Tor 0.2.1.8-alpha is out
Tor 0.2.1.8-alpha fixes some crash bugs in earlier alpha releases, builds better on unusual platforms like Solaris and old OS X, and fixes a variety of other issues. https://www.torproject.org/download.html.en Changes in version 0.2.1.8-alpha - 2008-12-08 o Major features: - New DirPortFrontPage option that takes an html file and publishes it as "/" on the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. o Security fixes: - When the client is choosing entry guards, now it selects at most one guard from a given relay family. Otherwise we could end up with all of our entry points into the network run by the same operator. Suggested by Camilo Viecco. Fix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. o Major bugfixes: - Fix a DOS opportunity during the voting signature collection process at directory authorities. Spotted by rovv. Bugfix on 0.2.0.x. - Fix a possible segfault when establishing an exit connection. Bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. o Minor bugfixes: - Get file locking working on win32. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. Fixes bug 859. - Made Tor a little less aggressive about deleting expired certificates. Partial fix for bug 854. - Stop doing unaligned memory access that generated bus errors on sparc64. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. Fix for bug 862. - Fix a crash bug when changing EntryNodes from the controller. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. Fix for bug 867. Patched by Sebastian. - Make USR2 log-level switch take effect immediately. Bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta. - If one win32 nameserver fails to get added, continue adding the rest, and don't automatically fail. - Use fcntl() for locking when flock() is not available. Should fix compilation on Solaris. Should fix Bug 873. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. - Do not mark smartlist_bsearch_idx() function as ATTR_PURE. This bug could make gcc generate non-functional binary search code. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. - Build correctly on platforms without socklen_t. - Avoid potential crash on internal error during signature collection. Fixes bug 864. Patch from rovv. - Do not use C's stdio library for writing to log files. This will improve logging performance by a minute amount, and will stop leaking fds when our disk is full. Fixes bug 861. - Stop erroneous use of O_APPEND in cases where we did not in fact want to re-seek to the end of a file before every last write(). - Correct handling of possible malformed authority signing key certificates with internal signature types. Fixes bug 880. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. - Fix a hard-to-trigger resource leak when logging credential status. CID 349. o Minor features: - Directory mirrors no longer fetch the v1 directory or running-routers files. They are obsolete, and nobody asks for them anymore. This is the first step to making v1 authorities obsolete. o Minor features (controller): - Return circuit purposes in response to GETINFO circuit-status. Fixes bug 858. signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: technical solution for censorship [was: UK internet filtering]
If I understood well, Psiphon is eye-catching installer for web proxy with authentication. And without any standard way, how to obtain public list of psiphonodes (~ Tor directory servers). If you are interested in this level of "breaking censorship", consider http://samair.ru/proxy/ . Hundreds of free proxies. As easy and fast as possible. Marek 2008/12/10 Curious Kid <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Check out Psiphon. It's purpose is undermine Internet censorship. > http://psiphon.ca/ >
Re: technical solution for censorship [was: UK internet filtering]
You are describing a gargantuan problem beyond the scope of Tor.
A tool to compare the results from various exit nodes would be nice, though.
That would be a powerful tool to determine what is blocked in various
locations. That output could be exported to a large database keeping track of
Internet censorship.
Check out Psiphon. It's purpose is undermine Internet censorship.
http://psiphon.ca/
- Original Message
> From: Benjamin S. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: or-talk@freehaven.net
> Sent: Monday, December 8, 2008 8:05:09 AM
> Subject: technical solution for censorship [was: UK internet filtering]
>
> Am Samstag, den 06.12.2008, 19:49 -0500 schrieb Gregory Maxwell:
> >
> http://community.zdnet.co.uk/blog/0,100567,10009938o-2000331777b,00.htm?new_comment
> >
> > I've confirmed the reports of UK ISPs censoring Wikipedia using some
> > UK tor exists.
>
> I think it's time to find a better technical solution to deal with
> censorship in different countries.
> Censorship is increasing all around the world and we should be prepared
> that sooner or later nearly every country will censor the internet for
> different reasons (cp, intellectual property, politcal reasons, etc.)
> and in a different way.
>
> A perfect technical solution would make it possible to request any
> ressource as long as there is just one exit-node which isn't affected by
> censorship.
> But at the moment TOR-Nodes doesn't know which ressources are censored
> and which really doesn't exist, so it can happen that you use a circuit
> which is not able to bypass censorship.
> Putting them on the bad-exit-list is no solution, because first that way
> they are lost for the network for all requests which are not censored at
> all, and second the specific user has to know that the requested
> ressource does exist, which nodes are able to access it and how he can
> force TOR to do so.
>
> This could be done better: TOR itself should know which nodes are
> affected by censorship and use another for the specific request.
>
> The list could be auto-generated by the exit-nodes. For example an exit
> which gets back a 404 or a negative DNS-result could simply ask some
> other exit nodes (in a different country) to check if this is "real" or
> censorship. If last one, the specific request could be put on a list and
> published to the directory.
> Other TOR-Servers could use this list to check if they are also
> affected; clients would be able to check if the existing circuit is
> affected for the specific request and build up a different one.
>
> Not every censorship would be recognized this way, but for the other
> ones there could be a button implemented to TOR-Client. If pressed, the
> TOR-Exit is forced by the user to do the check.
>
> A nice side-effect is, that we get the neccessary data to check the
> censor which could be useful at least in democratic countries which have
> no public lists ('cause of index liborium prohibitum).
>
> So far,
> B.
> --
> Surf anonymously and reach Hidden Services by using TOR, JonDos (JAP)
> and I2P with https://tor-proxy.net .
Re: No data retention in germany for donated services
Am 09.12.2008 um 14:23 schrieb Hans Schnehl: Unfortunatelly it does not solve the problem, the mere fact traffic is going to be logged and held for 6 months is the problem, not who does the actual logging. So the necessary data will be easily obtained on request of executives from the isp's where nodes are hosted/running. But it may keep up the number of nodes in that country. This is not correct! I have to repeat myself: There will be no general traffic logging at hosters! The data retention only records the information who used which "identifier" at which time. For access networks this is which dynamic IP address a customer used at a certain time. There will be no IP packet or TCP connection logging (at least not because of the data retention law)! Sven smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
Re: No data retention in germany for donated services
On Tue, Dec 09, 2008 at 10:58:03AM +0100, Karsten N. wrote: > Seth David Schoen schrieb: > > NO DATA RETENTION FOR FREE-OF-CHARGE SERVICES > > > > Original German text of this article "Keine Vorratsdatenspeicherung für > > unentgeltliche Dienste" is available at > > > > > > http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/keine-vorratsdatenspeicherung-fuer-unentgeltliche-dienste/ > > > > > > Copyright 2008 Patrick Breyer; licensed under Creative Commons BY-2.0 > > (Germany) license. > > > > http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/de/ > > > > Translation by Seth Schoen. This text version omits hyperlinks to the > > German text of laws, treaties, and court decisions which appear in-line > > in the original German version. > > The article by Patrick Breyer and the translation by Seth Schoen gives > the information about one main reason, why Tor nodes are not affected > by the EU data retention an the German data retention law §113a TKG. > > Supported by qualified lawyers, we have identified one or two more > points, why tor nodes has to be data retention free, but these points > are technical and more difficult to communicate with the judiciary. > > So we ask the tor community, to keep tor non-commercial at all. If a > commercial version of tor was online, it will be much more difficult > in the next time, to fight against data retention in EU. > > Yes, it is possible, to make a data retention law for donated services > in EU too. But this will takes time. We can use this time, to make tor > more robust against this attack. > > We will keep the German tor admins and the board of torproject.org > up-to-date about the lawyers expert opinion but with respect to the > recommendation of the lawyers, we will not publish it at the moment. This is great news for all Tornode operators in Germany, if it comes true in the meaning of the local (german) jurisdiction has to accept this. It saves German operators from having to chose between breaking anonymity by loggging data or being criminalyzed, or art least heavily fined or punished otherwise. It also would save quite a lot of work and money to be spent for saving all the data. This would be, presuming it to become accepted, excellent. Unfortunatelly it does not solve the problem, the mere fact traffic is going to be logged and held for 6 months is the problem, not who does the actual logging. So the necessary data will be easily obtained on request of executives from the isp's where nodes are hosted/running. But it may keep up the number of nodes in that country. Regards Hans
Re: No data retention in germany for donated services
Seth David Schoen schrieb: > NO DATA RETENTION FOR FREE-OF-CHARGE SERVICES > > Original German text of this article "Keine Vorratsdatenspeicherung für > unentgeltliche Dienste" is available at > > > http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/keine-vorratsdatenspeicherung-fuer-unentgeltliche-dienste/ > > > Copyright 2008 Patrick Breyer; licensed under Creative Commons BY-2.0 > (Germany) license. > > http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/de/ > > Translation by Seth Schoen. This text version omits hyperlinks to the > German text of laws, treaties, and court decisions which appear in-line > in the original German version. The article by Patrick Breyer and the translation by Seth Schoen gives the information about one main reason, why Tor nodes are not affected by the EU data retention an the German data retention law §113a TKG. Supported by qualified lawyers, we have identified one or two more points, why tor nodes has to be data retention free, but these points are technical and more difficult to communicate with the judiciary. So we ask the tor community, to keep tor non-commercial at all. If a commercial version of tor was online, it will be much more difficult in the next time, to fight against data retention in EU. Yes, it is possible, to make a data retention law for donated services in EU too. But this will takes time. We can use this time, to make tor more robust against this attack. We will keep the German tor admins and the board of torproject.org up-to-date about the lawyers expert opinion but with respect to the recommendation of the lawyers, we will not publish it at the moment. Regards Karsten N.
Re: technical solution for censorship [was: UK internet filtering]
On Mon, 8 Dec 2008 16:21:47 -0500 "Gregory Maxwell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >On Mon, Dec 8, 2008 at 4:07 PM, Scott Bennett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >[snip] >> That some people have found tor to be helpful in bypassing censorial >> regimes' efforts is one of the nicer unintended consequences of tor's design, >> but such use is fallout from, not motivation for, the design. > >I thought a driving idea behind TOR was to bring together people with >different goals but a common need (or at least a set of tightly >related needs) so that we form a larger anonymity pool and benefit >from common investment in infrastructure. > Yes, all of that is helpful, as is spelled out on the tor project's web pages. But all of that is not the goal, but rather in aid of the goal. This is also quite clear on those same web pages. >Many Tor users regard some of the uses to be unfortunate but tolerable >side effects. I run nodes primarily because I want to help people >avoid censorship, I regard anonymity (except to the extent that it is >needed to avoid effective censorship) to be socially detrimental >collateral damage. (http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19/) Those are *your* goal and view, but they are not the goal or view of the project. If you remain in any confusion over the goal of the project, please go to the project's web site and read what is posted there. It was posted in order that interested persons might understand what the developers are doing and why. > >So when you use Tor to achieve anonymity you should be thankful that >there are other people who use the same tools to avoid censorship. > Indeed I am. And, although I use tor and run a relay primarily in aid of the same goal as that of the project, I do not see that your goal is detrimental to "society". If you stop to consider that "society" is just a label referring to many individuals, it may make it easier to understand that anonymity in itself is not detrimental to those individuals, but rather that it protects those same individuals Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
