Re: checking new email on adium

2010-10-14 Thread Simon Ruderich
On Thu, Oct 14, 2010 at 01:46:08AM +, M wrote:
 When Adium checks for new emails when an acct is routed thru tor.. will the
 eail checking also be routed thru it, or will it use the global settings?

That depends on Adium. I don't have any experience with it, so I
guess your best bet is to test it yourself (wireshark helps).

Regards,
Simon
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Re: gratuitous change blocks upgrade to 0.2.2.15-alpha :-(

2010-09-10 Thread Simon Ruderich
On Fri, Sep 10, 2010 at 04:29:38AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
  I'm still in astonishment, wondering how I can actually exclude the
 nodes that should be excluded.  No angry rants from me at this point.

I would recommend a little script which generates the torrc file
for you using a template file with your commented nodes on
separate lines.

Simon
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Re: How does TOR deal with mac addresses

2010-03-28 Thread Simon Ruderich
On Sat, Mar 27, 2010 at 11:03:09PM -0400, Faraaz Damji wrote:
 Since he in Marco's original post referred to the client's ISP,
 just to clarify, your ISP can't even see leaked data sent through
 Tor.  It would be encrypted before being sent through the Tor
 network.

Just to clarify,  you can leak DNS requests with a faulty setup
which _can_ be seen by your ISP.

Simon
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Re: How does TOR deal with mac addresses

2010-03-27 Thread Simon Ruderich
On Sat, Mar 27, 2010 at 08:00:44PM +0530, emigrant wrote:
 On Fri, 2010-03-26 at 19:48 +0100, Marco Predicatori wrote:
 If you use Tor correctly, he can't figure out what site you
 are connecting to, and that's the whole point.

 thanks for the reply,
 what do you mean by using Tor correctly?

If Tor is not correctly used you can still leak information
regarding your identity. See this link on the main Tor page:
https://www.torproject.org/download.html.en#Warning

Hope this helps,
Simon
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Re: Tor/Iptables Question

2009-08-21 Thread Simon Ruderich
On Thu, Aug 20, 2009 at 09:34:23AM -0400, Ringo wrote:
 Ok so I added this one (which seemed like the only one that would open
 things up) and still no luck:
 iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT

 Here's a export of my current rules:

 # Generated by iptables-save v1.4.1.1 on Thu Aug 20 09:28:22 2009
 *filter
 :INPUT ACCEPT [9850:7346270]
 :FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
 :OUTPUT ACCEPT [10373:5920044]
 -A INPUT -p tcp -j DROP
 -A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
 -A INPUT -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

You're dropping all incoming TCP traffic! This must be switched.
And you should use conntrack (it replaces state).

-A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -j DROP

But I'm not sure if this is necessary at all. You could accept
all incoming traffic.

 -A OUTPUT -o lo -p tcp -m tcp --dport 8118 -m owner --uid-owner torify -j 
 ACCEPT
 -A OUTPUT -o lo -p tcp -m tcp --dport 9050 -j ACCEPT
 -A OUTPUT -o lo -p tcp -m owner --uid-owner torify -j REJECT --reject-with 
 icmp-port-unreachable
 -A OUTPUT -o lo -p tcp -m tcp --dport  -j ACCEPT
 COMMIT

 [snip]

I haven't tested it so I'm not sure it will work.

Hope this helps,
Simon
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