Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
On Wed, 2007-09-12 at 10:31 +0200, TOR-Admin (gpfTOR1) wrote: supporting spammers when setting up my node for 465,993,995? The SSL-encrypted SMTP-ports are using SMTP-Auth (mostly). The support of spammer is very low (in my opinion). By the way, I have the same problems like you since Nov.2006 (trouble with the german BKA because of childporn, trouble with my ISP). Half a year ago I switched to middleman but it did not help. I run into a telecommunication surveillance and became a terrorist or something like that. You have read the Heise-News about bad exit nodes (controlled governments and others): http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/95770 I think, a middleman node is not a solution for our problems. May be, we are listed in a database and the listing is not deleted after switching to middleman. May be, a bad exit feature out the next middleman... My recommendation: Try to find a strong, TOR-friendly organisation for your nodes. You manage the nodes and the organisation takes the liability (jurisitische Verantwortung). Good recommandation, I agree, but almost impossible to follow IMHO only privacy and civil right organization are eligible, and in Italy there are very few, and normally not interested in technology. No way, at least for me. The normal pattern of a contact for this activity when I contacted a candidate organization is 1) you find a person that can decide 2) you talk to him, explaining the fact and normally have some interest in return 3) suddendly the person understand that sooner or later someone will say or write that he is helping terrorist and paedophiles 4) end of the story Someone has a success story ? Ciao. Marco -- +--- http://www.winstonsmith.info ---+ | il Progetto Winston Smith: scolleghiamo il Grande Fratello | | the Winston Smith Project: unplug the Big Brother | | Marco A. Calamari [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.marcoc.it | | DSS/DH: 8F3E 5BAE 906F B416 9242 1C10 8661 24A9 BFCE 822B | + PGP RSA: ED84 3839 6C4D 3FFE 389F 209E 3128 5698 --+ signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part
Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
Just one contra: Supporting $some_crime always means that you knew about that certain case they're suing you about. Since you can only know about something if you start sniffing - which is strictly forbidden - you can't possibly know about a direct certain crime. Unless you were it yourself, using your own Tor exit-node, trying to veil yourself behind this clever coupe. (yes, that's what one policeman thought of me once...) However, that doesn't protect you from Mickey Mouse investigation. Any lawyers here who can confirm/dissect my argument? Alex. -- I am tired of all this sort of thing called science here... We have spent millions in that sort of thing for the last few years, and it is time it should be stopped. -- Simon Cameron, U.S. Senator, on the Smithsonian Institution, 1901. .
Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
Last not least: how great, do you think, is the danger of supporting spammers when setting up my node for 465,993,995? The SSL-encrypted SMTP-ports are using SMTP-Auth (mostly). The support of spammer is very low (in my opinion). By the way, I have the same problems like you since Nov.2006 (trouble with the german BKA because of childporn, trouble with my ISP). Half a year ago I switched to middleman but it did not help. I run into a telecommunication surveillance and became a terrorist or something like that. You have read the Heise-News about bad exit nodes (controlled governments and others): http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/95770 I think, a middleman node is not a solution for our problems. May be, we are listed in a database and the listing is not deleted after switching to middleman. May be, a bad exit feature out the next middleman... My recommendation: Try to find a strong, TOR-friendly organisation for your nodes. You manage the nodes and the organisation takes the liability (jurisitische Verantwortung).
Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
On Wed, Sep 12, 2007 at 10:31:15AM +0200, TOR-Admin (gpfTOR1) wrote: By the way, I have the same problems like you since Nov.2006 (trouble with the german BKA because of childporn, trouble with my ISP). Half a year ago I switched to middleman but it did not help. I run into a telecommunication surveillance and became a terrorist or something like that. Can you expand on that a bit? Do you have reasons to suspect you're under surveillance? If there are hints you are, I have every reason to suspect I am as well, which would require a full-scale audit, and a review of security procedures. You have read the Heise-News about bad exit nodes (controlled governments and others): http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/95770 I think, a middleman node is not a solution for our problems. May be, we are listed in a database and the listing is not deleted after switching to middleman. May be, a bad exit feature out the next middleman... Have you heard of middleman operators in Germany facing trouble for their pains? My recommendation: Try to find a strong, TOR-friendly organisation for your nodes. You manage the nodes and the organisation takes the liability (jurisitische Verantwortung). -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
Hi, I just would like to request you not to take this discussion off the list, or if you want to do that for whatever reason, to still include me - I am very interested in the reply. I do not think that I am under surveillance, but I know how easy it is in Germany to become a suspect. Until I was visited by the Kripo, I thought that never such a thing would happen. Am Mittwoch, 12. September 2007 11:15 schrieb Eugen Leitl: help. I run into a telecommunication surveillance and became a terrorist or something like that. Can you expand on that a bit? Do you have reasons to suspect you're under surveillance? If there are hints you are, I have every reason I think, a middleman node is not a solution for our problems. May be, we are listed in a database and the listing is not deleted after switching to middleman. May be, a bad exit feature out the next middleman... Have you heard of middleman operators in Germany facing trouble for their pains? As I run a relay node, I would like to know about any possible risks and am very interested in the answers. Thanks! Martin -- Dr. Martin Senftleben, Ph.D. (S.V.U.) http://www.drmartinus.de/ http://www.daskirchenjahr.de/ pgpBX34EPzj6Y.pgp Description: PGP signature
What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
Last year I was running my torserver (baphomet) as exit for port 80/443. The results were interesting: first a DOS attack, then later my box was seized by the german Staatsanwalt because of childporn. OK, I got my box back from them but this took 3 months. Then I got trouble with my ISP who told me that it were forbidden to run a tor exit (bullshit). So I configured my meanwhile 2 nodes (baphomet info4all) to run as middleman, I only allowed them to be exit for DNS requests over tor. But I am not satisfied with that. These days I read about Dan Egerstad and his mailsniffer experience and I started thinking: If I open exit ports for only those that do encrypted access to mailservers (465,993,995), I should be save from the Staatsanwaltschaft. If they seize a mailserver, they should be interested in getting the realname of the account owner, not of the IP, from where the traffic came. Is that right? On the other hand I support those protocols that work with encryption. If lots of people close their unencrypted mail ports, users experience that it is slow over tor and (hopefully) switch to secure protocols and cannot be sniffed anymore. Last not least: how great, do you think, is the danger of supporting spammers when setting up my node for 465,993,995? Kind Regards Thomas Hluchnik
Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
Your idea is good. Perhaps EU police also don't have enough time and energy to decrypt SSL traffic. While it's easier for them to monitor non-SSL traffic. But I guess EU police probably will be very interested in IP numbers if they seize a mail server, so they might still get upset if you run an exit server. But as an addition to your suggestion, it would be good to have an IP filter that blocks child porn and terrorism. Perhaps the Tor programmers could implement an option for exit servers to only allow SSL traffic (and other options not based on the port number but content)? And also the possibility to have huge IP filters, or compatibility with other existing IP filters. (There is already a possibility to block IPs in the torrc, but does it work with enormous IP lists?) Why the police in EU, China, Saudi Arabia and other countries believe they have the right to monitor people's Internet activities is another question. To me it's a matter of personal judgment and honesty what content you access on the Internet. The governments shouldn't spend tax payers money on spying on it's own citizens. But when the reality is that we have governments that seize people's computers and/or prosecute them if they run a Tor exit server, use P2P, or access illegal websites, then we have to protect ourselves against the abuse from the governments. The possibility to run a Tor exit server without getting caught will most likely make the number of Tor servers increase. Thomas Hluchnik skrev: Last year I was running my torserver (baphomet) as exit for port 80/443. The results were interesting: first a DOS attack, then later my box was seized by the german Staatsanwalt because of childporn. OK, I got my box back from them but this took 3 months. Then I got trouble with my ISP who told me that it were forbidden to run a tor exit (bullshit). So I configured my meanwhile 2 nodes (baphomet info4all) to run as middleman, I only allowed them to be exit for DNS requests over tor. But I am not satisfied with that. These days I read about Dan Egerstad and his mailsniffer experience and I started thinking: If I open exit ports for only those that do encrypted access to mailservers (465,993,995), I should be save from the Staatsanwaltschaft. If they seize a mailserver, they should be interested in getting the realname of the account owner, not of the IP, from where the traffic came. Is that right? On the other hand I support those protocols that work with encryption. If lots of people close their unencrypted mail ports, users experience that it is slow over tor and (hopefully) switch to secure protocols and cannot be sniffed anymore. Last not least: how great, do you think, is the danger of supporting spammers when setting up my node for 465,993,995? Kind Regards Thomas Hluchnik
Re: What do you think about this exit policy for germany?
Am Dienstag, den 11.09.2007, 19:05 +0200 schrieb [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [...] Why the police in EU, China, Saudi Arabia and other countries believe they have the right to monitor people's Internet activities is another question. To me it's a matter of personal judgment and honesty what [...] ...and it looks like some of them are using NarusInsight Secure Suite. The Saudi Arab definately do and ATT and some more others (You should look at the FlashDemo).. Sorry, but i'm currently stuck on that NARUS thing somehow.. ;-) http://www.narus.com/products/index.html http://www.narus.com/NSSdemo/NSS_Demo.html I'm wondering that this badly 'nice' supertoy does not detect Tor as 'threat' yet... .. Greets -- BlueStar88 [EMAIL PROTECTED] signature.asc Description: Dies ist ein digital signierter Nachrichtenteil
