Re: Sum legl trubs wid TOR en France + more
So far in US laws, proxy owners can't be held responsibile for enabling illegal activities unless they endorse or encourage them. For instance, if you started a CGI proxy for a fee that offered "complete protection" and "easy way to trade credit cards" you would end up in jail. On 5/15/06, Jonathan D. Proulx <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: So the summary on drives is:* There's no point in being overly paranoid about wiping these because $they already got them and can be presumed to have a copy if theywant it, the only point in wiping is the removal of potentialmalware, any reforam will do that.* Given sufficient time and money only physical destruction is sufficient protection (googling : destruction of classified disksSOP : gives the US Military position on this, presumably they knowwhat they can recover...)ON the topic of what *could* happen:* The worst case is you could be the subject of an "extrodinary rendition" and spend the last painful month of your life in a darkhole.* The most likely case is you'll be questioned, searched, and possiblybreifly detained while the cops fugure out you really can't help them even if you want to.My personal anectdote about police and TOR. I was running a verypopular exit node (was usually top three at the time), I was contectedby a Sheriff from North Carolina (for those out side the US, this is not known as a particularly lenient, or computer savvy jurisdiction).It seems someone was commitiing a bit of credit card fraud through myexit node. I explained how tor worked (mixing a bunch of stufftogather repeatedly with no logs), and gave URLs to documentation. Basicly the standard form letter on the phone. I never heard about itagain. Law enforcement is used to leads that go no where, most do.I may have getten the benefit of some doubt due to my position (sys admin at major comp sci lab, and the node was on that network not aprivate connection), but I doubt it.-Jon
Re: Sum legl trubs wid TOR en France + more
So the summary on drives is: * There's no point in being overly paranoid about wiping these because $they already got them and can be presumed to have a copy if they want it, the only point in wiping is the removal of potential malware, any reforam will do that. * Given sufficient time and money only physical destruction is sufficient protection (googling : destruction of classified disks SOP : gives the US Military position on this, presumably they know what they can recover...) ON the topic of what *could* happen: * The worst case is you could be the subject of an "extrodinary rendition" and spend the last painful month of your life in a dark hole. * The most likely case is you'll be questioned, searched, and possibly breifly detained while the cops fugure out you really can't help them even if you want to. My personal anectdote about police and TOR. I was running a very popular exit node (was usually top three at the time), I was contected by a Sheriff from North Carolina (for those out side the US, this is not known as a particularly lenient, or computer savvy jurisdiction). It seems someone was commitiing a bit of credit card fraud through my exit node. I explained how tor worked (mixing a bunch of stuff togather repeatedly with no logs), and gave URLs to documentation. Basicly the standard form letter on the phone. I never heard about it again. Law enforcement is used to leads that go no where, most do. I may have getten the benefit of some doubt due to my position (sys admin at major comp sci lab, and the node was on that network not a private connection), but I doubt it. -Jon
Re: Sum legl trubs wid TOR en France + more
Ringo, You would have had an idea if you followed and read any of the links I sent previously. --- Ringo Kamens <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I agree with you about the hops. Thanks for posting the info about > hard > drives. I had no idea. > > On Sun May 14 21:58:42 2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] < > [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > FYI. > > > > Hard Disks.. (so abou the length) > > > > It is possible to find old data on "scrubbed" disks even with 100's > of > > cycles of writeover. > > > > The reason is coz of wobble or track shape. Imagine washing machine > at > > home, as it spins it wobbles. Now look at your hard disk (get an > old one out > > that is past it and open it up!) you'll see the disk rotates at > high speed. > > Thoughout its life it has a wobble, just a small one. But this > wobble > > changes now and then with time. So when your write/read head lays > down its > > magnetic bits on a track it does so with a wobble in it. The track > itself is > > wider than the individual bit patterns and so there is only partial > overlap > > with past bit patterns. When a disk finds a bits pattern which is > wrong > > (from the extra data it stores for check bits) and it cant recover > > logically the original pattern it starts to "wipe" away the edges > of the bit > > pattern on the track, so as to "clean" the signal. It does this by > > offsetting the head from the current midpoint of the track. It then > tries a > > RE-READ the cleaned track. This is often susuccessful in removing > "noise" > > from past bit patterns so as to ge > > t "clean" read of the last bit pattern. If not successful this > process > > might be done any number of times upto the maximum "re-reads" > specifed in > > the disk firmware. > > > > It is this EXTRA width and the varying wobble that allows data to > be left > > on the disk even if "military strength" scrubbing is perfomed by > software. > > This is particularly relevant ot data put on when the disk is young > > remaining there for some months so that the disks bearing wear > changes the > > wobble. New bit patterns written over this old bit pattern are > almost > > vertaain to bew able to be read - even years later! > > > > > > The more.. > > > > A while back it was asked if "3 hops is enough". At the time I had > prblems > > getting to my email account so here's my 2 cents. > > > > The current set 3 hops is a predictable number of hops and because > of > > that, the predictability is a DEFINITE weakness in TOR. > > > > Its all about ENTROPY (the mathematical concept not the network). > > > > If the current systme of a fixed 3 hops was changed to allow 3-6 > hops then > > I think this would create a much LESS predictable system. > > > > Pulling the records on a ALL our TOR servers is possible. And then > going > > through them records to see the 3 fixed hops by computer is simple! > > > > You then only need to monitor the traget web site to see the EXIT > server > > and follow them back. Remeber all US, European, Australasian & many > Asian > > govs are now co-operating. so much of the data is ALREADY being > pooled. > > > > BUT if a random 3 to 6 hops was the norm then TOR becomes much less > > predictable and the computers now have to do mulptile path analysis > for 3 > > to6 nodes, instead of just 3. > > > > Ok so not everyone would need this, or want it and ewe dont know > the > > effects on the system. > > > > It looks like we have enough middle men to cope so why not give it > a go. > > > > Allow the users to set their min and max hops (3 to 6) and let TOR > client > > portion set up random length circuits within those limits. > > > > If this was to be tried out it would be best to use 3 to 4 in the > intial > > version and see how it goes. > > > > Also to hinder timiing attacks and log lookup software it would be > a good > > idea to allow the TOR client side to specify random "delay" for the > hops to > > put into its packets. Specify max packet delay time and then the > hop > > randomly distributes between this and zero delay, some packets > might then > > get forwarded in the wrong order, that would further confuse any > attack > > software. I say this should be the clients instruction because they > may not > > want any delay (eg for streams such as voip). > > > > Once again a little at a time, from one version to the next! > > > > > > > > Ok .. i'm done. > > > > Message sent with Supanet E-mail > > Signup to supanet at > > https://signup.supanet.com/cgi-bin/signup?_origin=sigwebmail > > > > > > > > >
Re: Sum legl trubs wid TOR en France + more
I agree with you about the hops. Thanks for posting the info about hard drives. I had no idea. On Sun May 14 21:58:42 2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote: FYI.Hard Disks.. (so abou the length)It is possible to find old data on "scrubbed" disks even with 100's of cycles of writeover. The reason is coz of wobble or track shape. Imagine washing machine at home, as it spins it wobbles. Now look at your hard disk (get an old one out that is past it and open it up!) you'll see the disk rotates at high speed. Thoughout its life it has a wobble, just a small one. But this wobble changes now and then with time. So when your write/read head lays down its magnetic bits on a track it does so with a wobble in it. The track itself is wider than the individual bit patterns and so there is only partial overlap with past bit patterns. When a disk finds a bits pattern which is wrong (from the extra data it stores for check bits) and it cant recover logically the original pattern it starts to "wipe" away the edges of the bit pattern on the track, so as to "clean" the signal. It does this by offsetting the head from the current midpoint of the track. It then tries a RE-READ the cleaned track. This is often susuccessful in removing "noise" from past bit patterns so as to ge t "clean" read of the last bit pattern. If not successful this process might be done any number of times upto the maximum "re-reads" specifed in the disk firmware.It is this EXTRA width and the varying wobble that allows data to be left on the disk even if "military strength" scrubbing is perfomed by software. This is particularly relevant ot data put on when the disk is young remaining there for some months so that the disks bearing wear changes the wobble. New bit patterns written over this old bit pattern are almost vertaain to bew able to be read - even years later! The more..A while back it was asked if "3 hops is enough". At the time I had prblems getting to my email account so here's my 2 cents.The current set 3 hops is a predictable number of hops and because of that, the predictability is a DEFINITE weakness in TOR. Its all about ENTROPY (the mathematical concept not the network).If the current systme of a fixed 3 hops was changed to allow 3-6 hops then I think this would create a much LESS predictable system. Pulling the records on a ALL our TOR servers is possible. And then going through them records to see the 3 fixed hops by computer is simple!You then only need to monitor the traget web site to see the EXIT server and follow them back. Remeber all US, European, Australasian & many Asian govs are now co-operating. so much of the data is ALREADY being pooled. BUT if a random 3 to 6 hops was the norm then TOR becomes much less predictable and the computers now have to do mulptile path analysis for 3 to6 nodes, instead of just 3.Ok so not everyone would need this, or want it and ewe dont know the effects on the system. It looks like we have enough middle men to cope so why not give it a go.Allow the users to set their min and max hops (3 to 6) and let TOR client portion set up random length circuits within those limits. If this was to be tried out it would be best to use 3 to 4 in the intial version and see how it goes.Also to hinder timiing attacks and log lookup software it would be a good idea to allow the TOR client side to specify random "delay" for the hops to put into its packets. Specify max packet delay time and then the hop randomly distributes between this and zero delay, some packets might then get forwarded in the wrong order, that would further confuse any attack software. I say this should be the clients instruction because they may not want any delay (eg for streams such as voip). Once again a little at a time, from one version to the next!Ok .. i'm done.Message sent with Supanet E-mailSignup to supanet at https://signup.supanet.com/cgi-bin/signup?_origin=sigwebmail
Re: Sum legl trubs wid TOR en France + more
FYI. Hard Disks.. (so abou the length) It is possible to find old data on "scrubbed" disks even with 100's of cycles of writeover. The reason is coz of wobble or track shape. Imagine washing machine at home, as it spins it wobbles. Now look at your hard disk (get an old one out that is past it and open it up!) you'll see the disk rotates at high speed. Thoughout its life it has a wobble, just a small one. But this wobble changes now and then with time. So when your write/read head lays down its magnetic bits on a track it does so with a wobble in it. The track itself is wider than the individual bit patterns and so there is only partial overlap with past bit patterns. When a disk finds a bits pattern which is wrong (from the extra data it stores for check bits) and it cant recover logically the original pattern it starts to "wipe" away the edges of the bit pattern on the track, so as to "clean" the signal. It does this by offsetting the head from the current midpoint of the track. It then tries a RE-READ the cleaned track. This is often susuccessful in removing "noise" from past bit patterns so as to ge t "clean" read of the last bit pattern. If not successful this process might be done any number of times upto the maximum "re-reads" specifed in the disk firmware. It is this EXTRA width and the varying wobble that allows data to be left on the disk even if "military strength" scrubbing is perfomed by software. This is particularly relevant ot data put on when the disk is young remaining there for some months so that the disks bearing wear changes the wobble. New bit patterns written over this old bit pattern are almost vertaain to bew able to be read - even years later! The more.. A while back it was asked if "3 hops is enough". At the time I had prblems getting to my email account so here's my 2 cents. The current set 3 hops is a predictable number of hops and because of that, the predictability is a DEFINITE weakness in TOR. Its all about ENTROPY (the mathematical concept not the network). If the current systme of a fixed 3 hops was changed to allow 3-6 hops then I think this would create a much LESS predictable system. Pulling the records on a ALL our TOR servers is possible. And then going through them records to see the 3 fixed hops by computer is simple! You then only need to monitor the traget web site to see the EXIT server and follow them back. Remeber all US, European, Australasian & many Asian govs are now co-operating. so much of the data is ALREADY being pooled. BUT if a random 3 to 6 hops was the norm then TOR becomes much less predictable and the computers now have to do mulptile path analysis for 3 to6 nodes, instead of just 3. Ok so not everyone would need this, or want it and ewe dont know the effects on the system. It looks like we have enough middle men to cope so why not give it a go. Allow the users to set their min and max hops (3 to 6) and let TOR client portion set up random length circuits within those limits. If this was to be tried out it would be best to use 3 to 4 in the intial version and see how it goes. Also to hinder timiing attacks and log lookup software it would be a good idea to allow the TOR client side to specify random "delay" for the hops to put into its packets. Specify max packet delay time and then the hop randomly distributes between this and zero delay, some packets might then get forwarded in the wrong order, that would further confuse any attack software. I say this should be the clients instruction because they may not want any delay (eg for streams such as voip). Once again a little at a time, from one version to the next! Ok .. i'm done. Message sent with Supanet E-mail Signup to supanet at https://signup.supanet.com/cgi-bin/signup?_origin=sigwebmail
