Tor-exit without any exit rejection policies

2010-04-27 Thread James Brown
Hi people,
For protecting the Tor project I want to start an exit Tor node. Because
I live in Russia, i.e. in the country with extremal tyranicсal regime
and without any political and personal liberties, I am afraid to do it
here and I intend to rent for it a VDS/VPS-server in suitable offshore
jurisdiction.
As a victim of Russian tyrannism and dictatorship I know how important
to have a fully functional but anonymous access to the Internet.
Because it I want to set up a Tor-exit without any exit rejection policies.
Could anything of you advice me such jurisdiction for that or maybe
concrete VDS/VPS-providers having servers in such jurisdictions?
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Re: Botnet attack? [was: Re: Declining traffic]

2010-04-27 Thread Scott Bennett
 On Tue, 27 Apr 2010 13:07:24 +0200 Hans Schnehl 
wrote:
>On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 01:35:20AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
>>  On Mon, 26 Apr 2010 13:36:17 -0400 Flamsmark 
>> wrote:
>> >On 26 April 2010 09:59, Timo Schoeler  wrote:
>> >
>> >> (Deutsche Telekom AG). For me it really seems as there's some kind of
>> >> botnet attack going on.
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >What makes you think that this is a botnet attack? What are the
>> >characteristics of a botnet attack, and how do these logs exhibit them? If
>>
>someone playing around, it's rather background noise...  relax, guys ;)
>
> 
>>  What my system logged over a two- to three-hour period was a very high
>> rate of illicit connection attempts being logged, a rate much higher that
>> usual and for an extended period of time.  Some of the connection attempts
>> involved only one or two tries for a single port number.  However, consider
>> another type that also occurred frequently during that time span.  That
>> other type looked more like an individual attack that came in this evening:
>
>[snip]
>
>> 
>> 2010-04-26 23:38:20.086026 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
>> 81.64.6.141.3422 > 24.1.225.89.8080:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
>> < 20]
>> 2010-04-26 23:38:20.990386 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
>> 81.64.6.141.3416 > 24.1.225.89.8000:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
>> < 20]
>> 2010-04-26 23:38:25.214087 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
>> 81.64.6.141.3419 > 24.1.225.89.8001:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
>> < 20]
>> 2010-04-26 23:38:26.122380 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
>> 81.64.6.141.3422 > 24.1.225.89.8080:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
>> < 20]
>> 
>
>[lot's of snip]
>
>There was a scan. yes. Happens.
>But these -> [bad hdr length 12 - too short, < 20] <- are *NOT* a
>maliciuos attempt of something but rather a matte ofr tcpdump running against
>a pflog* interface. There are different expectations about the snaplen ,
>so if increasse the snaplen to sth. higher than 68 bytes the message will
>disappear, it is rather harmless.
>
 Yes, yes, I understood all that.  That wasn't my point.  My point was
that on the morning in question, I was getting scans similar to that example,
each batch from a different IP address, as frequently as a couple of scans
in two or three seconds, and that that kind of thing went on almost
continuously for about three hours.  That was the first time I had seen a
protracted onslaught of such stuff on my system.  There are probably many
culprits that escaped getting added to my block list because after three
hours of trying to add each address by hand, scrolling back and forth through
the intermingled addresses in messages in an xterm, I was worn out and gave
up.  By the time I gave up, I had added over 220 addresses or address ranges.
Then the onslaught stopped very abruptly and has not recurred.  I still get
several scans per day of varying sets of ports, just as I did before, but no
further deluges of scans and individual port attempts coming from lots of
different IP addresses.  The event that morning was intense, but of finite
duration.
 While we're on the subject of illicit TCP connection attempts, I'd like
to mention something that I've noticed begin only in the last two months or
so and seems to be becoming more frequent as time passes.  At first, it was
the occasional attempt to connect to port 9030, which became more frequent
over the last few weeks.  Then 9001 was added to that and has also been
getting more frequent.  In the last day or so, I've begun seeing 8118 in
addition to those.  Hmmm...


  Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
**
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Re: Botnet attack? [was: Re: Declining traffic]

2010-04-27 Thread Hans Schnehl
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 01:35:20AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
>  On Mon, 26 Apr 2010 13:36:17 -0400 Flamsmark 
> wrote:
> >On 26 April 2010 09:59, Timo Schoeler  wrote:
> >
> >> (Deutsche Telekom AG). For me it really seems as there's some kind of
> >> botnet attack going on.
> >>
> >
> >
> >What makes you think that this is a botnet attack? What are the
> >characteristics of a botnet attack, and how do these logs exhibit them? If
>
someone playing around, it's rather background noise...  relax, guys ;)

 
>  What my system logged over a two- to three-hour period was a very high
> rate of illicit connection attempts being logged, a rate much higher that
> usual and for an extended period of time.  Some of the connection attempts
> involved only one or two tries for a single port number.  However, consider
> another type that also occurred frequently during that time span.  That
> other type looked more like an individual attack that came in this evening:

[snip]

> 
> 2010-04-26 23:38:20.086026 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
> 81.64.6.141.3422 > 24.1.225.89.8080:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
> < 20]
> 2010-04-26 23:38:20.990386 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
> 81.64.6.141.3416 > 24.1.225.89.8000:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
> < 20]
> 2010-04-26 23:38:25.214087 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
> 81.64.6.141.3419 > 24.1.225.89.8001:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
> < 20]
> 2010-04-26 23:38:26.122380 rule 5.logscanners.0/0(match): block in on bge0: 
> 81.64.6.141.3422 > 24.1.225.89.8080:  tcp 16 [bad hdr length 12 - too short, 
> < 20]
> 

[lot's of snip]

There was a scan. yes. Happens.
But these -> [bad hdr length 12 - too short, < 20] <- are *NOT* a
maliciuos attempt of something but rather a matte ofr tcpdump running against
a pflog* interface. There are different expectations about the snaplen ,
so if increasse the snaplen to sth. higher than 68 bytes the message will
disappear, it is rather harmless.

PLease see man tcpdump 

[quote]
TCP Packets
[snip]

If  the  snapshot was small enough that tcpdump didn't capture the full
TCP header, it interprets as much of the header  as  it  can  and  then
reports  ``[|tcp]'' to indicate the remainder could not be interpreted.
If the header contains a bogus option (one with a length that's  either
too  small  or  beyond  the  end  of the header), tcpdump reports it as
``[bad opt]'' and does not interpret any further  options  (since  it's
impossible  to  tell where they start).  If the header length indicates
options are present but the IP datagram length is not long  enough  for
the  options  to  actually  be  there, tcpdump reports it as ``[bad hdr
length]''.

[/quote]

on my bsd's a snaplen on 104 is sufficient, but you might try  256 or find
the appropriate value by checking it.


tcpdump ${wtf} -s 104 -i pflog*   

 
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