Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
Once again, the Internet has patched around a failure, and information resumes its flow. Thank you, tup! On Tue, 2 Oct 2007 03:54:56 + tup [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 9/28/07, Scott Bennett [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm trying to set up a free wireless service for those of my neighbors within range of a little wireless router I have. To keep things safe for me and at least somewhat safer for them, I want to route all the outbound connections from that router through tor using pf under FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE (i386). In order to keep such traffic distinguishable from my own local traffic, I intend to route it to tor on a second loopback interface (lo1). I've looked at instructions for doing something like this at http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy The second loopback interface is simply a kludge I found that allows pf to apply rdr rules to locally-originated traffic. You don't need it if you're only trying to redirect others' traffic; see section 3.2 in that wiki page. Yeah, that much I had gotten. I only wanted it on a separate interface, so that I could see traffic volume for the wireless router at a glance with systat(1). If it went via lo0, I would have no way to distinguish the wireless traffic volume from all other loopback traffic. dns-proxy-tor apparently uses the MAPADDRESS command via the tor control port, so it is also necessary to specify a VirtualAddrNetwork in torrc for dns-proxy-tor's use, so those instructions include an example of VirtualAddrNetwork. However, I had been hoping to use DNSPort in torrc instead of running dns-proxy-tor. Am I correct in thinking that I will not neet to specify a VirtualAddrNetwork? You'll still want to set VirtualAddrNetwork to an unused, private address space so that .onion and .exit names will resolve to routable addresses when you specify 'AutomapHostsOnResolve 1'. Ah. Another undocumented command for use in torrc. Thanks for the info! A second question for someone who uses or has used pf under FreeBSD or OpenBSD involves the use of rdr commands to redirect the TCP connections from the interface connected to the wireless router's WAN port. If the rdr changes the TCP or UDP packets' destination addresses to lo1's address (127.0.0.2), how does tor know what the original destination is supposed to be? I didn't find anything in the tor documentation or elsewhere to explain this. This is a platform-specific implementation detail, which explains why it's not documented. What happens is that the route-to rule routes traffic to lo1, where the rdr rule actually rewrites the destination address and port to 127.0.0.1:9040. The original destination is kept around in the connection state table, so it can be looked up by Tor with the right ioctl(2) command on /dev/pf; see pf(4). *Oh*. Okay. That makes it much clearer. Thank you once more. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
On Mon, 01 Oct 2007 03:33:46 +0200 Juliusz Chroboczek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [I, Scott Bennett, wrote:] I'm trying to set up a free wireless service for those of my neighbors within range of a little wireless router I have. To keep things safe for me and at least somewhat safer for them, I want to route all the outbound connections from that router through tor using pf under FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE (i386). Do not do that. I am going to do that and as soon as I can figure out how to do it correctly. You should not make traffic go transparently through tor, unless the people using your network fully understand what tor is about, and what are the associated security risks (such as exit nodes performing MITM attacks on SSL certificates). Thank you for your opinion, but it was not particularly relevant to what I posted. First, please reread what I wrote. I will be providing a *free wireless access* service to my neighbors. Even if I tell them *nothing*, they will be better off than without the service. They do not even have to know that it is going through any sort of anonymizing process. Just the fact that they will have a free, if rather pokey, service available will be an enhancement to my neighborhood. Second, tor 0.1.2.2 and up are designed to do this. See the torrc line called TransPort. tor 0.2.0.1 and up are designed to do this without the earlier necessity of providing a name service proxy. See the torrc line called DNSPort. Third, you didn't even ask whether I might have already given some thought to the matter of educating/informing my neighbors about how their TCP connections and name server queries will be reaching the Internet and how responses will be returned from the Internet. I have been planning this service for quite some time. Fourth, my primary motivation for running my neighbors' connections through tor is to protect *me* from whatever *they* are doing. The fact that routing their connections through tor should also give *them* some protection is a purely secondary benefit. I am now in the process of trying to get it to work. If anyone knows the answers to the questions I posted, I would still appreciate your information. Instead, put a simple stateless firewall on your network, and redirect port 80 traffic to a web server that explains how to set up their web browser to go through tor. That would defeat the purpose of providing free wireless TCP access to the Internet. Please make sure that your HTTP proxy allows CONNECT to TCP ports 22, 80, 109-110, 143, 443, 873, 993 and 995. 22 is especially important if there are any geeks in your neighbourhood. My HTTP proxy is privoxy and will continue to provide service only to me. It is quite possible that I will never have any direct communication with many of my neighbors, so requiring them to reconfigure their applications, which may include more than mere web browsers, to use an HTTP proxy is out of the question. It also would not be of any use to network applications that do not use HTTP. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
Scott Bennett wrote: I'm trying to set up a free wireless service for those of my neighbors within range of a little wireless router I have. To keep things safe for me and at least somewhat safer for them, I want to route all the outbound connections from that router through tor using pf under FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE (i386). Do not do that. I am going to do that and as soon as I can figure out how to do it correctly. You should not make traffic go transparently through tor, unless the people using your network fully understand what tor is about, and what are the associated security risks (such as exit nodes performing MITM attacks on SSL certificates). Thank you for your opinion, but it was not particularly relevant to what I posted. First, please reread what I wrote. I will be providing a *free wireless access* service to my neighbors. Even if I tell them *nothing*, they will be better off than without the service. They do not even have to know that it is going through any sort of anonymizing process. Just the fact that they will have a free, if rather pokey, service available will be an enhancement to my neighborhood. If you set up something like that you're opening up all sorts of attacks against the people who use your service. If they don't know that all of their plain text traffic can be read and modified by, dodgy, exit nodes, and almost certainly *will* be at some point... Mike
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
On Mon, 01 Oct 2007 10:06:50 +0100 Mike Cardwell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Scott Bennett wrote: I'm trying to set up a free wireless service for those of my neighbors within range of a little wireless router I have. To keep things safe for me and at least somewhat safer for them, I want to route all the outbound connections from that router through tor using pf under FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE (i386). Do not do that. I am going to do that and as soon as I can figure out how to do it correctly. You should not make traffic go transparently through tor, unless the people using your network fully understand what tor is about, and what are the associated security risks (such as exit nodes performing MITM attacks on SSL certificates). Thank you for your opinion, but it was not particularly relevant to what I posted. First, please reread what I wrote. I will be providing a *free wireless access* service to my neighbors. Even if I tell them *nothing*, they will be better off than without the service. They do not even have to know that it is going through any sort of anonymizing process. Just the fact that they will have a free, if rather pokey, service available will be an enhancement to my neighborhood. If you set up something like that you're opening up all sorts of attacks against the people who use your service. If they don't know that all of their plain text traffic can be read and modified by, dodgy, exit nodes, and almost certainly *will* be at some point... How will they be subject to any greater number of possible attacks if their connections are funneled through tor than if they are not? They can go to any of several coffee shops in the area and use unencrypted, completely unprotected, free or paid wireless services. They just can't do that at home. If you see some way by which anonymizing their TCP source addresses and their UDP port 53 (name service) packets' source addresses when they access the Internet at home will cause them to suffer more attacks than they will in any public location or, for that matter, from a direct connection in their own dwelling if they had one, please enlighten me. Aside from that, the only IP addresses that could conceivably be discovered would either be the one temporarily assigned to my connection or the one assigned on a private network by my wireless router via DHCP. In any case, I still would appreciate helpful information, so I'll repeat my questions here, quoting from my original query: - dns-proxy-tor apparently uses the MAPADDRESS command via the tor -control port, so it is also necessary to specify a VirtualAddrNetwork in -torrc for dns-proxy-tor's use, so those instructions include an example of -VirtualAddrNetwork. - However, I had been hoping to use DNSPort in torrc instead of running -dns-proxy-tor. Am I correct in thinking that I will not neet to specify a -VirtualAddrNetwork? - A second question for someone who uses or has used pf under FreeBSD -or OpenBSD involves the use of rdr commands to redirect the TCP connections -from the interface connected to the wireless router's WAN port. If the -rdr changes the TCP or UDP packets' destination addresses to lo1's address -(127.0.0.2), how does tor know what the original destination is supposed -to be? I didn't find anything in the tor documentation or elsewhere to -explain this. Thanks! Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
Scott Bennett wrote: If you set up something like that you're opening up all sorts of attacks against the people who use your service. If they don't know that all of their plain text traffic can be read and modified by, dodgy, exit nodes, and almost certainly *will* be at some point... How will they be subject to any greater number of possible attacks if their connections are funneled through tor than if they are not? They can go to any of several coffee shops in the area and use unencrypted, completely unprotected, free or paid wireless services. They just can't do that at home. If you see some way by which anonymizing their TCP source addresses and their UDP port 53 (name service) packets' source addresses when they access the Internet at home will cause them to suffer more attacks than they will in any public location or, for that matter, from a direct connection in their own dwelling if they had one, please enlighten me. If they use an Internet cafe, their traffic is subject to being monitored. If they use Tor it is *also* subject to being modified. Example 1: Your user goes to http://www.hotmail.com/ and enters their login details. The Tor exit node controller has written something to modify the html on that page so the form posts to a http url instead of a https url. Their login details are now compromised. Example 2: Your user goes to http://www.msn.co.uk/livemessenger to download msn messenger. They click the download it now link. The tor exit node controller intercepts that request and returns a modified exe containing a trojan instead of the original. Scary huh? Of course, you could argue that the person running the Internet cafe or the ISP could do that, but I am inclined to believe it's much more likely to occur on the Tor network than in those cases. Aside from that, the only IP addresses that could conceivably be discovered would either be the one temporarily assigned to my connection or the one assigned on a private network by my wireless router via DHCP. In any case, I still would appreciate helpful information, so I'll repeat my questions here, quoting from my original query: The anonymity of the IP address is not at issue here. The issue is, by using Tor, you allow the possibility of exit nodes monitoring and modifying traffic, so you should only use Tor if you truly understand these issues and how to deal with them. IMHO. There's no need to use Tor for general web browsing, and at the end of the day it probably makes your online experience more dangerous rather than less dangerous. Mike
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
On Mon, 01 Oct 2007 15:19:26 +0100 Mike Cardwell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Scott Bennett wrote: If you set up something like that you're opening up all sorts of attacks against the people who use your service. If they don't know that all of their plain text traffic can be read and modified by, dodgy, exit nodes, and almost certainly *will* be at some point... How will they be subject to any greater number of possible attacks if their connections are funneled through tor than if they are not? They can go to any of several coffee shops in the area and use unencrypted, completely unprotected, free or paid wireless services. They just can't do that at home. If you see some way by which anonymizing their TCP source addresses and their UDP port 53 (name service) packets' source addresses when they access the Internet at home will cause them to suffer more attacks than they will in any public location or, for that matter, from a direct connection in their own dwelling if they had one, please enlighten me. If they use an Internet cafe, their traffic is subject to being monitored. If they use Tor it is *also* subject to being modified. If they go to a coffee shop or other location with free wireless access, their traffic is also subject to being modified, but at *any and every* hop between their computer and the destination, unless they use end-to-end encryption anyway. Example 1: [deleted as not unique to the tor environment --SB] Example 2: [deleted as not unique to the tor environment --SB] Scary huh? Of course. But in my intended setup, the only places that could happen would be in my equipment, the exit node, the destination, or the hops between the exit node and the destination. It's not going to happen in my equipment because I don't do that sort of thing and wouldn't have the time or energy to devote to it even if I did do that kind of thing. That leaves the exit node, the destination, and the hops between them. If the traffic does not go through tor, then those things could happen at any of the up to 32 hops normally allowed for a TCP connection. I do not see how reducing the number of potential points of attack increases the risk. Of course, you could argue that the person running the Internet cafe or the ISP could do that, but I am inclined to believe it's much more likely to occur on the Tor network than in those cases. So could anyone along the path of an ordinary, unencrypted TCP link. Some governments apparently do this sort of thing already, most likely including the U.S. government. Aside from that, the only IP addresses that could conceivably be discovered would either be the one temporarily assigned to my connection or the one assigned on a private network by my wireless router via DHCP. In any case, I still would appreciate helpful information, so I'll repeat my questions here, quoting from my original query: The anonymity of the IP address is not at issue here. The issue is, by using Tor, you allow the possibility of exit nodes monitoring and modifying traffic, so you should only use Tor if you truly understand these issues and how to deal with them. I see. The elitist approach to limiting use of damned good software. Reminds me of David Sternlight claiming that there was no reason for anyone to use PGP and therefore people shouldn't bother with it. It was ridiculous on its face, yet he persisted in trolling the PGP news groups with it for years. Do you work for the NSA by any chance? (Like you would really say so if you did. Right.) IMHO. There's no need to use Tor for general web browsing, and at the end of the day it probably makes your online experience more dangerous rather than less dangerous. Then perhaps you should get permission to update the tor web pages and documentation. After all, we wouldn't want all that general web browsing traffic to help hide traffic that certain governments really don't want hidden. And I'm sure that Roger Dingledine et al. really don't want to promote widespread use of all their hard work for something so mundane as general web browsing. Feh. Again, if someone knows the answers to the questions I've now posted twice, please advise. I know I can probably figure it out by trial and error, but it would be messy, and I don't have a spare computer at present to do that properly. Testing it from the same computer runs into problems with routing tables, arp responses from the wrong interfaces, etc. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army.
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
Scott Bennett wrote: If they use an Internet cafe, their traffic is subject to being monitored. If they use Tor it is *also* subject to being modified. If they go to a coffee shop or other location with free wireless access, their traffic is also subject to being modified, but at *any and every* hop between their computer and the destination, unless they use end-to-end encryption anyway. Example 1: [deleted as not unique to the tor environment --SB] Example 2: [deleted as not unique to the tor environment --SB] Scary huh? Of course. But in my intended setup, the only places that could happen would be in my equipment, the exit node, the destination, or the hops between the exit node and the destination. It's not going to happen in my equipment because I don't do that sort of thing and wouldn't have the time or energy to devote to it even if I did do that kind of thing. That leaves the exit node, the destination, and the hops between them. If the traffic does not go through tor, then those things could happen at any of the up to 32 hops normally allowed for a TCP connection. I do not see how reducing the number of potential points of attack increases the risk. Of course, you could argue that the person running the Internet cafe or the ISP could do that, but I am inclined to believe it's much more likely to occur on the Tor network than in those cases. So could anyone along the path of an ordinary, unencrypted TCP link. Some governments apparently do this sort of thing already, most likely including the U.S. government. 1.) People that can perform these attacks if you just use a normal Internet connection: Governments, people working for ISPs 2.) People that can perform these attacks if you use Tor: Governments, people working for ISPs and anyone who know how to install Tor. Including some wannabe hacker 13 year old kid living on the other side of the World. If you use Tor, you considerably increase the number and range of people that could potentially attack you. You also make yourself a tastier target. This is not a bad thing if you know how to deal with it. It *is* a bad thing if you don't. For example, I have only ever had attempted MITM attacks against my ssh sessions when using them over Tor. Aside from that, the only IP addresses that could conceivably be discovered would either be the one temporarily assigned to my connection or the one assigned on a private network by my wireless router via DHCP. In any case, I still would appreciate helpful information, so I'll repeat my questions here, quoting from my original query: The anonymity of the IP address is not at issue here. The issue is, by using Tor, you allow the possibility of exit nodes monitoring and modifying traffic, so you should only use Tor if you truly understand these issues and how to deal with them. I see. The elitist approach to limiting use of damned good software. Reminds me of David Sternlight claiming that there was no reason for anyone to use PGP and therefore people shouldn't bother with it. It was ridiculous on its face, yet he persisted in trolling the PGP news groups with it for years. Do you work for the NSA by any chance? (Like you would really say so if you did. Right.) Your interpretation of what I said is quite hilarious. Hopefully nobody will help you use Tor for something that is dangerous and that you clearly don't understand. For your users sake. Mike
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
On Mon, 01 Oct 2007 16:35:29 +0100 Mike Cardwell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Scott Bennett wrote: If they use an Internet cafe, their traffic is subject to being monitored. If they use Tor it is *also* subject to being modified. If they go to a coffee shop or other location with free wireless access, their traffic is also subject to being modified, but at *any and every* hop between their computer and the destination, unless they use end-to-end encryption anyway. Example 1: [deleted as not unique to the tor environment --SB] Example 2: [deleted as not unique to the tor environment --SB] Scary huh? Of course. But in my intended setup, the only places that could happen would be in my equipment, the exit node, the destination, or the hops between the exit node and the destination. It's not going to happen in my equipment because I don't do that sort of thing and wouldn't have the time or energy to devote to it even if I did do that kind of thing. That leaves the exit node, the destination, and the hops between them. If the traffic does not go through tor, then those things could happen at any of the up to 32 hops normally allowed for a TCP connection. I do not see how reducing the number of potential points of attack increases the risk. Of course, you could argue that the person running the Internet cafe or the ISP could do that, but I am inclined to believe it's much more likely to occur on the Tor network than in those cases. So could anyone along the path of an ordinary, unencrypted TCP link. Some governments apparently do this sort of thing already, most likely including the U.S. government. 1.) People that can perform these attacks if you just use a normal Internet connection: Governments, people working for ISPs ...and anyone running a destination site being accessed with or without tor, and anyone with a wireless card in a laptop in the same public location, etc. 2.) People that can perform these attacks if you use Tor: Governments, people working for ISPs and anyone who know how to install Tor. Including some wannabe hacker 13 year old kid living on the other side of the World. Governments are incomparably more dangerous than any 13-year-old or even ISPs. Also, given the number of teenagers who have cracked well funded web servers, I'd say that said teenager is still not out of the loop without tor. If you use Tor, you considerably increase the number and range of people that could potentially attack you. You also make yourself a tastier target. This is not a bad thing if you know how to deal with it. It *is* a bad thing if you don't. For example, I have only ever had attempted MITM attacks against my ssh sessions when using them over Tor. Aside from that, the only IP addresses that could conceivably be discovered would either be the one temporarily assigned to my connection or the one assigned on a private network by my wireless router via DHCP. In any case, I still would appreciate helpful information, so I'll repeat my questions here, quoting from my original query: The anonymity of the IP address is not at issue here. The issue is, by using Tor, you allow the possibility of exit nodes monitoring and modifying traffic, so you should only use Tor if you truly understand these issues and how to deal with them. I see. The elitist approach to limiting use of damned good software. Reminds me of David Sternlight claiming that there was no reason for anyone to use PGP and therefore people shouldn't bother with it. It was ridiculous on its face, yet he persisted in trolling the PGP news groups with it for years. Do you work for the NSA by any chance? (Like you would really say so if you did. Right.) Your interpretation of what I said is quite hilarious. That line would certainly be in character for Sternlight. Hopefully nobody will help you use Tor for something that is dangerous and that you clearly don't understand. For your users sake. I understand it fine. I just evaluate the dangers differently from you. Not using tor at all is far more dangerous in my view. If it worries you so much, then I guess you need to convince the tor development team to remove the support for TransPort and DNSPort. Maybe you should also get them to stop making tor freely downloadable from the tor.eff.org web site, perhaps limiting downloads only to people who have passed a course on subjects you deem pertinent, so that the great unwashed will be protected. Yet again, I'd appreciate any *helpful* information regarding my two questions. It would save me a lot of headaches getting to it by trial and error. BTW, I didn't come up with the idea to provide wireless service to neighbors via tor. I first read about it on this list, IIRC, where the person posting the start of that thread had an old 802.11b router that he wanted to put to use rather than add to his
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
Scott Bennett wrote: [...] Governments are incomparably more dangerous than any 13-year-old or even ISPs. Also, given the number of teenagers who have cracked well funded web servers, I'd say that said teenager is still not out of the loop without tor. [...] Not using tor at all is far more dangerous in my view. In this case, using TOR will make things less secure / anonymous for the people using your wireless AP. People using an open, unencrypted, AP can have their traffic sniffed by: - other people nearby - AP owner - ISP of the AP owner - government - ... (depends on the destination) When sending the traffic over TOR, (part of) it can also be watched by: - all exit node operators (some owned by crackers / government agencies) - their ISPs - their governments Since the AP user doesn't know he's using TOR, he will probably transmit information that shows his identity. He may end up on a government watch list, because they know that all TOR users are child pornographers / terrorists. Take a look at this too (it was mentioned on this list before): http://www.derangedsecurity.com/time-to-reveal%e2%80%a6/ You should inform the users about TOR, before letting them use it. It's less convenient, but it's much more secure for them. Not using TOR at all would be even more secure for them, but then your IP would show up when your users do bad things. Some ideas: Manual proxy setup - redirect non-proxy http / https traffic to a page with setup information for your proxy - allow traffic to your proxy - block all other traffic VPN, using PPTP or something like that - redirect non-VPN http / https traffic to a page with setup information - redirect all VPN traffic through TOR - block all other traffic I prefer a VPN solution, because of the wireless link encryption. It should also work for any application that doesn't know about proxies. Arjan
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
On Monday 01 October 2007 16:35:29 Mike Cardwell wrote: If you use Tor, you considerably increase the number and range of people that could potentially attack you. You also make yourself a tastier target. This is not a bad thing if you know how to deal with it. It *is* a bad thing if you don't. For example, I have only ever had attempted MITM attacks against my ssh sessions when using them over Tor. I think torifying a user's traffic without informing him of it is a very bad idea. Pop3 is the best example. I don't think anyone with all the facts to hand would ever use a pop3 session over Tor. Whatever the merits of the well-you-go-over-x-hops-anyway argument (and it generally does not apply to pop3), tor is always x-hops + 1, and that '+ 1' could be anyone from Aunt Nellie to the NSA, no special privileges required. This is one of the main challenges faced by Live CDs and other Torified environments - is it better to anonymize everything in the session or always prevent the likes of pop3 from being anonymized, ever? signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
You should not make traffic go transparently through tor, unless the people using your network fully understand what tor is about, and what are the associated security risks (such as exit nodes performing MITM attacks on SSL certificates). Thank you for your opinion, but it was not particularly relevant to what I posted. Perhaps this tone is not absolutely necessary? First, please reread what I wrote. I will be providing a *free wireless access* service to my neighbors. Even if I tell them *nothing*, they will be better off than without the service. No, they won't. Non-technical people often assume that DNS and routing are secure. We know they aren't, but they don't. By routing their traffic transparently through tor, you increase their chance of exposure to MITM attacks. Unless you warn them, you'd actually be doing them a disservice. Third, you didn't even ask whether I might have already given some thought to the matter of educating/informing my neighbors about how their TCP connections and name server queries will be reaching the Internet and how responses will be returned from the Internet. [...] It is quite possible that I will never have any direct communication with many of my neighbors, so requiring them to reconfigure their applications, which may include more than mere web browsers, to use an HTTP proxy is out of the question. So are you or aren't you in touch with them? Fourth, my primary motivation for running my neighbors' connections through tor is to protect *me* from whatever *they* are doing. The fact that routing their connections through tor should also give *them* some protection is a purely secondary benefit. You will have the same amount of protection if you put a stateless firewall (with no interception) that forces them to go through the proxy. Please re-read the following: Instead, put a simple stateless firewall on your network, and redirect port 80 traffic to a web server that explains how to set up their web browser to go through tor. It also would not be of any use to network applications that do not use HTTP. Please re-read the following: Please make sure that your HTTP proxy allows CONNECT to TCP ports 22, 80, 109-110, 143, 443, 873, 993 and 995. 22 is especially important if there are any geeks in your neighbourhood. CONNECT is a sub-protocol of HTTP that is used to tunnel non-HTTP protocols through an HTTP proxy. It's sort of like SOCKS, but cleaner. Juliusz
Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
I think this discussion brings up an interesting point, again. Tor [b] changes [/b] the risks you are opened to. It removes the risk of ISP's, search engines, and advertisers from tracking your click stream, and being the receipt of a government request for your online history. (Most people don't need tor because of the anonymity. The more people using tor, the better hidden those that do need it are hidden.) It exposes serious MITM attacks for anything that is not HTTPS: unless you use exit guards. We have entry guards specifically because otherwise evil node group X will at some point grab your entry node and exit node, and correlate who you are. We need exit guards specifically because otherwise evil exit node X will at some point grab your authentication cookies. Previously, someone said that having both entry guards and exit guards together was self defeating. Do we need exit guards more than we need entry guards?
funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
I'm trying to set up a free wireless service for those of my neighbors within range of a little wireless router I have. To keep things safe for me and at least somewhat safer for them, I want to route all the outbound connections from that router through tor using pf under FreeBSD 6.2-STABLE (i386). In order to keep such traffic distinguishable from my own local traffic, I intend to route it to tor on a second loopback interface (lo1). I've looked at instructions for doing something like this at http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy dns-proxy-tor apparently uses the MAPADDRESS command via the tor control port, so it is also necessary to specify a VirtualAddrNetwork in torrc for dns-proxy-tor's use, so those instructions include an example of VirtualAddrNetwork. However, I had been hoping to use DNSPort in torrc instead of running dns-proxy-tor. Am I correct in thinking that I will not neet to specify a VirtualAddrNetwork? A second question for someone who uses or has used pf under FreeBSD or OpenBSD involves the use of rdr commands to redirect the TCP connections from the interface connected to the wireless router's WAN port. If the rdr changes the TCP or UDP packets' destination addresses to lo1's address (127.0.0.2), how does tor know what the original destination is supposed to be? I didn't find anything in the tor documentation or elsewhere to explain this. Thanks in advance! Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
