if it isn’t it will have been a great waste of energy.
In any case have a good weekend everyone. I’m off to eat some delicious central
Texas BBQ!

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://www.fibercove.com]
On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Elizabeth K. Joseph 
wrote:
We'll be getting together on Monday around 1700 UTC to work through this
together in a debug session in #openstack-infra (I'm too sick this weekend, plus
we need a time when more infra-root folks with the institutional knowledge are
around).

On Feb 27, 2016 05:37, "Marton Kiss" < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:
Yeah, the Settings.php was overriden by the latest puppet run. We need to wait
for some infra guys to approve my patches and make it permanent: 
https://review.openstack.org/285669 [https://review.openstack.org/285669] 
Disable standard password based auth
https://review.openstack.org/285672 [https://review.openstack.org/285672] 
Disable mobile frontend
M.
On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:27 PM JP Maxwell < j...@tipit.net [j...@tipit.net] > 
wrote:
FYI. Still seeing the mobile view...

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://fibercove.com]

On Feb 27, 2016 6:53 AM, "Marton Kiss" < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:
Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and check for new spam
content / user accounts.

M.
JP Maxwell < j...@tipit.net [j...@tipit.net] > (időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 
13:50) ezt írta:
Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should we clear
out these non launchpad accounts from the DB?

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com 
[http://fibercove.com]

On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss" < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:
And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch: 
https://review.openstack.org/285672 [https://review.openstack.org/285672] 
Disable mobile frontend

M.
On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wrote:
I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are created by
accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad openid auth is not
affected at all.
So the spam script is creating accounts like this: mysql> select * from user 
where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G; *** 1. row 
*** user_id: 7494 user_name: CedricJamieson 
user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson user_password:
:pbkdf2:sha256:1:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
 user_newpassword: user_newpass_time: NULL user_email: 
balashkina.evdok...@mail.ru [balashkina.evdok...@mail.ru] user_touched: 
20160227052454 user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379 
user_email_authenticated: NULL user_email_token: 
be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320 user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441 
user_registration: 20160227052441 user_editcount: 2 user_password_expires: NULL
The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this field of
non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty. We have 423 total 
accounts with passwords: mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password 
!= ''; +--+ | count(*) | +--+ | 423 | +--+ 1 row in set 
(0.00 sec)
Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary email
confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard user login
page, as described here: 
https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
[https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages]
And I made this patch to make it permanent: https://review.openstack.org/285669 
[https://review.openstack.org/285669] Disable standard password based auth

Just for the record, the last spam user account: 7536 | EarthaChester22

Marton

On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss < marton.k...@gmail.com 
[marton.k...@gmail.com] > wro

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-03-22 Thread JP Maxwell
If anyone wants to approve this I am still happy to help.

https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285641/1

I don't think you are ever going to be successful at blocking accounts or
IPs. You must block the creation of the spam by the bots. IMHO focusing on
improving the captcha or understanding the bypass path around the captcha
is the best short term path to accomplish this.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-03-22 Thread JP Maxwell
If anyone wants to approve this I am still happy to help.

https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285641/1

I don't think you are ever going to be successful at blocking accounts or
IPs. You must block the creation of the spam by the bots. IMHO focusing on
improving the captcha or understanding the bypass path around the captcha
is the best short term path to accomplish this.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Mar 22, 2016 8:15 AM, "Paul Belanger"  wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 03:32:23PM +0800, Tom Fifield wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> >
> > I'm sad to say that:
> >
> > * spammers are back - 100-odd pages have gone in over the weekend
> > https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Special:NewPages
> >
> > * Cleanup was ineffective, with many spam pages still existing on the
> wiki
> > (scroll through the NewPages link above)
> >
> So, we are still working through the clean up of the wiki.  Right now,
> we've
> only stopped the creation of new accounts.  Both from openid and mobile
> users.
>
> We're going to be adding SmitSpam[1] to allow admins to run some cleanup
> tools.
> But that hasn't landed yet.
>
> Until now, I am going into the wiki every few days to ban existing
> accounts that
> have already been created manually.
>
> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/287232/
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> >
> > Tom
> >
> >
> > On 28/02/16 01:11, JP Maxwell wrote:
> > >Elizabeth
> > >
> > >I hope you feel better.
> > >
> > >Just FYI, this is going full force in IRC right now.  I’ve bowed out as
> > >the approach I was suggesting didn’t get traction.
> > >
> > >I proposed to manually iterate on this to confirm precisely which change
> > >solves the spam problem.  Once that has been identified we can revert
> > >and come up with a proper patch.  Right now the assumption is that
> > >disabling manual accounts will solve the problem (and it might).  As a
> > >result the team is trying to solve for the consequences of not having
> > >manual accounts.  Some bots currently use manual accounts among other
> > >issues.  If the assumption is correct, these efforts will be worth it.
> > >  However, if it isn’t it will have been a great waste of energy.
> > >
> > >In any case have a good weekend everyone.  I’m off to eat some delicious
> > >central Texas BBQ!
> > >
> > >
> > >*J.P. Maxwell* | tipit.net <http://tipit.net> | fibercove.com
> > ><http://www.fibercove.com>
> > >
> > >On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Elizabeth K. Joseph
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >We'll be getting together on Monday around 1700 UTC to work through
> > >this together in a debug session in #openstack-infra (I'm too sick
> > >this weekend, plus we need a time when more infra-root folks with
> > >the institutional knowledge are around).
> > >
> > >On Feb 27, 2016 05:37, "Marton Kiss"  > ><mailto:marton.k...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > >
> > >Yeah, the Settings.php was overriden by the latest puppet run.
> > >We need to wait for some infra guys to approve my patches and
> > >make it permanent:
> > >https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password
> > >based auth
> > >https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
> > >
> > >    M.
> > >
> > >On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:27 PM JP Maxwell  > ><mailto:j...@tipit.net>> wrote:
> > >
> > >FYI. Still seeing the mobile view...
> > >
> > >J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net <http://tipit.net> | fibercove.com
> > ><http://fibercove.com>
> > >
> > >On Feb 27, 2016 6:53 AM, "Marton Kiss"
> > >mailto:marton.k...@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
> > >
> > >Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and
> > >check for new spam content / user accounts.
> > >
> > >M.
> > >JP Maxwell mailto:j...@tipit.net>>
> > >(időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 13:50) ezt írta:
> > >
> > >Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has
> > >stopped the spam? Should we clear out these non
> > >launchpad 

Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Wiki.o.o sustaining spam attack

2016-03-22 Thread JP Maxwell
My intention is to make a series of rapid fire changes to the config files
while tailing the log files in order to quickly suss out if the spammers
are defeating or bypassing captcha and what change would need to be
implemented to prevent this from happening. Once we actually know what is
happening and how to stop it then we would propose a permanent patch which
could be submitted through the normal processes.

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Mar 22, 2016 5:39 PM, "Jeremy Stanley"  wrote:

> On 2016-03-22 08:23:08 -0500 (-0500), JP Maxwell wrote:
> > If anyone wants to approve this I am still happy to help.
> >
> > https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285641/1
>
> Can you elaborate on how you intend to help which has to be done
> first with root access to the server (rather than merely with the
> assistance of someone with root access)? The commit message on that
> change indicates you just want access to logs files, which I or
> other root sysadmins can certainly provide.
>
> We want to make sure that all modifications are reflected in
> configuration management so that it's reviewed, tracked and
> repeatable, and this is why we generally limit production server
> root access to people who also have the ability to approve
> configuration management changes for the same servers. This service
> is already in a bit of an unfortunate state because years ago we
> were less strict and in a moment of weakness allowed the MW
> deployment/migration to precede the configuration management of that
> deployment (which was subsequently never completed). We need to make
> sure its tenuous situation doesn't regress further.
>
> > I don't think you are ever going to be successful at blocking
> > accounts or IPs. You must block the creation of the spam by the
> > bots. IMHO focusing on improving the captcha or understanding the
> > bypass path around the captcha is the best short term path to
> > accomplish this.
>
> I'm pretty sure we have consensus on this already. Blocking accounts
> and manual cleanup are only viewed as a temporary workaround while
> we plan for a safe upgrade to a more recent MW (and as a
> prerequisite, more recent Ubuntu) release so that we can take
> advantage of current access control measures and similar mitigation
> solutions developed by their community in response to escalating
> advancement in defacement and valdalism on Wikipedia and elsewhere.
> --
> Jeremy Stanley
>
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Re: [OpenStack-Infra] Pholio Spec 340641

2016-08-09 Thread JP Maxwell

There is only currently one issue: I can get it to authenticate against
login.ubuntu but neither dev or production OpenStackID. If we wish to stand
this up against OpenStackID I'm going to need some eyes on that particular
issue.
Craige greetings - are you trying to use Open ID 2.0 or Open ID connect to 
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