http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2010/11/08/lessons-from-abroad-counter\
ing-terrorism-in-japan-part-iii-on-the-methods/
<http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2010/11/08/lessons-from-abroad-counte\
ring-terrorism-in-japan-part-iii-on-the-methods/>       Lessons from
abroad – Countering             terrorism in Japan – Part III
(on the methods)
<http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2010/11/08/lessons-from-abroad-counte\
ring-terrorism-in-japan-part-iii-on-the-methods/>
November 8th,           2010 - by Donovan C.             Chau
<http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/authors/donovan-c./>

When one thinks of Japan, popular         American images that        
come to mind are affordable and reliable automobiles (I drive a        
Toyota Camry         Hybrid), sophisticated electronics and gadgetry (I
have an iPod         nano), and, to         those who have been there,
the most advanced toilets in the         world (you really         have
to experience them for yourself).

In short, a commonly held view of         this island        
nation-state is one of extraordinarily advanced technological        
wonder – robots,         Shinkansen (bullet trains) and all. I will
be the first to admit         that these and         other images ran
through my mind on the direct flight from LAX         to Narita; I
wondered how such mastery of machines translated to countering        
terrorism in Japan. In my         first meeting in the heart of Tokyo,
my fantasies and preconceived notions were thoroughly dispelled.

The Japan Science             and Technology Agency's Research
Institute of Science and             Technology for             Society
(RISTEX) <http://www.ristex.jp/EN/index.html>          sounds about as
innocuous and typically "Japanese" as any bureaucratic        
organization. Yet, as it         turned out, I may have learned more at
this initial meeting than         I learned         during my entire
fortnight in the land of the "Rising Sun."

I was early to RISTEX and sat in a         modern yet         simplistic
meeting room, nondescript blue-gray carpet and walls         with
light-beige built-in shelving. The unusually hot September        
morning caused         difficulties for foreigners and locals alike. As
it turned out,         my interviewee         was delayed not because of
the Tokyo Metropolitan Subway (which         would be         unusual,
indeed) but because of his normal walk, a forty minute         jaunt, as
opposed to the fifteen-minute ride underground. Counterterrorism        
in Japan, as it turns out, is more akin to the         sweaty
forty-minute walk than the efficient Tokyo subway system.

In my discussions at RISTEX, as         well as the National        
Police Agency (NPA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), I        
learned that the         traditional counterterrorism approach in Japan
involves         encirclement,         monitoring and observation, as
needed. While advanced         technological tools are        
undoubtedly used, the Japanese focus on the traditional craft of        
counter-espionage and counter-intelligence in their        
counterterrorism         operations, relying on human intelligence
(HUMINT) as opposed to         technical         intelligence.

The focus on HUMINT and         first-line-of-defense reveals        
the Japanese tendency toward prevention, especially through        
border control         (i.e., garrisoning), in countering terrorism.
Over the past         fifty years, Japan has developed tactically
proficient human         methods of counterterrorism, so much so that
Japan         shares its techniques with others across East Asia        
(e.g., seminars with Southeast Asian security agencies). Rather        
than relying on         high-tech solutions, Japanese counterterrorism
as it turns out         places much         emphasis on the human
element.

Yet, considering the Aum Shinrikyo         attacks in 1995 and        
left-wing terrorist incidents during the Cold War, Japan's        
history of counterterrorism         may be criticized as decidedly
deficient. Strategically, as I         learned during my        
meetings in Tokyo,         Japanese counterterrorism is sorely lacking.
The decidedly         non-security         oriented society may be one
impediment; higher education in the         topics of         national
security and strategy as well as study of potential         regions of
the         world of concern such as the Middle East and Africa is
deficient. Moreover, the         legal framework for countering
terrorism is absent and even         constraining         (terrorists
have fundamental human rights, for example). Certain         security
lapses have not resulted in meaningful punishments and        
wiretapping remains         severely circumscribed for countering
terrorists. What does this         all mean for         counterterrorism
in Japan?

Like most, if not all, liberal         democratic         nation-states,
Japan's         policy of counterterrorism is reactive and passive.
Japanese         counterterrorism         tends towards so-called
consequence management, which was         performed admirably        
after the 1995 Aum attacks. Trying to prevent the initial entry        
of potential         terrorists into Japan         is also a key focus
of counterterrorism. These emphases, border         control and        
consequence management, would appear to account for the        
fundamental nature of         terrorism, which is ultimately a duel
between state and         non-state actors.

Terrorists seek to strike, when         and where physically        
able. Preventing their entry and, failing that, being ready to        
respond, would         seem like sensible counterterrorism solutions.
Yet, the         long-term, political         nature of terrorism should
inform us that understanding         terrorism remains         paramount
to countering it. And understanding terrorism requires         deep and
intimate knowledge of terrorists' motivations, intentions and
capabilities. Terrorists         understand violence and its
consequences. The message that         passive         counterterrorism
measures (like border control) sends to         terrorists, however,
is counterproductive in Japan         and elsewhere.

Japan         has experienced terrorism in its various forms for several
decades now; and the         Japanese have participated in terrorism
internationally. Yet,         Japan's         measures to counter
terrorism remain short on the strategic         level. Ostensibly safe
and secure, Japan         has much to learn, and it will do so in due
course. Though         remarkably different         from the United
States, Japan's         experience attempting to counter terrorism
nevertheless remains         informative to         other democratic
nation-states. The focus on the human element         of        
counterterrorism is particularly useful, especially to America,        
which         has a propensity to look for technological solutions to
national         security         challenges.

As international terrorists         continue to threaten         liberal
democracies like Japan         and the United States,         it is
necessary to continually enhance and modify border control        
measures as         well as immigration policies for countering
terrorism. Likewise         is there an         imperative to understand
better how cyberspace and         unconventional weapons (especially
chemical and biological weapons) may be used by terrorists, who        
remains         thinking and adaptive. Yet, for all the techno-imagery
that         Japan conjures up         in the mind, the most important
lesson learned during my         research trip to Japan         –
and one of enduring value – is that effective counterterrorism
begins and         ends with the human beings involved; the United
States would be         well-advised to         remember this.

 
<http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2010/11/08/lessons-from-abroad-counte\
ring-terrorism-in-japan-part-iii-on-the-methods/>


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