Volume II, Issue 2 Perspectives on Terrorism - 13 Years since Tokyo: Re-Visiting the 'Superterrorism' Debate By Adam Dolnik
Acquisition and weaponization of CBRN agents Admittedly, any analysis that seeks to address the threat of "CBRN terrorism" collectively as a monolithic phenomenon is inevitably too vague to be useful, given the fact that C vs. B vs. R vs. N are very disparate threats with regards to issues such as difficulty of acquisition, potential to cause significant damage, technological hurdles involved in mass production and weaponization, and challenges posed for states on the side of detection, prevention, and response. [17] In light of this limitation, it is not the ambition here to provide an exhaustive analysis, but only a general coverage of the core issues. For most CBR (but not N) agents the acquisition step is not difficult because many weapons-usable substances have legitimate uses and are therefore relatively widely available. Further, the boom of information technologies and the Internet makes the necessary know-how for successful procurement of cultures more widely available than ever before. On the other hand, the production of large quantities of a biological agent, as well as its successful weaponization (the process of producing a mass casualty capable delivery system for the acquired agent), is a much more complex and difficult endeavor than generally believed. [18] The difficulty of weaponizing chemical and biological substances varies greatly based on the agent of choice. Inflicting mass casualties with chemical and non-contagious biological agents such as anthrax or tularemia requires a high-tech delivery because every victim has to come into direct contact with the agent in order to be affected. One popular scenario for a bioterrorist attack has been the mass contamination of a city's water supply. A major difficulty of successfully perpetrating such an attack is represented by the fact that most water-borne organisms die in the presence of sunlight, ozone, or chlorine. One possibility solution would be the contamination of water post-treatment/ Such an operation would involve pumping enormous quantities of agent into the water distribution system while avoiding detection not an easy feat considering the huge quantities of agent needed and the fact that the water in the pipelines is under pressure. Assuming terrorists overcame all of the hurdles associated with contamination of a city's water supply, the chances of inflicting mass casualties are minimal, unless the agent used is colorless, tasteless, and odorless, in order to facilitate mass consumption. Despite the fact that this seems common sense, past plots and a review of dozens of terrorist chemical and biological weapons manuals demonstrate the lack of realization of this simple fact on behalf of most terrorist groups. Consider, for instance, the February 2002 plot to poison the water supply of the U.S. Embassy in Rome, which has been widely cited as evidence of al Qaida's "chemical weapons" capability. [19] In this case, the four Moroccan perpetrators arrested in Italy possessed 8.8 pounds of potassium ferrocyanide - enough to theoretically kill several individuals, but certainly not suitable for a water borne attack but were unsuccessful because the agent changes color significantly when mixed with water. Thus, providing ample warning to the possible target. [20] The next commonly discussed scenario is the open-air dissemination of a non- contagious agent such as bacillus antharcis (a.k.a. anthrax). Anthrax is the prototypical biological weapons agent - it is relatively easy to produce, it is extremely virulent, and the infection is not contagious, so the outbreak will not spread beyond those affected directly. Most importantly, anthrax forms rugged spores when exposed to environmental stresses, and these spores facilitate processing and weaponization. However, significant hurdles to effective open-air dissemination of anthrax exist as well. While the liquid form is relatively easy to produce, it is much more difficult to deliver effectively because it is susceptible to clumping into heavy droplets that fall to the ground instantly, providing insufficient time for the victims to inhale the agent. Conversely, the powder form is significantly less challenging to disseminate, but is much more difficult to produce; its effective dissemination requires an aerosol composed of particles between one and five microns in diameter. Production of such fine aerosol requires a sprayer system that is equipped with specialized nozzles that are not widely available. Finally, an open-air dissemination of aerosol is also highly susceptible to meteorological conditions that make targeting much less controllable. Contagious agents on the other hand, allow for a much less efficient delivery, as it is only necessary to infect a small group of people, who can then spread the disease by secondary transmission. In this regard, the popular scenario of a suicide "bomber" infected with smallpox and cruising along crowded city areas comes to mind. This scenario is, of course, not nearly as technologically sophisticated as the scenarios mentioned above. However, obtaining the virus today is almost impossible, and even then there are very few organizations in the world that would be inclined to use such an unpredictable method; contrary to a classical suicide bombing one of the key advantages of which is a high level of control of the circumstances under which the detonation occurs, in the "biosuicide" attack the organizers lose any control whatsoever following the first secondary transmission of the disease. Few of today's known groups seem willing to launch a terror campaign that would have the capacity to indiscriminately eliminate not only the intended victims, but also the group's constituencies, membership and leadership, as well as their friends and families. [21] It is thus not surprising that none of the many existing biological weapons manuals inspected by the author has ever covered the category of contagious agents. While the technological difficulty of obtaining a mass casualty capable chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon is clearly the dominant reason for why the use of such weapons by terrorist organizations has been extremely rare, the comparative ease with which a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could be assembled raises the question of why there has not yet been a single incident involving the "dirty bomb" scenario. RDDs can be very crude and can take the form of simple placement of radioactive material in a location with the intent of causing damage, destruction, or injury by the means of radiation produced by the decay of the material used, or by the dispersal of radioactive material over a larger area by the means of attaching it to a conventional explosive. [22] The damage and injury inflicted by such a device would depend greatly on the amount and type of the radioactive material used. The effects of a "dirty bomb" would be threefold: the blast and fragmentation effects of the explosive device, radiation effects, and psychological effects. [23] Of these, the psychological implications would be the most devastating, mainly because of the automatic association of the word "radioactive" with "nuclear" in the minds of the majority of world population. In reality, however, more people would probably die in stampedes and car accidents resulting from the panicking population's desire to leave the affected area immediately, than from direct effects of radiation. Second, in the hierarchy of destructive impact would be the damage inflicted by the blast and the fragmentation effects of the explosive device to which the radioactive material was attached. The physical damage caused by the actual radiation effects would in most instances be minimal, comprising mainly of area denial rather than mass casualties resulting from radiation poisoning. And while the possibility of a significantly lethal RDD design cannot be ruled out completely, even states with access to virtually unlimited amounts of highly radioactive materials have found this difficult. The main obstacle in this case was the handling of gamma-emitting radioactive substances, which requires the use of extremely heavy and bulky protective lead shielding. [24] Other obstacles included the problems associated with grinding the material into the five-micron size and mixing it with an inactive solid substance to enhance dispersion and increase inhalation hazard, the variability of whether conditions, and the ability of buildings to absorb large amounts of radiation. [25] Nevertheless, the relative ease with which an RDD can be assembled combined with the immense psychological effects such a weapon has to offer, make the "dirty bomb" scenario a threat that is very real. Assessment of contemporary terrorist capabilities Due to significant obstacles faced by terrorist organizations in the process of weaponizing chemical, biological, and nuclear agents; most of the doomsday scenarios often cited by security agencies and sensationalist media accounts are unlikely to be fulfilled any time soon. In fact, judging by past incidents and dozens of CBRN terrorism manuals, contemporary terrorist organizations still demonstrate a relatively naïve approach to this issue. Even al Qaida and its associate groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI) have demonstrated a very limited ability to acquire a significant chemical or biological capability. [26] For instance, al-Qaida had initiated its plan to develop chemical and biological weapons -- the so-called "Project Yogurt" as far back as 1999. [27] In the initial stages, the alleged plan was to conduct a survey of literature while the organization looked to recruit a scientist to run the program. In 2001, al-Qaida's third in command, Mohammed Atef, approached JI's top operational leader of Hambali with a request to find a scientist that would take over the program. Hambali introduced Yazid Sufaat, a U.S. trained bio-chemist and former Malaysia military officer, who subsequently spent several months attempting to cultivate anthrax in a laboratory near the Kandahar airport. [28] Plans were also established to set up another laboratory in Malaysia and a third lab in Bandung, Indonesia, through Sufaat's company called Green Laboratories Medicine. [29] But while this intent may sound scary on paper, it is interesting to compare the logistics and expertise of al-Qaida's biological weapons program with that of the Aum Shinrikyo, the undisputed leader in this field. Prior to deciding on the production of chemical agents, Aum Shinrikyo had conducted no less than 10 attacks with biological agents (particularly bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin), under the direction of Dr. Seichi Endo, a molecular biologist who had obtained graduate degrees in genetic engineering, genetics, and medicine from the prestigious Kyoto University. [30] Even though the group had at its disposal an unrivaled amount of resources equaling nearly $1 billion, a team of no less than 20 graduate level scientists, and state of the art laboratories and equipment, it failed to kill a single person with a biological weapon. Compare that with al-Qa'ida's "Project Yogurt," which had the startup budget of only $2-$4,000, was based on an initial survey of literature from the 1920s to 1960s, [31] and its chief "scientist" only had a bachelors degree in biological sciences and a minor in chemistry from Cal State University in Sacramento. In this perspective, al-Qa'ida's ability to kill thousands of people with biological agents seems rather questionable. Could this reality suddenly change? The rapid scientific advances in the fields microbiology and genetic engineering seem to suggest so, but in order to get the full picture we must also consider the issue of willingness and ability of terrorist organizations to adopt new technologies. History tells us that terrorist organizations rarely alter their established modus operandi, and when they do, these changes are driven by very specific reasons. [32] The first such reason comes in the event of an introduction of government countermeasures, such as target hardening efforts that serve as a direct obstruction to the tactics used by terrorists in the past. While most groups can be expected to respond by selecting substitute targets, an innovative organization will refuse go down this path of least resistance in order to increase its probability of success. Instead, such a group will work to overcome these countermeasures by means that have not been accounted for by the enemy, often placing an emphasis on projecting an image of invincibility as well as mocking the state for failing to stop the attack despite all of its resources. In this light certain chemical and biological agents pose a direct threat for the future, as they could be used to overcome security measures already in place at key targets such as airports. And while CBW employment in this scenario is unlikely to involve a mass casualty capable delivery system, even crudely delivered agents deployed onboard a commercial airliner in midcourse flight could result in very significant damage and casualties. Another scenario in which a group can be expected to alter its operational methods in a novel direction comes in the presence of an inherent ideological pre-determination toward using certain technologies or the need to innovate in order to obtain the capability to match the level of violence associated with the respective ideological and strategic preferences. [33] An example of this in the CBRN realm is the incorporation of certain chemical or radiological agents into explosive devices, along the lines of the HAMAS inclusion of pesticides in suicide belts for anticoagulant effect, [34] or the detonation of chorine canisters recently introduced by the insurgents in Iraq. What is important to emphasize here, is that mass casualties remain an unlikely outcome even in this scenario, as most of the added agent tends to be consumed by the initial explosion. Nevertheless, the psychological effect of such operations cannot be underestimated. The third relevant scenario of a trigger to terrorist adoption of new operational methods is an incidental or unintended acquisition of a particular human or material resource. In the CBR context this is a real threat, especially in light of the growing decentralization of the global jihadi movement and the associated phenomenon of "self-starter groups" emerging in Western countries. If, for instance, a highly skilled microbiologist decided to launch an attack in the name of "al Qaida," it is likely that such a person would use the skills and technologies that he or she is most familiar with, as opposed to resorting to traditional terrorist weaponry. Given the growing prevalence of highly educated individuals actively participating in terrorist violence, the scenario of a "homegrown" terrorist cell attacking with a CBR capability in a western city is becoming increasingly more imaginable. That being said, even in this scenario, there would be significant technological obstacles standing in the way of producing mass casualties. Conclusion Today's terrorist organizations demonstrate only a limited potential to use CBRN agents for the purposes of launching an attack capable of causing mass casualties or significant physical damage. Nevertheless, the threat of small scale operations involving certain chemical, biological and radiological agents is certainly real, and is most likely on the rise. Of great concern in this light is the gradually growing understanding of the difficulty of casing mass destruction with CBRN among the terrorists themselves. Whereas a decade ago the known terrorist plots and CBRN manuals demonstrated a very high level of technological naivety and ridiculous ambitions, today's organizations seem to have a greater appreciation of the technological hurdles they are facing and seem to be reflecting on this reality by shelving unrealistic projects in favor of focusing their energy on the more feasible scenarios. Even more importantly, today's terrorists seem to have a much greater appreciation of the psychological impact that even small-scale CBRN operations will have on us, [35] leading to an increasing likelihood of the occurrence of such attacks in the future. Given the importance of the primarily psychological dimension of this threat, it will be even more vital for us in the future to take these plots for what they are, and to avoid misleading interpretations of such events as "weapons of mass destruction terrorism." With a longer-term outlook, the issue of specific concern is the continual process of transnationalization of terrorism and the associated rise of global decentralized networks of small cells operating independently of any central command. Given their lack of a longer term strategic outlook and the overwhelmingly supportive views of the online jihadi community on the issue of using CBRN, these cells are arguably going to be even less constrained in their motivation to deploy such technologies for attack purposes. While this increasing motivation in combination with our limited ability to accurately assess it beforehand is certainly a cause of concern, it must be emphasized that this growing intent is by no means matched by capability - in fact, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the two. Small groups of individuals operating in a hostile environment under pressure of the security services are likely to be in very difficult position to breach the technological hurdles associated with a mass-casualty CBRN weapons program. Actually, the homegrown cells typically experience very limited success in launching even small to medium-scale conventional attacks without obviation and disruption, which has led some members of the online jihadi community to call for less sophisticated and operationally less challenging attacks and plots, as a substitute to the current preference for synchronized suicide bombings. The further arrests of cells in Germany, U.S., Norway, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, U.K., Australia, and the Netherlands, as well as the failure of even rudimentary attacks launched in June 2007 by a comparatively well-educated group of jihadis in London and the Glasgow airport, seem to confirm that the upcoming trend of terrorist operations will be one of decreasing, rather than increasing, technological sophistication. And while the continuing process of "democratization of destructive power" will arguably make it easier for even small groups of individuals to wreak havoc and destruction, the prospects for significant acts of "superterrorism" appear bleaker than 13 years ago. Adam Dolnik is the Director of Research Programs and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong, Australia. For a Printable PDF Version of this Issue Click Here <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv2i2.pdf> NOTES: [ ] An extended version of this article will appear in Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova (Eds.) Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation" forthcoming [2] Brian Michael Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" RAND Paper P-5541 (1975) p. 4 [3] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Orion Publishing Co. 1998) p. 201 [4] "Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers Use Poison Gas Against Government Troops, Says Senior Officer," The Xinhua General Overseas News Service (06/18/90) [5] David E. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo," in Jonathan Tucker ed. Toxic Terror (London: MIT Press, 2000) p. 207 [6] This incident is sometimes incorrectly attributed to a neo Nazi group "Order of the Rising Sun." [7] W. Lee Rensselaer III, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) p. 135-6 [8] The container, which weighed approximately 15 kilograms and measured 400 by 300 by 250 centimeters, was wrapped in yellow paper and plastic, and contained an ordinary piece of equipment found in the oil industry. [9] is LTTE's employment of chlorine gas during the siege of a Sri Lankan Army camp in Kiran in 1990, which also came as a direct result of the group's decreasing access to ammunition following the seizure of several of the group's arms shipments. (Hoffman, Bruce, "The Debate Over Future Terrorist Use of Chemical Biological, Nuclear and Radiological Weapons" ( RAND 2000) p.13 [10] Consider the experience of Aum Shinrikyo, who after investing $30 million into sarin alone, succeeded in killing only 12 people in its most lethal attack - a number that pails in comparison to the 192 persons who died in the 2003 suicide attempt on the Seoul subway, which was executed by a mentally disturbed individual who used technology requiring only about a $3 investment: a paper milk container filled with gasoline and a cigarette lighter. The lesson is that even for a group that tries to maximize casualties, the cost benefit analysis is not necessarily in favor of "weapons of mass destruction." [1] Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (Routledge, 2007) p. 178 [12] Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal: Avenging Israel's Blood. In Tucker, Jonathan B., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000) p. 26 [13] Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (Routledge, 2007) p. 177 [14] Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, The New Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002) p. 7 [15] Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does Intent Equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (November 2005), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/123/123salama.pdf <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/123/123salama.pdf> [16] Ibid. [17] For instance, only N and B but not R and C have the capacity to achieve "mass destruction". [18] The term "weaponization" refers to the process of producing an effective delivery system for the acquired agent. Generally, two basic scenarios for a chemical or biological terrorist attack exist. One is a relatively crude, small-scale delivery along the lines of the 2001 anthrax letters, which can succeed in causing massive panic and disruption, but lacks the potential of inflicting significant damage in terms of loss of human life. The other scenario is a mass-casualty attack, which is much less likely, but which could potentially be catastrophic. It is the latter type of attack that is the primary focus in this study. [19] Melinda Henneberger, "4 Arrested in Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Rome," New York Times, February 21, 2002, p. A15. [20] For an excellent analysis of this incident see: Croddy, Eric, Osborne, Matthew, and McCloud, Kimberly, "Chemical Terrorist Plot in Rome?" Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020311.htm <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020311.htm> (accessed on 6/15/07) [21] It is interesting to note that the in jihadi manuals surveyed by the author, the category of contagious agents tends to be avoided completely. The AQ manual "Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants" when discussing assassination with biological agents even specifically limits the discussion "only to poisons that the mujaheed can prepare without endangering his health" [22] James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat" Internet. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum136.html <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum136.html> (accessed on 1/23/02) [23] Ibid. [24] James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat" Internet. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum136.html <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum136.html> (accessed on 1/23/02) [25] Ibid. [26] For excellent analyses of al Qaida's potential to acquire and use CBRN see Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does Intent Equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (November 2005), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/123/123salama.pdf <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/123/123salama.pdf> . and René Pita, "Assessing al-Qaeda's Chemical Threat," International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Volume 20, Issue 3 (September 2007), pp. 480 511. For an analysis of Jemaah Islamiya see Dolnik, Adam and Gunaratna Rohan: "Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism." in Howard, Russell D. and Forest, James J.F. (eds.) Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (McGraw-Hill, 2007) [27] Cullison, Alan, Inside al Qaeda's Hard Drive. Atlantic Monthly. September 2004 [28] 9-11 Commission Report, p. 151 [29] Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Al Qaeda analyst on cricket terrorist plot claims. (10/10/2006) Full transcript of the interview with Zachary Abuza is available at: http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1759229.htm <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1759229.htm> (accessed on 12/10/06) [30] Miller, Judith, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War, (New York: Touchstone, 2002) p. 160 [31] Cullison, Alan, Inside al Qaeda's Hard Drive. Atlantic Monthly. September 2004 [32] Dolnik, Adam, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (London: Routledge, 2007) p. 173 [33] Ibid. [34] Weizman, Steve, "HAMAS Pleased with Addition of Poison to Bombs," Associated Press (December 12, 2001) [35] For the more details about this argument demonstrated on the Kemal Bourgass, (January 2003) and Dhiren Barot, (November 2006) plots, see: Hoffman, Bruce, "CBRN Terrorism Post-9/11." In in Howard, Russell D. and Forest, James J.F. (eds.) Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (McGraw-Hill, 2007) p. 273-274 Note: Perspectives on Terrorism invites a diversity of opinions to be presented in articles. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Perspectives on Terrorism or the Terrorism Research Initiative. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=ar\ ticle&id=26 <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=a\ rticle&id=26> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. 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