http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/08/10/d60810020325.htm Strategically Speaking 'A new hub for terrorism?' Brig Gen Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd)
Nothing that the article: "A New Hub for Terrorism?" appearing in the Washington Post of August 2, says has not been said in our press, in the last year and a half in particular, insofar as it relates to Jamaat-e-Islam (JI) and its alleged link to the two radical groups in Bangladesh whose leaders are under orders of execution. The article is of course articulated most immaculately. It has covered other aspects apart from the issue of terrorism and has suggested a carrot and stick policy, of incentives and threats, should the government not come up with acceptable changes in certain political institutions. But this article will dwell only on the comments related to terrorism and the indigenous militants in Bangladesh. Selig Harrison quite reflects the (mis)perception of some of the alarmist strategic analysts in India, who see all their woes springing from across their borders, and all the terrorist incidents that occur in India as being planned, financed and executed by foreign hands in foreign lands. But suggesting that the Bangladesh radicals' links with foreign intelligence agencies and al Qaeda is fomenting terrorism in India as well as Southeast Asia, is taking a very reductionistic view of terrorism, and its rise in the region including Southeast Asia. Terrorism, and insurgency, one complementing the other, in India and Southeast Asia, predated the formation of the two identified religious radical groups in Bangladesh. In fact, one could perhaps say that the possibility of a reverse osmosis of the phenomenon in this case is more. The article has rightly caught our attention, being written by an American South Asian expert of repute, and published in a newspaper whose reportage has led to the resignation of a US president. But the piece suffers from the shortcomings that are inevitable in a detached author's piece pegged on information fed by local sources; it is speculative and judgmental. His quoting the Indian police officials' comments after the Bombay blasts, insinuating links of the key suspects, "having connection with groups in Nepal and Bangladesh, which are directly or indirectly connected to Pakistan" shows the weakness of the basic premise on which he wants to validate his argument that Bangladesh is becoming a "hub for terrorism" because, the allegation, made so soon after the blasts, has not been substantiated even after more than one month of the occurrence. Therefore, to use a groundless comment, obviously made with more haste than conviction, does not seem to be a very cogent way to prove one's point. To any keen observer, the tenor of the piece cannot hide the source of some of the information on which the author rests his arguments. As for relocating al Qaeda operations from Malaysia and Indonesia to Bangladesh, as the author suggests has been done, one feels that it is an unwise strategic action on the part of the militants to shift thousands of miles away from their original operational base in regions with no ethnological or etymological similarity. And what is their target? To destabilise a country in which they are seeking a safe haven from pressures at home? It also negates his statement that terrorism is radiating out from Bangladesh to Southeast Asia. However, what had been said now and in the past in respect of the radicals bear repetition, if only because the complex equation of the radicals and their internal and external links, has the potential for destabilising the state, to the extent that the neighbours may construe the development inside our country, as being a factor in their security and act in the manner they chose fit, to prevent its impact on their own. The talk about militant camps and Indian militants in the Northeast conducting their operations based in Bangladesh should not be lost on our establishment. While there is a constant barrage of accusations that we have to bear with from the Indian authors, one is also not unfamiliar with reports in some of our newspapers, and one was about one of the scores of Indian militant factions, that appeared very recently in a Bangla daily, talking of Indian insurgents camps in our territory, with pictures to prove the point. The possibility of these elements seeking temporary relief in inaccessible areas in our territory cannot be ruled out, and something that the border force must guard against. After all, if a journalist can track these elements and take pictures of their temporary shelters, it defies logic that the BDR is not able to locate them. What has been said in the article regarding the international links has been a matter of discussion in various circles in the country for some time. While some were speculative, other reports, regarding the linkages of the JMB and JMJB with the international terrorist groups, have not been confirmed as yet; and thus there is an urgent need on the part of the government to seek all the help that it can lay its hands on to find out the motivators, financers, and supporters of these groups, both at home and abroad. However, nothing has given a more authenticate description of the connection between the JI and the JMB and JMJB, than the statements of the cadres and the high ranking members of these groups, who in their depositions during the trial have revealed their association with the party at one time of their lives or the other. And there is what one might term the despondency theory that has caused these elements to all of a sudden resort to precipitate actions on August 17, 2005. These groups have two elements, one engaged in open platform politics, and the other, not so transparent, if not totally underground, with ideological convictions strong enough to indulge in self-immolation in order to establish their political aims. Having become despondent with their representatives in open politics to bring about the political change that they would like, through normal political process, aligned with a major political party, and with time running out, they had no other option but to indulge in what they thought would bring about a collapse of our political system and allow them to impose theirs. That did not happen, not surprisingly. A better strategic sense cannot be expected from a group whose leadership, although veterans of the Afghan war, were reportedly placed in no higher a position than that of bodyguards of the al Qaeda leader. There is a link, the extent of which needs to be established. But more importantly, the source of their funding will have to be determined. In this respect a great piece of work has been done by a leading Bangladeshi economist and which has been cited in the article also. The least the government can do is to use the data and identify those that are involved in funding the radical elements in Bangladesh. While it is our faulty policy and institutional weaknesses in certain cases that have caused us to confront a monster, what the western scholars and experts seem to conveniently forget when pointing their accusing finger at us is that, it is they who had not only created but also nurtured the monster in the first place. The author is, Editor, Defence and Strategic Issues, The Daily Star. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. 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